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Resume 
Bevæggrunden for studiet er en undring over det tilsyneladende fravær på risikostyring ifm. 
reducering af lagre, afkortning af leveringstider, specialisering, etc.  Der opstilles en hypotese 
om at graden (eller niveauet) af SCM må hænge sammen med niveauet for risikostyring, da et 
tættere integreret netværk vil resultere i en forholdsmæssigt større konsekvens af en 
forstyrrelse (Perrow, 1984). 
Pilotstudier 
Det første trin i afdækning af disse forhold sker i et pilotstudie hvor et antal medlemmer af 
brancheorganisationen CLM (senere CSCMP) indvilliger i at deltage i en paneldiskussion af 
deres SCM and risikostyrings-praksis.  Dette studie viser, at den grundlæggende SCM model 
fremsat af Stevens (1989) ikke afspejler de deltagende virksomheders virkelighed, da 
resultaterne af analysen viser at integration ikke starter indefra.  Endnu et pilotstudie 
gennemføres derfor – med en revideret forskningsramme.  Igen viser analysen det samme 
resultat: Stevens’ model afspejler ikke virkeligheden. 
Et Eksplorativt Forskningsdesign – og en Risikomatrice 
Forskningsdesignet ændres derfor til et mere eksplorativt forskningsdesign, der har til formål 
at afdække sammenfaldet mellem risikostyring og SCM – empirisk som konceptuelt/ 
teoretisk.  I forlængelse af en beskrivelse af de to domæner præsenteres en matrice (Supply 
Chain Risk Matrix – se Figure 2-14) der forsøger at afgrænse risikostyring ift. de helt 
specifikke forhold, der gør sig gældende ved ledelse af forsyningskæder.  De fire risici 
indeholdt i matricen (samt logikken i opdelingen i de to akser) forudsættes at være dækkende 
for risikostyring af forsyningskæder.  Der opstilles endvidere en række hypoteser, der senere i 
afhandlingen styrer udvælgelsen af case-virksomheder. 
Litteraturstudier 
Første trin i det eksplorative forskningsdesign er gennemførelse af to litteraturstudier. 
Det første litteraturstudium afdækker SCM-domænet for bidrag der refererer til Risiko, 
Usikkerhed, og Sårbarhed (samt bidrag fra risiko-domænet der refererer SCM/Logistik). 
Bidragene er overvejende a-teoretiske og orienteret mod et større antal emner indenfor 
domænet.  Der identificeres elleve temaer, der efterfølgende illustreres i et Supply Chain Risk 
Framework (se Figure 3-16). 
Det andet litteraturstudium er orienteret mod design af forsyningskæder.  Søgning foregår i de 
samme journaler, men ved brug af en mere effektiv metode – og igen afdækkes et større antal 
bidrag (se Appendix F).  De identificerede, relevante bidrag illustreres igen i et Supply Chain 
Risk Framework (se Figure 4-2) og der sammenlignes med temaet ”Supply Chain Design” fra 
det første litteraturstudium (se Figure 4-3 for det endelige resultat).  Igen må det konkluderes 
at det teoretiske indhold er begrænset og ganske smalt da kun Kaos Teori og Transaktions-
omkostningsteori er refereret.  En analyse af bidragene viser at kun syv artikler har risiko som 
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design-mål, mens tretten har enten omkostninger eller performance som mål.  Overordnet set 
må det konkluderes at risiko ikke er et dominerende tema indenfor design af forsyningskæder. 
Teorianalyse 
I forlængelse af litteraturstudierne gennemføres en analyse af de indenfor SCM oftest 
anvendte teorier: Transaktionsomkostningsteori, Principal/agent Teori, Ressourcebaseret 
Teori, samt Netværksteori.  Analysen omfatter teoriernes anvendelighed på SCM domænet 
(med fokus på design og analyse) samt anvendelighed ift. håndtering af de fire definerede 
forsyningskæde-risici.  Analysen konkluderer, at alle teorierne hver for sig har svagheder ift. 
SCM-domænet, men at disse til dels kan imødegås ved foreslåede ”udvidelser” af teorierne.  
Anvendeligheden ift. håndtering af omtalte forsyningskæde-risici er dog noget mangelfuld da 
ingen af teorierne adresserer alle fire risici. 
Det Empiriske Studium 
Der udvælges en convenience sample på ti virksomheder med støtte af en række kriterier.  For 
hvert virksomhed gennemføres en række interviews med personale fra henholdsvis 
SCM/Logistik og Indkøb.  På denne basis udvikles der to konstrukt-hierarkier, én for SCM og 
én for risikostyring.  Ud fra de opstillede hierarkier gennemføres analyse på tværs af 
virksomhederne.  Denne analyse støttes af en værditildeling til omtalte hierarkier med 
efterfølgende beskrivende analyse.  Analysen viser at de kriterier der blev brugt ved 
udvælgelse af virksomheder stort set ikke beskriver forskelle – og de afvises derfor.  Det viser 
sig dog, at der en vis sammenhæng mellem den opnåede score for SCM og SCRM.  En 
efterfølgende vurdering af hvorvidt den eksisterende praksis er passende viser at SCM 
praksisserne for ni af virksomhederne er under fortløbende udvikling og derfor ikke kan 
vurderes på denne måde.  Den manglende modenhed indenfor risikostyring gør spørgsmålet 
ugyldigt. 
Den Videre Forskning 
I forlængelse af afdækningen af praksisser indenfor SCM og risikostyring er det blevet 
åbenlyst at der er behov for en mere sammenhænge ramme for forklaring af begge domæner.  
Herudover opfattes det som kritisk vigtigt at forstå hvordan kontrakter kan understøtte 
risikostyring indenfor inter-organisatoriske samarbejder. 
Måske mest væsentligt er det at opnå bedre forståelse af hvordan mindre virksomheder kan 
sikre sig selv ved tvungen outsourcing som det er set i fx Brüel & Kjær og Bang & Olufsen.  
Når virksomheder tvinges til at flytte værdiskabelse udenfor virksomheden bør det 
sikkerstilles at virksomheden undgår ensidig afhængighed hvor muligt. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Disruptions to business-as-usual take many forms, from general disruptions like diseases, 
nuclear accidents, and strikes to the company-specific such as e.g. a fire in a plant.  The 
emphasis in this thesis is on the company-specific incidents. 
The Aisin – Toyota Fire 
This famous incident occurred at the Aisin facility at Kariya on February 1st 19971.  The fire 
started on the Saturday morning at 4:18 AM and lasted less than six hours.  By 8:52 AM the 
lines dedicated to P-valves and other brake-related parts were almost completely destroyed, 
along with special-purpose machinery and drills that could take months to reorder.  The near 
destruction of the P-valve lines was potentially disastrous for Toyota; nearly all its vehicles 
used Aisin P-valves manufactured exclusively at the Kariya plant, which turned out 32.500 P-
valves a day for Toyota and other Toyota-group assemblers.  The potential damage to the 
Toyota group was promptly recognized by the Aisin management, who quickly set up an 
emergency task force to deal with the initial tasks of communicating the bad news to their 
customers (actually, it was set up at 5:30 AM, while the lines were still on fire).  Besides 
talking to their customers, possible collaborators were contacted and asked for assistance.  
After consulting its customers, Aisin started faxing design drawings of all prioritized parts to 
the volunteering collaborators on Sunday February 2nd.  The race for design and 
manufacturing of prototypes for replacement parts had begun.  On Tuesday February 4th, it 
was reported that only one of thirty assembly plants were operating, and that it would take 
Toyota at least a week to identify alternative suppliers (Reitman, 1997b).  Progress in 
developing prototypes for replacement of the Aisin parts showed such promise, that Toyota 
the following day was able to announce that they expected to be back on normal output by 
Friday February 7th  (Reitman, 1997c).  Following a truly amazing display of cooperation, 
Toyota was back on normal output by Friday, not least due to the informal coordination by 
first tier suppliers (Reitman, 1997a).  In total, Toyota lost production of 72.000 vehicles and 
160 billion YEN in revenues.  Most of the lost revenue was recouped through overtime and 
holiday shifts, but losses in the range 20-30 billion YEN were unavoidable.  For Aisin, the fire 
cost 7.8 billion YEN, but enhanced their position in the Toyota network through their efforts 
in minimizing the impact of the disaster.  To compensate the collaborating suppliers Toyota 
paid out a bonus, amounting to 1.5 billion YEN. 
The aftermath of the Aisin fire was a realization by the Toyota management of the dual 
vulnerability of having too many (unique) parts and too few suppliers.  The fire left Toyota 
plants in need of more than 200 unique valve types, a number deemed unacceptable by the 
Toyota management.  An emergency purchasing review was performed, aiming at identifying 
sole suppliers or severe capacity constraints, as well as opportunities to further limit the 
number of unique parts (Treece & Rechtin, 1997).  A positive consequence was the 
                                                 
1  Source: Nishiguchi & Beaudet (1998). 
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reassurance of the toughness of the Toyota group, and the Toyota Production System’s2 
capability of problem solving.  The world famous production system thereby was both the 
cause and the cure of the problem – the cause being the high degree of dependency on even 
very minor suppliers and the absence of redundancies, the cure being the close relationships 
with (at least major) suppliers.  Whether the response from the suppliers was based on an urge 
to help a prominent, long-term business partner or on a calculated interest of helping out is an 
open question, but whatever the rationale the problem was solved and continuation of 
business secured. 
Ericsson/Alberquerque 
A less successful recovery from a comparative accident is presented in Norrman & Jansson 
(2004).  Being the world’s largest supplier of mobile telecom systems in the world, with a 
history of more than 130 years and a staff count of more than 61.000 people in more than 140 
countries, the effects of a ten minute fire at a sub-suppliers plant came as a complete surprise 
to management and employees at Ericsson.  For the past ten years, Ericsson had outsourced a 
great deal of its assembly and production to contract manufacturers and sub-suppliers.  Like 
most companies, Ericsson had been exposed to a number of risks and incidents in the last few 
years:, e.g. suppliers having quality and delivery problem, industries’ general lack of capacity, 
and power disruption.  These issues had been dealt with and operations were running 
smoothly until a fire broke out on March 18th 2000 in a very small production cell (small as a 
conference room for ten people) at a sub-supplier’s plant in Albuquerque, New Mexico 
(USA).  The ten-minute fire was an effect of a lightning bolt hitting an electric line causing 
power fluctuations throughout the state.  The problem was that when the power was out, there 
was no spare diesel motor to supply the fans with power, so the fans stopped.  The resulting 
fire was almost negligible and the fire was quickly put out. 
But for Ericsson the impact was huge.  In the spring of 2001, when the annual report from 
Ericsson was announced, a major loss of about $400 million was indicated, primarily resulting 
from the shortage in the supply of radio-frequency chips from this supplier.  The reason was 
that the fire occurred in one of the plant’s “clean rooms”, where absolutely no dust is 
tolerated.  Due to the fire, and especially the smoke and sprinkler water, it took almost three 
weeks until the production was up and running.  After six months, the yield was only 50 
percent, and it would take years to get new equipment delivered and installed.  As this plant 
was Ericsson’s only source for this chip, Ericsson was not able to sell and deliver one of its 
key consumer products during its booming “market window”.  The company lost many 
months of mobile phone production, and the accident finally had a great impact on Ericsson’s 
decision to withdraw from the mobile phone terminal business.  It also had the effect that 
Ericsson changed its procedures for supply chain risk management. 
                                                 
2 For more on the Toyota Production System, see e.g. Ohno (1988) or Spear & Bowen (1999). 
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Nokia/Alberquerque 
Interestingly, Nokia also fell victim to this accident but due to their strategies the impact on 
them was quite different.  As reported in e.g. Lee (2004) and Chopra & Sodhi (2004), Nokia 
and Ericsson differed in the degree of redundancy in the supply of IC’s.  Where Ericsson had 
trimmed the supply base for this category down to one or two, Nokia had chosen to keep a 
higher degree of redundancy, just in case.  Combined with the ability to quickly redesign their 
products, Nokia was able to quickly (within five days) to have their production back on track.  
In the short run this earned Nokia market shares - in the long run Ericsson left the market. 
1.1 More SCM ? More Supply Chain Risk? 
Intuitively the risks described in the three cases could all be dealt with by introducing the 
appropriate level of redundancy.  But doing so leads to other problems: first and foremost the 
introduction of more redundancy can be perceived as “anti-SCM” – within the SCM domain it 
is often advocated that buffers must be removed, that lead times must be minimized, that the 
supply base must be reduced and that all relevant (critical?) partners must be tightly integrated 
creating what Wilding (1998a) would call a complex system.  Secondly, the uncritical 
introduction of redundancy will lead to a de-coupling from reality, resulting in a sense of 
safety and a subsequent relaxation of procedures and routines (Carroll, 2004).  The “trimming 
down” of companies to achieve goals of cost minimization and speed by reduction of buffers 
(time, inventory, and other types of redundancy) thereby introduces risks of failure.  And the 
increased specialization (Gripsrud, Jahre, & Persson, 2006) and closer integration of 
companies in supply chain lead to more complex systems, amplifying the impact of a failure 
(Perrow, 1984)3.  The generic relationship between impact and degree of redundancy is 
illustrated in Figure 1-1 below. 
Figure 1-1: Impact of Failure vs. Degree of Redundancy 
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3  Using the terms ”interactive complexity” and ”tight coupling” Perrow (1984) illustrates the effects of 
normal (inevitable) accidents.  The point is that the removal of redundancies will dramatically increase the 
impact of a failure as activities in human systems are not independent.  Autonomous action of individuals is 
described as the primary source of accident avoidance. 
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So, if chasing cost (and other) advantages by implementing SCM leads to a more complex 
system, the more mature SCM practices will require more mature Supply Chain Risk 
Management (SCRM) practices?  A preliminary hypothesis is therefore: 
H1: The level of SCRM practices corresponds with the level of 
SCM practices. 
To test this hypothesis measures of maturity for SCM and SCRM are needed. 
1.1.1 Testing the Relevance of the Study4 
Before performing the actual study it is often recommended to perform a pilot study to test the 
relevance and validity of the indented research: 
“…the case study design is not something completed only at the outset of a 
study.  The design can be altered and revised after the initial stages of a study, 
but only under stringent circumstances.  As an example, pilot case studies may 
reveal inadequacies in the initial design or may help to articulate it.  …  [A]fter 
some early data collection and analysis, an investigator has every right to 
conclude that the initial design was faulty and to modify the design.  This is an 
appropriate and desirable use of pilot studies.” (Yin, 1994, p. 52). 
To speed up data collection a panel group study method is applied.  The primary purpose is to 
measure the maturity of SCM practices and secondary to obtain knowledge on the present 
state of SCRM in the participating companies. 
Models and Data Collection Vehicle 
To measure the maturity of the SCM practice a model is created from a number of “classic” 
contributions.  Combining the stage models by Stevens (1989) and Mentzer et al. (2001), the 
process model by Cooper, Lambert, & Pagh (1997), and using existing maturity models (e.g. 
Lockamy III & McCormack, 2004) a (simple) model for the measurement of SCM Maturity is 
developed.  The assumptions underlying the questions on SCRM is somewhat simpler as it is 
assumed the presence of formal structure (department/positions) indicates a more mature 
practice than otherwise, and the use of an integrated approach is more mature than a 
functionally divided approach.  Using these two models in the form of a questionnaire, the 
pilot study is performed in cooperation with CLM5 at a regular meeting.  The study has ten 
participants (representatives from software companies and consultancies participate in the 
discussions but do not fill in a questionnaire as their perspectives differ from the rest). 
                                                 
4  The pilot studies are described in detail in Appendix A.  See also Sørensen (2005, 2007). 
5  Being quite a select club of logistics and SCM professionals, it was initially assumed that the practices 
reported by these companies would be somewhat more sophisticated than the average company.  The 
organization has since then changed name to Council of Supply Chain Management Professionals 
(CSCMP).  For more information, please see www.cscmp.org. 
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Findings 
The findings within the SCM practices are a bit troubling.  Analyzing the returned 
questionnaires does not lead to the expected results, as e.g. most of the companies claim to be 
working process-oriented, but process names clearly show the term ‘Process’ has little or no 
meaning.  Another troubling finding is that half the companies claiming to work with SCM do 
not do so internally within the company.  And apparently length of relationship with 
customers and suppliers has little to do with SCM as no correlation between these two 
phenomena can be identified.  The findings within SCRM are somewhat ambiguous.  The 
overwhelming interest in the subject is reassuring, but the lack of current practice is a bit 
troubling.  Even if half the companies report working with SCRM, only one reports having 
positions within the domain.  It seems as if SCRM is underdeveloped – or at least not 
formalized.  All in all it is concluded SCRM is critically important but apparently not 
practiced (or communicated). 
Revising the Constructs… 
These findings naturally result in a thorough analysis of the assumptions in the models used 
and a revision of the questionnaire. 
… and Repeating the Study 
The study is then repeated at a seminar at Copenhagen Business School with specially invited 
companies all (known to be) working with SCM.  Surprisingly, not all the companies in this 
study reports doing so.  Most of the companies claiming to perform SCM can name processes, 
but again: not all process names are accepted (as they resemble department names).  The 
companies all have ERP6 systems, and all but one exchange EDI7 documents with suppliers 
and/or customers.  None of the companies participate in CPFR8 initiatives, but most claim 
having adapted processes to the requirements of the suppliers or customers.  Updating the 
constructs to measure the maturity of the SCM practices thereby repeats the finding from the 
previous study: the answers from the respondents do not “fit” the model. 
Perhaps due to a more thorough introduction to the categorization of risks, more than half the 
respondents are able to estimate the impact and probability for their company’s most critical 
risks.  Again: all agree that SCRM is of critical importance due to the high degree of 
dependency on other companies, and nobody within the organization has the formal 
responsibility.  So, the overall conclusions are identical to the first study: 1. the practices of 
SCM does not “fit” the theoretical/conceptual models, and 2. SCRM is critically important but 
not performed in a systematic, structured, formalized manner. 
                                                 
6 Enterprise Resource Planning – type of IT system integrating multiple administrative and production 
oriented functionality in one integrated system.  Examples are SAP, Baan, PeopleSoft etc. 
7 Electronic Data Interchange - a technology used to automatically share information.  Implementation relies 
on dyadic interpretations of the definitions in the “standard” applied (such as UN/EDIFACT). 
8 Collaborative Forecasting, Planning, and Replenishment – a concept for planning/forecasting across 
company boundaries, see e.g. Skjøtt-Larsen, Thernøe, & Andresen (2003). 
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Elaborating on the Pilot Studies 
The pilot studies performed are thereby both successes and failures.  Successes in the sense 
they confirm the relevance of SCRM but failures in the sense the idea of progression in SCM 
practices as described in the literature is rejected9.  The classification of SCM practices in the 
companies participating seems pointless as the fit between the domain’s assumptions and 
reality is quite poor.  Especially the assumption that “SCM starts from within” is discarded as 
most companies have long-term relationships with suppliers and customer, but no internal 
integration (no cross-functional processes implemented).  The pilot studies thereby disqualify 
the intended research design: an explanatory investigation of SCM and SCRM maturity. 
Interviewing Consultancies for Risk Management Frameworks 
Before the research design is changed, though, another reality check is performed: 
consultancies are interviewed for their knowledge of (the market for) integrated risk 
management frameworks10.  The results of this study are ambiguous: 
? On the one hand the risk management consultancy Marsh recognizes the need for 
SCRM, and apparently has resources allocated towards the creation of such a 
framework (albeit not able to document it).  In a separate effort PwC is working on the 
COSO/ERM framework integrating the departmental risk functions into a framework 
for risk and opportunities management. 
? On the other hand Marsh and PwC have very little empirical evidence of the relevance 
of performing risk management in relation to SCM.  Marsh and PwC report how the 
vast majority of projects focus on insurance brokerage and incremental improvement of 
departmental risk management functions.  Even more discouraging, most of the 
remaining consultancies did not even respond to the request for an interview. 
Weighing these results up against the findings from the two pilot studies it is concluded SCM 
and SCRM are subjects worthy of scrutinization. 
1.2 Re-designing the Study 
Altering the research design from an explanatory design (by means of a two-construct 
contingency model) to a more exploratory design is thereby a direct consequence of the 
rejection of the fundamental assumptions on SCM (the stage model) and the paradoxical 
difference between the observable absence of and the documented need for SCRM. 
1.2.1 Overall Research Objective 
The challenge is thereby to understand the business practices on SCRM alongside the 
practices on SCM in general.  For any production system or service organization the 
management of operational risks is of obvious relevance as to minimize losses and ensure 
continuation of the organization.  A poorly performing supplier is most likely to be replaced, 
                                                 
9 As reported in Appendix A and Sørensen (2005, 2007). 
10  The findings from the study are described in detail in Appendix B. 
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and a customer continually changing order quantity and/or delivery terms are not likely to 
receive (above) average attention.  But even if both suppliers and customers are important to 
any business there are differences. 
The Downstream Side… 
At least in the short term the loss of a customer simply represents a decrease in demand 
resulting in a need to adjust output and thereby capacity.  The threat changes in case e.g. the 
customer is the key reference enabling the company to market its products.  In other words, if 
the customer is a dominant player (in terms of volume, turnover etc.) either directly or by 
proxy this customer relationship must be safeguarded or the customer portfolio must be 
altered.  Consequently, from a risk perspective, it is important to have as many customers as 
possible, or to make customers dependent.  For customers representing a smaller portion of 
revenue (and not representing any other advantage/value) less resources are to be spent on the 
relationship.  For larger customers, on the other hand, the effort in “locking in” the customer 
should be proportionate with the customer’s importance in terms of current and future 
turnover (and other advantage/value). 
…Versus Upstream 
For suppliers the basic mechanism in play to reduce risk is to remain as independent as 
possible to ensure price competition and redundancy on all inputs.  In cases where this is not 
possible, critical suppliers should be made dependent on the company thereby ensuring a 
certain balance between the two companies.  A practice for ongoing evaluation of the 
portfolio of activities and inputs will “protect” this balance – determining whether to in- or 
outsource a certain activity based on portfolio composition and market uniqueness.  The main 
difference between the risk management requirements towards customers and suppliers is 
thereby partially related to the time perspective: all inputs (standard and non-standard) must 
be available to produce the required output (short term) whereas the impact of a loss of a 
customer has turnover and market implications (longer-term). 
Choosing Chain Orientation 
Applying the risk perspective up- and down-stream reveals that the level of complexity differs 
greatly.  Where on the downstream side the generic risk mitigation argument may be reduced 
to increasing the number of customers and avoiding “lock-in” by individual (large) customers 
the argument on the upstream side may prove less simple.  Accepting analyzing both 
upstream and downstream is beyond the reach of this study the upstream side is chosen over 
the downstream side.  Therefore the investigations of current practice focus on SCM/Logistics 
and Purchasing11. 
                                                 
11  Albeit the SCRM practices researched are not limited to the supply side alone, the practicalities of the 
project have restricted the setup of interviews with representatives from the sales organization of the case 
companies.  More on the selection of interviewees in Chapter 6. 
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Overall Research Objective 
The overall research objective is thereby: 
How do leading Danish companies engaging in inter-
organizational relationships safeguard their organization through 
supplier management and design of their supply chains? 
 
1.2.2 Research Questions 
Understanding the current practice of SCRM is therefore the primary objective of the study, 
but first a more thorough understanding of risk and uncertainty within the SCM domain is 
required.  Furthermore it is important to understand the state-of-art of Supply Chain Design, 
and more specifically the role played by Risk and Uncertainty.  The investigation of the 
domain thereby consists of two research questions: 
Research Question 1: Which are the major themes on Risk and 
Uncertainty within the SCM literature? 
 
Research Question 2: How does state-of-the-art supply chain design 
address the management of supply chain risks? 
 
Also it is considered relevant to understand to which extent the management of risks is 
supported by the theories applied within the SCM domain.  Acknowledging SCM is a multi-
disciplinary domain (e.g. Giannakis, Croom, & Slack, 2004; Gripsrud, Jahre, & Persson, 
2006) a short list of theories must be developed before answering the third research question: 
Research Question 3: How do the theories most commonly applied within 
the SCM domain address the management of supply 
chain risks? 
 
As mentioned previously the conclusions from the pilot studies resulted in a redesign of the 
study.  Assumptions on the evolution of SCM practices are discarded as a direct consequence 
of these studies, and the nature of the study is changed from a contingency type study into a 
more exploratory design.  The stated hypothesis (H1, see page 6) still stands, though. 
The investigations of the two domains are thereby linked, hopefully resulting in useful 
knowledge on ‘safe SCM’.  The last research question is defined as: 
Research Question 4: How do the case companies perform SCM and 
SCRM? 
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To answer these research questions a research design is needed – but first a stance on 
methodology must be taken. 
1.3 Methodology 
In Arbnor & Bjerke (1997) the relation between ultimate presumptions and study area is 
described as depicted in Figure 1-2 below. 
Figure 1-2: Methodology12 
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The logic of the model is that two choices are made: 
1. With the use of theory of science and based on one’s ultimate presumptions to 
determine paradigm, and subsequently to choose the most appropriate methodological 
approach, and 
2. Based on the chosen methodological approach to determine the operative paradigm for 
the study. 
The former choice is heavily influenced by the researcher’s personal beliefs but also by the 
study area.  Further, certain disciplines will have traditions limiting the “accepted” 
methodological approaches.  In Arbnor & Bjerke (1997) social science paradigms are 
categorized13 and ranked according to a scale ranging from ‘Objectivist-Rationalistic – 
Explaining Reality’ to ‘Subjectivist-Relativistic – Understanding Reality’.  From this 
categorization Arbnor & Bjerke develop three methodological approaches for business: The 
Analytical Approach, The Systems Approach, and The Actors Approach. 
Arbnor & Bjerke then further characterize each approach according to 1. ‘Concept of reality’, 
2. ‘Knowledge creation’, 3. ‘Explanation/understanding’, 4. ‘Result’, and 5. ‘Prerequisites for 
continuing’ enabling the researcher to position him/her-self according to personal preferences 
                                                 
12  Source: Figure 1.8 in Arbnor & Bjerke (1997), p. 17. 
13 Categories are: ’Ultimate reality presumptions’, ’Stipulations about human nature’, ’Ambitions for creating 
knowledge’, ’Some common metaphores, pictures, and descriptions’, and ’Some techniques for creating 
knowledge’, see Table 2.1 in Arbnor & Bjerke (1997), p. 27. 
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and the nature of the study.  In this instance the re-design of the study has resulted in a more 
exploratory study than initially intended, but this has not altered the ultimate presumptions of 
the researcher.  The study still falls within the ‘Systems Approach’ class, see Figure 1-3 
below. 
Figure 1-3: Methodological Approaches14 
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As illustrated above the ‘Analytical Approach’ and ‘Systems Approach’ overlap when 
depicted on a simple scale, but differ in e.g. reality assumptions: 
“The analytical approach has its origins in classic analytical philosophy and 
therefore has a deeply rooted tradition in Western thinking.  Its assumption 
about the quality of reality is that reality has a summative character, that is, the 
whole is the sum of its parts.  …  Knowledge created using the analytical 
approach is characterized as being independent of the observer.” (Arbnor & 
Bjerke, 1997, p. 50), and 
“The assumption behind the systems approach, different from the assumption 
underlying the analytical approach, is that reality is arranged in such a way 
that the whole differs from the sum of its parts.  This means that not only the 
parts but also their relations are essential, as the latter will lead to plus or 
minus effects (synergy)…  Knowledge developed through the systems approach 
depends on systems.  …  Consequently, the systems approach explains or 
understands parts through the characteristics of the whole (of which they are 
parts).” (pp. 51-52). 
The ‘Actors Approach’ is radically different as e.g. systemic characteristics as recognized in 
the other two approaches are meaningless concepts.  The actors approach is directed towards 
reproducing the meanings of the actors, and: 
“…reality is therefore taken as a social construction that is intentionally 
created by processes at different levels of meaning structures.  …  Systems - as 
these are understood by the systems approach – are not real.  The actors 
approach asserts that such systems exist only in the head of the systems 
approach researcher/consultant/investigator and are therefore not based on the 
way actors interpret themselves in relation to their own experienced and 
                                                 
14  Source: Figure 2.1 in Arbnor & Bjerke (1997), p. 44. 
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constructed totality of meaning structures..  …  Knowledge developed with the 
actors approach is therefore dependent on actors…” (p. 52). 
As indicated in Figure 1-3 above, the evaluation of before mentioned categories (see footnote 
13) results in the study being positioned under the heading ‘Reality as concrete determining 
process’.  The methodological approach chosen is the ‘Systems Approach’, as the notion that 
context and relations (externally and between system components) are necessary to 
understand a system is appealing to the researcher. 
1.4 Method Applied – Literature Studies 
As for other dissertations (and research projects/reports in general) literature studies are of 
critical importance to understand the state-of-art within the domain/subject area (e.g. Bell, 
1993; Ghauri, Grønhaug, & Kristianslund, 1995).  Failing to perform a thorough and stringent 
investigation into existing knowledge will inevitably lead to unnecessary repetition of trivial 
studies (Yin, Bingham, & Heald, 1976; Burgess, Singh, & Koroglu, 2006).  As a direct 
consequence of the pilot studies, the researcher experienced an acute need to understand the 
state-of-art of two areas: 1. the use of the terms Risk, Uncertainty, and Vulnerability, and 2. 
arguments/principles for Supply Chain Design. 
Strategies for performing literatures vary from the thorough, stringent procedures to the 
almost haphazard “critical” literature studies.  Justified by the surprising results from before 
mentioned pilot studies the researcher chose to perform both literature studies following a 
stringent method.  A typology of strategies for literatures studies is presented in Appendix C, 
the strategy applied in both literature studies is the ‘Domain-based Strategy’15. 
Defining the Domain 
As indicated by the name of the strategy, a definition of the domain is required to identify 
relevant contributions.  In this dissertation two distinct domains are investigated: the 
SCM/Logistics domain and the Risk domain.  For reasons of e.g. time criticality, ease of 
identification, resource consumption, tradition etc. it was decided to use journals as the 
primary source for both literature studies. 
For the SCM/Logistics domain the population is derived as a compromise between other 
literature studies performed within the field (e.g. Zsidisin, 2003b) and evaluations of the 
usefulness of journals (e.g. Gibson & Hanna, 2003; Fawcett, Vellenga, & Truitt, 1995; 
Emmelhainz & Stock, 1989).  The journals investigated fall in three categories, listed in Table 
1-1 below. 
                                                 
15 The literature used in the preliminary work (i.e. the pilot studies) is best described as an application of the 
’Snowballing Strategy’.  So-called ‘critical literature studies' have just these characteristics. 
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Table 1-1: Journals Defining the SCM/Logistics Domain 
Area Journal Name Abbrev. E-database 
Logistics    
 European Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management16 EJPSM ScienceDirect 
 International Journal of Logistics: Research and Application IJL-RA Business Source Premier 
 International Journal of Logistics Management IJLM ABI/INFORM 
 International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Mgmt IJPDLM EMERALD 
 International Journal of Purchasing and Materials Management17 IJPMM ABI/INFORM 
 Journal of Business Logistics JBL Business Source Premier 
 Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management JPSM ScienceDirect 
 Journal of Supply Chain Management JSCM ABI/INFORM 
 Supply Chain Management: An International Journal SCM-IJ EMERALD 
 Supply Chain Management Review SCMR Business Source Premier 
Operations Management   
 Interfaces I Business Source Premier 
 Integrated Manufacturing Systems18 IMS EMERALD 
 International Journal of Operations & Production Management IJOPM Business Source Premier 
 International Journal of Production Economics IJPE ScienceDirect 
 Journal of Manufacturing Technology Management JMTM EMERALD 
 Journal of Operations Management JOM ScienceDirect 
 Production and Operations Management POM ABI/INFORM 
 Production Planning & Control PPC Business Source Premier 
Management   
 California Management Review CMR Business Source Premier 
 Decision Science DS ABI/INFORM 
 European Management Journal EMJ ScienceDirect 
 Harvard Business Review HBR Business Source Premier 
 Industrial Marketing Management IMM ScienceDirect 
 Journal of Occupational Behaviour19 JOcB JSTOR 
 Journal of Organizational Behavior JOrB JSTOR 
 Scandinavian Journal of Management SJM ScienceDirect 
 Sloan Management Review SMR Business Source Premier 
 
For the Risk domain, the journals included in the population are all journals identified in the 
available e-databases, see Table 1-2. 
Table 1-2: Journals Defining the Risk Domain 
Area Journal Name Abbrev. E-database 
Risk   
 Journal of Risk JR [ dedicated website ] 
 Journal of Risk & Insurance JRI Business Source Premier 
 Journal of Risk Research JRR Business Source Premier 
 Journal of Risk and Uncertainty JRU Kluwer 
 Risk Management RM ABI/INFORM 
 Risk Analysis: An International Journal RA-IJ Kluwer 
 
For an overview of the e-databases used, see Table 1-3 below. 
                                                 
16  The journal changed name to “Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management” in 2003. 
17  The journal changed name to “Journal of Supply Chain Management” in 1999. 
18  The journal changed name to “Journal of Manufacturing Technology Management” in 2004. 
19  The journal changed name to “Journal of Organizational Behavior” in 1988. 
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Table 1-3: E-databases Available 
E-database Description 
ABI/INFORM A.k.a. ProQuest.  Contains articles from approx. 700 journals within Economics. 
Business Source Premier Contains articles from approx. 3800 journals within Management, Economics, 
 Finance, Accounting, Law, and International Business. 
EMERALD Contains articles from approx. 100 journals within Management, Marketing, 
 Logistics, Quality Assurance, HRM, Higher Education etc. 
JSTOR Contains recent articles (2-5 years) from journals within the social sciences. 
Kluwer Contains articles from approx. 650 journals from a variety of areas. 
ScienceDirect Contains articles from approx. 1700 journals from a variety of areas. 
www.thejournalofrisk.com Website for “The Journal of Risk”. 
 
From these two populations the literature studies are performed, and the first two research 
questions are answered.  The strategy applied is described in the introduction to each study. 
1.5 Method Applied – Analysis of Theories 
In order to answer the third research question theories routinely applied within the SCM 
domain are analyzed to determine how the management of the relevant risks (as defined in the 
‘Risk Matrix’ in Chapter 2.4.2) is addressed.  As no methods for the analysis of theories have 
been identified the method applied is “homegrown”.  For each theory the basic assumptions, 
the causalities, and the objects recognized are described, followed by an evaluation of the 
appropriateness of the application of the theory to the SCM domain in general.  Subsequently 
the generic risks identified are evaluated against the theory and its assumptions and causalities 
(if any).  Answering the third research question is thereby highly dependent on the viewpoint 
of the researcher. 
1.6 Method Applied – Current Practice 
To answer the last research question empirical data on current practices is needed – and to 
that end a research strategy must be carefully chosen. 
Choosing a Research Strategy 
One of the characteristics of the research situation determining the appropriateness of a 
research strategy is the existing body of knowledge (Yin, 1994; Ghauri, Grønhaug, & 
Kristianslund, 1995 etc.).  As pointed out several times already, a certain degree of skepticism 
is felt towards the current knowledge of SCM.  Coupling this uncertainty with the lack of 
knowledge of the practices on SCRM, the research design for the empirical part has to enable 
an understanding of the phenomenon, instead of testing existing hypotheses. 
In Ghauri, Grønhaug, & Kristianslund (1995) it is emphasized that the understanding of the 
problem is a classifying variable: 
“Based on the problem structure, we may distinguish between three main 
classes of research design: 
  Research design Problem structure 
  1. Exploratory Unstructured 
  2. Descriptive Structured 
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  3. Causal  Structured” (p. 27). 
According to Ghauri, Grønhaug, & Kristianslund an exploratory research design is 
appropriate when the research problem is badly understood, whereas both descriptive and 
causal research design are appropriate when the problem is structured and well understood.  
They consider the case study method of special relevance when the area of interest is poorly 
understood: 
“In relatively less-known areas, where there is little experience and theory 
available to serve as a guide, intensive study of selected examples is a very 
useful method of gaining insight and suggesting hypotheses for further 
research.  …  The main focus is on seeking insight rather than testing: instead 
of testing existing hypotheses we seek insight through the features and 
characteristics of the object being studied.” (pp. 87-88). 
This position is challenged by Yin (1994) who claim case studies can be exploratory as well 
as exploratory/descriptive: 
“A common misconception is that the various research strategies should be 
arrayed hierarchically.  We were once taught to believe that case studies were 
appropriate for the exploratory phase of an investigation, that surveys and 
histories were appropriate for the descriptive phase, and that experiments were 
the only way of doing explanatory or causal inquiries.  …  This hierarchical 
view, however, is incorrect.  …  The more appropriate view of these different 
strategies is a pluralistic one.  Each strategy can be used for all three purposes 
– exploratory, descriptive, or explanatory.” (pp. 3-4). 
To Yin the case study research strategy is well suited in a very specific situation: 
“In general, case studies are the preferred strategy when ‘how’ or ‘why’ 
questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events, 
and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life 
context.  Such ‘explanatory’ case studies also can be complemented by two 
other types – ‘exploratory’ and ‘descriptive’ case studies.” (p. 1). 
The case study research strategy thereby fits this specific combination of research question, 
control over events, and “contemporariness” of events to be studies.  ‘How’ and ‘when’ 
questions can also be studied by applying research strategies ‘experiments’ or ‘history’, but 
the former requires control over events, the latter focuses on non-contemporary events20.  
Albeit Yin does not agree with Eisenhardt (1989b) (and others) that case study research is 
especially well-suited when performing research of more exploratory nature, he does not 
disqualify the research strategy neither. 
But others have criticized the research strategy.  In a special issue of the journal 
Administrative Science Quarterly on qualitative methods, Miles (1979) criticizes the case 
study method (or rather qualitative methods) for producing results that can not be analyzed, 
neither with-in case nor cross-case.  Furthermore Miles points out that the frequency of 
objections from participants to research results far exceeds the frequency from other types of 
studies.  In a reply published two years later in the same journal, Yin (1981) reciprocates by 
questioning the link between qualitative data and case study research (case study research can 
                                                 
20 Summary in Figure 1.1 in Yin (1994), p. 6. 
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use both qualitative and quantitative data) and by suggesting methods of performing with-in 
case and cross-case analysis. 
A Model for Theory-building in Case Study Research 
This line of development was continued in Eisenhardt (1989b) where a method for theory 
development from case study research is presented.  Referencing other researchers performing 
case study research it is claimed the a priori definition of research question and possibly even 
constructs is beneficial: 
“… definition of research question within a broad topic permitted these 
investigators to specify the kind of organization to be approached, and, once 
there, the kind of data to be collected.  …  A priori specification of constructs 
can also help shape the initial design of theory-building research.” 
(Eisenhardt, 1989b, p. 536). 
Knowing state-of-art of the subject through stringent literature review is an important 
requirement for defining the initial research question and preliminary constructs, but it is 
emphasized the researcher should be willing to alter these as appropriate during the study: 
“Although early identification of the research question and possible constructs 
is helpful, it is equally important to recognize that both are tentative in this type 
of research.  No construct is guaranteed a place in the resultant theory, no 
matter how well it is measured.  Also, the research question may shift during 
the research.” (p. 536). 
Differentiating the knowledge available in the literature from theoretical perspectives it is also 
emphasized that theory should delineate neither research question nor constructs, but: 
“… theory building research is begun as close as possible to the ideal of no 
theory under consideration and no hypotheses to test.  …  [A]ttempting to 
approach this is important because preordained theoretical perspectives or 
propositions may bias and limit the findings.  Thus, investigators should 
formulate a research problem and possibly specify some potentially important 
variables, with some reference to extant literature.  However, they should avoid 
thinking about specific relationships between variables and theories as much as 
possible, especially at the outset of the process.” (p. 536). 
Progressing to the case selection Eisenhardt further describes the difference in the sampling 
method for theory testing versus theory building studies: 
“The cases may be chosen to replicate previous cases or extend emergent 
theory, or they may be chosen to fill theoretical categories and provide 
examples of polar types.  While the cases may be chosen randomly, random 
selection is neither necessary, nor even preferable.  As Pettigrew (1988) noted, 
given the limited number of cases which can usually be studied, it makes sense 
to choose cases such as extreme situations and polar types in which the process 
of interest is ‘transparently observable’.  …  In contrast, traditional within-
experiment hypothesis-testing studies rely on statistical sampling, in which 
researchers randomly select the sample from the population.  In this type of 
study, the goal of the sampling process is to obtain accurate statistical evidence 
on the distributions of variables within the population.” (p. 537). 
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The case selection method thereby determines the type of conclusion reached – the 
exploratory case study might naturally be limited to theory-generation if not supplemented by 
studies of a more explanatory nature. 
But also the theory generation requires a stringent process for analysis of the often staggering 
volumes of data.  Eisenhardt proposes to start with the with-in case analysis “to become 
intimately familiar with each case as a stand-alone entity” (p. 540) followed by a cross-case 
analysis to identify patterns of similarity.  Various strategies for the cross-case analysis are 
proposed, all aiming at increasing the quality of the analysis and: 
“… to force investigators to go beyond initial impressions, especially through 
the use of structured and diverse lenses on the data.  These tactics improve the 
likelihood of accurate and reliable theory, that is, a theory with a close fit with 
the data.  Also, cross-case searching tactics enhance the probability that the 
investigators will capture the novel findings which may exist in the data.” (p. 
541). 
The fit between the data and the emerging theory improve as the iterative process of 
systematically comparing data with hypotheses progresses.  Between iterations constructs are 
refined and measures are developed, and multiple sources of evidence might be introduced to 
further improve construct validity.  In conclusion the strengths of the case study research 
strategy are: 
? the likelihood of generating novel theory, 
? the emergent theory is likely to be testable with constructs that can be readily measured 
and hypotheses that can be proven false, and 
? the resultant theory is likely to be empirically valid. 
Conversely, some of the characteristics which lead to the strengths also may lead to some of 
the weaknesses when building theory from case studies.  These include: 
? the intensive use of empirical evidence may lead to overly complex theory, as well as 
the opposite, namely 
? the creation of idiosyncratic theory stemming from the bottom-up approach of case 
study theory creation. 
These shortcomings obviously are quite severe. 
An Ongoing Discussion 
Two years later a critique by Dyer & Wilkins (1991) was published objecting to: 
“…three critical areas: (a) the in-depth study of a single case (context) versus 
the study of multiple cases (contexts), (b) deep versus surface description, and 
(c) the telling of good stories versus the creating of good constructs.” (p. 613). 
The basis for their criticism was a defense for the “classic case study” where a single (or 
possibly two or three) cases are included in the study.  They argue that the method put 
forward by Eisenhardt is cases study instead of case study and go on to argue that the “rich 
story” is an important exception to the argument made by Eisenhardt: 
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“With fewer than 4 cases, it is often difficult to generate theory with much 
complexity, and its empirical grounding is likely to be unconvincing, unless the 
case has several mini-cases within it.” (Eisenhardt, 1989b, p. 545). 
To Eisenhardt knowledge is obtained and verified through cross-case examination whereas 
Dyer & Wilkins argue getting close to the case is a valid source of knowledge, resulting in 
“deep insights”.  They argue that the ultimate goal is to “provide a rich description of the 
social scene, to describe the context in which events occur, and to reveal … the deep structure 
of social behaviour.” (p. 615).  Dyer & Wilkins further claim the main advantage of the 
classic case study is the “quality” of the theory generated: 
“Theory that is born of such deep insights will be both more accurate and more 
appropriately tentative because the researcher must take into account the 
intricacies and qualifications of a particular context.  …  Eisenhardt’s method 
[is] necessarily constrained by the number of cases that will be studied, and 
description will be rather ‘thin’, focusing on surface data rather on deeper 
dynamics.” (p. 615). 
Dyer & Wilkins admit Eisenhardt’s method might provide “flashes of insight” but insist the 
method will: 
“… neglect the more tacit and less obvious aspects of the setting under 
investigation.  [It] is more likely to provide a rather distorted picture or no 
picture at all, of the underlying dynamics of the case.” (p. 615). 
Dyer & Wilkins end their criticism by insisting on the advantages of the classic case study 
(the rich story of a single or a few cases) and argue: 
“… that the classic case study approach has been extremely powerful because 
these authors have described general phenomena so well that others have little 
difficulty seeing the same phenomena in their own experience and research.  
We return to the classics because they are good stories, not because they are 
merely clear statements of a construct.” (p. 617). 
In a response Eisenhardt (1991) first rejects the critiques put forward and continues to repeat 
the claim that rigor and stringent methods are necessary in order to create generalizable 
theory.  In the concluding comments the relevance of good story telling is emphasized:  
“… the similarities between single- and multiple-setting research are vastly 
more important then the differences.  For both, storytelling is an essential first 
step, but good theory is fundamentally the result of rigorous methodology and 
comparative, multiple-case logic.  This is as evident in the classic case studies 
as it is in contemporary multiple-case research.” (p. 627). 
The authors mentioned above are but a few of the participants in the ongoing debate over the 
relevance and applications of case study research.  Many other could have been mentioned but 
the examples described above clearly describe the intensity of the debate, and give some 
indications on the advancements within case study research. 
Case Study Research for Exploratory Studies 
The use of case study research is now accepted within Management/Organization Theory (e.g. 
Woodside & Wilson, 2003), Operations Management (e.g. Meredith, 1998; Lewis, 1998), 
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Marketing (e.g. Johnston, Leach, & Liu, 1999; Hillebrand, Kok, & Biemans, 2001) and 
Logistics/SCM (e.g. Gammelgaard, 2004; Frankel, Naslund, & Bolumole, 2005) albeit debate 
on the application and contingencies surrounding case study research is still ongoing.  In this 
dissertation the case study research strategy has been chosen due to its capability to unravel 
and make possible description of complex organizational phenomena of which little is known.  
The detailed design of the case studies is described in Chapter 6. 
1.7 Overall Research Design 
The overall research design (including the pilot studies) thereby can be illustrated 
conceptually as in Figure 1-4 below.  The upper part of the figure depicts the pilot studies 
already reported, whereas the lower part shows the planned study. 
Figure 1-4: Research Design 
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The conceptual model translates into chapters as depicted in Figure 1-5 below. 
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Figure 1-5: Structure of the Dissertation 
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Chapter 2 SCM & Risk Management 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the idea of integrating SCM and Risk 
Management.  First, the SCM and Risk Management domains are described by a brief 
historical account of both domains, and trends within Risk Management and general 
management (Corporate Governance) are briefly described as mechanisms to integrate SCM 
and Risk Management.  From the general perspective of Corporate Governance attention is 
directed at the SCM domain, and a Supply Chain Risk Matrix is put forward as a generic 
model for the rest of the dissertation.  The chapter closes with a preliminary discussion of the 
impact of risk management on the design of supply chains. 
2.1 The Coming of Supply Chain Management 
The term Supply Chain Management (SCM) was introduced more than twenty years ago in an 
article (Oliver & Webber, 1982) advocating the strategic importance of logistics.  Instead of 
focusing on the optimization of operations in the individual company, Oliver & Webber 
proposed taking a more holistic perspective on operations.  Their definition differentiated 
SCM from logistics: 
“Supply-chain management differs significantly from classic materials and 
manufacturing control in four respects.  First, it views the supply chain as a 
single entity rather than relegating fragmented responsibility for various 
segments in the supply chain to functional areas such as purchasing, 
manufacturing, distribution, and sales.  The second distinctive feature of 
supply-chain management flows directly from the first: It calls for – and in the 
end, depends upon – strategic decision making.  ‘Supply’ is a shared objective 
of practically every function in the chain and is of particular strategic 
significance because of its impact on overall costs and market share.  Third, 
supply-chain management provides a different perspective on inventories, 
which are used as a balancing mechanism of last, not first, resort.  Finally, 
supply-chain management requires a new approach to systems: Integration, not 
interfacing, is the key.” (Christopher, 1992, p. 66). 
The outcry for strategic attention was a result of the increased pressures for cost reduction.  In 
the early 1980’s logisticians were “back seat drivers” but this was to change.  Scale 
production did no longer seem to result in winning market share, and corporate cost reduction 
schemes did not seem to be successful enough.  In order to remain competitive the corporate 
strategists needed to look beyond the corporate boundaries for efficiencies in the logistics 
flow.  Theoretical and conceptual developments had enabled the increased sophistication of 
previously quite “practice-oriented” disciplines such as purchasing, manufacturing and 
logistics, and political upheaval was about to change the world into a global marketplace.  The 
deregulation of industries and the increased globalization combined with the advances within 
IT and logistics concepts have resulted in increased pressures on the logistics function, as the 
need for better products at lower costs, modified for each customer, and delivered anywhere 
on the planet became valid claims. 
Within academia the SCM concept took on quite slowly - in the beginning the contributions 
referencing SCM (e.g. Jones & Riley, 1985; Houlihan, 1988) all dealt with smoothing the 
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flow of materials and were quite similar as they aimed at removing inefficiencies caused by 
the “bullwhip effect” as described by Forrester (1961)1. 
In the seminal work by Stevens (1989) the scope of SCM is extended: 
“The scope of the supply chain begins with the source of supply and ends at the 
point of consumption.  It extends much further than simply a concern with the 
physical movement of material and is just as much concerned with supplier 
management, purchasing, materials management, manufacturing management, 
facilities planning, customer service and information flow as with transport and 
physical distribution.” (p. 3). 
Stevens continues: 
“The objective of managing the supply chain is to synchronise the requirements 
of the customer with the flow of materials from supplier in order to effect a 
balance between what is often seen as the conflicting goals of high customer 
service, low inventory investment and low unit cost.  The design and operation 
of an effective supply chain is of fundamental importance to every company.” 
(p. 3). 
Besides obtaining effectiveness in operations, Stevens advocates the early involvement of 
suppliers in product development, which is only possible when long term commitments are 
made between suppliers and focal company (i.e. the elimination of multiple sourcing).   
Figure 2-1: Achieving an Integrated Supply Chain2 
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Suppliers Internalsupply chain
 
 
                                                 
1  Often forgotten, the Burbidge effect describes the inefficiencies created by lack of synchronization across 
echelons, see e.g. Towill (1997). 
2  Source: Figure 5 in Stevens (1989), p. 7. 
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The main contribution though in Stevens (1989) is the integration model (see Figure 2-1 
above) which has had an enormous effect on the work on supply chain integration and supply 
chain design (referenced in e.g. Hewitt, 1994; Cooper, Lambert, & Pagh, 1997; Towill, 
Childerhouse, & Disney, 2002; Lockamy III & McCormack, 2004).  The progression model 
describes how the integration of functions (breaking down of functional silos) enables the 
removal of interim buffer stock, making external integration and the removal of buffers all 
together possible.  Internal integration of materials and information flow is thereby a 
prerequisite for SCM. 
This idea is brought even further in Cooper & Ellram (1993) where SCM is compared to other 
types of channel relationships.  Besides the overall reduction of inventory and other costs, the 
authors identify e.g. time horizon (relationship and planning), compatibility in corporate 
philosophies, sharing of risk and reward, and breadth of supplier base as characteristics 
distinguishing SCM.  An additional goal for SCM is introduced: 
“A goal of supply chain management is continuous improvement.  This includes 
increased speed of operations, as well as improved information and inventory 
flows, due to better coordination and focused goals across supply chain 
members.” (p. 21). 
Besides the smooth flow of materials and information the strategies and corporate 
philosophies need to be compatible in order for the cooperation to work. 
The idea of optimality in supply chains is explicated in an article (Hewitt, 1994) taking a BPR 
view on cooperation on logistics activities across firm boundaries: 
“What emerges is a long series of small steps leading to an increasingly cross-
functional and process-oriented view of the activity.  […]  It is significant but 
unsurprising that the historical evidence shows that progressive co-ordination 
of existing functional activities, followed by rationalization of these activities 
has been more common than radical moves to a totally revised process 
management approach.  Currently, few of the companies surveyed in either 
Europe or the U.S. have reached even the level of integration implied in Stages 
III or IV3.  On the other hand, taking a BPR view of the reported findings, it is 
clear that a few enterprises are now going beyond cross-functional co-
ordination to an explicitly process oriented way of working, thereby truly 
justifying the term supply chain process management.” (p. 3). 
Redesigning the company towards process orientation might lead to improved efficiencies but 
“…process redesign is only likely to be successful if it is recognized as a multi-
dimensional activity, simultaneously and explicitly addressing the work activity 
dimension, the information flow dimension and the decision/authority 
dimension” (p. 5). 
In the studies reported by Hewitt redesign extending beyond the scope of the individual firm 
is rare.  Reporting from a number of leading edge companies in Europe and the U.S., Hewitt 
                                                 
3  The phases in the referenced framework are: I. Fragmented Technical Disciplines, II. Functional Scope, III. 
Broad Scope Logistics, and IV. Links with Customers and Suppliers.  It thereby resembles Stevens (1989) 
framework. 
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suggests that principles for intra-firm redesign may be appropriate for inter-firm initiatives as 
well. 
Integration of Processes 
The concept of integration is further elaborated upon in Cooper, Lambert & Pagh (1997) 
where the integration is described by a number of processes.  They support the idea of early 
supplier involvement in product development, and further expand the scope of SCM by 
suggesting that more functions than just logistics should be integrated across firm boundaries.  
The importance of process is emphasized as they claim: 
“The integration of business processes across the supply chain is what we are 
calling supply chain management.” (p. 2). 
They list of number of possible supply chain business processes and describe a SCM 
framework by means of three components: business processes, supply chain structure, and 
management components. 
Figure 2-2: A Framework of Supply Chain Management4 
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4  Source: Figure 2 in Cooper, Lambert, & Pagh (1997), p. 10. 
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In a later contribution (Lambert, Cooper, & Pagh, 1998) the integration of processes across 
firm boundaries are described in terms of types of process links: Managed Process Links, 
Monitored Process Links, Not-managed Process Links, and Non-member Links.  Recognizing 
not all supply chain partners are equally important, the effort on managing the links should be 
differentiated accordingly.  In the 1997 article, the emphasis is on the management component 
- no less than ten management components are identified based on a literature review.  
Besides the (by now) “classic” components “Planning and control”, “Work structure”, 
“Product flow facility structure”, and “Information flow facility structure”, the authors 
suggest a variety of other management components, such as organizational structure, product 
structure, power/leadership structure in the supply chain, and the cultural context (see Table 
2-1 below). 
Table 2-1: Identified Supply Chain Management Components5 
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Houlihan (1985) ? ? ? ? ? ? ?   ? 
Jones & Riley (1985) ? ? ? ? ?  ?   ? 
Stevens (1989) ? ? ? ? ?     ? 
Ellram & Cooper (1990) ? ?  ? ?    ?  
Lee & Billington (1992)  ?  ? ?      
Cooper & Ellram (1993) ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? 
Hewitt (1994) ? ? ? ? ?    ?  
Scott & Westbrook (1991)  ?  ? ? ?     
Towill, Naim & Wikner (1992) ? ?  ? ? ?     
Hammer (1990) ? ? ? ? ?  ?  ? ? 
Andrews & Stalick (1994) ? ? ?  ?  ? ? ? ? 
Cooper & Gardner (1993) ? ?  ? ?    ? ? 
Lambert, Emmelhainz & Gardner (1996) ? ?   ?  ?  ? ? 
 
From Push to Pull 
At the same time as the “process perspective” (Gripsrud, Jahre, & Persson, 2006) evolved and 
became “mainstream SCM” concepts like ECR6 and Lean Production (Womack, Jones, & 
Ross, 1990) provoked a shift from forecast-based production towards make-to-order.  At least 
in principle inventory of finished goods was discarded and techniques like Value Stream 
Analysis (Hines & Rich, 1997) determined the decoupling point for modularization of 
products, minimizing the overall inventory cost or balancing it with end-customer lead time.  
Conceptually, activities within the supply chain (or rather: network) are perceived as driven 
                                                 
5  Source: Table 2 in Cooper, Lambert, & Pagh (1997), p. 8. 
6 Efficient Consumer Response - replenishment program for the retailing industry.  For more information, 
please see e.g. www.ecrnet.org. 
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by end-customer demand instead of the “pre-SCM” concept of forecasting7.  These 
developments caused e.g. Christopher (1998) to propose replacing “Supply Chain” with 
“Demand Network”.  The proposed term never really caught on… 
Five Schools of Thought 
The domain continued to evolve causing Bechtel & Jayaram (1997) to describe SCM in a 
framework of five schools of thought.  From the initial work (called the Chain Awareness 
School) four separate strands of research were identified: the Linkage/Logistics School, the 
Information School, the Integration School, and The Future. 
The Linkage/Logistics School distinguishes itself from the Chain Awareness School by laying 
out the linkages internally between functional areas and externally between the focal company 
and supply chain partners.  The Information School emphasizes the flow of information 
between supply chain members, a flow that is bi-directional and not constrained by 
organizational boundaries.  The Integration/Process School focuses on integrating the supply 
chains into a system defined as a set of processes.  In this school, the idea of local (sub) 
optimization is abandoned as the ideal is the design of the entire system of processes to 
benefit all participating supply chain members.  The goal is to optimize customer satisfaction 
through design of processes and solutions and subsequently the removal of redundancies. 
The last school of thought in the framework, The Future, describes relationships and IT 
integration as means to further integrating the end users into the system of fulfillment: 
“Traditional supply chain relationships capture sales data, and based on these 
data place orders with their suppliers, manufacturers, or distributors.  New 
technologies such as EDI and ECR enable customer related information to be 
sent directly to suppliers, distributors, and manufacturers who can use this 
information to respond instantaneously to changing inventory levels.  This 
represents the beginning of a SCM revolution which will capture and diffuse 
customer trends and preferences deep into supply chain member companies.” 
(Bechtel & Jayaram, 1997, p. 20). 
Albeit not explicitly described in the article, one gets the impression that the five schools are 
described as a chronology8.  If so, little agreement on this classification is found in more 
recent review articles as e.g. Tan (2001) categorize the body of knowledge into: 1. Supplier 
Base Integration/SCM, and 2. Integrated Logistics/SCM and Croom, Romano, & Giannakis 
(2000c) into: 1. Strategic Management, 2. Logistics, 3. Marketing, 4. Relationships/ 
partnerships, 5. Best practices, and 6. Organizational behavior.  Where Bechtel & Jayaram 
give the impression of a few competing strands of research pointing towards a coherent body 
of knowledge, later reviews document the opposite: the research is getting more and more 
dispersed9. 
                                                 
7 Naturally forecasting is still critically important as only very few supply chains have access to “excess 
inputs on stand-by”. 
8  Actually, the model might suggest that the Linkage/Logistics School has a different object (transportation), 
whereas the Information and Integration/Process Schools describe a more general trend leading towards The 
Future. 
9 In Gibson, Mentzer, & Cook (2005) the multiplicity of definitions of SCM documents the dispersion. 
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Critical Voices… 
This has caused a number of authors (e.g. Larson & Halldorsson, 2002; Fawcett & Magnan, 
2002) to questions the relevance and/or existence of SCM  - others try to map out the 
theoretical foundation for SCM (e.g. Halldorsson et al., 2004).10  In a recent article Giannakis, 
Croom, & Slack (2004) similarly try to describe the key event leading to and the development 
of SCM.  Using three basic dimensions of supply chain decision making they propose a model 
(see Figure 2-3) describing the development (leading to and) within SCM.  The authors define 
the three dimensions as: 
“Synthesis … describe[s] the strategic decisions related to the structure of 
supply chains primarily to reflect the importance of the characteristics relating 
to the construction of supply chains. … 
Issues of synergy are concerned with the manner and form of interactions and 
relationships across supply chains. … 
The dimension of synchronization is primarily concerned with the management 
and coordination of resource flows across supply chains.” (pp. 14-15). 
The overall domain of SCM is thereby described by its structural characteristics, the 
relationships and the efficiency of the overall structure.  The legacy from OM is present in the 
references to Operational Research, Inventory Theory, Manufacturing Theory, and The 
Transformation Model.  On the relational side references are made to Open Systems Theory, 
Social Network Theory, and The Interaction Model (IMP).  Claiming a multi-disciplinary and 
multi-methodological foundation for SCM seems almost an understatement. 
Figure 2-3: Chronology of influences on SCM11 
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10  In a recent article Gammelgaard (2004) calls for more methodological diversification in the research within 
SCM.  She claims the Analytical and Systems approaches in Arbnor & Bjerke (1997) framework have been 
dominant within the domain, and advocates the use of the Actor approach as well. 
11  Source: Figure 1.3 in Giannakis, Croom, & Slack (2004), p. 16. 
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Concerns on SCM Theory 
Also in terms of theory concerns are raised.  In Burgess, Singh, & Koroglu (Burgess, Singh, 
& Koroglu, 2006) an extensive literature review on SCM is reported, and the authors 
comment: 
“For the field of SCM, the extent to which theories have been developed 
appears to be slight.  The development of SCM appears to have been largely 
practitioner-led, with theory following.  …  Of all the articles that adopted 
theoretical perspectives, none proposed an original SCM theory.” (p. 711), and 
“It is possible that the current state of theory development in the field could be 
preventing its evolution towards a more mature status.” (p. 717). 
These concerns are supported and extended in Storey et al. (2006): 
“If supply chain management is to mature as a discipline there needs to be 
further progress in clarifying its domain, its central problems, its core 
components, its theories and its theoretical map.” (p. 755). 
Concepts for Improving Business-as-Usual 
In the midst of all this diffusion a number of concepts seem to survive over time: Just-in-Time 
(JIT) (e.g. Schwarz & Weng, 2000), Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) (e.g. Blatherwick, 
1999), and ECR (e.g. Sabath, 1998).  Certain principles likewise seem to receive continued 
attention: Supply Chain Integration (e.g. Bagchi & Skjøtt-Larsen, 2002b; Langabeer & 
Seifert, 2003; Lee, 2000), Postponement (e.g. Pagh & Cooper, 1998), Mass Customization 
(e.g. Gilmore & Pine, 1997), and Leanness/Agility/Leagility (e.g. Mason-Jones, Naylor, & 
Towill, 2000b).  Albeit quite different, they all focus on the same: increasing the efficiency of 
business-as-usual. 
2.2 Risk Management 
In e.g. Barlow (1993) the evolution of modern risk management is described.  In the 
beginning (the 1960’s) risk management was basically insurance buying12, but as exposures 
increased the insurance buyer in the finance department was replaced by insurance managers 
cooperating with the other departments in the company.  Following the expansion and 
diversification of the enterprise, the responsibilities of the insurance manager changed from 
insurance buying to examining the enterprise for uninsured risks and implementing various 
types of risk prevention schemes etc.  According to Barlow the title “risk manager” was first 
proposed by Wayne Snider in 1955, the term Risk Management was introduced the following 
year in an article in Harvard Business Review (Gallagher, 1956).  In the early days of “risk 
management”, the management component took the form of insurance buying to minimize the 
exposures.  Focus was on the downside only: 
                                                 
12  In Englehart (1994) the history of corporate insurance is dated back to at least 1878, where one of the 
railroad companies created such a function.  Corporate insurance functions became popular during the 
1930’s; the American Management Association initiated an Insurance Division in 1931.  By the 1950’s the 
use of a separate function for insurance monitoring was widespread among large corporations. 
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“…the field of risk management is that of ‘pure risks’, meaning risks offering 
the possibility of loss or no loss, as contrasted by ‘speculative risks’, which 
offer the chance of loss or gain and are the domain of entrepreneurs, boards of 
directors, and CEOs.” (Barlow, 1993, pp. 38-39). 
The goal of the risk manager was clearly cost-minimization as: 
“…each of the insurable risks to which an organization is exposed should be 
seen as a cost composed of the interrelated factors of loss prevention, insurance 
premiums, losses sustained net of indemnities from insurers and third parties, 
and expense of administration; and secondly, that the objective of risk 
management should be to minimize the cost of the risks by changing amenable 
factors as appropriate…” (p. 39). 
In Englehart (1994) a similar history of the development of insurance buying into risk 
management is told.  Following an analysis of the use of the term “risk management” in the 
period 1956 to 1990, Englehart concludes that: 
“… the field of risk management is not dying, but rather [that] it is being 
divided into smaller units for discussion and analysis.” (p. 68). 
Soon the responsibility of the risk management department encompassed the management of 
e.g. credit, interest rate, currency, commodity, equity, and liquidity risks.  The commonality 
between all these types of risks were the reliance on objective measures obtained through 
ingenious mathematical models.  From the simple “Probability times Impact” equation the 
domain of risk measurement now had evolved into sophisticated models analyzing patterns of 
events to determine correct values for the risks13. 
At the same time as the mathematics used to control financial risks got more and more 
sophisticated the scope of the risks to be managed increased.  The new risks presented a real 
problem to the domain, as the underlying “mechanisms” were less understood or even eluded 
description.  The introduction of these new risks resulted in the division of the domain of risk 
management into Financial Risk Management (FRM) and Business Risk Management 
(BRM), the former primarily relying on measures obtained from sophisticated mathematical 
and statistical models, the latter on intuition and experience.  The management of business 
risks became (at least partly) a responsibility of management whereas the financial risks were 
firmly rooted in the finance departments.14 
                                                 
13  From the mid-1990’s the concept Value-at-Risk (VaR) has become an “industry standard” using historical 
data to predict probable impact within a certain time period (Banks & Dunn, 2003).  For a critical 
perspective, see Ju & Pearson (1998). 
14 SCRM is considered a true subset of BRM. 
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Risk Management Approaches 
Evolving through the 1980’s and 1990’s various integrated approaches like Integrated Risk 
Management (IRM) (e.g. Doherty, 2000) and Organization/Enterprise-Wide Risk 
Management (ORM/ERM) (e.g. Young & Tipping, 2000; DeLoach, 2000) were introduced, 
advocating the strategic importance of an integrated approach to the management of business 
risks15.  In Williams (1996) the new integrated paradigm contrasts the “old paradigm”. 
Table 2-2: Re-inventing Risk Management16 
Old Paradigm New Paradigm 
Risk Management applied only to pure 
risks 
Risk Management applied to pure and 
speculative business risks 
Functional approach, limited to the risk 
management department 
Process approach transcending functions 
and divisions 
Operational perspective Operational and strategic perspective 
Risk manager Risk process manager or risk champion 
Senior management support Senior management support and 
involvement 
Insurance jargon understood by a few Common risk language understood from 
the boardroom to the boiler room 
 
Further enhancing the concept of ERM a voluntary organization, The Committee of 
Sponsoring Organizations of The Treadway Commision (COSO) engaged 
PricewaterhouseCoopers to develop an “integrated framework for enterprise risk 
management”.  Two reports have been published (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2003; 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2004)17 providing companies with a framework for process-
oriented risk management across the enterprise and a definition of ERM: 
 “Enterprise risk management is a process, effected by an entity’s board of 
directors, management and other personnel, applied in strategy setting and 
across the enterprise, designed to identify potential events that may affect the 
entity, and manage risks to be within its risk appetite, to provide reasonable 
assurance regarding the achievement of the entity objectives.” 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2004, p. 3). 
The Risk Management Process 
The shift from insurance buying to risk management called for a new way of working, a 
process which is almost universally agreed upon within the domain (e.g. Sadgrove, 1996; 
Vaughan, 1997), see Figure 2-4 below. 
                                                 
15  One might say that Risk Management became strategic as Strategic Management might be perceived as the 
“management of speculative risks” (Williams, 1996).  See also Figure 2-4. 
16  Source: Exhibit 1 in Williams (1996), p. 24. 
17  For more information on the COSO/ERM framework, please see Appendices B and K. 
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Figure 2-4: The (Business) Risk Management Process 
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Whether the objectives are set within or outside the risk management process is a disputed 
issue but the interaction between Strategic and Risk Management is undisputed.  The holistic 
approach implied above seems to fit perfectly with the inter-organizational scope of SCM. 
2.3 Corporate Governance18 
Also emerging through the 1990’s Corporate Governance describes the good practices 
identified in leading companies.  In USA the Enron scandal and the scandals following that 
resulted in a dramatic loss of trust in the American stock market.  The American government 
had an urgent need to amend this lack of trust, and to that end the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was 
passed in July 2002.  The Sarbanes-Oxley act lays out certain rules and principles for the 
companies to follow, and gives the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) competence 
to further specify rules and regulations regarding the trade of securities.  The generic 
principles aim at: 
1. creating more transparency regarding the management of the companies, 
2. strengthening the internal control and reporting in the companies, and 
3. strengthening the control with the companies’ external auditing. 
All three principles support the need of the actors in the stock markets for a better 
appreciation of the worth of the companies by creating sounder management principles and a 
more reliable reporting.  Besides the act and the further development by SEC the individual 
stock exchanges developed their own set of rules for Corporate Governance19. 
                                                 
18 This section relies heavily on Chapter 1 in Iversen (2004). 
19 Both NYSE and NASDAQ have published a rule set for Corporate Governance, see NYSE (2003) and 
Emen (2004), respectively. 
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In the European Union (EU) a comparison of the Corporate Governance guidelines of the 
individual member states20 led to the development of a plan of action for the harmonization of 
rules and principles across all member states.  In the plan the Commission, contrary to the 
practice in the USA, did not recommend the development of a detailed codex for Corporate 
Governance but focused on: 
1. strengthening the requirements on external reporting, 
2. enhancing the rights of share holders, and 
3. modernization of the work performed by the members of the board. 
Furthermore the Commission suggested that the financial statements from companies 
registered on the stock exchange should contain a section on Corporate Governance 
initiatives, or an explanation of why Corporate Governance is irrelevant (the “comply or 
explain” principle).  Following the receipt of feedback on the plan of action and suggestions 
the Commission has started the work on modernizing and harmonizing Corporate Governance 
across member states.  In March 2004 a suggestion concerning the mandatory auditing of 
registered companies was put forward, suggesting rules for changing responsible accountant 
much resembling the American rules.  More proposals are anticipated. 
Danish Initiatives 
For unknown reasons Denmark was one of the last countries in Europe to commence working 
with Corporate Governance21.  Speculation will have it that perhaps the Nordisk Fjer scandal 
(resembling the before mentioned Enron scandal) was the catalyst to strengthen the 
regulations ensuring independence between management of the firm on the one side and the 
board and auditors on the other.  In March 2001 Ole Stavad, the Minister of Economic and 
Business Affairs of that time, commissioned four highly respected Danish businessmen to 
further develop the ideas presented in the report from 1999 and draft a guideline for Corporate 
Governance.  Three quarters of a year later the “Nørby commission” published a report 
containing voluntary guidelines for Corporate Governance in Denmark22.  The report focused 
on seven main areas: 
1. The role of the shareholder and the interaction with the management of the company 
2. The role of the stakeholders and their importance to the company  
3. Openness and transparency 
4. The tasks and responsibility of the board 
5. The composition of the board 
6. The compensation of the board and the directors 
7. Risk Management 
                                                 
20 See Weil, Gotshal, & Manges (2002). 
21 According to Iversen (Iversen, 2004), the first official Danish contribution was the report “Debatoplæg om 
aktivt ejerskab” (Ministry of Finance, 1999) – a product of a joint collaboration initiated in 1997 between 
The Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs,  The Ministry of Finance, and The Ministry of Taxation.  
The report can be downloaded from the homepage of the State Employer’s Authority (www.perst.dk). 
22 “Nørby-udvalgets rapport om Corporate Governance i Danmark – Anbefalinger for god selskabsledelse i 
Danmark” (Nørby Johansen et al., 2001). 
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The report caused quite some debate.  Some commentators rejected the proposals in the report 
as they were perceived being to narrowly defined and restrictive, whereas others considered 
the proposals being too operational.  Nonetheless, the community embraced the report for its 
intent: to improve the practice of corporate management and to provide a starting off point for 
further debate.  The Copenhagen Stock Exchange immediately after publication 
recommended companies being traded on the stock exchange to apply the recommendations 
put forward in the report, a recommendation which was adhered to by more than half of the 
companies in their financial statements in 2003. 
Since the initial report was published the Copenhagen Stock Exchange has been the main 
driver of Corporate Governance, as two reports have been published so far: “Report on 
corporate governance in Denmark”23 (Fondsbørsen, 2003) and an updated version in 2005. 
Recommendations on Risk Management 
Of special interest here is naturally the content on Risk Management.  In the original report 
the commission under Chapter VII “Risk Management” recommended: 
“Effective risk management is a prerequisite for the board to perform the tasks 
it has been appointed to do.  It is therefore crucial the board ensures 
appropriate systems to the management of risks are present, and further 
ensures the systems match the requirements of the company.” (translated from 
Fondsbørsen (2005), p. 58). 
The report promoted the focus of the risk management was to support the company in 
reaching its goals by: 
1. making sure strategic and operational goals are known and understood throughout the 
organization, 
2. analyzing threats and opportunities relating to above mentioned goals, and 
3. analyzing the core activities of the company to identify risks. 
Furthermore it is recommended that the risk management is evaluated at least yearly, with 
special attention given to insurance, foreign currency, and investment policies.  Besides 
insisting Risk Management is a part of Corporate Governance, the recommendation did little 
in way of supporting the development of a practice as no tools, methods or frameworks were 
supplied.  In the latest report the section on Risk Management has been revised.  Besides the 
original recommendations, it is now recommended that the Board and the Management when 
developing the overall business strategy also identify and describe the major risks.  
Management is furthermore encouraged to develop a plan for risk management for approval 
by the Board.  The plan should include periodic reporting and evaluation of the risks 
identified, as well as strategies for the management of the risks.  Finally the report 
recommends openness by suggesting a section in the Annual Account for description of the 
risk management activities. 
                                                 
23 Translated from: ”Rapport om god selskabsledelse i Danmark – Fondsbørsens komité for god 
selskabsledelse”. 
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Risk Management is definitely on the agenda within Corporate Governance, albeit the 
recommendations still does little in guiding implementation.  The recommendations also have 
a shortcoming in relation to SCM as the view of the company in the reports does not support 
the notion of supply chains.  Nonetheless, the recommendations might have an impact on the 
external reporting, if not directly on the practice of SCRM. 
2.4 Combining SCM & Risk Management 
The need for risk management is not a new claim, though.  From the earliest contributions to 
the field, there has been an emphasis on stability and robustness.  The aim is to balance 
resources and 
“…that an integrated systems strategy that reduces the level of business 
vulnerability is developed and implemented.” (Oliver & Webber, 1982, p. 66). 
The fragility of the supply chain is duly noted in another early contribution: 
“If one activity fails, the chain is disrupted, creating poor performance and 
destabilizing the workload in other areas, thereby jeopardizing the effectiveness 
of the supply chain.” (Stevens, 1989, p. 3). 
The previously mentioned “Bullwhip Effect” (Forrester, 1961; Lee, Padmanabhan, & Whang, 
1997) becomes a life-threatening phenomenon when buffers are low and integration is high.  
The reduction of inventory, shortening of lead times, and outsourcing of activities leave 
companies vulnerable not only to these “simple” fluctuations, but to any kind of disruption as 
redundancy is low.  When viewed from a risk management point of view, it becomes apparent 
that the integration must have a “maximum level”24, that the extreme reliance on external 
partners is a very dangerous strategy.  Conversely, it is understood that fast product 
development is a necessity to remain competitive (in some markets). 
Using chaos theory and perceiving supply chains as complex systems Wilding (1998a) 
introduces “The Supply Chain Complexity Triangle” (see Figure 2-5 below).  The three 
sources of uncertainty generation are: deterministic chaos, parallel interactions, and demand 
amplification.  The “Forrester effect” is well known, but the impacts of parallel interactions 
(shifting demand from one supplier to another) were not considered in the SCM domain, 
albeit definitely within “Systems Dynamics”.  The last factor creating uncertainty, the 
deterministic chaos, is described as resulting from supply chain decision-making and supply 
chain control systems25.  The argument on supply chain decision making basically relies on 
the “Forrester effect” – aggressive stock adjustment policies will affect all supply chain 
members.  Removing the human component from the system does not help either: 
“Increasingly within industry, managerial decision-making rules are being 
formalised by computer algorithms.  A conclusion that can be drawn is that if 
such algorithms are inappropriately designed, chaotic behaviour can be 
                                                 
24  The “maximum level” might be perceived as a measure for “loss exposure” (e.g. in terms of days of 
interruption). 
25  This is in line with the skepticism towards the ideal of the fully integrated supply chain put forward by New 
(2004). 
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generated, thus contributing to the uncertainty experienced in the supply 
chain.” (p. 602). 
Having modeled supply chains and various types of control mechanisms, Wilding continues: 
“The main emphasis of the investigation is to quantify how the increasing 
complexity of the supply chain resulting from increasing the number of echelons 
and/or channels impacts on the degree of chaos… The investigations 
demonstrated that warehouse supply chain acted as characteristic chaotic 
system exhibiting sensitivity to initial conditions, ‘islands of stability’, 
characteristic patterns, the ‘reductionist view’ was invalidated, and finally, that 
chaos undermined computer accuracy (Wilding, 1998b).” (p. 603). 
Figure 2-5: The Supply Chain Complexity Triangle26 
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So, on the one hand SCM holds a promise that the closer integration leads to better 
performance, and on the other is the claim that complex systems generate chaotic behavior.  It 
becomes evident that designing the supply chain is a critically important task.  But it is also 
evident that the objectives of and perspective on the supply chain(s) will influence the 
“optimal” design. 
2.4.1 Choosing a Perspective on SCM 
As described previously the origins of SCM are logistics and manufacturing but the focus of 
SCM has dispersed across almost any type of activity, supporting any rationale or objective 
(Storey et al., 2006; Burgess, Singh, & Koroglu, 2006).  Furthermore the acronym SCM has 
                                                 
26  Source: Figure 1 in Wilding (1998a), p. 600. 
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been widely used to add a sense of novelty to existing frameworks/concepts.  This problem is 
broadly recognized, e.g. Cooper & Ellram (1993) state: 
 “To consider supply chain management to be a different approach from other 
channel relationships, there should be some characteristics that could be used 
to differentiate it.” (p. 15), and 
 “Since the original goal of supply chain management is system-wide inventory 
reduction, this characteristic should exist in all supply chains.” (p. 22). 
On choosing a perspective on SCM the author therefore chooses to address personal aversions 
in the SCM literature, aversions which relate to: 
? Type of organization (service vs. manufacturing) 
? Innovation (product and process) vs. operation 
? Current process models 
These aversions are described in more detail below. 
Aversion One: Service versus Manufacturing Organizations 
To the author the notion of SCM in service organizations does not make much sense.  Service 
organizations resemble manufacturing organizations in that they also need to perform e.g. 
capacity planning and make sure the internal infrastructure enables employees to perform the 
needed activities with the right timing, sequence etc.  But service organizations do not have an 
upstream supply chain as their primary input is the knowledge (or at least the presence) of 
their employees.  Obviously, most service organizations have the need for certain physical 
inputs (e.g. paper for the printers at a car rental agency), but these relate to the enablement of 
the service, and is not a part of the service as such. 
Aversion Two: Innovation versus Operations 
The second aversion is the meshing together within the SCM domain of innovation and 
operations.  Intuitively, closer interaction between supply chain partners might lead to better 
innovative processes and better products, but might just as well lead to the opposite.  An 
extensive European survey performed in 2002 (Bagchi, Skjøtt-Larsen, & Sørensen, 2003) 
revealed amongst other things that performance was perceived to be decreasing with the 
length of the relationship.  This definitely counters the argument of improved innovation. 
On a more conceptual note, the difference in time perspective (innovation versus operations) 
gives rise to more skepticism as does the issue of participation.  The existence of professional 
product development agencies conflicts with the notion of tight integration as these partners 
will participate in innovation only, and leave when innovation goals are reached.  Figure 2-6 
below illustrates the “Innovation Perspective” as understood by the author. 
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Figure 2-6: The Innovation Perspective 
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Albeit product innovation is becoming an ongoing task for many companies, it is still 
beneficial to view innovation (at least when innovating with external parties) as separate 
projects27.  This further complicates the membership issue as certain parties are member in 
innovation projects for a limited period of time only. 
In contrast hereto, the fulfillment perspective presents a more stable constellation of 
companies participating in the fulfillment of end-customer needs.  Borrowing from Porter’s 
Value Chain (see Figure 2-7 below), a distinction is made between primary and secondary 
(support) activities.  Primary activities are the activities directly oriented towards the 
fulfillment of end-customer needs: Purchasing, Production, and Sales/Distribution. 
                                                 
27  For incentive and risk management (if for no other) reasons.  Behavior of external parties may be adjusted 
through re-negotiation of innovation contracts.  External parties may then have a strong incentive to behave 
non-opportunistic.  It may also have a performance perspective. 
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Figure 2-7: The Generic Value Chain28 
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The concept of SCM extends further than the concept of Value Chain, though.  The holistic 
perspective, the ideal of aligned strategies and of appropriate integration of processes across 
corporate boundaries makes SCM a much more sophisticated framework.  The inclusion of 
external parties both up- and downstream as critical entities in fulfilling end-customer needs 
differentiates SCM from other concepts, and adds complexity as the before mentioned 
“membership issue” becomes critically important. 
Figure 2-8: The Fulfillment Perspective 
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28  Source: Figure 2-2 in Porter (1985), p. 37. 
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But as a certain degree of stability is to be assumed29, membership is determined through 
participation in meeting the “meta-objective” of the supply chain as a “fulfillment system”.  A 
graphical illustration of the fulfillment perspective is shown in Figure 2-8 above. 
Aversion Three: Current Process Models 
The last aversion to be described here is an objection towards the highly influential model put 
forward in Cooper, Lambert, & Pagh (1997), see Figure 2-2.  In this model all processes cross 
all participating supply chain members, and all functions within each company participate in 
all processes.  To this author the focus on operations clearly illustrates the distinction between 
primary and secondary activities.  Functions like HR and Finance are crucial to the survival of 
the company but do not participate directly in operations.  Research and development is 
obviously of critical importance but again: does not participate in the fulfillment of end-
customer needs. 
Figure 2-9: Supply Chain Process Model 
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The names of the processes suggested in Figure 2-2 set aside, it seems obvious that processes 
have different scopes, e.g. that the process “Supplier Relationship Management” points 
upstream only and the process “Customer Relationship Management” points downstream30.  
Whether these processes encompass more than the first tier or not will depend on the context, 
e.g. the power distribution in the supply chain.  These processes, and other processes like 
                                                 
29  In some articles the concept of Virtual Enterprise (VE) is considered a form of SCM.  This is rejected by the 
author, primarily due to the temporal nature of the relationships promoted in VE.  For a comparison of SCM 
and VE, see Pires et al. (2001). 
30  In the tradition of explaining SCM from the point of view of ”the focal company”, relationship management 
with suppliers will naturally differ from the relationship management with customers albeit the overall 
goals are identical: to ensure win-win in the long term. 
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“Collaborative Planning”, “Procurement”, and “Returns Handling” are examples of processes 
supporting the “meta-process” of “Order Fulfillment” as illustrated in the Supply Chain 
Process Model depicted in Figure 2-9 above. 
Choosing a Perspective 
The elaboration over the author’s personal aversions has resulted in this dissertation focusing 
on manufacturing firms.  By choosing the “Fulfillment” perspective the supply chain is 
perceived as a “long-linked technology” (Thompson, 1967).  Interdependence is constituted 
(in part) by the activity dependency (same author) and the supply chain becomes a system 
which can be designed.  Fulfillment is the “meta-objective” crossing legal boundaries, 
justifying the holistic approach and the emphasis on win-win to create long-term, stable 
organizational structures to achieve corporate and shared goals for the entire supply chain.  
This should in no way be perceived as a rejection of the importance of innovation in process 
or product, but simply that the “raison d’etre” for SCM is to optimize the fulfillment of end-
user demand.  Innovation is crucially important to most companies, but is perceived as 
different from SCM.  Finally, recognizing the process orientation is crucial to SCM, the 
emphasis on fulfillment is supported by the elaboration over the scope and relevance of 
processes.  The “Order Fulfillment” process is therefore perceived as the “meta-process” of 
SCM, and the principal object for risk management. 
2.4.2 Designing for Supply Chain Stability 
Ensuring the stability of the “Order Fulfillment” process is thereby the objective when 
designing the supply chains of a company.  For the process to perform satisfactory throughput 
should be kept at the anticipated level at all times, requiring the minimization of disruptions 
of the in-flow and of the performance of internal operations.  In case disruptions from internal 
operations are persistent activities may be outsourced; alternatively if activities are performed 
outside the organization they may be insourced to obtain control. 
Using outsourcing to reduce disruptions may be a risky option as it exposes the company to 
the risk of sudden exits of the outsourcing party.  This risk may be mitigated by the use of 
contracts, but contracts may be useless if size disparities exist, or if the outsourcing party 
seizes to exist (e.g. bankruptcy or explosion/fire). 
Overall, one might say that ceteris paribus risks should be avoided or minimized to the degree 
costs can be justified, and as long as the strategic ambition of the supply chain is not 
jeopardized.  Comparing with a popular OM author’s design model provides interesting 
insights, see Figure 2-10 below. 
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Figure 2-10: Performance objectives…31 
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First and foremost it is evident the risk objective is missing from the model.  This may be 
either a crime of omission, or a distinct choice by the author, but it seems obvious that the risk 
of failure must be part of the decision when evaluating performance objectives.  In other 
words, risk must be part of this typology of performance objectives, and must even have a 
special status along with cost. 
Another insight is that (production) systems are designed for a multiplicity of goals, of which 
risk and cost must always be part.  It would be hard to imagine a production engineer having a 
long career at a company if the (production) system was designed to achieve a given goal (e.g. 
flexibility) but paid no attention to neither risk nor cost.  Albeit the former might not be a 
problem in the short run (as failures are not necessarily evenly distributed over time) the lack 
of attention paid to the cost objectives will quickly be identified. 
Also, it may be intuitively understood that the pursuit of one objective might result in poorer 
performance on another.  E.g. raising the quality of the product over a certain threshold might 
cause excessive cost increases, or pursuing a strategy of speed might increase risk of failure as 
buffer (in the shape of time) is removed from the system.  A further complexity is naturally 
experienced when a company services more than one market or supplies more than one 
product (or in other words: have more than one business model/supply chain). 
                                                 
31 Source: Slack, Chambers, & Johnston (2004), p. 57. 
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Achieving Stability 
For these reasons designing supply chains for stability is quite a challenging task – balancing 
objectives for each supply chain with risk and cost, and obtaining synergies or acceptable 
compromises across supply chains (in case the company has more supply chains). 
The design task in itself might include redistribution of activities, by in- or out-sourcing as 
mentioned above, or by redesign of products.  Also the implementation of various production 
and distribution concepts (various types of postponement, mass customization, decentralized 
inventories, the use of TPL’s etc.) might prove beneficial in achieving the defined goals.  
Concurrently with the evaluation of the objectives an analysis of risk and cost must be 
performed, creating a foundation for decision making supporting the long-term survival of the 
company. 
2.5 Introducing the Supply Chain Risk Matrix 
Perceiving supply chains as “long-linked technologies” (Thompson, 1967) supports the use of 
systems theory.  In systems theory the concepts Structure and Process are routinely used to 
describe the system and its activities.  These concepts are also well known and used within 
SCM (e.g. Gammelgaard, 2004; Holmberg, 2000; New, 1997) and Supply Chain Design (e.g. 
Korpela, Lehmusvaara, & Tuominen, 2001a; van Hoek & Weken, 1998).  Intuitively, this 
division corresponds to the structural and process aspects of managing risks in the supply 
chain.  The Structure component translates into the risk of managing “the sudden departure of 
a critical supply chain partner” where as the Process component translates into the risk of a 
“disruption of the material flow”. 
But, from a risk management perspective, also moral hazard (Arrow, 1965) is of critical 
importance.  Managing the risk of an intentional disruption is quite different from managing 
the un-intentional ditto.  In the former case writing up a contract might take care of the 
problem whereas the latter might include monitoring of operations at the suppliers’ sites, and 
the creation of redundancies in form of e.g. long lead times downstream and various levels of 
inventory throughout the supply chain.  The related term information asymmetry (Arrow, 
1963) explains how information availability enables a party to make more informed decisions 
– like initiating or ending a business relationship.  In unison these mechanisms may be 
grouped under the term intentionality as the critical aspect is whether or not disruptions and 
exits are a result of a deliberate strategy or the inherent chaos of any business context. 
Combining Intent with Systems Theory Components 
Combining the systems theory components with intentionality result in the Supply Chain Risk 
Matrix depicted below in Figure 2-11.  In realizing some supply chain partners are non-
critical, the identification of supply chain risks will depend on the classification of the 
supplier and/or customer (critical/non-critical).  The management of structural risks is thereby 
a matter of design, minimizing the impact or likeliness of a departure of a critical supply chain 
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partner32.  On the process side, the design must assure resilience towards disruptions, or 
minimize the likeliness of the occurrence.  The supply chain must be designed, not only to 
withstand the occurrence of the above mentioned risks, but to meet the defined goals (cost, 
responsiveness etc.) of each supply chain as well. 
Figure 2-11: The Supply Chain Risk Matrix 
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The Use of the Supply Chain Risk Matrix 
The model described above is the principal model in this dissertation as it details the risks 
under scrutiny.  Therefore the model is referenced in most chapters (sometimes supplemented 
by Figure 2-9) containing analyses, describing e.g. in Chapter 4 how state-of-the-art Supply 
Chain Design addresses the management of supply chain risks. 
 
In the next three chapters the literature and theory reviews will document the level of support 
to the model. 
                                                 
32  E.g. choosing to use single-sourcing means accepting a higher impact of the exit of the supplier as no 
alternatives are readily available.  Choosing dual sourcing instead probably means higher prices (due to less 
volume) but less impact in case one of the suppliers should exit.  See e.g. Treleven & Schweikhart (1988) 
for a risk/benefit analysis of sourcing strategies. 
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Chapter 3 Risk, Vulnerability, and Uncertainty 
The purpose of this chapter is to answer the first research question: 
Research Question 1: Which are the major themes on Risk and 
Uncertainty within the SCM literature? 
 
Therefore an extensive literature study on Risk, Vulnerability, and Uncertainty has been 
performed1.  After briefly describing the research methodology applied the identified articles 
are described, first using the categories defined and subsequently according to the themes 
identified.  The identified themes are subsequently positioned according to the Supply Chain 
Risk Framework as illustrated in Figure 3-1 below. 
Figure 3-1: Supply Chain Risk Framework 
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The last step is an analysis of Risk Journals for contributions on SCM. 
3.1 Research Methodology 
As the intent of the literature study is to describe the use of the terms Risk, Vulnerability, and 
Uncertainty within SCM the “domain-based” strategy2 has been applied.  The source for the 
study (the population) is the list of journals presented in Table 1-1, the volumes investigated 
                                                 
1  The study was performed in the spring of 2003 and updated in August 2004.  Details in Appendix D.  See 
also Sørensen (2004).  A comparable study (albeit on SCM in general) is reported in Burgess, Singh, & 
Koroglu (2006). 
2  As described in Appendix C. 
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are listed in Table D-23.  As the intent is to perform an exhaustive study of the journals 
chosen, the selection criterion is loosely defined as “any article referencing risk, vulnerability, 
or uncertainty” and instead of using a search engine the journals were read through manually 
by the author.  The resulting gross list is thereby a result of the subjective opinion of the 
author, only rejecting editorials, book reviews, and interviews.  The strategy chosen for the 
literature study enables and justifies a completeness check which is performed by text 
searches across the five relevant databases available: ABI/INFORM, Business Source 
Premier, EMERALD, JSTOR, and ScienceDirect.  The criterion applied is for abstracts to 
contain the phrases “Risk”, “Vulnerability”, or “Uncertainty” AND either “Logistics” or 
“Supply chain”4.  The number of relevant hits will determine the “completeness” of the list of 
relevant journals mentioned above.  The parameters for the study are shown in Table D-1. 
Subsequent to the identification of the relevant articles, each article is classified according to 
the following categories: 
? Term: Risk, Vulnerability, Uncertainty 
? Phase: Risk Identification, Risk Assessment, Risk Management 
? Orientation: Upstream, Internal, Downstream, Network 
? Level: Strategic, Operational 
The categories serve three purposes: 
1. to give an idea of the Risk Management contribution, 
2. to document the focus of the article, and 
3. to show the time perspective and/or structural vs. process/activity implications. 
The first two categories support the first purpose where the third and fourth categories support 
the second and third purposes, respectively.  Besides the categories for each article the 
research method and the theory explicitly referenced is analyzed and documented.  Insisting 
on the explication of theory is justified by the need to document the operationalisation of 
theory on Risk Management. 
The final step in the analysis is to identify themes, defined as a collection of at least three 
articles focusing on the same problem or phenomenon.  As the analysis is performed for each 
class of articles (SCM/Logistics, OM, and Management) already identified themes may be re-
used.  After performing the completeness check, the entire collection of identified articles is 
analyzed creating the final list of themes. 
3.2 Results 
Reading through the journals on SCM/Logistics resulted in 47 hits, in OM journals 73 articles 
were found, and in Management journals the result was 56 hits.  The completeness check 
across the five databases resulted in adding another thirteen articles from nine journals to the 
                                                 
3 For the analysis of risk journals, the population is presented in Table 1-2, the volumes investigated are listed 
in Table E-2.  
4  Search expression: “(‘logistics’ OR ‘supply chain’) AND (‘vulnerability’ OR ‘uncertainty’ OR ‘risk’)” in 
the Abstract field. 
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list.  Comparing the high number of articles identified in the original study with the dispersion 
and low number of articles identified in the completeness check, prompts the conclusion that 
the study is complete. 
3.2.1 Categories: Term & Phase 
Only very few (nine) of the 189 articles found reference the term Vulnerability, whereas 76 
reference Uncertainty and 104 articles reference Risk.  Of the nine articles referencing 
Vulnerability, six are authored by Göran Svensson (2000, 2001, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2002d) 
using Marketing Channels theory to measure the vulnerability of in- and out-bound logistics 
flows.  None of the other authors referencing Vulnerability use theory, but Albino & Garavelli 
(1995) work with vulnerability measurement as well (albeit on JIT production systems).  The 
last two articles (Zaidman, 1994; Watkins & Bazerman, 2003) are similar in the sense that the 
Vulnerability concept is used to describe risk sources; in the former the marketplace, in the 
latter a typology of risk sources: psychological, organizational, and political risks. 
A large portion of the articles referencing Uncertainty, especially articles from OM journals, 
are focused on improving internal operations under uncertainty.  It is not the intent of these 
contributions to identify or remove uncertainties, but “merely” to improve techniques to 
handle variability.  A subset of these contributions is the articles dealing with MRP/IT 
systems.  Interestingly, many of the problems described in these articles, e.g. problems on 
scheduling (Denzler, Boe, & Duplaga, 1987; Ho & Carter, 1994; Lin & Krajewski, 1992; 
Tang & Grubbström, 2002), dynamic lot sizing (Callarman & Hamrin, 1984), or inventory 
control (Etienne, 1987; Guide Jr & Srivastava, 2000) are routinely managed in modern ERP 
systems.  In this area the work on managing uncertainty has had an impact. 
Even if the terms Risk and Uncertainty may to a certain extent be used interchangeably, there 
is one distinct difference between the two groups of articles: the articles on Uncertainty do not 
attempt to assess the uncertainties.  Only one article (Koh & Saad, 2003) comes close as the 
authors attempt to diagnose uncertainties in ERP-controlled shop floors.  The article is 
classified as identifying uncertainties, a combination shared with only two other articles (van 
der Horst & Beulens, 2002; Wilding, 1998a).  These two articles are especially interesting as 
they reference SCM directly, the former referencing Uncertainty as a driver for re-design, the 
latter explaining the causes and mechanisms for uncertainty generation in the supply chain. 
The other combination, Uncertainty and Management, appear in a limited number of articles 
as well.  The commonality between these articles is clearly SCM, as only one (Collis, 1992) 
does not reference the concept.  The management of uncertainties take different forms as two 
articles (Martha & Subbakrishna, 2002; Sheffi, 2001) are on disasters/terrorism whereas the 
remaining four articles (Davis, 1993; Geary, Childerhouse, & Towill, 2002; Lee, 2002; 
Ottesen & Gronhaug, 2002d) deal with the management of the less dramatic uncertainties: 
supply, demand, process, and control.  Conversely, the contributions on Risk are 
predominantly concerned with the identification, assessment, and management of risks. 
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3.2.2 Categories: Orientation & Level 
Analyzing the entire population reveals large differences in orientation as the most “popular” 
orientation is Internal (82), a lot are oriented upstream (62) or downstream (43), and 
comparatively few (fourteen) are oriented toward the network level5. 
Performing a similar analysis on Level (strategic/operational) shows the same heterogeneous 
distribution.  Only a third (61) of the articles are oriented toward the strategic level.  The 
“operational” articles show the same pattern.  Analyzing the combination of Level and 
Orientation reveals few surprises: Internally oriented articles are predominantly “operational” 
whereas Network articles are “strategic”.  The portions of the articles that are oriented Up- 
and/or Down-stream are more or less evenly distributed. 
3.2.3 Category: Research Method 
A large portion (54) of the articles does not have a distinct research method but are of a 
conceptual nature.  The rest of the articles use either simulation (twelve), describe surveys 
(20), are case studies (35), or use some sort of mathematical modeling (68). 
3.2.4 Category: Explicitly Referencing Theory 
Except for previously mentioned author Göran Svensson and his use of Marketing Channels, 
the use of theory is scarce.  Of the 189 articles identified only 36 explicitly reference theory.  
Besides Marketing Channels, theories referenced with some frequency include Decision 
theory6 (8), Finance theory (3), Agency theory (3), Resource Based Theory (3), and 
Transaction Cost Economics (3).  The absence of explicit theory should not be conceived as 
an absence of theory in general, though.  Especially within the OM journals the explicit 
reference to theory is very scarce as the published work relies on a paradigm of optimization 
and efficiency.  The paradigm itself defines the playing field within which research is done. 
3.3 Themes 
The most popular theme, “Improving Operations under Uncertainty”, has already been 
described as has the theme “Vulnerability in Physical Flows”.  Both are considered marginal 
in relation to SCM, as the former is internally oriented and the latter considers the company as 
a black box.  Another theme already mentioned is “MRP/IT and Uncertainty”.  Besides these 
three themes another eight are identified, describing in total 157 of the 189 articles identified. 
It is quite evident certain journals have a distinct focus, as e.g. the theme “Decision Making” 
is almost exclusively based on the journal Decision Sciences.  Only one article (Kouvelis & 
Milner, 2002) from this theme seems to address design decisions in a SCM perspective 
(supply and demand uncertainty in planning for capacity).  The theme “Pricing/Financial 
Instruments” contains sixteen articles all dealing with the effects of risk on the pricing 
                                                 
5  Please note that Upstream, Internal, and Downstream classifications can be used in combination whereas 
Network can not. 
6  Decision theory and Finance theory is perceived as aggregate terms, not referencing a distinct theory. 
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decision or on investments and their valuation.  Within this theme one article (Arcelus, 
Pakkala, & Srinivasan, 2002) stands out as it references pricing decisions and risk sharing in 
supply chains.  Closer investigation reveals the article has limited general relevance as it is 
oriented towards a very specific context (global co-operation based on e-business under a 
floating-exchange regime, long-term supply contracts, and risk-sharing clauses). 
Introduction of new products is another theme identified.  In four articles, various risks in 
relation to the introduction of new products are described.  Two of the articles (Meldrum & 
Millman, 1991; Polk, Plank, & Reid, 1996) focus on high tech products and one (Hertz & 
Thomas, 1983) deals with the planning of new product and facilities introduction.  The last 
article belonging to the theme (Bowersox, Stank, & Daugherty, 1999) is on “Lean Launch”, a 
term describing the use of the pull strategy (and postponement techniques) upon new product 
introduction instead of the traditional push strategy (and forecast-driven ramp-ups). 
Primarily found in the European Management Journal, the theme “Risk and Strategy” deals 
with strategic management of risk and uncertainty.  None of the articles deal specifically with 
SCM but contribute to the general domain of strategic management. 
The last four themes identified: “Securing the Supply Chain”, “Supply Management”, 
“Supply Chain Design”, and “Risk Management in Supply Chains” all have a high degree of 
relevance as they confront the domain of SCM with the need to manage risks.  These themes 
are therefore described in further detail below, including an analysis of the risk management 
strategies suggested (if any). 
3.3.1 Theme: Securing the Supply Chain 
The articles in the theme “Securing the Supply Chain” all deal with extreme events, like 
terrorism, and all elaborate on finding the “correct” response to this type of events. 
In Lee & Wolfe (2003) the use of principles from the quality movement is advocated in the 
form of risk avoidance/prevention strategies (standardized procedures for inspection, 
protection of commercial information, and implementation of anti-tampering practices) as 
well as risk mitigation strategies (tracking & monitoring, supply chain event management 
(SCEM), flexible sourcing and inventory strategies, and the redesign of product and process).  
The claim is that appropriate practices will automatically lead to improved security, and that 
these appropriate practices by and large will pay themselves back in the long run. 
The necessity of redesigning supply chains for concurrent security and resilience is stated in 
Rice & Caniato (2003) as: 
“For many companies, the only thing standing between them and a disastrous 
supply chain disruption is luck.  But, as any gambler knows, your luck 
eventually runs out.  In today’s business environment, you need a supply 
network that has comprehensive security processes and procedures in place 
and is resilient enough to bounce back from any disruption that does happen.  
Luck plays no part in the equation.” (p. 23). 
Their claim is that security and resilience should be designed into supply chain concurrently, 
implementing prevention and mitigation procedures to increase the chances of corporate 
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survival.  They propose a list of basic and advanced responses for supply chain security, and 
an extensive list of supply chain resilience responses by failure mode. 
Simchi-Levy, Snyder, & Watson (2002) support the claim that rethinking the supply chain 
strategies under uncertainty is needed. They offer four strategic approaches for creating robust 
supply chains: hedge strategies, flexible strategies, collaboration & outsourcing, and What-If 
Analysis.  Their proposition is basically different levels of standardization of plant capabilities 
enabling easy re-distribution of demand from plant to plant, and implementation of 
redundancy in buffer inventory, capacity, supplier capabilities etc.  The only contingency 
mentioned is the added cost of using the flexible strategies. 
In Martha & Subbakrishna (2002) the balancing of advantages of SCM against the 
vulnerability created by e.g. the 9/11 attack is advised.  The authors suggest a variety of risk 
management strategies including insurance, reduction, sharing and avoidance.  Furthermore, 
the creation of redundancy in transportation, sourcing and inventory management is 
encouraged. 
In the last article in the theme (Sheffi, 2001) the cost of using dual sourcing for the reduction 
of the impact of an interruption is illustrated using utility theory.  Besides dual sourcing, the 
explicit use of inventory management to buffer against extreme events is elaborated upon: 
“To mitigate the effect of another terrorist attack, manufacturers should keep, 
in addition, inventory designated ‘Strategic Emergency Stock’.  This stock 
should not be used to buffer day-to-day fluctuations.  It should only be used in 
the case of an extreme disruption.  The costs of carrying this extra inventory 
represent the price of the premium for the insurance it buys.” (p. 3). 
The management of supply chain under uncertainty might improve by ensuring shipment 
visibility, risk pooling, and improved collaboration. 
The contributions in this theme are thereby quite conceptual in their attempt to ensure stability 
and resilience in the supply chain.  The generic strategies suggested for the management of 
the “extreme event” (terrorist attack) are shown below. 
Table 3-1: Risk Management Strategies in Theme “Securing the Supply Chain” 
 ----------------------Risk Management Strategy---------------------- 
Author(s) Acceptance Insurance Reduction Sharing Avoidance 
Lee & Wolfe, 2003   ? (?) ? 
Martha & Subbakrishna, 2002 ? ? ?  ? 
Rice & Caniato, 2003   ?  ? 
Sheffi, 2001   ? (?) ? 
Simchi-Levi, Snyder, & Watson, 2002   ? ? ? 
 
As shown in the table above, only Martha & Subbakrishna (2002)7 really apply the generic 
strategies of risk management, the rest of the contributions share an aim at designing the 
companies and their processes to reduce or avoid the identified risks. 
                                                 
7  It is no coincidence though, since Joseph Martha and Sunil Subbakrishna are vice presidents of Mercer 
Management Consulting, a major player in international consulting on insurance and risk management. 
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3.3.2 Theme: Supply Management 
Differing from “Securing the Supply Chain”, the theme “Supply Management” is more 
heterogeneous as it contains contributions from the past twenty five years, covering a range of 
issues. 
Early Contributions on Purchasing/Supply Management 
In the earliest contribution identified (Wright, 1980), it is advocated purchasing is about risk-
taking: 
“What is not well recognised, however, especially by the senior non-purchasing 
managers in the majority of manufacturing organizations, is the need to 
consider purchasing as a risk-taking function and the need for supply 
management to be involved in strategic planning.” (p. 47). 
The importance of the risk taking part of the above statement is emphasized: 
“It is essential that the purchasing function attempts to evaluate the stability of 
its sources of supply and to assess the supply failure risks that may be present 
in particular supply channels, especially those providing essential inputs for the 
company’s mainstream operations.” (pp. 48-49) 
and 
“…if purchasing is to be effective in providing the correct logistics support then 
supply risks must be evaluated and appropriate supply strategies must be 
formulated and become an essential input to corporate planning.” (p. 50). 
The author moves on to argue for the involvement of purchasing in corporate strategizing as: 
“Corporate strategies and plans are normally expressed in terms of products, 
markets, customers and competition – the outgoing aspects of the business – but 
if equilibrium and a state of dynamic stability is to be achieved with respect to 
both sales and supply markets, then the corporate strategy of a business should 
include supply strategy in terms of essential inputs, sources and supply 
channels.“ (p. 50). 
The development of purchasing capabilities in identification and assessment of supply risks is 
thereby of critical importance, as is the capability to develop contingency plans and ensure 
alternative sources of supply.  Recognizing that the perceived importance of the company by 
its suppliers is of critical importance as well, Wright proposes a conceptual Supply Risk 
Model, combining the ability to assess current and potential suppliers with the company’s 
standing with the supplier.  Wright does not offer frameworks to measure the proposed 
variables, but insists that continued research is necessary to make any progress beyond the 
simple point rating systems.  He furthermore proposes a generic model for risk assessment 
and contingency planning, see Figure 3-2.  But even if the model seems to follow a simple 
logic, it does not add much value as it leaves out a detailed description of which risks are 
relevant, how they are rated, and how alternatives are identified.  The model thereby is 
conceptual almost to the point of irrelevance – but it does offer a point of reference for other 
contributions within the field. 
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Figure 3-2: Risk Assessment and Contingency Planning8 
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In another early contribution, Treleven & Schweikhart (1988) offer a more nuanced view on 
supply risk as they perform a risk/benefit analysis of sourcing strategies.  Differentiating 
between single, sole, and multiple9 sourcing, they propose the following five categories of 
risks/benefits: 1) disruption of supply, 2) price escalation, 3) inventory and schedule, 4) 
technology access, & 5) quality.  The first two are cited as the most common arguments for 
not using single sourcing and are perceived as pure risk categories in the single sourcing 
strategy, whereas the rest have risks and benefits both for all three sourcing strategies.  
Interestingly, categories one and three fit quite well with the supply-side structural and 
process risks, as described in Chapter 2.  Access to technology is probably even more relevant 
today than when the article was written, but the quality discussion seems to have silenced.  
                                                 
8  Source: Figure 3 in Wright (1980), p. 57. 
9  ”Single sourcing is broadly defined as fulfillment of all of an organization’s needs for a particular purchased 
item from one vendor by choice. …  If this [single sourcing] is not done by choice, such as when a vendor 
has a monopoly, it is termed ’sole sourcing’. …  Multiple sourcing refers to a vendee purchasing an 
identical part from two or more vendors.  If only two vendors are used, this is a special case of multiple 
sourcing called dual sourcing.” (Treleven & Schweikhart, 1988, pp. 95-96). 
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The authors make quite a strong point in analyzing the risks relating to the use of single 
sourcing arrangements as they insist on either building a trust-based relationship prior to 
discarding alternative suppliers or performing a thorough analysis of the soundness of the 
suppliers (the former is preferred).  Irrespectively, after entering into a single sourcing 
arrangement, the risks must be monitored continuously: 
“The vendee cannot rely sole on these initial precautionary measures.  A 
contingency plan should be developed which describes the steps to be taken in 
the event that, despite its precautionary measures, a disruption in supply 
occurs. …  Developing contingency plans is also a wise step for companies 
which are vertically integrated since backward vertical integration is 
tantamount to internal single sourcing.” (p. 98). 
Besides the conceptual analysis of risks and benefits relating to the described sourcing 
strategies and the insistence on the continued monitoring, the authors do not offer anything on 
the management of the risks. 
Likewise referencing strategic sourcing and vertical integration, Walker (1988) uses 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) and Resourced Based Theory (RBT) to describe the 
strategic risks to be dealt with when determining sourcing strategy and the level of vertical 
integration.  The strategic risks identified are: 1) appropriation risk (the potential for decline 
in equitable exchange relationships), 2) diffusion risk (the likelihood of a competitor imitating 
the firm’s distinctive value-creating assets, and 3) product degradation (the chance that 
important product attributes will be distorted, ignored or impaired in distribution, marketing, 
or technical service operations).  Defining uncertainty in the sourcing relationships by volume 
uncertainty and technological uncertainty, Walker argues the relationship between uncertainty 
and vertical integration is quite straight-forward: 
“Vertical integration becomes the ultimate option as uncertainty associated 
with the sourcing relationship rises.” (p. 69). 
To Walker, the decision of vertical integration and de-integration depends on a number of 
contingencies: level and type of uncertainty (volume and/or technological) experienced, value 
of input, strategic importance, asset specificity, and level of buyer qualification. The 
qualification of inside and outside sources is especially interesting as it: 
“…entails an examination of their [the internal or external suppliers] 
capabilities to meet specific performance criteria.  These may be either 
operational-level criteria, primarily price based on production costs and 
controlled for delivery and quality, or strategic criteria, for example, 
technological leadership, ability to link to other suppliers, and the compatibility 
of the outside source’s long-range plan with that of the firm.” (p. 70). 
The emphasis on the strategic level is thereby apparent as no attention is given to e.g. 
disruptions in input.  The decision model on integration/de-integration is depicted in Figure 
3-3 below. 
Risk Management in the Supply Chain 
Page 58 
Figure 3-3: Vertical integration decisions associated with combinations of strategic risk and 
buyer qualification10 
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The framework describes the two mechanisms, buyer qualification and strategic sourcing risk, 
and their impact on the make-buy decision.  The lower capabilities and the higher sourcing 
risk, the more likely a company is to reject the use of external sources. 
Taking a more logistically oriented perspective, Hill & Vollmann (1986) also deal with a 
much more specific situation as they have vendor delivery uncertainty in a JIT environment 
under scrutiny – the authors suggest in-sourcing the responsibility of inbound logistics from 
all JIT suppliers.  Simply letting the manufacturing firm organize the pick up of required input 
to the operation will reduce delivery uncertainty.  Boronico & Bland (1996) likewise are 
logistically oriented as they investigate the distribution of seasonal, perishable food products 
with fixed demand and probabilistic supply.  In line with these two contributions, Ottesen & 
Grønhaug (2002c) investigate how upstream actors cope with uncertain supply to handle 
customers’ demand. 
Buying Decisions 
In another early contribution (Tullous & Munson, 1991) tradeoffs under uncertainty for 
industrial purchasers are investigated.  The authors define uncertainty as: 1) need uncertainty 
(ease or difficulty encountered in specifying and measuring product uses and characteristics), 
2) market uncertainty (stability of the marketplace and the degree of difficulty encountered in 
comparing the characteristics of the potential suppliers), and 3) transaction uncertainty (the 
degree of difficulty encountered in delivering the product to the purchaser), and interviewed 
eighty companies in the electronics industry to determine the relative importance of widely 
used selection criteria under varying degrees of uncertainty.  On much the same note, Templin 
& Noffsinger (1994) assess the role of technical and risk evaluation factors in source selection 
in the US military.  In their analysis they describe risk in terms of: 1) technical, 2) past 
                                                 
10  Source: Figure 1 in Walker (1988), p. 70. 
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performance, 3) cost and 4) schedule risks, and conclude that low values for these risk 
indicators correlate strongly with awarding of contract. 
Taking the perspective of organizational behavior Henthorne, LaTour, & Williams (1993) 
investigate the influence of informal members of a buying centre have on the perceived type 
and level of risk.  They use the following categories: 1) performance risk (likelihood of 
product failure), 2) social risk (risk of purchased product not being approved by important 
reference group), and 3) economic risk (potential dollars investment loss), and conclude that 
the opinion of both internal and external informal members influence the perceived risk and 
thereby the buying behavior.  Bunn & Liu (1996) investigate the reverse situation: how 
customer perceptions of risk have an impact on the buying decision.  To them perceived risk 
is central to the issue of adaptive selling: 
“Because a buying decision can be viewed as an instance of risk taking, and 
because buying behaviours can be thought of as risk handling strategies, we 
sought to develop a categorization based on the dimensions of perceived risk.” 
(p. 441). 
Their hypothesis is that current customer classifications does not support adaptive selling, and 
criticize e.g. Kraljic (1983) for not dealing explicitly with risk.  They propose using only two 
variables (purchase importance and task uncertainty) to describe situational risk, and to set up 
a 2-by-2 matrix to categorize customer situations11.  Subsequently the categorization is tested 
by means of a survey, after which it is concluded that these four cells represent four distinctly 
different buying situations.  In Westbrook (1996), the last of the three articles identified in 
Industrial Marketing Management, a list of propositions on risk coordinative maneuvers 
during buyer-seller negotiations are put forward.  Westbrook assumes that stakes and risk 
framing drive the negotiation style, and includes the risk component in the contingency model 
in the antecedent “risk orientation”.  As the model is not tested, it only serves as inspiration 
for other researchers. 
Hunter et al. (2004) likewise propose a matrix for classifying organizational buying decisions 
into categories with implications for e-business, see Figure 3-4 below.  In order to link risk 
with the benefits of e-business, the authors reference a concept of risk perception as a 
construct of 1) risk importance (the perceived importance in the buyer’s mind of the potential 
negative consequences of a poor product choice) and 2) risk probability (the perceived 
probability of making a poor choice).  Combining risk importance and risk probability, their 
model is much more complex as it uses product characteristics, essentiality of the product, the 
number of suppliers, supplier capabilities, and ease of specifying the product requirements.  
For each cell, the generic risks and benefits of performing e-business are outlined. 
 
                                                 
11 Values Low-Low result in low risk, High-High in high risks, combinations of Low/High in moderate risk. 
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Figure 3-4: A risk/benefit framework for industrial buying12 
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Contemporary Contributions on Supply Management 
Lonsdale (1999) uses a terminology different from that of Walker but basically writes on the 
same subject as he aims at improving the practices of outsourcing through the use of concepts 
from RBT: resource heterogeneity, ex-post and ex-ante limits to competition, and imperfect 
mobility.  Lonsdale argues the risk to manage is the danger of dependency, a danger emerging 
in three different ways: 
“There are a number of ways in which dependency can emerge: outsourcing 
into a limited supply market, poor internal alignment, and contractual 
incompetence in the face of different degrees of asset specificity.” (p. 179). 
Where the argument made on outsourcing into a limited supply market is quite obvious, the 
results of poor internal alignment are less so.  The argument made is that choosing suppliers 
too early in the procurement process will limit the bargaining power of the purchasing 
department. 
                                                 
12  Source: Figure 1 in Hunter et al. (2004), p. 148. 
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Figure 3-5: A risk management model for outsourcing13 
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The last way in which dependency emerges, the contractual incompetence, is the most 
sophisticated argument: 
“The third way in which dependency on suppliers can arise is the most 
intriguing.  Whilst the firm might be able, pre-contractually, to choose from a 
competitive supply market, at the re-contracting stage it’s capacity to do so 
again can be reduced.  This is because, in the case of certain transactions, re-
accessing that supply market is often constrained by the sunk and switching 
costs that have been built up during the initial contractual term.  To understand 
why and when supply options might diminish in this way, it is necessary to refer 
to the work of transaction cost economists, most notably Williamson, and his 
concept of asset specificity.” (p. 179). 
Switching from a single-period analysis to a multi-period thereby changes the rules of the 
game between supplier and buyer, limiting the value creation potential of outsourcing.  Figure 
3-5 above illustrates the logic of the model. 
More specifically targeting the risk component, George Zsidisin (Zsidisin, Panelli, & Upton, 
2000; Zsidisin, 2003a; Zsidisin, 2003b; Zsidisin & Ellram, 2003; Zsidisin et al., 2004) has an 
interest in exploring the perceptions of supply risks and the management of suppliers using 
e.g. agency and grounded theory.  In Zsidisin, Panelli, & Upton (2000) the current practice of 
supply risk management is investigated, concluding: 
                                                 
13  Source: Figure 1 in Lonsdale (1999), p. 181. 
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“However, with such sourcing strategies [single sourcing], companies are 
exposing themselves to increased levels of risk…  Because of the imminent 
threat supply risks may entail, some companies are realizing the importance of 
assessing risks, contingency planning, and managing supply risk.” (p. 196). 
In a later article Zsidisin & Ellram (2003) use Agency Theory to describe (external) risk 
prevention as Behavior-Based Management and risk reduction as Buffer-Oriented 
Management14.  Buffering is perceived as the simple response whereas Behavior-Based 
Management (supplier certification, quality programs, target costing etc.) is perceived as 
sophisticated.  One of the findings of this study is that the extent of implementation of supply 
risk management is influenced by firm size and percentage of strategic purchases.  Another is 
that even companies having implemented Behavior-Based Management still have buffering in 
place.  In yet another article (Zsidisin et al., 2004) the focus is directed at supply risk 
assessment techniques, which is researched by means of interviews with a small number of 
manufacturing firms.  They conclude that the formalized practices for identification and 
assessment is almost absent, but that existing tools for proactive supplier management makes 
relevant information available. 
The importance of proactive supply management is supported in at least two other 
contributions: Smeltzer & Siferd (1998) and Norrman & Jansson (2004).  In the former the 
connection between proactive supply management and risk management is stated clearly: 
“…proactive supply management is qualitatively different from reactive supply 
management.  Also, it is more than integrative procurement management and 
more than strategic procurement management.  Proactive supply management 
is concerned with a significant additional issue: risk management.” (p. 39). 
The claim is that purchasing departments working proactively are able to reduce the inherent 
risks and improve returns and will add more value than their counterparts working reactively.  
In the latter article, the development of supply chain risk management (SCRM) practices at 
Ericsson following the Albuquerque accident (see also Chapter 1) is described.  The practices 
described in the article include risk identification, risk evaluation, and risk management.  
Figure 3-6 below illustrates how risks identified and measured are linked to the invoicing (or 
lost invoicing) through the product portfolio.  The resulting indicators, BRT and BRI, enable 
Ericsson to choose the right action based on estimates of impact and cost of action. 
                                                 
14  With reference to the ‘Probability times Impact’ model, it might be argued that the prevention strategy aims 
at reducing the probability of the detrimental event, whereas the reduction strategy seeks to minimize the 
impact. 
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Figure 3-6: Ericsson’s approach to Supply Chain Risk Management15 
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So, combining the assessment (BI and BRT values) leads to the choice of risk treatment 
options, constrained by the cost of the option. 
In Hallikas et al. (2004) previous work on risk analysis and assessment (Hallikas, Virolainen, 
& Tuominen, 2002) is extended, as risk management processes in supplier networks are 
investigated.  In the 2002 article a risk definition including: 1) demand related factors and 
value chain positioning, 2) delivery performance, 3) financial factors, and 4) pricing was used, 
and tools and methods for the analysis and assessment of these risks were presented, see 
Figure 3-7 below.  The approach to risk management thereby has direct effects on the choice 
of strategies: 
“The assessment of risks is important for two reasons: it helps a company to 
focus on essential risks, and it has significance for the choice of strategies. …  
The primary aim of the model is not to provide an absolute value of risk, but 
rather to provide support in the decision making process.” (p. 53). 
Choosing a proactive approach will enable the companies to react to the root cause instead of 
the symptom, as the proactive approach will monitor for identified risks.  After decomposing 
the four risks mentioned above based on the collected empirics, it is stated that the definition 
of a typical network risk is not possible, and that further research is needed. 
                                                 
15  Source: Figure 13 in Norrman & Jansson (2004), p. 451. 
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Figure 3-7: Risk assessment framework16 
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This is addressed in the 2004 article, where the risk definition is altered as the “financial 
factors” category is replaced by “weaknesses in resources, development and flexibility”.  
Each of the phases in the generic risk management process (identification, assessment, choice, 
implementation, and monitoring) is thoroughly described, and integration of risk management 
processes in network environments is recommended: 
“Each enterprise operates at its own risk and should manage risks itself.  As 
the interconnections of the enterprises in the network make them dependent on 
each other, it can be useful to share partially the risk management process and 
to develop collaborative means to manage the risks.” (p. 52). 
Figure 3-8: Risk management process in network environment17 
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16  Source: Figure 6 in Hallikas et al. (2002), p. 53. 
17  Source: Figure 2 in Hallikas et al. (2004), p. 55. 
Chapter Three – Risk, Vulnerability, and Uncertainty 
Page 65 
It remains unclear exactly how these risk management processes are to interlink, and how 
emerging risks are to be addressed, but the model has a strong point in its aim at aligning risk 
management processes and the coordinating of risk management per se across the network, 
see Figure 3-8 above. 
This problem is addressed in Sinha, Whitman, & Malzahn (2004), where a generic approach 
to supplier risk management is presented.  The objective of the model is to enable supplier 
risk management in a consistent way across the multiple supply chains companies participate 
in.  The model contains the usual risk management process steps: identify, assess, plan & 
implement, monitor (failure mode & effect analysis), and improve.  The model differs from 
other models, though, in the fact that each step is supposed to take the rest of the network into 
consideration, and that change in one process might influence other processes: 
“Today, many opportunities (risks) arise due to changes in business practices.  
A supply chain network can never be risk free, that is, one cannot eradicate the 
chance of an undesirable event occurring.  As trading partner needs (internal 
or external) change, the redesigned process (with mitigated risk) must be 
improved.  Therefore, embedding continuous improvements into the redesigned 
process is required.  However, to manage risk effectively, that is monitoring 
and controlling it, the iterative steps of identifying, assessing, planning 
solutions, and conducting failure mode and effect analysis should be followed.” 
(p. 160). 
The model is generic, but applied to the aerospace industry, documenting the risk sources and 
mechanisms in the supply markets and the regulatory institutions for this industry. 
Lastly Harland et al. (2003) review definitions and literature and suggest a generic model for 
the identification, assessment, and management of supplier network risks.  Their model is, as 
some of the other models presented, generic, but is applied to the risk of trade compliance.  
As suggested in Hallikas et al. (2004), Harland et al. propose setting the level of analysis at 
the network level and applying collaborative supply network risk strategies. 
 
So, albeit all interested in improving the management of supply, commonality in risk 
definition and approaches to risk management is absent.  The sophistication of the risk 
management strategies differ greatly across the identified articles, with Hallikas et  al. (2004) 
and Sinha, Whitman, & Malzahn (2004) being the most developed.  Most of the articles 
reference the reduction and avoidance strategies only, see Table 3-2 below. 
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Table 3-2: Risk Management Strategies in Theme “Supply Management” 
 ----------------------Risk Management Strategy---------------------- 
Author(s) Acceptance Insurance Reduction Sharing Avoidance 
Hallikas et al., 2004 ? ? ? ? ? 
Harland, Brenchley, & Walker, 2003   ? ? ? 
Lonsdale, 1999   ?  ? 
Norrman & Jansson, 2004 ?  ?  ? 
Ottesen & Gronhaug, 2002b ?    ? 
Sinha, Whitman, & Malzahn, 2004 ? ? ? ? ? 
Walker, 1988   ? (?) ? 
Wright, 1980 ?  ?  ? 
Zsidisin & Ellram, 2003   ?  ? 
Zsidisin, Panelli, & Upton, 2000   ?  ? 
 
3.3.3 Theme: Supply Chain Design 
The articles on supply chain design are as diverse as the articles in the previous theme, not 
least in terms of research method. 
Modeling 
Quite a few of the article identified for this theme use modeling.  In Gupta, Gerchak, & 
Buzacott (1992) the aim of the model is to find the optimal mix of flexible and dedicated 
manufacturing capacity under uncertain demand, in Agrell, Lindroth, & Norrman (2004) the 
effect of incentive structures on a three-tier supply chain is investigated using a two-period 
agency model assuming stochastic demand.  The model described in Korpela et al. (2002) 
resembles the first model as it aims at minimizing the production capacity needed given a 
sales plan, but differs as it uses a risk profile of the relation between supplier and customer 
instead of uncertain demand.  In Kouvelis & Milner (2002) both supply and demand are 
uncertain, the question to answer is whether to outsource or adapt capacity. 
Vidal & Goetschalkx (2000) investigate the effect of uncertainties on global logistics systems 
(GLS) by means of mathematical models.  Besides pointing out the importance of getting 
correct and reliable data, they insist that: 
“Despite attempts to consider uncertainties in global supply chain models, it 
appears that no model is capable of managing the uncertainties that 
characterize a GLS.  As a consequence, existing models are useful only if they 
allow analysts to perform adequate sensitivity analyses in a reasonable 
computation time.” (p. 103). 
After having investigated the effects of various types of uncertainties they conclude: 
“A simple model illustrated two important ideas.  First, any good strategic 
configuration of a global supply chain may become inadequate due to inherent 
uncertainties of the system, such as exchange rate fluctuations, changing 
demand, supplier reliability, and/or stochastic lead times.  Second, MIP models 
are powerful tools for analysing those variations and re-optimizing the system 
under the new conditions. … The integration of several stochastic aspects in 
MP production–distribution models creates a valuable tool for analyzing 
different scenarios.” (p. 112). 
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The mathematical models thereby can not predict the better designs, but may be able to 
replicate current results given larger and larger portions of reality?  Furthermore, the models 
are unable to determine the relevant types of uncertainties to include in the model, but may be 
able to evaluate whether each uncertainty has an effect on any of the desired outputs.  Their 
framework is depicted in Figure 3-9 below. 
Figure 3-9: The Global Supply Chain Design Process18 
• Management strategies
• Expertise and intuition
• Data and information
• Quantitative techniques
• Cost
• Customer service
• Quality
• Product innovation
• Flexibility
• Core capabilities of the company
• General costs
• The market
• Infrastructure
• Cash flow
• Suppliers
• Manufacturing characteristics
• Distribution systems
• Political/economic environment
• Uncertainties
• Taxes and duties
• Managerial issues
• Information flow
• Other (e.g. alliances)
SET OF POTENTIAL
• Suppliers
• Facility sites
QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES &
DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS
(MP models for fine tuning and 
sensitivity analyses)
• Transportation channels
• Commodity flows
• Implementation
• Management of the global supply chain
 
 
On more or less the same note, Sabri & Beamon (2000) present a multi-objective (efficiency, 
effectiveness, and flexibility) model assuming production, delivery, and demand uncertainty.  
The model produces a “supply chain performance vector” describing total costs, volume 
flexibility, customer service level index, and delivery flexibility index. 
                                                 
18  Source: Figure 1 in Vidal & Goetschalckx (2000), p. 100. 
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Case-based Contributions 
Another group of articles are the case-based contributions, possibly offering less abstract 
results than the optimization models.  As already described, Lonsdale (1999) investigates the 
practice of outsourcing critical activities and ex-ante and ex-post dependencies of suppliers 
using Hewlett-Packard as case.  Also using Hewlett-Packard Davis (1993) describes the 
practices of managing uncertainties in input, production, and demand.  Johnson (2001) 
describes the toy industry and unravels the relevant up- and down-stream risks.  In Hauser 
(2003) the case for using software tools and spreadsheet to identify and assess risks is made. 
To Geary, Childerhouse, & Towill (2002) supply chain uncertainty can be described by 
process, supply, demand, and control uncertainty.  They thereby combine the “usual” 
framework of upstream, internal, and downstream uncertainties with the mitigation 
mechanisms of visibility and control put forward in Christopher & Lee (2004).  With the aim 
of creating the “seamless supply chain” tighter integration is advocated, reducing uncertainty 
by creating visibility up- and down-stream.  The self-enforcing mechanism described here 
thereby contradicts the vicious circle depicted in Figure 3-15 below as they claim: 
“Thus, the seamless supply chain becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy: Lower 
uncertainty leads to tighter integration, which reduces uncertainty further, and 
the cycle continues.” (p. 56). 
The level and type of uncertainty is furthermore used in combination with the integration 
framework put forward by Stevens (1989) to create a model of supply chain maturity, see 
Figure 3-10 below. 
Figure 3-10: Maturity and Uncertainty Levels19 
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Identifying the level of maturity from the integration framework, the company can directly 
observe which types of uncertainty it faces.  The authors list the typical uncertainties within 
each class (process, supply, demand, and control) and describe the effects of the uncertainty 
                                                 
19  Source: Exhibit 3 in Geary, Childerhouse, and Towill (2002), p. 57.  (High numbers indicate a high level of 
uncertainty, low numbers the opposite). 
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by “type of supply chain disruption”.  To help the typical company achieving better 
performance by moving to the next level of maturity/integration, a model of the “well-trodden 
path to remove uncertainties” is presented, see Figure 3-11 below. 
Figure 3-11: Removing Uncertainties in a Particular Pattern20 
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Lee (2002) claims the appropriate management of supply chain(s) is determined by 
uncertainties in supply and demand both (thereby expanding the framework put forward by 
Fisher (1997)).  As illustrated in Figure 3-12 below the “solutions” proposed for reduction of 
supply and demand uncertainty thereby aims at 1. decreasing the uniqueness of offerings as 
innovation in products is avoided and 2. decreasing uncertainty by using stable (known) 
processes instead of new (evolving) processes (broadly defined). 
 
                                                 
20  Source: Exhibit 5 in Geary, Childerhouse, & Towill (2002), p. 58. 
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Figure 3-12: The Uncertainty Reduction Strategies21 
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Lee furthermore develops a taxonomy of matched strategies for the management of supply 
chains by combining supply and demand uncertainties, see Figure 3-13 below. 
Figure 3-13: Matched Strategies22 
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The principal contribution of the two models described above is thereby the lower left 
quadrant in the latter, the “Risk-hedging supply chains”, which is to be avoided through 
“Supply Uncertainty Reduction Strategies”.  The three other strategies are well-known within 
the domain. 
Conceptual Articles 
The rest of the articles are conceptual in nature, and differ quite a lot from each other.  In Rice 
& Caniato (2003) designing for both security and resilience to withstand e.g. terrorism is 
                                                 
21  Source: Figure 4 in Lee (2002), p. 109. 
22  Source: Figure 8 in Lee (2002), p. 114. 
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advocated, whereas the problem of dual/multiple supply chain memberships are pointed out 
by Sinha, Whitman, & Malzahn (2004): 
“… as a supplier provides value to different supply chains, it becomes 
increasingly risky.  Each supply chain has different objectives.  A member of a 
chain may have requirements placed upon them by one supply chain that 
conflict with requirements of another.” (p. 154). 
They propose designing the supply chains to minimize the risks of conflicting goals. 
The work by Newman, Hanna, & Maffei (1993) resembles the work of Gupta, Gerchak, & 
Buzacott (1992) as they propose a dynamic equilibrium model containing internal/external 
integration, manufacturing flexibility, and buffers (inventory, capacity, and time).  In van der 
Horst & Beulens (2002), the food supply chain is studied and strategies for supply chain 
redesign based on identified uncertainties are proposed.  Analyzing SME’s Ritchie & 
Brindley (2000) propose the future need to build relationships at speed. 
The table below shows the use of the generic risk management in the contributions aiming at 
the management of the risks.  This theme repeats the conclusion from the previous two: risks 
are to be reduced or avoided. 
Table 3-3: Risk Management Strategies in Theme “Supply Chain Design” 
 ----------------------Risk Management Strategy---------------------- 
Author(s) Acceptance Insurance Reduction Sharing Avoidance 
Agrell, Lindroth, & Norrman, 2004   ?  ? 
Davis, 1993   ?  ? 
Geary, Childerhouse, & Towill, 2002   ?  ? 
Grabowski & Roberts, 1999   ?  ? 
Hauser, 2003 ? ? ? ? ? 
Johnson, 2001   ?  ? 
Lee, 2002   ? ? ? 
Lonsdale, 1999   ?  ? 
Rice & Caniato, 2003   ?  ? 
Ritchie & Brindley, 2000   ?  ? 
Sinha, Whitman, & Malzahn, 2004 ? ? ? ? ? 
 
3.3.4 Theme: Risk Management in Supply Chains 
Not surprisingly all articles belonging to the theme “Risk Management in Supply Chains” are 
classified as strategic.  The articles are either reporting case studies or are of a conceptual 
nature, and theory is absent in all but one article (Hallikas et al., 2004 use TCE).  All but one 
article reference Risk, Davis (1993) reference Uncertainty.  Albeit quite homogenous when 
described using the categories the contributions differ quite a lot. 
In Grabowski & Roberts (1997) the perspective of complex systems is taken.  This clearly 
differs from a supply chain perspective as the boundaries of the system are not necessarily 
determined by the commercial objectives of the focal company (as assumed in the supply 
chain perspective).  One of the basic assumptions in complex (or large-scale) systems is that 
the system as a whole is difficult to comprehend, and decomposition of the system is therefore 
the norm.  Decomposing the system into subsystems to e.g. enable risk mitigation (as is the 
subject in the article) does not necessarily result in increased clarity: 
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“In large-scale systems, subsystems are often characterized paradoxically by 
both autonomy and interdependence.” (p. 154). 
In a supply chain perspective the interdependence between subsystems (entities in the chain) 
is in no way controversial as this may well be the criterion for participation (that is: to become 
a partner in a supply chain one has to offer dependency to/from other partners?).  Autonomy, 
on the other hand, is less obvious in a SCM perspective, unless perceived as the autonomy in 
decision making in the entity.  Nonetheless, the argument made might be valid for supply 
chains as well: 
“Autonomy and interdependence in large-scale systems make risk mitigation 
difficult.  While risk mitigation measures may well reduce risk in the 
autonomous subsystems, they may also have little impact (or even increase risk) 
in the system as a whole. …Thus, risk mitigation measures for interdependent 
subsystems must consider the effect on both the subsystems and the overall 
system.” (p. 154). 
Further complicating things, the authors claim that: 
“Because of the complexity inherent in large-scale systems, decision making in 
such systems often has both intended and unintended consequences.  Since 
interactions and influences in large-scale systems can be difficult to discern, the 
intended results of risk mitigation (i.e. reduced risk) may not occur, and those 
measures may instead produce unintended consequences.” (pp. 154-155). 
Translated into SCM arguments this might result in something like “sub-optimizing on the 
risk mitigation in any participating entity in the chain, might make the entire chain worse off.  
Therefore risk management should be communicated and perhaps even integrated”. 
Recognizing the multiplicity of risk management alternatives, Hauser (2003) proposes taking 
a risk perspective when analyzing the supply chains in a company.  Working as an advisor on 
risk management her approach relies on financial models, quantification of the identified 
risks, and the use of spreadsheets and simulations of adverse events.  The overall process of 
risk management is identical to previous authors, but has an emphasis on the assessment 
phase and the subsequent monitoring. 
Yet another perspective is presented in Link & Marxt (2004) as they deal with projects of 
cooperation instead of “normal operations”.  Perceiving risk as an inherent component in 
every type of cooperation they propose the integration of “risk and chance management” in 
the practice of cooperation, and suggest a model, see Figure 3-14 below.  Surprisingly, the 
proposed model does not seem to differ greatly from any other model reviewed, even if the 
time perspective and the objectives probably will differ from normal operations.  The absence 
of focus on the time perspective and the definition of milestones relating to risk/chance 
sharing clearly present an opportunity for improvement. 
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Figure 3-14: Risk and chance management process23 
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Norrman & Jansson (2004) take a SCM perspective and agree with other authors (e.g. 
Christopher & Lee, 2004; Link & Marxt, 2004; Hallikas et al., 2004) that supply chain risks 
increase due to current business trends such as outsourcing of manufacturing and R&D, 
globalization of supply chains, reduction of supplier base, more intertwined and integrated 
processes between companies, and reduced buffers (inventory and lead time) etc.  They 
suggest that: 
“… the focus of supply chain risk management (SCRM) is to understand, and 
try to avoid, the devastating ripple effects that disasters or even minor business 
disruptions can have in a supply chain.” (p. 435) 
and reference an earlier definition of the term SCRM: 
“Supply chain risk management is to [collaborate] with partners in a supply 
chain apply risk management process tools to deal with risks and uncertainties 
caused by, or impacting on, logistics related activities or resources.” (p. 436). 
They emphasize that tools, practices and organizational principles supporting the 
identification, assessment, prioritization and management of the risks span broader than the 
focal company: 
“SCRM means widening this approach to the chain of suppliers and suppliers’ 
suppliers.  This could be done by visiting suppliers and analyze and assess 
them, but more proactively to make them implement a SCRM approach 
themselves, which guarantees a further spread upstream.” (p. 450). 
The use of the KPI’s Business Recovery Time (BRT) and Business Interruption Value (BIV) 
is proposed as measures when implementing SCRM.  Not defining the relevant risks, the 
authors suggest that: 
“Current and new logistics principles could be evaluated from a SCRM 
perspective, and risk management actions must be evaluated from a logistics 
perspective focusing on cost, time, quality etc.” (p. 454). 
                                                 
23  Source: Figure 2 in Link & Marxt (2004), p. 73. 
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In conclusion the integration of Risk in the “logistics triangle” of Cost, Time, and Quality is 
suggested. 
Further elaborating on the supply chain risks, Christopher & Lee (2004) propose that some 
supply chain risks are generated by the supply chain itself, depending on certain 
characteristics.  They thereby support the notion of uncertainty generation in the supply chain 
put forward in Wilding (1998a) and propose another concept: the risk spiral.  In the risk 
spiral, the long (lead time in) pipelines lead(s) to a lack of visibility, which in turn leads to a 
lack of confidence in the supply chain partners and a subsequent build-up of buffers.  This in 
turn increases the time needed for a product to travel through the pipeline further decreasing 
the visibility etc.  Besides the “traditional” risk sources, the author thereby introduce a new 
category: the decision risks, risks incurring from the participants in the supply chain. 
Figure 3-15: The Risk Spiral24 
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To break this vicious circle an increased confidence in the supply chain is needed.  This is 
done be increasing the visibility (e.g. through information sharing) and the control (e.g. by 
defining control limits and exceptions procedures). 
The problem of interdependence in networks/chain is also under scrutiny in Spekman & Davis 
(2004) who build the case for even tighter integration between companies as they introduce a 
new term: 
“The notion of the extended enterprise takes supply chain management (SCM) 
to the next level and focuses on those factors and characteristics that link 
supply chain members by far more than just workflow and logistics.” (p. 415). 
Not easily implemented the authors warn: 
                                                 
24  Source: Figure 1 in Christopher & Lee (2004), p. 390. 
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“You would think that cross-functional cooperation is easily understood and 
implemented.  However, many if not most managers cannot rise above the 
typical company reward system that favors individual unit thinking over cross-
functional and cross-firm thinking.  Metrics that emphasize individual unit 
profit and loss rarely encourage such joint actions, where win-win thinking 
rules the day.” (p. 415). 
Investigating the risks inherent in supply chain and close cooperation the authors conclude 
that the management (and acceptance) of risks must be balanced with the traditional 
measures: 
“Cost, delivery and quality can still remain as important considerations, and 
supply chain members will have to develop processes and mechanisms for 
developing and nurturing trust among the members of the supply chain as well 
as acknowledge that they must also take responsibility for the actions of their 
partners.” (p. 432). 
Reporting his experience from Hewlett-Packard Davis (1993) claims effective supply chain 
management facing short product life cycles, complex corporate joint ventures and increasing 
requirements from the customers requires the systematic management of supply chain risks.  
He suggests using modeling to tame the uncertainties and concludes that: 
“The value of taking a systems view of the problem cannot be overstated.  
Organizational barriers introduce tremendous inefficiencies in supply chains.  
It is critical that all players in the business of getting products to customers 
consider their role in the objective of satisfying the customer.  Strategic 
decisions on supply chain design can increase customer satisfaction and save 
money at the same time – the classic win-win situation.” (p. 45). 
Reporting on case studies Hallikas, Virolainen et al. (2002) use internal audits and cause-
effect mapping to describe the risks in the networks studied.  The risks investigated in their 
study fall in four classes: “Demand related factors and value chain positioning”, “Delivery 
performance ability”, “Financial factors”, and “Pricing”.  In a later article Hallikas et al. 
(2004) develop the framework further, and suggest a “network version” of the generic risk 
management process (described above, see Figure 3-8).  The authors suggest that the mutual 
management of risks may follow the implementation of internal risk management practices, 
and may enable the participating partners to develop their risk management to identify, assess, 
and manage risks facing the network as a whole. 
Presenting a case study from the toy industry, Johnson (2001) categorizes the risks into the 
classes Demand Risk and Supply Risk.  Both classes are further broken down and alternative 
means of managing the risks are suggested, illustrating the multiplicity of risk sources and 
risk management opportunities in managing risks, see Table 3-4 below. 
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Table 3-4: Summary of Risk Management Lessons25 
Risk Alternative Means of Managing Risk 
 Product Demand  
 Seasonal Imbalance Licensed Products; Alternative Channels; Develop Collector Market 
 Fad Volatility Channel Release Strategies for Licensed Products; Shortage Strategies; 
  Collector Markets 
 New Product Adoption Match Channel and Product; Product Extensions and Branding; Licensing 
 Short Product Life Manage Product Variety with Rolling Mix 
 Product Supply  
 Manufacturing Capacity Outsourcing Strategy; Combine Off-Setting Seasonal Products 
 Logistics Capacity Consolidation; Supplemental Outsourcing; Electronic Supply Chain; Product 
  Diversion; Channel Coordination; Retail Ready Products; Air Freight 
 Currency Fluctuations Financial Hedging 
 Supply Disruptions Diversify Supply 
 
Further emphasizing the perception that each risk is a separate and distinct event with unique 
opportunities for management, Johnson perceives the up- and down-stream risk sources as 
distinctly different.  The focus on the down-stream risks distinguishes Johnson from most of 
the other authors identified, as risks for some reason are perceived as primarily originating 
from the supply side.  But Johnson has a point when he emphasizes the necessity of including 
the downstream side as well, especially in the toy market characterized by short product life 
cycles and highly seasonal demand. 
In conclusion, all contributions on the management of risks rely on a traditional phase model, 
including identification, assessment, management and subsequent monitoring.  The adaptation 
of the traditional single-company perspective to a multi-entity environment is under way but 
has a long way to go, as described in Grabowski & Roberts (1997).  The classification of risk 
sources and mechanisms also seem to be evolving.  Most of the identified articles illustrate 
the importance of acknowledging the perspective taken when dealing with risk management 
in supply chains/networks. 
An overview of the contributions advocating the management of the risks can be seen in 
Table 3-5 below.  As for the other themes, most emphasize the reduction or avoidance of 
risks.  Different from the other themes, almost all contributions in this theme are published 
within the past few years. 
Table 3-5: Risk Management Strategies in Theme “Supply Chain Risk Management” 
 ----------------------Risk Management Strategy---------------------- 
Author(s) Acceptance Insurance Reduction Sharing Avoidance 
Christopher & Lee, 2004   ?  ? 
Davis, 1993   ?  ? 
Grabowski & Roberts, 1997   ?  ? 
Hallikas et al., 2004 ? ? ? ? ? 
Hauser, 2003 ? ? ? ? ? 
Johnson, 2001   ?  ? 
Link & Marxt, 2004   ? ? ? 
Norrman & Jansson, 2004 ?  ?  ? 
 
                                                 
25  Extract from: Exhibit 8 in Johnson (2001), p. 122. 
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3.4 Conclusion 
It should by now be evident that the use of the terms Risk and Uncertainty has been quite 
extensive within the SCM domain and that the use of the term Vulnerability has been quite 
limited.  Albeit to a certain degree used interchangeably, the terms Risk and Uncertainty have 
each had their distinct use: Uncertainty as an assumption for authors aiming at improving 
various techniques for operations, and Risk implying the possibility of identification, 
assessment, and management.  No commonality on risk definitions, time horizons or other 
classifying attributes on the terms has been identified. 
The themes identified clearly illustrate the wide scope of risk, uncertainty and vulnerability.  
A lot of the contributions have no direct relevance to SCM, besides emphasizing the 
uncertainty of e.g. Operations, Decision Making, or the problems concerning New Product 
Introduction.  That risk relates to strategy is directly observable in the seven articles belonging 
to that theme. 
Figure 3-16: Themes Identified 
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In relation to the SCM perspective a number of relevant themes have been identified.  The 
theme “Securing the Supply Chain” has a limited number of articles, and contains primarily 
conceptual contributions advocating preparing for terrorist attacks and other shocks.  In 
contrast, quite a lot of articles deal with “Supply Management”.  The interest is spread 
between e.g. perceptions of risk (e.g. Zsidisin, 2003a; Zsidisin, 2003b), management of 
uncertainty in supply (e.g. Hill & Vollmann, 1986; Ottesen & Gronhaug, 2002a), and risk 
assessment techniques (e.g. Templin & Noffsinger, 1994; Zsidisin et al., 2004).  In the theme 
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“Risk Management in Supply Chain” various definitions of the term SCRM are presented.  
The last theme identified, “Supply Chain Design”, shows great variation on the definition of 
relevant risks as well.  Interestingly, the interest for the downstream side is quite limited, 
except for articles on distribution (e.g. Bartezzaghi & Verganti, 1995; Johansen, 1999; Speh 
& Wagenheim, 1978; Weng, 1999; Zaidman, 1994) or marketing/demand uncertainty (e.g. 
Bunn & Liu, 1996; Meldrum & Millman, 1991; Polk, Plank, & Reid, 1996; Westbrook, 
1996).  Figure 3-16 above illustrates the identified themes against the SCRM framework. 
3.5 Epilogue: SCM in the Risk Domain 
The last perspective on the intersection of SCM and the terms Risk, Uncertainty and 
Vulnerability is described in an analysis of articles on Logistics/SCM within the Risk domain. 
This study uses the same methodology, but performs the completeness check within the 
selected journals26.  As for the main study the volumes are read through manually. 
Results 
The result from the study is quite meager as only six articles are identified.  Published in the 
journals Risk Analysis – An International Journal and Risk Management the articles all deal 
with transportation risk.  All articles are at the operational level, all are oriented up- and 
downstream (but not internally), and none use theory. 
Conclusion 
It is thereby concluded that the primary source for contribution on Risk, Uncertainty, and 
Vulnerability within the SCM domain is to be found with that domain – and that the main 
study unraveled the relevant contributions. 
                                                 
26  This study was performed in parallel with the main study.  Details in Appendix E. 
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Chapter 4 Supply Chain Design 
The purpose of this chapter is to answer the second research question: 
Research Question 2: How does state-of-the-art supply chain design 
address the management of supply chain risks? 
 
To this end an extensive literature study on Supply Chain Design has been performed1.  The 
aim of the literature study is to identify and analyze the articles on Supply Chain Design, and 
to investigate how and to which degree the management of risk is integrated into the design of 
supply chains.  To aid the description the conceptual model developed in previous chapters is 
used – categorizing contributions according to orientation and design object, see Figure 4-1 
below. 
Figure 4-1: Supply Chain Risk Framework 
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4.1 Research Methodology 
As the intent of this literature study is to be able to make firm statements on the state-of-art of 
Supply Chain Design the “domain-based” strategy has been applied.  As for the literature 
study in the previous chapter, the source (population) for the study is the list of Supply Chain 
Management, Operations Management, and General Management journals presented in Table 
1-1.  Instead of repeating the time-consuming task of manually reading through each volume 
of each journal as done in the study reported in the previous chapter, this study is designed for 
the use of internet-based search engines.  To ensure a wide collection of articles, the search 
criterion has been set to articles with the Abstract field containing the words “Supply”, 
                                                 
1  The study was performed in the spring of 2003 and updated in April, 2005.  Details in Appendix F. 
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“Chain”, and “Design”2.  As this obviously will result in irrelevant articles as well as relevant 
ones, each article is evaluated for relevance. 
The strategy chosen for the literature study enables and justifies a completeness check which 
is performed by text searches across the five relevant databases: ABI/INFORM, Business 
Source Premier, EMERALD, JSTOR, and ScienceDirect.  The criterion for the completeness 
check is for the article to have the words “Supply”, “Chain”, and “Design” in the Keyword 
field3.  The number of relevant hits in this search will determine the “completeness” of the 
literature study.  Subsequent to performing the identification of the articles, each article is 
evaluated according to the following categories: 
? Relevance: Addressing Supply Chain Design? 
? Design Object: Structure and/or Process 
? Orientation: Upstream, Internal, Downstream, and/or Network 
? Research Method: Case study, Simulation… 
? Explicit Theory: TCE, RBT… 
The first category serves the obvious goal of identifying and eliminating irrelevant articles 
from the list.  The next two categories serve the purpose of illustrating the focus and reach of 
the design ambition of each article.  The research method aims at classifying the articles based 
on the approach to empirics (conceptual articles are classified ‘None’), and the last category 
aims at classifying according to the explicitly referenced theory.  Insisting on the explication 
of theory is justified by the need to document the operationalization of theory on Supply 
Chain Design.  Subsequently, the articles are analyzed and classified in the categories 
‘Subject Area’, ‘Design Objective(s), and ‘Reference to Risk/Uncertainty’. 
4.2 Results 
The search results in a gross list containing 149 articles, distributed across the journal 
categories as follows: SCM/Logistics 77, Operations Management 52, and Management 
journals 20.  The completeness check identifies 27 articles, of which fourteen have already 
been identified, thereby increasing the number of potential contributions to 162.  
Proof reading the articles for relevance reveals a wide variation of subjects and methods.  
Most articles rejected for lack of relevance (for this study) fall into the following categories: 
1. methodological frameworks (e.g. Larson & Gammelgaard, 2001; Zografos & Giannouli, 
2001), 
2. implications of various techniques/methods (e.g. Anumba, Siemieniuch, & Sinclair, 
2000; Nynke Faber, de Koster, & van de Velde, 2002), and 
3. narrowly defined sub-disciplines/areas (e.g. reverse logistics: Guide Jr & Van 
Wassenhove, 2002; Walker, 2000). 
                                                 
2  Search expression: “’Supply’ AND ’Chain’ AND ‘Design’” in the Abstract field. 
3  Search expression: “’Supply’ AND ‘Chain’ AND ‘Design’” in the Keyword field.  In databases not 
supporting keyword searching (ABI/INFORM and JSTOR), search expression is: ”’Supply Chain Design’” 
in the Abstract field. 
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Of the total 162 articles 122 are rejected due to lack of relevance.  The net list thereby 
contains a total of 40 articles (SCM: 22, OM: 11, MGMT: 4, & Other: 3).  As only three 
relevant articles (Johnson, 1998 from Management Review, Abdinnour-Helm, 1999 from 
International Journal of Agile Management Systems, and Reiner & Trcka, 2003 from 
International Journal of Production Economics (IJPE)) are identified in the completeness 
check, the list of journals and the search method is considered appropriate for the research 
topic, and the study is considered complete. 
4.2.1 Categories: Design Object & Orientation 
The articles are quite evenly distributed across ‘Design Object’ as thirteen of the 40 articles 
focus on structure, seventeen on process, and the remaining ten articles focus on the 
concurrent design of process and structure.  The other category, ‘Orientation’, displays less 
homogeneity as seven articles are oriented upstream, 25 are internally oriented, seven are 
oriented downstream, and 21 are oriented towards the network level (multi-entity)4. 
4.2.2 Category: Research Method 
A large portion (fourteen) of the articles identified (primarily in SCM journals) is of a 
conceptual nature.  Also primarily from SCM journals fifteen articles are reporting case 
studies, whereas the eight articles using modeling primarily are from OM journals.  Lastly, 
three articles use simulation. 
4.2.3 Category: Explicit Theory 
Analyzing the identified articles for explicit use or reference to theory reveals that only two 
theories are referenced: Chaos Theory and Transaction Cost Economics (TCE).  The article 
referencing Chaos Theory (Wilding, 1998b) has already been described in Chapter 1 and will 
therefore not be further elaborated on here.  As for TCE, three articles (Christiaanse & 
Kumar, 2000; McIvor, 2000; McIvor, 2003) have been identified. 
Being interested in outlining general principles for ICT-enabled5 redesign of supply chains for 
improved responsiveness, lower cost, and reduced lead times, Christiaanse & Kumar claim 
that ICT makes radical supply chain redesign possible.  The TCE framework is used to 
illustrate archetypes of inter organizational structures, and to describe switching and 
coordination costs6.  In McIvor (2000) a general framework for the outsourcing decision is 
presented, in the latter article (McIvor, 2003) a case study using that framework is presented.  
The use of the theoretical framework of TCE is most explicit in the latter article where the 
theoretical discussion on e.g. bounded rationality, opportunism, small numbers bargaining etc. 
is to be found. 
                                                 
4  These values are non-exclusive – an article might be oriented upstream and internally both.  The sum across 
the four category values therefore might exceed the number of articles identified. 
5  ICT - Information & Communications Technology. 
6  For a more comprehensive discussion on theories, please refer to Chapter 5. 
Risk Management in the Supply Chain 
Page 82 
4.2.4 Subject Area and Design Objective(s) 
Another way of describing the state-of-art of Supply Chain Design is by analyzing the 
identified articles by subject area and design objective(s), see Table 4-1 below. 
Table 4-1: Further Classification of Articles on Supply Chain Design7 
 No Author(s) Risk/Uncertainty Subject Area Design Objective(s) 
 1. Anderson & Katz, 1998 ? Supply management Profitable/sustainable growth 
 2. Christopher & Towill, 2002 ? Leanness/Agility Responsiveness/Lower cost 
 4. Hewitt, 1994 ? SC re-design Efficiency/Effectiveness 
 5. Payne & Peters, 2004 ? Matching product and chain Cost/Performance 
 6. van der Horst, van Dijk, & Beulens, 2001 
   ? Decoupling Reduce demand uncertainty 
 7. van Hoek & Weken, 1998 ? Modular production Responsiveness/Efficiency 
 8. Wilding, 1998b ? Chaos theory Removal of uncertainty 
 9. Wouters, Sharman, & Wortmann, 1999 
   ? Inventory mgmt. Differentiation/Efficiency 
 18. Christiaanse & Kumar, 2000 ? ICT and SC redesign Cost/Value/Flexibility 
 19. Christopher & Towill, 2001 ? Agility Cost 
 29. Mason et al., 2002 ? Outsourcing (electr. mfg.) Agility 
 40. van Hoek, Commandeur, & Vos, 1998 
   ? Postponement Responsiveness 
 48. Chandra & Kumar, 2000 ? Accurate (quick) response Synchronization of chain 
 50. Hammel, Kuettner, & Phelps, 2002 ? SC re-design Exploitation of opportunity? 
 58. McIvor, 2000 ? Outsourcing Strategic Decision Making 
 59. McIvor, 2003 ? Outsourcing Identify drivers and processes 
 64. Towill, 1996 ? Time compression Cost/Responsiveness 
 67. Zeng, 2003 ? Global sourcing Effectiveness (transport/dist.) 
 70. Boyson & Corsi, 2001 ? Real-time supply chain Reduction of waste (time) 
 72. Dershin, 2000 ? Business process re-eng. Efficient SC integration 
 74. Kopczak, 2001 ? SC design/Last mile strategy Differentiation/Efficiency 
 75. Martha & Subbakrishna, 2002 ? Risk management in SCD Risk (Survival) 
 83. Boardman & Clegg, 2001 ? 3D-CE for Prod. Dev. Faster product introduction 
 86. Fowler, 1998 ? Modelling in Mgmt of Ops Competitive Advantage 
 92. Korpela, Lehmusvaara, & Tuominen, 2001a 
   ? Supply Chain Development Logistics effectiveness 
 93. Korpela, Lehmusvaara, & Tuominen, 2001b 
   ? SC Design for Cust. Service Cost/Customer service 
 94. Korpela et al., 2002 ? Allocation of prod. capacity Risk (Customer service) 
 96. Persson & Olhager, 2002 ? Simulation of supply chain Cost/Quality/Lead time 
 104. Blackhurst, Wu, & O'Grady, 2005 ? Design decisions “Fit”/Efficiency 
 105. Fine, Golany, & Naseraldin, 2005 ? 3D-CE “Fit”/Efficiency 
 109. Hammel & Kopczak, 1993 ? Distrib. Res. Planning (DRP) Availability/Cost 
 113. Fine, 2000a ? 3D-CE “Fit”/Efficiency 
 127. Towill, 1997 ? Material flow Order cycle/Variability 
 137. Robinson Jr & Satterfield, 1998 ? Design of distrib. systems Profit maximization 
 138. Swaminathan, Smith, & Sadeh, 1998 ? SC design Cost 
 142. Ferdows, Lewis, & Machuca, 2004 ? Quick response Responsiveness/Cost (inv.) 
 148. Lee, Padmanabhan, & Whang, 1997 ? Bullwhip/Forrester Cost (inventory) 
 158. Johnson, 1998 ? Bullwhip/Forrester Cost (inventory) 
 165. Abdinnour-Helm, 1999 ? Distribution Performance 
 175. Reiner & Trcka, 2003 ? SC design Performance/Robustness… 
 
                                                 
7  Number corresponds to the list of identified articles in Appendix F. 
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Grouping by Subject Area 
Analyzing the articles for subject area a few groupings quickly emerge.  The largest group of 
articles identified not surprisingly deals with principles for Supply Chain Design.  But other 
groups are identified. 
A number of articles deal with the fit between product, process, and supply chain, most 
notably by Fine (2000b) who introduces the term Three Dimensional Concurrent Engineering 
(3D-CE).  Another group of articles deal with distribution and yet another with outsourcing, 
see Table 4-2 below. 
Table 4-2: Grouping articles on Supply Chain Design by Subject Area8 
Group Articles (referenced by number) 
Supply Chain Design 4, 18, 50, 72, 92-94, 138, 175 
3D-CE 5, 83, 104, 105, 113 
Distribution 74, 109, 137, 165 
Outsourcing 29, 58, 59 
Agility 2, 19 
Bullwhip 148, 158 
Quick Response 48, 142 
Supply Management 1, 67 
 
The last four entries in the table above barely qualify for being a group as only two articles 
could be identified for each of those subject groups (shown in italics).  The articles not 
referenced in the table above are so different from each other that no commonalities could be 
found.  The degree of dispersion is thereby quite high. 
Grouping by Design Objectives 
Analyzing the articles for design objectives shows the same pattern.  Classifying the articles 
according to a multi-objective framework as e.g. the one mentioned in Chapter 2 results in a 
number of categories emerging. 
The most “popular” design objective is ‘Cost’ as fourteen of the 40 articles explicitly 
reference this design objective9.  The second most popular objective is ‘Performance’ with 
thirteen articles, followed by ‘Responsiveness’ (five), and ‘Lead Time’ (four)10.  Two articles 
(Martha & Subbakrishna, 2002; Korpela et al., 2002) even reference ‘Risk’ as design 
objective.  Articles not referencing these “generic” objectives include articles on reducing 
demand uncertainty (van der Horst, van Dijk, & Beulens, 2001; Wilding, 1998b), 
synchronization and integration of supply chains (Chandra & Kumar, 2000; Dershin, 2000) 
and five others on assorted subjects.  Table F-7 contains all the details. 
More interestingly, most (24) of the articles refer to a single in contrast to multiple objectives 
(as shown in Figure 2-10).  It may be that the ‘Cost’ objective is taken for granted.  But, even 
                                                 
8  Number corresponds to the list of identified articles in Appendix F. 
9  Actually, two articles (Anderson & Katz, 1998; Robinson Jr & Satterfield, 1998) reference Profit.  They are 
shown in brackets in the table. 
10  One article (Boardman & Clegg, 2001) refer to the speed of introducing new products (shown in brackets in 
the table). 
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if few articles use ‘Risk Management’ or ‘Uncertainty Reduction’ as a design objective, more 
articles reference Risk and/or Uncertainty. 
4.2.5 Reference to Risk/Uncertainty 
Besides analyzing first the focus and reach of the contributions within Supply Chain Design 
and then the subject and design objectives, it is of interest to analyze the roles Risk and 
Uncertainty play.  Analyzing the 40 articles for reference to Risk and Uncertainty is 
disappointing as only thirteen contributions are identified (see Table 4-1 above).  Among 
these articles almost no commonality exists; three articles deal with uncertainty/volatility of 
demand - all other deal with some unique aspect of risk/uncertainty. 
Demand Uncertainty/Volatility 
Furthermore, the three articles on demand uncertainty are quite different from each other.  
Christopher & Towill (2002) write on agility and leanness and aim at reducing total cost and 
improving customer responsiveness, whereas Van der Horst, van Dijk, & Beulens (2001) 
illustrate coping with demand uncertainty in a food supply chain by the use of decoupling 
points.  The last article dealing with demand uncertainty is Reiner & Trcka (2003) who write 
on supply chain improvements, and aim at increasing the robustness of supply chain through 
(non-defined) improvements. 
Other aspects of Risk/Uncertainty 
The residual group of articles referencing other aspects of risk/uncertainty span from 
Wilding’s (1998b) article on uncertainty generated by the complexity of (tightly integrated) 
supply chains over Martha & Subbakrishna’s (2002) piece on the potential effects of terrorism 
to Boardman & Clegg’s (2001) article on 3D concurrent engineering (3D-CE) to reduce the 
commercial risks in product development. 
In McIvor (2003) an analysis of the risks involved in three cases of outsourcing within the 
same firm is presented, and the company is cited for concluding that: 
“Through outsourcing the company is reducing its level of risk.  For example, 
by gradually outsourcing manufacturing processes it is reducing risk by 
converting its fixed costs into variable costs.  In times of adverse business 
conditions suppliers will then have to deal with the problem of excess capacity.  
The company argues that suppliers are better able to cope with demand 
fluctuations through economies of scale and have more scope for alternative 
sources for this excess capacity.” (p. 390). 
Interestingly, this conclusion is in direct conflict with the argument put forward by the author 
in a previous article (McIvor, 2000), where reliance on external partners is avoided whenever 
possible.  Also in Anderson & Katz (1998) risk is a part of a framework, business risk is 
coupled with revenue impact in a portfolio model for purchasing, and defined as: 
“The revenue impact/business risk dimension addresses the degree to which a 
purchase category can influence customers’ perception of value.” (p. 5). 
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The portfolio model combines ‘Revenue Impact/Business Risk’ with ‘Procurement 
Complexity’ and suggests strategic sourcing skills for each cell. 
The uncertainty referred to in Kopczak (2001) relates to the implementation of the internet-
based distribution channel, whereas in Boyson & Corsi (2001) the uncertainty to be tamed 
stems from the complexity of the “real-time supply chain” spanning the globe.  Dershin 
(2000) claims the lack of awareness and control of supply chain processes is a major risk to 
companies and advocate the use of the TQM framework to redesign business processes. 
In Korpela et al. (2002) a modeling approach is taken to the problem of allocating production 
capacity to customers with different service requirements, using suppliers with different 
strategies and with different risks relating to the customer-supplier relationship.  The risk 
element is further broken down into History, Position, Competitors, and Customer’s Business 
and the three-tier structure is modeled using AHP and mixed integer programming.  Also 
using modeling Swaminathan, Smith, & Sadeh (1998) propose using simulation to analyze the 
risks and benefits of different supply chain reengineering alternatives before implementation. 
Overview 
In Figure 4-2 the identified articles are depicted according to Level and Orientation.  Numbers 
correspond with Table 4-1. 
Figure 4-2: Articles on Supply Chain Design 
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Four of the identified articles are emphasized in the figure above.  Number 75 is the article on 
terrorism (Martha & Subbakrishna, 2002) and number 94 is the one on (internal) production 
capacity allocation (Korpela et al., 2002).  These two articles are the ones having ‘Risk’ as a 
design objective (marked as bold).  Articles numbered 6 and 8 are the case study on the Dutch 
poultry supply chain (van der Horst, van Dijk, & Beulens, 2001) and Wilding’s (1998b) 
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article on chaos theory, respectively.  The former article aims at removing demand 
uncertainty, the latter at removing uncertainty in general (both marked as bold and 
underlined).  The rest of the articles depicted in the figure above simply use risk/uncertainty 
as an assumption about the context/environment. 
4.2.6 Conclusion 
The analysis of the orientation of the identified articles on supply chain design showed that 
both the up- and down-stream sides as well as internal operations are covered.  A number of 
articles even take the holistic (network) level when analyzing for supply chain design.  Both 
structure and process are objects for design, and a number of articles have the aim of 
performing concurrent analysis and design of both.  A large proportion of the articles 
identified are of a conceptual nature.  Among the empirically based papers most use case 
studies, especially the articles from the SCM journals.  Conversely, the articles from the OM 
journals are primarily using modeling, and few use simulation. 
Grouping the articles by subject area reveals a wide range of subjects, and analyzing the 
articles by design objective reveals that relatively few have (explicitly stated) multiple 
objectives, thereby contradicting the multi-objective model presented in Figure 2-10.  Of the 
40 articles identified, only two reference ‘Risk’ as design objective (Martha & Subbakrishna, 
2002; Korpela et al., 2002).  Another two aim at reducing uncertainty (van der Horst, van 
Dijk, & Beulens, 2001; Wilding, 1998b). 
Most surprisingly, the role played by risk and uncertainty within Supply Chain Design is quite 
marginal as only thirteen articles referencing the terms can be identified.  Even within this 
select group of articles very little commonality exist.  Three articles reference demand 
uncertainty, whereas little commonality is to be found between the rest.  Of all the articles 
analyzed only one (Martha & Subbakrishna, 2002) actually aims at integrating the process of 
risk management into SCM when designing supply chains. 
4.3 Comparing With Theme ‘Supply Chain Design’ 
As the literature study on Risk and Uncertainty reported in the previous chapter contains a 
theme called ‘Supply Chain Design’, it seems appropriate to compare the two studies and to 
supplement the study on Supply Chain Design with any contributions not already identified.  
Therefore the articles from the theme ‘Supply Chain Design’ are listed in Table 4-3 below. 
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Table 4-3: Extracts from Appendix D11 
 Term   Phase   Orientation  Level Research Explicit 
 No Author(s) R V U I A M U I D N S O Method Theory 
 16. van der Horst & Beulens, 2002   U I   U     O None None 
 30. Vidal & Goetschalkx, 2000   U - - -    N  O Math. mod. None 
 38. Lonsdale, 1999 R    A M U    S  Case study RBT 
 39. Sinha, Whitman, & Malzahn, 2004 R     M U    S  None SCOR* 
 42. Geary, Childerhouse, & Towill, 2002 
     U   M U I D  S  Case study None 
 43. Hauser, 2003 R   I A M    N S  Case study None 
 46. Rice & Caniato, 2003 R     M U I D  S  None None 
 60. Newman, Hanna, & Maffei, 1993   U - - -  I   S  None None 
 62. Agrell, Lindroth, & Norrman, 2004 R    A M    N S  Math. mod. Agency 
 69. Gupta, Gerchak, & Buzacott, 1992   U - - -  I    O Math. mod. None 
 77. Korpela et al., 2002 R    A    D  S  Math. mod. None 
 103. Treleven & Schweikhart, 1988 R    A  U    S  None None 
 122. Johnson, 2001 R     M U  D  S  Case study None 
 123. Lee, 2002   U   M U  D  S  None None 
 172. Davis, 1993   U   M    N S  Case study None 
 181. Grabowski & Roberts, 1999 R     M    N S  None None 
 182. Kouvelis & Milner, 2002   U - - - U  D  S  Math. mod. None 
 184. Ritchie & Brindley, 2000 R     M U  D  S  None None 
 185. Sabri & Beamon, 2000   U - - -    N S  Math. mod. None 
 
The overlap between this study and the literature study reported in previous chapter is 
surprisingly low as only three articles (Vidal & Goetschalkx, 2000; Sinha, Whitman, & 
Malzahn, 2004; and Korpela et al., 2002) appear in both studies. 
Analyzing for Design Objective 
This leaves sixteen articles to be analyzed for design objective. 
Table 4-4: Articles Classified According to Design Objective(s)12 
   Cost Perfor- Respon- Lead Risk/ Residual 
 No Ref. (Profit) mance siveness Time Vulnerability Design Objective(s) 
 177. 16. ? ? ? ? ? Uncertainty 
 178. 38. ? ? ? ? ? Dependency 
 179. 42. ? ? ? ? (?) Uncertainty 
 180. 43. ? ? ? ? ?  
 181. 46. ? ? ? ? ? Resilience 
 182. 60. ? ? ? ? ? Flexibility 
 183. 62. ? ? ? ? ? Investment efficiency 
 184. 69. ? ? ? ? ? Optimal capacity, 
        Flexibility 
 185. 103. ? (?) ? ? ? Technology Access, 
        Quality 
 186. 122. ? ? ? ? ?  
 187. 123. ? ? ? ? ? “Fit”: Product & Strategy 
 188. 172. ? ? ? ? ? Supply chain uncertainty 
 189. 181. ? ? ? ? ?  
 190. 182. ? ? ? ? ? Outsource/adapt capacity 
 191. 184. ? ? ? ? ? Adaptability (amorphous net) 
 192. 185. ? ? ? ? ? Flexibility 
                                                 
11 Please note that ‘Level’ (Strategic/Operational) does not correspond completely with ‘Design Object’ 
(Structure/Process). 
12 The ’Ref.’ field contains reference to the literature study in Chapter 3 and to Table 4-3. 
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Of these sixteen articles seven address risk or vulnerability directly, as shown in the table 
above.  Including the articles not directly designing for risk management but aiming at 
reducing uncertainty in some way, the resulting set contains nine articles.  Distribution across 
structure/process and orientation is depicted in Figure 4-3 below (the four articles identified in 
the original study is included as well). 
Figure 4-3: Articles on Supply Chain Design (& Risk/Uncertainty) 
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4.3.1 Conclusion 
Despite the stringency of the method applied in the search for articles on “Supply Chain 
Design” the subset of articles from the literature study on “Risk, Uncertainty, and 
Vulnerability” (the theme on “Supply Chain Design”) actually contribute with more articles 
on supply chain design for risk management than the original study.  Albeit frustrating, this 
only emphasizes the necessity of performing stringent literature studies, and to try alternate 
strategies before settling with a population for further analysis. 
The combined set depicted in Figure 4-3 above thereby represents the state-of-art of “Supply 
Chain Design referencing Risk or Uncertainty”. 
4.4 Comparing with Classic Articles 
In Table 2-1 a list of classic articles on SCM is presented.  The overlap between these articles 
and the results of this study is quite limited as they have only three articles in common 
(Hewitt, 1994; Lee & Billington, 1992; Towill, Naim, & Wikner, 1992).  Encouraging 
though, is the fact that the classification of these articles are identical in the two studies 
(neither Lee & Billington (1992) nor Towill, Naim, & Wikner (1992) are considered relevant 
from a risk perspective). 
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Risk and Reward Structure 
Of special interest is naturally the seven articles referring the category “Risk and Reward 
Structure”.  The earliest of the articles (Ellram & Cooper, 1990) is on Supply Chain 
Management, partnerships, and third-party relationships (within transportation).  Being an 
early contribution, the authors spend quite some time discussing SCM as well as explaining 
the role of uncertainty: 
“Wherever uncertainty exists along a supply chain, whether it be in terms of 
product quality, delivery timing, final demand, or the actual amount of the 
product which will ultimately be received, this uncertainty has traditionally 
been buffered with inventory.” (p. 2). 
The authors state that SCM challenges this traditional approach to managing uncertainty: 
“The supply chain management concept focuses attention on holding inventory 
in the location and quantity that is optimal for the entire supply chain.  Clearly, 
exchanging information for inventory is central to the supply chain 
management concept.” (p. 3). 
They emphasize that strategic partnerships and leadership in the supply chain is crucial: 
“Successful supply chain management relies on forming strategic partnerships 
with trading partners along the supply chain, with one partner playing a key 
role in coordinating and overseeing the whole supply chain, similar to what is 
called a channel captain in the marketing literature.” (p. 3). 
Before presenting the framework for risks and benefits of entering into supply chain 
relationships, some risks are discussed, e.g. financial risks when using third parties: 
 “The risks associated with shifts in the market and in technology can be 
mitigated to some extent by shifting functions outside the firm.  Market entry 
risks can be reduced by utilizing third parties, focusing on shorter time 
horizons and smaller investments than required for vertical integration.” (p. 5), 
and the economic risk of implementing dedicated IT systems: 
 “However, integrated information systems are costly and time-consuming to 
develop.  If these costs can be shared by partners in a long-term relationship, 
the economic risk is reduced.” (p. 5). 
The benefits of using third parties are clear: 
“Third party benefits accrue from potentially more stable environments and 
longer term relationships with fewer shippers, thereby reducing the risks of 
open market uncertainty.” (p. 6). 
The relationship between shipper and third party is analyzed and risk and benefits for both 
parties are outlined under the categories Economic, Managerial, & Strategic.  But besides 
identifying potential sources of risk and reward, the authors do not offer insights into the 
management of these risks or procedures for the sharing of costs.  In a later article Cooper & 
Ellram (1993) continue the discussion on SCM and the risks of entering into this type of 
relationships, e.g. on the breadth of the supplier base: 
“Traditional systems often involve several suppliers of the same materials or 
services to increase competition and to obtain more favorable terms of sale.  
This approach also spreads the risk of shutdown if one supplier becomes 
suddenly unable to fulfill the contract or order.  The supply chain management 
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approach suggests that the supplier base be reduced so that the firms can be 
more closely integrated.  A reduced supplier base permits closer management 
and coordination of a few relationships.” (p. 17). 
They claim sharing risks and rewards between partners is a prerequisite for SCM: 
“…a close relationship requires that channel members be willing to share risks 
and rewards over the long term.  This implies a win-win situation over the life 
of the supply chain.  In traditional systems, channel members are relatively 
independent, with a short term approach that does not consider counter-
balancing of risks and rewards over time.” (p. 17). 
They argue that the planning of SCM should ensure a balanced or “fair” sharing of risks and 
rewards in the long run, and a willingness to “take a hit” in the short.  But still there are no 
specific guidelines as how to perform the sharing, how to measure, or how to implement. 
These shortcoming are not addressed in the article by Cooper & Gardner (1993), who 
continue the discussion on the contingencies for choosing one relationship form over another.  
Lambert, Emmelhainz & Gardner (1996) present an extensive framework covering a 
multiplicity of “partnership components” of which “Risk/reward sharing” is of particular 
interest.  They more or less mimic Ellram & Cooper (1990) when they state: 
“A partnership is a tailored business relationship based on mutual trust, 
openness, shared risk and shared rewards that yield a competitive advantage, 
resulting in business performance greater than would be achieved by the firms 
individually.” (p. 2). 
Figure 4-4: Partnership Component Levels13 
Partnership Component Partnership type 
 Low Medium High 
… 
RISK/REWARD SHARING 
 Loss tolerance ? Very low tolerance for ? Some tolerance for ? High tolerance for 
     loss    short-term loss    short-term loss 
 Gain commitment ? Limited willingness to ? Willingness to help the ? Desire to help the other 
     help the other party gain    other party gain    party gain 
 Commitment to fairness ? Fairness is evaluated by ? Fairness is tracked year ? Fairness is measured 
     transaction    to year    over life of relationship 
… 
 
The article by Hammer (1990) does not contribute a lot to this discussions besides introducing 
two case studies (Mutual Benefit Life and Hewlett-Packard).  Neither Andrews & Stalick 
(1994) nor Hewitt (1994) contributes significantly besides insisting design is multi-
dimensional: 
”A further output which has emerged from these discussions is a very clear 
consensus concerning the nature pf the redesign process itself.  This is that true 
process redesign os only likely to be successful if it is recognized as a multi-
dimensional activity, simultaneously and explicitly addressing the work activity 
dimension, the information flow dimension and the decision/authority 
dimension.” (Hewitt, 1994, p. 5). 
                                                 
13  Source: Table 4 in Lambert, Emmelhainz, & Gardner (1996), p. 17. 
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The claim made in Cooper, Lambert, & Pagh (1997), that ‘Risk and Reward Structure’ is a 
well-documented component within the SCM domain is thereby challenged.  It seems the 
articles only contain statements in favor of dividing the gains from the implementation of 
SCM, but do not offer principles or methods for identifying or managing this division. 
4.5 Conclusion 
The study on ‘Supply Chain Design’ reveals the state-of-the-art of Supply Chain Design 
contains contributions oriented both up- and down-stream as well as towards the network as a 
whole, aiming at designing processes and structures both.  Analyzing the contributions for 
design objective reveals that most models are single objective models, thereby contradicting 
the discussion in Chapter 2.  The objective best represented in ‘Cost’ (14 articles) whereas 
‘Risk’ could only be identified in two articles.  Another two articles aim at reducing 
uncertainty. 
Comparing with the contributions from the theme ‘Supply Chain Design’ from Chapter 3 
reveals a low degree of overlap.  Combining the two sets of contributions results in a total of 
thirteen articles on Supply Chain Design referencing Uncertainty or Risk (see Figure 4-3).  
This set of contributions address Process and Structure both, and are oriented Internally, 
Upstream, Downstream as well as towards the Network. 
The explicit reference to theory is quite limited – in the study on ‘Supply Chain Design’ only 
four of the identified articles reference theory (one using Chaos Theory, three using TCE; see 
Appendix F).  As shown in Table 4-3 the theme on ‘Supply Chain Design’ from Chapter 3 
adds one article using RBT (Lonsdale, 1999) and one on Agency Theory (Agrell, Lindroth, & 
Norrman, 2004).  The (explicit) theoretical underpinning of the design models identified is 
thereby quite limited. 
Lastly, the “classic articles” referenced in Cooper, Lambert, & Pagh (1997) (see Table 2-1) 
are investigated in order to identify other relevant contributions on Supply Chain Design, and 
furthermore to verify the claim for “Risk and Reward Structure”.  The overlap is very limited, 
but at least the articles are classified consistently.  The claim on “Risk and Reward Structure” 
seems to be exaggerated as only suggestions but no concrete models or principles for the fair 
division of cost advantages are proposed. 
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Chapter 5 Supply Chain Theories and Risk 
The aim of this chapter is to answer the third research question: 
Research Question 3: How do the theories most commonly applied within 
the SCM domain address the management of supply 
chain risks? 
 
The first step is to identify theories often applied within the SCM domain. 
Theories Often Applied Within the SCM Domain? 
Acknowledging SCM is a multi-disciplinary domain (e.g. Giannakis, Croom, & Slack, 2004; 
Gripsrud, Jahre, & Persson, 2006) the list of theories applied within the domain is quite long.  
Identifying the (most) relevant theories can be performed by reviewing e.g. literature studies 
and contributions on conceptual frameworks on SCM. 
In Giannakis & Croom (2004) the authors claim SCM has: 
“… evolved … through the incorporation of theoretical concepts and research 
in strategic management, industrial organization, industrial and production 
economics (transaction costs), inter-organizational relationships, knowledge 
management and systems theory.” (p. 29) 
whereas Gripsrud, Jahre, & Persson (2006) claim systems theory is the dominant theory 
within business logistics – and transaction cost is the dominant theory within distribution 
research.  In both Croom, Romano, & Giannakis (2000b) and Storey, Emberson, Godsell, & 
Harrison (2006) extensive lists of theoretical influences are presented1.  In Halldorson, 
Kotzab, Mikkola, & Skjøtt-Larsen (2004)2 three perspectives on the management of supply 
chains is presented: Transaction Cost Economics and Principal/Agent Theory as the 
‘economic perspective’, The Interaction Approach (IMP) as the ‘socio-economic perspective’, 
and The Resource Based View as the ‘strategic perspective’.  Comparing this portfolio of 
theories to before mentioned contributions and other review articles (e.g. Burgess, Singh, & 
Koroglu, 2006; Giannakis, Croom, & Slack, 2004) shows a good ‘coverage’: 1. in their 
“structured literature review” Burgess, Singh, & Koroglu (2006) the four above mentioned 
frameworks account for 86% of the references, and 2. the previously mentioned literature 
review by Giannakis & Croom (2004) also supports the finding – even if they identify a wider 
range of theories3.  Finally, the previous two chapters have documented the identified four 
frameworks as the most relevant in relation to the subject at hand. 
                                                 
1 Also covered in Giannakis, Croom, & Slack (2004) (see Figure 2-3).  
2 This work is to a certain degree a continuation of Skjøtt-Larsen (1999). 
3 The wider range of theories identified is not surprising as the population of journals investigated span a 
wider range as well.  Excluding articles from e.g. Law, Knowledge Management etc. from the analysis 
results in a short list of theories and conceptual frameworks identical to the findings from previous chapters. 
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Answering the Research Question 
To answer the research question the theories are described and evaluated one by one.  Each 
description is followed by a brief analysis on how the theory relates to SCM, how relevant 
articles identified in previous chapters utilize the theory, and how the risks defined in the 
matrix are addressed. 
The chapter closes off by analyzing the overall applicability of the theoretical frameworks in 
relation to the Supply Chain Risk Management (see Figure 5-1) for intentional and 
unintentional exits/disruptions both. 
Figure 5-1: Supply Chain Risk Framework 
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5.1 Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) 
The original intention of TCE was to try to explain why firms exist when markets seem much 
more efficient (Coase, 1937).  After being almost completely ignored for fifty years, the issue 
of industrial organization received renewed interest in the 1970’s and 1980’s which led to the 
introduction of a new body of theory and a fundamentally different way of perceiving a 
company (Coase, 1988).  As stated in Williamson (2000)4: 
“The need was to get beyond the analytically convenient (and sometimes 
adequate) conception of the firm-as-production function (which is a 
technological construction) to consider the firm as a governance structure 
(which is an organizational construction) in which internal structure has 
economic purpose and effect.  More generally, the need was to identify and 
explicate the properties of alternative modes of governance – spot markets, 
incomplete contracts, firms, bureaus, etc. – which differ in discrete structural 
ways.  Because each generic mode of governance possesses distinctive 
strengths and weaknesses, there is a place for each yet each needs to be kept in 
its place.  The logic of discriminating alignment … applies.” (p. 602). 
The basic unit of analysis is the transaction, defined as: 
”A transaction occurs when a good or service is transferred across a 
technologically separable interface.” (Williamson, 1985, p. 1)5, 
which more than implies a departure from the neo-classical idea of the frictionless economic 
system.  From the offset the propositions put forward by Williamson were at the same time 
contradicting the predominant perspective on economic activity and based on well defined 
assumptions: 
 “As compared to other approaches to the study of economic organization, 
transaction cost economics (1) is more microanalytic, (2) is more self-conscious 
about its behavioral assumptions, (3) introduces and develops asset specificity, 
(4) relies more on comparative institutional analysis, (5) regards the business  
firm as a governance structure rather than a production function, and (6) place 
greater weight on the ex post institutions of contract, with special emphasis on 
private ordering (as compared to court ordering).” (Williamson, 1985, pp. 17-
18).6 
The use of private ordering (as opposed to legal/court ordering) is a central assumption within 
TCE: 
”…transaction cost economics maintains that the governance of contractual 
relations is primarily affected through the institutions of private ordering rather 
than through legal centralism.  Although the importance of ex ante incentive 
alignment is acknowledged, primary attention is focused on the ex post 
institutions of contract.” (Williamson, 1985, p. xii). 
                                                 
4  The description of the transaction cost economics theory is almost exclusively based on the work of Oliver 
E. Williamson.  It should be duly noted that other streams exist (see e.g. Coase, 1988), and that Williamson 
himself explicates the heritage of earlier economists and organization theorists, see later in this subchapter. 
5  See also Arrow (1969), p. 48: ”transaction costs are the costs of running the economic system.”.  In 
Williamson (1981) the proposition that the transaction is the basic unit of analysis is accredited Commons 
(1934). 
6  Previously Williamson (1983) included the use of hostages (to signal credible commitment) as well. 
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The study of economic organization insists that organization form matters7, and that: 
“Transaction costs are economized by assigning transactions (which differ in 
their attributes) to governance structures (the adaptive capabilities and 
associated costs of which differ) in a discriminating way.” (p. 18). 
Human actors are assumed to be bounded rational (“behavior intendedly rational, but only 
limitedly so”, Simon, 1947, p. xxiv) and opportunistic (defined as “self-interest seeking with 
guile”)8.  Markets are assumed to experience failures, and companies are defined as being 
able to change their governance forms – to change from market to hierarchy or vice-versa 
based on the characteristics of the transactions they take part in.  That the precise definition of 
assumptions is of critical importance for TCE is clearly stated in Williamson (1985): 
“Planning is necessarily incomplete (because of bounded rationality), promise 
predictably breaks down (because of opportunism), and the pairwise identity of 
the parties now matters (because of asset specificity).  …  This is the world with 
which transaction economics is concerned.  The organizational imperative that 
emerges in such circumstances is this: Organize transactions so as to 
economize on bounded rationality while simultaneously safeguarding them 
against the hazards of opportunism.  Such a statement supports a different and 
larger conception of the economic problem than does the imperative ‘Maximize 
profits!’.” (p. 32). 
Transaction costs of ex ante and ex post types are usually distinguished.  The first are the 
costs of drafting, negotiating, and safeguarding an agreement whereas 
“Ex post costs of contracting take several forms.  These include (1) the 
maladaption costs incurred when transactions drift out of alignment in relation 
to what Masahiko Aoki refers to as the ‘shift contract curve’, (2) the haggling 
costs incurred if bilateral efforts are made to correct ex post misalignments, (3) 
the setup and running costs associated with the governance structures (often 
not the courts) to which disputes are referred, and (4) the bonding costs of 
effecting secure commitments.” (p. 21).9 
Transaction costs are thereby complex cost structures.  The difference between TCE and other 
related theoretical domains is quite clearly laid out in Williamson (1985) where contract law 
is used as the explanatory framework.  Property rights and agency theory both assume hazards 
are known and efficiently managed ex ante, the future thereby holding no surprises.  In 
contrast, TCE maintains that it is impossible to concentrate all bargaining ex ante, instead 
claiming that “bargaining is pervasive” (Williamson, 1985, p. 29). 
                                                 
7  For more on organization forms within TCE, please refer to Chapter 11 (“The Modern Corporation”) in 
Williamson (1985). 
8  It is furthermore assumed that the parties to the transactions are risk neutral, see Williamson (1985), pp. 
388-390. 
9  Footnote 12 on page 21 of Williamson (1985) states: “The ex post transaction costs are related to, but 
plainly differ from, what Michael Jensen and William Meckling refer to as agency costs, which they define 
as the sum of ‘(1) the monitoring expenditures of the principal, (2) the bonding expenditures by the agent, 
and (3) the residual loss’ (1976, p. 308) – this last being a very expansive category.” 
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Governance Mechanisms and Structures 
The early contributions (e.g. Williamson, 1975) contained only two forms of governance 
structure: hierarchy and market, but due to continued criticisms the typology was extended to 
reflect the various forms of cooperation, e.g. franchising, joint ventures, strategic alliances 
etc. (called “hybrid” forms)10, 11.  What remained, though, was the belief that the market form 
was preferable in terms of costs to other forms, under appropriate conditions.  Complexity of 
organizational form is to be kept as simple as possible as complexity is expected to result in 
added cost. 
The contingencies characterizing transactions are naturally a focal point within TCE: 
“… the three critical dimensions for characterizing transactions are (1) 
uncertainty, (2) frequency with which transactions recur, and (3) the degree to 
which durable transaction-specific investments are incurred.” (Williamson, 
1979, p. 239).12 
The latter two are apparent in Figure 5-2 below. 
Figure 5-2: Efficient Governance13 
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As the goal is to achieve efficient governance the various combinations of investments 
characteristics (non-specific, mixed, and idiosyncratic) and transaction frequency (one-time14, 
                                                 
10  As stated in Williamson (1985): ”Whereas I was earlier of the view that transactions of the middle kind 
were very difficult to organize and hence were unstable … I am now persuaded that transactions in the 
middle range are much more common.” (p. 83). 
11  As indicated in the first quote from Williamson (2000) the framework has been extended to include bureaus 
(government institutions) as well. 
12  In Williamson (1991b) a fourth contingency, ease of measurement, is added to the list. 
13  Source: Figure 3-2 in Williamson (1985), p. 79.  This is a modified version of Figure II in Williamson 
(1979), p. 253. 
14  Early on in Williamson (1985) the frequency ”one-time” is dropped as: ”…the difference between one-time 
and occasional transactions is not apparent.  Accordingly, only occasional and recurrent frequency 
distinctions will be maintained.” (p. 72). 
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occasional, and recurrent) has a corresponding governance mechanism facilitating the specific 
transactions. 
The governance types referenced in the figure above are (naturally) precisely defined. 
? Market governance (or classical contracting) applies for transactions where asset 
specificity is absent.  No adaptations are necessary as transactions are standardized, 
alternative purchase and supply arrangements are (presumably) easy to work out.  Even 
if the market governance is especially efficient when transactions are recurrent, market 
governance is also appropriate for occasional transactions. 
? Bilateral governance (or obligational contracting) is one of the two types of governance 
structures under the heading “relational contracting”.  Relational contracting applies for 
recurrent transactions only – and bilateral governance applies for transactions in the 
mixed investment class.  Implying the absence of scale economies (which would result 
in standardization of the transaction thus leading to market governance), bilateral 
governance is preferable in situations where asset specificity exists but is not 
completely idiosyncratic.  Assuming incomplete contracts one of the challenges 
inherent in this governance structure is the need for ex post adaptations which must take 
place across a market interface. 
? Unified governance (or internal organization) efficiently deals with the problem of ex 
post adaptations as fiat is available under this governance structure.  As transactions 
become more idiosyncratic the incentive for trading weakens, as there is parity between 
outside suppliers and the buyer on economies of scale.  As no cost advantages are to be 
harvested, the decision point becomes the ease of adaptations. 
? Trilateral governance (or neoclassic contracting) is the fourth and last governance 
structure.  Covering the combination of occasional transactions of mixed or high degree 
of idiosyncrasy, these transactions pose a distinct challenge in terms of governance.  
Once entered into both principals have strong incentives to complete the transactions.  
Setup costs are assumed to be non-trivial, and due to the specificity the opportunity 
costs are most likely to be much lower in alternative use (or for alternative users).  But 
even if both principals have an interest in seeing transactions to completion, the contract 
is assumed to be incomplete and therefore adaptations are expected.  Instead of resorting 
immediately to litigation (with its transaction-disruptive features), third-party assistance 
(arbitration) is employed instead. 
 
These governance mechanisms support the previously mentioned governance structures 
(market, hybrid, and hierarchy) which differ on at least the following attributes: instruments, 
adaptation, and contract law, see Table 5-1 below. 
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Table 5-1: Distinguishing Attributes of Market, Hybrid, and Hierarchy Governance Structures15 
 Distinguishing Attributes of Market, Hybrid, and Hierarchy Governance Structures* 
 Governance structure 
Attributes Market Hybrid Hierarchy 
Instruments    
Incentive intensity + + + 0 
Administrative controls 0 + + + 
    
Performance attributes    
Adaptation (A) + + + 0 
Adaptation (C)  0 + + + 
    
Contract law + + + 0 
* + + = strong;   + = semi-strong;   0 = weak. 
 
Markets and hierarchies are each others opposites on every attribute whereas the hybrid form 
has all attributes defined as “semi-strong”.  The incentives in the markets are perceived as 
strong, whereas administrative control is impossible.  Conversely, hierarchies have strong 
administrative control but weak incentives. 
Also on adaptation the governance structures differ: autonomous adaptation through quantity 
and price adjustment is the primary mechanism in the market, in the hierarchy adaptation is 
done through cooperation.  Where the market assumes “faceless” transactions, the identity of 
the parties is very much known in the cooperative adaptation in the hierarchy.  In the hybrid 
form, both types of adaptation are possible as negotiation over price/quantity has a meaning 
due to the semi-idiosyncratic nature of the transactions, and the cooperative approach is 
necessary to ensure stability in the semi-dependent exchange relationship. 
Also the last attribute, contract law, differs across governance structure as Williamson 
contradicts the “nexus of contracts” school: 
“Describing the firm as a ‘nexus of contracts’ … suggests that the firm is no 
different from the market in contractual respects.  …  That it has been 
instructive to view the firm as a nexus of contracts is evident in the numerous 
insights that this literature has generated.  But to regard the corporation only 
as a nexus of contracts misses much of what is truly distinctive about this mode 
of governance.  …  [B]ilateral adaptation effected through fiat is a 
distinguishing feature of the internal organization.  …  The implicit contract 
law of internal organization is that of forbearance.  Thus, whereas courts 
routinely grant standing to firms should there be disputes over price, the 
damages to be ascribed to delays, failures of quality, and the like, courts will 
refuse to hear disputes between one internal division and another over identical 
technical issues.  Access to courts being denied, the parties must resolve their 
differences internally.  Accordingly, hierarchy is its own court of ultimate 
appeal.” (Williamson, 1991a, p. 274). 
Viewed through the lenses of incentives, adaptation, and contract law, it becomes clear how 
different these governance structures are – thereby supporting quite different transactions.  As 
                                                 
15  Source: Table 1 in Williamson (1991a), p. 281. 
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mentioned previously transactions are characterized by asset specificity, frequency, and 
uncertainty - the former being the most important. 
Asset Specificity 
As indicated previously the concept of asset specificity is central to TCE: 
“Transaction cost economics further maintains that the most critical dimension 
for describing transactions is the condition of asset specificity.  Parties engaged 
in a trade that is supported by nontrivial investments in transaction-specific 
assets are effectively operating in a bilateral trading relation with one another.  
Harmonizing the contractual interface that joins the parties, thereby to effect 
adaptability and promote continuity, becomes the source of real value.” 
(Williamson, 1985, p. 30). 
The specificity of assets takes different forms16: 
? Site specificity – determined by the degree of mobility of the asset. 
? Physical asset specificity – stems from the specificity of physical attributes of the assets. 
? Human asset specificity - refers to the distinctiveness of competence of the individual as 
gained through job training, “learning by doing” etc.17 
? Dedicated assets – are assets, representing a discrete extension to the capacity of the 
firm, allocated to a specific buyer. 
? Brand specificity – is described by the value of the brand (brand name capital). 
? Temporal specificity – describes the timing of delivery requirements and the effects on 
product value. 
Even if asset specificity intuitively seems easy to observe in business life, it is a quite recent 
addition to the economic dictionary.  Prior to the work of Williamson, accounts of the 
phenomenon of asset specificity were considered unimportant and obscure.  The introduction 
of the concept had severe ramifications for contracting as it contradicts the stability of the 
market as a governance structure: 
“Transactions that are supported by investments made in durable, transaction-
specific assets experience ‘lock in’ effects, on which account autonomous 
trading will commonly be supplanted by unified ownership (vertical 
integration).” (Williamson, 1985, p. 53). 
The ‘lock in’ effect of the asset specificity and the creation of idiosyncrasies in exchange 
relations are described by the term ‘The Fundamental Transformation’. 
The Fundamental Transformation 
The ‘lock in’ effect is created through interaction, meaning that even if on the outset there are 
many qualified bidders, the winner of a contract acquires (transaction) cost advantage through 
e.g. learning (technical and managerial procedures, labor skills), acquisition of proprietary 
information etc.  TCE does not contradict the ex ante situation (that there may exist many 
                                                 
16  This typology has evolved over time.  In Williamson (1983) site, physical, and human asset specificity are 
referenced and dedicated assets are added to the list, and in Williamson (1991a) all six are listed. 
17  This type of asset specificity was the interest of Marshall (1948) perhaps making it the “original” definition 
of the concept. 
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qualified bidders competing for the contract), but insists that this does not necessarily mean 
that many bidders will prevail ex post.  Whether or not the ‘lock in’ effect will appear depends 
on the type of transactions taking place.  In case the transactions are supported by transaction-
specific assets, the initial winner will acquire an advantage over initial non-winners.  If 
transactions are not supported by specific investments, no advantage is gained and no 
advantage over non-winners exists.  The bidding parity will be upset and remain due to the 
continued self-enforcement (see e.g. Williamson, 1983). 
The ‘lock-in ‘effect is often symmetrical, in that the buyer can not turn to other sources of 
input as the cost of supply from unspecialized capital is presumably great.  But even if the 
departure from the market form might be perceived as a risky endeavor, advantages for both 
parties can arise through the creation of trust: 
“Additional transaction-specific savings can accrue at the interface between 
supplier and buyer as contracts are successively adapted to unfolding events 
and as periodic contract renewal agreements are reached.  …  Both 
institutional and personal trust relations evolve.  Thus the individuals who are 
responsible for adapting the interfaces have a personal as well as an 
organizational stake in what transpires.  …  Other things being equal, 
idiosyncratic exchange relations that feature personal trust will survive greater 
stress and will display greater adaptability.” (Williamson, 1985, pp. 62-63). 
The trust developing between parties thereby constitute a form of safeguarding. 
Safeguarding 
Safeguarding is thereby linked to asset specificity without which no safeguarding is necessary 
(since alternatives are easily found and trading relations are costlessly established).  
Safeguarding can take various forms: 
 “The protective safeguards to which I refer normally take on one or more of 
three forms.  The first is to realign incentives, which commonly involves some 
type of severance payment or penalty for premature termination.  A second is to 
create and employ a specialized governance structure to which to refer and 
resolve disputes.  The use of arbitration, rather than litigation in the courts, is 
thus characteristic of node C18 governance.  A third is to introduce trading 
regularities that support and signal continuity intentions.  Expanding a trading 
relation from unilateral to bilateral exchange – through the concerted use, for 
example, of reciprocity – thereby to effect an equilibration of trading hazards is 
an example of that last.” (Williamson, 1985, pp. 33-34). 
In case of the absence of contractual hazard (ambiguity of common knowledge, weak 
property rights, undisclosed quality and safety hazards etc.) the appropriate governance 
structure is the market.  Alternatively, if circumstances are more complex (e.g. less degree of 
transparency), the governance structure is determined by the existence of safeguards.  If no 
safeguards are present the contractual hazards are unchecked, creating a fundamentally 
unstable constellation.  Conversely, if safeguards exist they may take one of two distinct 
                                                 
18  Figure 5-3 below is a later version of the original schema; the correct reference is therefore nodes C and D. 
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forms: market safeguards and administrative safeguards.  The latter is elsewhere named 
vertical integration; the former is sometimes called credible commitments. 
The contingencies around safeguarding are depicted in Figure 5-3 below. 
Figure 5-3: Simple Contracting Schema19 
administrative
market safeguard
D (Integration)
C (Credible commitment)
B (Unrelieved hazard)
A (Unassisted market)
h = 0
h > 0
s = 0
s > 0
h = contractual hazards
s = safehuards
 
 
In one of the early contributions Williamson (1971) tried to explain vertical integration in 
TCE terms, emphasizing the differential incentive and control properties of firms in relation 
to markets: 
“Perhaps the most distinctive advantage of the firm, however, is the wider 
variety and greater sensitivity of control instruments that are available for 
enforcing intrafirm in comparison with interfirm activities.  Not only does the 
firm have the constitutional authority and low-cost access to the requisite data 
which permit it to perform more precise own-performance evaluations (of both 
contemporaneous and ex post variety) than can a buyer, but its reward and 
penalty instruments (which include selective use of employment, promotion, 
remuneration, and internal resource allocation processes) are more refined.” 
(pp. 113-114). 
Alignment is attempted through modification of the organization form by means of contracts, 
which are considered inherently incomplete due to before mentioned bounded rationality and 
the complexity of the situation to be covered.  As contracts are inherently incomplete the ex 
ante problem is determining to which level the contract should be defined, whereas the ex 
post problem is one of bargaining.  The costs of using the judicial system are no longer 
ignored as private ordering is preferred over court ordering, and maladaptations are 
considered a natural consequence of the dynamics in economic institutions. 
The other alternative, credible commitments (node C in Figure 5-3 above), consists of a 
number of mechanisms, e.g. various types of hostages, reciprocity in trade, and regulations. 
                                                 
19  Source: Figure 2 in Williamson (2000), p. 602. 
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Frequency 
An increase in uncertainty will have no effect on the transactions performed in the market as 
continuity has little value and new trading relations easily can be arranged for both parties.  
But for transactions performed in the hybrid form, a low frequency will require the use of an 
arbitrator for conflict resolution.  In case of high frequency, both participants will have 
enough experience and knowledge about the domain to perform the continuous negotiation 
and adaptation without the use of an arbitrator. 
The use of an arbitrator spills over into transactions supported by idiosyncratic and highly 
idiosyncratic investments.  The more idiosyncratic the investment supporting the transactions 
and the higher the frequency of the transaction the more pressure to implement unified 
governance.  For the recurrent transactions the change will result in a shift from a bilateral 
trading relationship to vertical integration. 
Uncertainty 
The last of the contingencies, uncertainty, is also of critical importance in understanding TCE: 
 “The third dimension, uncertainty, is assumed to be present in sufficient degree 
to pose an adaptive, sequential decision problem.  The occasion to make 
successive adaptations arises because of the impossibility (or costliness) of 
enumerating all possible contingencies and/or stipulating appropriate 
adaptations to them in advance.  The effects on economic organization of 
increases in uncertainty above that threshold level have not, however, been 
considered.” (Williamson, 1985, p. 79). 
For non-specific transactions the increase in uncertainty does not have an effect, but for 
transactions supported by specific assets uncertainty matters.  Even if uncertainty is defined at 
two levels (1. as behavioral uncertainty stemming from bounded rationality, and 2. as 
uncertainty due to interaction effects), the link between transaction frequency and uncertainty 
is undefined, at least initially.  The top two arrows in Figure 5-4 below (referring to the 
occasional transactions category) are therefore only suggestive.  The shift from hybrid to 
market seems pretty straightforward, though, whereas the shift from hybrid to hierarchy may 
require extraordinary justifications. 
For the recurrent transactions increases in uncertainty will make it more imperative to have 
governance structures with capacity to “work things out” in a cost-effective manner.  
Especially the transactions with mixed investment attributes pose an interesting problem.  
Unless the market can assist in governing the transaction it might “flee” towards the polar 
extremes as uncertainty increases.  In case the transaction is critical to the company the shift 
to hierarchy seems most appropriate20, otherwise the market might be more beneficial21.  
                                                 
20  Elsewhere (Williamson, 1971) a similar argument is made on vertical integration as a response to moral 
hazard: “In consideration of the costs and limitations of input monitoring by outsiders, the buyer may 
choose to bear the risk and perform the work himself.  The buyer thus internalizes, through backward 
vertical integration, a transaction which, but for uncertainty, would move through the market.” (p. 118). 
21  As stated in Williamson (1991b): “If, therefore, there are not compensating gains (bilateral or multilateral 
adaptability advantages), integration is the source of cost without benefit.  Firms that mindlessly integrate 
weaken themselves in relation to nonintegrated rivals.  …  Vertical integration is the organization form not 
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Reductions in uncertainty will have the opposite consequences (e.g. Williamson, 1979, p. 254; 
Williamson, 1985, pp. 79-80). 
Figure 5-4: The impact of uncertainty on governance structure 
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Frequency of Disturbances 
The impact of uncertainty is further elaborated upon in a later contribution (Williamson, 
1991a) where the frequency of disturbances and asset specificity is combined as depicted in 
Figure 5-5 below.  Resembling the previous argument it is proposed that the increase of 
frequency or variability of disturbances will have an effect on the appropriateness of 
governance structures.  Relying on negotiations the hybrid form is especially poor at adapting 
to series of disturbances.  Both markets and the hierarchy in contrast are able to handle this 
situation, the former by switching away from disturbances, the latter by control and fiat. 
The higher the frequency of disturbances the less appropriate is the hybrid form.  As the 
frequency of transactions is absent in the figure (and in the text) it is assumed to refer to the 
category of recurrent transactions, as before.  And as before it is not described what might 
trigger the shift from market to hierarchy or vice versa. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
of first but of last resort – to be adopted when all else fails.  Try markets, try long-term contracts and other 
hybrid modes, and revert to hierarchy only for compelling reasons.” (p. 83). 
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Figure 5-5: Organization form responses to changes in frequency22 
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The Heritage of TCE 
Albeit Williamson sometimes is referred to as synonymous with TCE a number of prominent 
researchers have made crucial contributions to the theory.  Williamson himself acclaims a 
number of fellow researchers: 
”The following propositions had thus been advanced and, in principle, could 
have been joined in a concerted study of economic organization as of 1940: (1) 
Opportunism is a subtle and pervasive condition of human nature  with which 
the study of economic organization must be actively concerned (Knight); (2) the 
transaction is the basic unit of organizational analysis (Commons); (3) a 
central purpose of economic organization is to harmonize exchange relations 
(Commons; Barnard); (4) the study of contract, broadly conceived, is the legal 
counterpart to, and both stands to benefit from and can help to inform the study 
of economic organization (Llewellyn); and (5) the study of internal 
organization and market organization are not disjunct but are usefully joined 
within a common transaction cost economizing framework (Coase).” 
(Williamson, 1985, pp. 6-7). 
The solid foundation on which TCE is based is no insurance against criticisms. 
Criticisms… 
As described above the evolution of TCE has been driven by critique.  The current emphasis 
on the hybrid form of governance is a direct result of criticisms as is the number of asset 
specificity categories (see footnote 16 above).  Other criticisms are somewhat less 
manageable as they attack the basic assumptions. 
                                                 
22  Source: Figure 3 in Williamson (1991a), p. 292.  (Slightly modified: descriptions on axis added). 
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In Dyer (1997) the correlation between transactions costs and relation-specific investments is 
questioned.  Dyer performs a comparative study of the American and Japanese automobile 
industries, and subsequently suggests differences across safe guards in terms of setup costs 
and transactions costs over time may explain why some Japanese companies obtaining both 
high asset specificity and low transactions costs.  One of the major innovations in the article is 
the introduction of differentiated time horizons and the implications on cooperation 
(propositions 1 and 4).  Furthermore the value of the interaction is of relevance, as the total 
volume of exchange will limit opportunism (proposition 2)23.  Quite reasonable propositions, 
contrary to the fifth proposition: 
“Above some minimum threshold level of trust, additional relation-specific 
investments serve to increase commitment and the costs of unilateral defection, 
thereby resulting in lower transaction costs.”  (Dyer, 1997, p. 550). 
Even if the argument that inter-company trust will reduce the need for safeguards is quite 
reasonable it lacks a “counter argument”.  Following the logic proposed to lower transaction 
costs it is only a matter of keep co-investing until companies share fates?  This argument is 
clearly not valid as extensive co-investing will act as vertical integration thereby altering the 
governance structure from hybrid to hierarchy.  Albeit a very interesting article at least part of 
the argumentation must be disregarded as the logic is simply invalid24. 
In Ghoshal & Moran (1996) both basic assumptions and normative implications of TCE are 
criticized25.  The major criticisms on assumptions include the definition of opportunism and 
the usage of social control in hierarchies.  Ghoshal and Moran “unpack” opportunism and 
develop a model (called “The Cycle of Self-fulfilling Prophecy”), see Figure 5-6 below.  They 
claim TCE is “bad for practice” as the expectation of opportunistic behavior restrains users of 
TCE (managers) to consider other modes of management (than fiat).  They therefore propose 
decomposing opportunism into two components: the attitude and the behavior, and to include 
more factors: ‘prior conditioning’ (relationship) and ‘feeling for the entity’ (individuals’ 
assessment of the partner) to facilitate a development of the managerial aspect of the theory.  
The implication of the new model is a new insight into the relevance of social control, which 
in Williamson’s model consists of control through fiat only.  In the new model, cooperation 
and adaptation is possible, widening the interpretation of efficiency gains.  The authors’ major 
claim is that, through the widening of the model, TCE might be able to describe a larger 
                                                 
23 The “cost of information” proposition is not new, though.  The more costly information is the higher cost of 
controlling the exchange. 
24 Furthermore (and as stated in the article itself) one should be a bit wary when it comes to the empirical 
translations performed.  The total transaction cost is translated into the cost of the purchasing department.  
This assumption may be valid for some of the companies analysed but has not been confirmed by all.  It 
would suggest all companies are similarly structured – which is a somewhat bold statement.  
25 Also they reference a number of other critics: “TCE has been criticized for many things – for embodying a 
hidden ideology that distorts more than it illuminates (Perrow, 1986), for ad-hoc theorizing divorced from 
reality (Simon, 1991), for lacking generality because of ethnocentric bias (Dore, 1983), for ignoring the 
contextual grounding of human actions, and presenting an undersocialized view of human motivation and 
an oversocialized view of institutional control (Granovetter)…” (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996, pp. 14-15). 
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portion of empiric reality, through modifying the strict and limiting assumptions concerning 
human nature in (Williamson’s version of) TCE. 
Figure 5-6: Models of Opportunistic Behavior26 
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In Johanson & Mattson (1987) the authors compare IA and TCE in respect to the ability to 
describe and explain inter-organizational relations.  Besides repeating some of the criticisms 
referenced above they reference another objection: 
“… Williamson makes unrealistic assumptions about the differences between 
markets and hierarchies.  Opportunism also exists within firms; organizations 
are not necessarily able to economize on bounded rationality; markets can also 
be characterized by asymmetrical power relations (controlled by ‘fiat’); etc.” 
(Johanson & Mattsson, 1987, pp. 42-43). 
In other words, the social control proposed by Williamson might not only be 
counterproductive (as described by Ghoshal & Moran) but might be ineffective.  Johanson & 
Mattson further point out a crucial shortcoming of transaction cost analysis in relation to 
industrial systems: 
                                                 
26 Source: Figure 1 and 2 in Ghoshal & Moran (1996), p. 19 and 22, respectively. 
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“The transaction is a dyadic relationship, but the industrial system is made up 
of many such relations that are more or less interdependent.  If we pick just one 
of those dyads and change the institutional form, e.g. through vertical 
integration, the other dyads may also be affected.  The efficiency of the wider 
system may very well move in the opposite direction from the efficiency 
achieved in the original dyad that was changed.” (Johanson & Mattsson, 1987, 
p. 43). 
Also in Noorderhaven (1995) the Interaction Approach is compared to TCE, here with 
emphasis on the shift between governance structures.  In order to provide a “dynamic theory 
for hybrid governance” TCE is criticized for its static nature: 
“Reduced to its essence, TCE is a two-period model: in the first period the 
relevant decisions with regard to investments and governance structure are 
made; in the second period the actual transactions follow.  TCE is geared to the 
comparative static analysis of governance structures, and offers little in the way 
of a theory of gradual change from one governance structure to the other.” 
(Noorderhaven, 1995, p. 45). 
Noorderhaven goes on to describe how the concept of safeguards is the most important 
difference between the two schools of thought, and describes how the longer time horizon in 
the Interaction Approach deems the use of safeguards irrelevant.  The arguments are based on 
the “usual criticisms” concerning assumptions on human nature and rationality. 
The last criticism to be dealt with here is also quite fundamental.  Many critiques have 
addressed the notion of trust put forward by Williamson, especially in his early work.  Even if 
the early work included the somewhat vague reference to “atmosphere” this was not further 
developed in subsequent work (Nooteboom, Berger, & Noorderhaven, 1997).  Focusing on 
the protection of self-interest, Williamson insisted trust is irrelevant to the governance of 
relationships.  But others disagree, e.g. Johanson and Mattsson (1987) who propose the 
perception of trust varies across theoretical frameworks due to different time horizon.  After 
quoting social exchange theory, they comment: 
“Single exchanges are … integral parts of a process in which the parties 
gradually build up a mutual trust in each other.  In supplier-customer 
relationships, business exchange is an important aspect of this social exchange 
process, and the gradual buildup is very familiar to businessmen.” (Johanson 
& Mattsson, 1987, p. 37) 
They perceive the buildup of knowledge of exchange partners and the emergence of trust as 
preconditions to inclusion into industrial network.  Williamson (1993) persists this use of the 
term trust is misleading, and explains his perception as a typology containing: 1. calculative 
trust, 2. institutional (hyphenated) trust, and 3. personal trust.  Only the latter is perceived as 
real trust, but: 
“Williamson posited that trust makes sense only if it goes beyond calculative 
self-interest. But since he maintained the centrality of calculativeness, there is 
no room in his view for trust.” (Nooteboom, Berger, & Noorderhaven, 1997, p. 
310). 
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Between these two extremes: 1. trust as a precondition for (business) relationships and 2. trust 
as irrelevant due to self-interest-seeking Nooteboom, Berger, & Noorderhaven (1997) present 
an alternative view: 
“Trust can only be considered an instrument of governance in a limited sense: 
it contributes to risk reduction, but it cannot be instituted instantaneously.  If 
trust is not already present, it has to be built by developing bonds or shared 
norms and values.  It can be more an outcome than a precondition of a relation, 
in which case it provides an improved basis for ongoing cooperation.  Shared 
norms and values should, however, be a criterion for the selection of partners 
and in that sense can serve as an instrument.” (p. 318). 
It seems obvious the notion of risk could be elaborated on, but here it should suffice to 
emphasize Williamson’s rejection of the notion of trust in relation to governance. 
5.1.1 TCE and SCM 
From the above description it is evident TCE is relevant to the domain of SCM.  It seems 
appropriate to compare the governance structures (market, hybrid, and hierarchy) with the 
understanding of SCM put forward in Chapter 2.  But before turning to the analysis of the 
three governance structures a few issues need to be addressed. 
Dyads versus Networks 
Already mentioned above TCE has the weakness in relation to SCM that it deals with dyads 
instead of (sub) networks.  Comparative analyses of governance structures does not support 
multi-tier structures and therefore can not describe the causality of failures of 2nd tier suppliers 
on 1st tier supplier performance.  First tier suppliers are liable for failures upstream as 
interactions in TCE are always only one tier deep.  Another shortcoming in this context is the 
lack of support for the notion of interconnectedness27 also severely damaging the applicability 
of the results of the before mentioned comparative analyses. 
Frequency of Transactions versus SCM 
As defined in Chapter 2 the focus of this dissertation is on manufacturing firms.  SCM is 
perceived as primarily concerned with manufacturing and the fulfillment of customer 
requirements, thereby differentiating itself from the literature emphasizing NPD or/and 
Innovation as the primary reason for close relationships.  The closeness of relationships is 
thereby justified by the need for stability in the supply chains, not by the need to innovate.  As 
a consequence only the frequent transactions are of relevance.  This does not mean, though, 
that companies being dependent on good relationships with e.g. equipment suppliers should 
pay less attention to these occasional trading partners.  But it means this type of infrastructure 
decisions is considered outside the domain of SCM.  A requirement for a relation to be 
                                                 
27 In Ritter (2000) the concept of interconnectedness is introduced to describe how one relationship in a 
network might influence one or more other relationships.  An example might be the relation between 
supplier A and the focal company C influencing the relationship between supplier B and focal company C – 
and perhaps even between suppliers A and B. 
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considered a SCM relationship is thereby transaction recurrence and open-endedness in time 
perspective. 
Safeguarding versus Trust 
These “long-term transactional relationships” are naturally somewhat different from the ideal 
in classical economics of the “one-off” transactions - not least in terms of trust.  The 
insistence within TCE that (personal) trust is irrelevant contradicts empirical findings from 
the domain of inter-organizational relations which states trust decreases the needs for 
safeguarding (e.g. Inkpen & Currall, 2004).  In Handfield & Bechtel (2002) it is concluded 
that trust may result from specific investments (in the form of site and human specific assets) 
leading to increased supply chain responsiveness.  As responsiveness is a more fragile and 
high-risk configuration the fundamental claim might be that trust is a precondition for 
implementing high-risk (or rather: high impact) inter-organizational configurations? 
This issue is further investigated in Suh & Kwon (2006) where a two-stage model of trust and 
specific asset investment is put forward.  They conclude, quite surprisingly, that the duration 
of relationship does little in terms of explaining trust in a relationship: 
“… our data has proven that the calculative-based trust theory has better 
explaining power than the knowledge-based trust theory proposing that trust 
develops over time as one accumulates trust-relevant knowledge through 
experience with the other person.” (Suh & Kwon, 2006, p. 198). 
They emphasize the importance of calculative trust – and the importance of trust when 
developing supply chain initiatives like CPFR. 
But the question is really whether trust should be seen as a precondition or a consequence of 
specific asset investments.  In Inkpen & Currall (2004) the co-evolution of trust, control and 
learning in joint ventures is analyzed using a two-stage (initial versus evolved conditions) 
model.  They conclude the three phenomena co-evolve, however: 
“… because trust cannot be instantaneously created or destroyed, partner firms 
must balance the inevitable trade-off between trust and control.” (Inkpen & 
Currall, 2004, p. 596). 
They claim trust may be a prerequisite for entering into joint ventures with a partner, but 
refrain from answering whether high levels of control or high levels of trust will maximize 
performance in the joint venture or not. 
The shortcoming of TCE in relation to trust (if any such exist) might thereby be a question of 
time horizon or number of scenarios evaluated, not on the basic assumption of opportunism? 
One-sidedness & Focus on Cost instead of Value 
As pointed out in Zajac & Olsen (1993) TCE has limited relevance to the analysis of inter-
organizational strategies for two reasons:  1. the theory is basically one-sided, and 2. the 
theory is limited to looking at (short term) costs instead of (long-term) value creation. 
Altering the decision in TCE from uni-directional to bi-directional when evaluating the 
appropriateness of governance structure is naturally quite extreme as it contradicts the basic 
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assumption in the theory.  But imaging the two companies negotiating the governance 
structure based on input from both sides is definitely more in the spirit of SCM.  And 
extending TCE to consider the creation of value as well as costs would enable TCE to explain 
a larger part of reality28. 
Efficiency versus Capabilities Building 
Furthermore, as stated in Barney (1999) TCE might have a shortcoming in certain settings 
where the development or purchase of certain capabilities is too costly.  According to Barney 
TCE simply does not cover the “logic of acquisitions”: 
“Thus, when the cost of using hierarchical governance to gain access to 
capabilities is high, a firm may prefer using non-hierarchical governance for 
this purpose, even if the threat of opportunism is real.  Opportunism is simply 
part of the cost of gaining access to the special capabilities controlled by 
another company that cannot be developed internally or accessed through 
acquisition in a cost-effective way.”  (Barney, 1999, p. 143) 
In Barney this argument is used in a special setting (high tech industries) but the argument 
carries weight in other settings as well.  The relative size of companies in supply chains gives 
the argument merit - and continued specialization and adaptations in the chain further 
emphasizes the problem. 
 
These issues set aside the governance structure and the shifts between them can be 
evaluated29. 
 
Market Governance 
Analyzing TCE for relevance in relation to SCM reveals the market governance structure 
more or less defines the boundaries of a company’s supply chains.  In case transactions are 
performed in a market partners are “faceless” thereby negating the possibility of integration.  
The “rules of the game” are dictated by the market and options for e.g. speedy delivery will 
over time be uniformly accessible to all players.  Since no relationship exists between players 
in such a market no common goals are identified and win-win does not make any sense.  So, 
analyzing the exchange relationships of a firm will enable the mapping out of the (borders of) 
supply chains using the transaction types as an object for analysis (see e.g. Gardner & Cooper, 
2003).  The move out of market governance into the hybrid form is described in detail above 
under the heading “The Fundamental Transformation” but the shift from market to hierarchy 
is less so.  Basically, the move from market to hierarchy conflicts with the overall premise of 
TCE as hierarchy is the most cost intensive of governance forms.  The implied assumption is 
therefore that the move from market to hierarchy will not happen as hybrid forms such as 
                                                 
28 The “value instead of cost” focus is supported by Dyer (1997). 
29  Above mentioned Noorderhaven (1995) analyzes shifts between governance structures, but since 
assumptions are modified and only the market and hybrid forms are included in the analysis, the 
contribution is ignored here. 
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joint ventures, strategic alliances etc. will have to be exhausted first.  But, in case of an 
immediate need for better control, perhaps the shift could be justified.  Especially under 
regimes of high uncertainty, the need for better control might justify the shift from market to 
hierarchy without first trying the various forms of hybrid governance.  Since this situation 
implies a sudden shift in uncertainty and an immediate need for better control, probably the 
activities (transactions) are internalized, but not the organization.  In other words: the 
responsibility for performing the transaction is internalized without the take-over of the 
supplier.  The consequence from a SCM perspective of both governance shifts is that a subset 
of the suppliers previously located in 2nd tier (known or unknown) are now moved up to the 
1st tier, resulting in the need to determine which suppliers to keep and which to discard.  So, 
on the one hand the number of players in the extended network has decreased (intuitively 
resulting in decreasing complexity) the number of first tier suppliers have increased, resulting 
in increased complexity.  And since uncertainty is dependent on the complexity of the 
network, the result of the described insourcing is ambiguous30. 
Hierarchy 
In contrast to market governance, performing the transactions internally does not conflict with 
the concept of SCM.  One might argue TCE can be used to analyze and describe the 
organization of transactions inside organizations but the concepts of market, hybrid, and 
hierarchy are not easily converted to describe functional versus process-oriented execution or 
management of activities.  Especially the concept of market governance does not translate 
well, as it implies a high degree of redundancy within organizations including alternative 
departments to make bids for transactions.  Such redundancy will have to be extremely costly.  
Hierarchical governance therefore does not imply that activities (transactions) are performed 
in a process oriented fashion, only that they are performed under the direct control (using fiat) 
of the organization.  TCE does not seem to have any distinct contributions on process-oriented 
execution or management of transactions. 
In considering the shift from hierarchy governance31 it is of critical importance whether or not 
a market for the transaction exists?  In case the transaction can be performed under market 
governance TCE suggests doing so in order to minimize costs.  In SCM terms this 
outsourcing can impact the company in two ways, depending on the closeness with suppliers 
to the activities being outsourced.  In case inputs to the activities being outsourced were 
supplied by “close” suppliers, the consequence is that the supply chain is “broken” as the 
relationship to the former suppliers is terminated.  In that sense, the move from a close 
relationship to an arms length32 (market based) relationship is “anti-SCM”, at least if analyzed 
                                                 
30  In the (under these circumstances rare) case of vertical integration, internal uncertainty is further increased 
by the task of merging the two companies. 
31  It is assumed that the transaction (activity or group of activities) in question is an integral part of the 
Fulfillment process.  The logic for support activities is similar but of less importance as these activities are 
expected to be performed within the relevant departmental/functional domain. 
32  The term arms length contrasts the close relationship in a manner similar to exit versus voice (see 
Hirschman, 1970).  For a more recent contribution see Sako & Helper (1998). 
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in isolation33.  Complexity is reduced at the cost of integrative features, as no additional 
suppliers are introduced and only “type A”34 adaptations are possible in the market.  
Alternatively, if inputs were obtained from a market, there are no changes to the integrative 
features and complexity is reduced at the cost of increased uncertainty.   
In case no option for market governance exists, the transaction will be governed under the 
umbrella concept of hybrid forms.  As described elsewhere this type of governance takes 
many forms ranging from franchising to joint ventures.  The shift from hierarchy to hybrid is 
less dramatic than the move to the market form as the former two both rely on relational 
contracting, see Figure 5-2.  In this shift complexity (and uncertainty) is expected to increase 
as an additional player in the supply chain is introduced and control over outcomes decreases.  
A further disadvantage of this governance structure is the immediate ‘lock-in’ effect resulting 
from the initial adaptations (especially of type C). 
Hybrid 
Comparing with the other two governance types the hybrid form is clearly the one most 
applicable to describe SCM from a TCE perspective.  The varying governance types under the 
umbrella concept of hybrid describes the varying types of cooperative arrangements ascribed 
SCM, from joint ventures to strategic alliances or other cooperative constellations.  TCE is 
clearly in line with the major part of the (normative) literature on SCM as it relies on the 
continued renegotiation and adaptation between supply chain partners.  Referencing contract 
law on which TCE rests contracts are renegotiated on a continual basis, creating opportunities 
for change.  In case circumstances have changed the “contract” might be altered, hopefully 
ensuring stability by creating symmetry in the inter-dependence. 
Considering shifts from the hybrid form, uncertainty and frequency of disturbance must be 
referenced (as described above).  In case uncertainty increases added costs incur as increased 
safeguarding is required to ensure stability.  In case of frequent disturbances (even if each 
disturbance in itself is non-dramatic) the costs of dealing with the disturbances becomes a 
burden, leading to a shift in governance type.  Asset specificity will determine in which 
direction the shift will be. 
The shift towards hierarchy is also a foreseeable consequence of the before mentioned 
“Fundamental Transformation”.  If the number of alternative suppliers have reduced to zero, 
thereby creating an uncomfortable dependency in the relation between supplier and buyer, 
strong incentive to insource the transaction occur.  This is especially the case if the 
asymmetry of dependency can not be altered by use of e.g. credible commitments.  Limits on 
the coordinative capacity of the corporation will, as mentioned above, determine the degree to 
                                                 
33  If should be noted that the reduction of the supplier base often will be performed by a combination of re-
design of products, re-specification of requirements, exclusion of redundant suppliers, and letting the more 
competent supplier act as systems suppliers.  The impact on the portfolio of supply chains will therefore 
vary from case to case. 
34  “Type A” adaptations describe the autonomous adaptations in the market by means of price and quantity.  
“Type C” denotes the coordinative adaptations in hierarchies.  As also described previously the hybrid 
forms enable both types, but not to the same extremes as in markets and hierarchies, respectively. 
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which the company can expand its activities and continue to insource transactions (see Coase, 
1937). 
The shift towards market will result from e.g. a deterioration of the assets’ specificity, a 
phenomenon directly observable in the TPL industry in Denmark today35.  As most suppliers 
of TPL have now developed to a certain level of competence, the services are becoming 
standard, and price competition reoccur.  In TCE terminology: suppliers of TPL services have 
not been good enough at creating unique solutions for their customers, thereby missing the 
opportunity of self-enforcing the dependency.  As soon as this fact becomes apparent to the 
buyers of these services, the shift towards market governance is imminent. 
Governance Structures and SCM 
The elaborations above describe an analysis of the relevance of governance structures in 
relations to SCM.  It was concluded that an additional characteristic, the recurrent nature of 
transactions, to be added to the working definition of SCM.  Furthermore it was concluded 
that transactions performed under market governance defines the boundary of the supply 
chain.  The relevance of governance structures in relation to SCM can thereby be illustrated as 
in Figure 5-7 below (colored cells denotes relevance). 
Figure 5-7: SCM and the Governance Structures 
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
R
ec
ur
re
nt
O
cc
as
io
na
l
Nonspecific Mixed Idiosyncratic
Investment Characteristics
Bilateral governance Unified governance
(relational contracting)
Trilateral governance
(neoclassic contracting)
M
ar
ke
tg
ov
er
na
nc
e
(c
la
ss
ic
al
co
nt
ra
ct
in
g)
 
 
Shifts between Governance Structures 
Furthermore the consequences of shifts between governance structures were analyzed to 
enable a discussion of the management of the defined risks.  The results of this analysis are 
briefly summarized in Figure 5-8 below. 
                                                 
35  As described by leading TPL operators during a seminar at KolleKolle, Denmark on May 26-27th 2005. 
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Figure 5-8: Shifts in Governance Structure 
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Among the most important conclusions is the (somewhat trivial) conclusion that ‘lock-in’ and 
the presence of integrative features in exchange relationships are mutually exclusive when 
shifting from hierarchy to either market or hybrid governance. 
5.1.2 Contributions Referencing TCE 
The use of TCE spans from the most superficial to the very thorough and mind provoking. 
In Hallikas et al. (2004) TCE is used to briefly explain the emergence of business networks.  
This explanation also borrows from RBT, but these explanations do not seem to be integrated 
into the proposed process for risk management in network environments.  TCE is also used 
quite superficially in Christiaanse & Kumar (2000) when commenting on supply chain 
design: 
“Design of a supply chain involves four design decisions.  These decisions are 
the choice of actors in the supply chain, governance mechanism in the chain, 
structuring (i.e. sequencing order) of the activities in the chain, and the choice 
of coordination structures in the chain.” (p.271). 
The authors use TCE to discuss governance under varying conditions, especially varying 
coordination costs versus degree of specialization and economies of scale. 
In Walker (1988) the emphasis is on the strategic risks in association with outsourcing.  For 
reasons of convenience the analysis and discussion focus on comparisons of market versus 
hierarchy albeit the other forms (joint ventures etc.) are acknowledged.  In their article 
complexity is further increased by combining resource based (see Chapter 5.3) with 
transaction cost arguments.  The TCE arguments to a certain degree suffer from the 
combination with the RBT arguments - it is apparent that the transaction costs are secondary 
to protecting the company’s assets.  The article by Smeltzer & Siferd (1998) also reference 
another theoretical framework, Resource Dependency Theory.  Unfortunately TCE is used in 
a somewhat limiting fashion, as the argument put forward is to minimize the number of 
transactions.  As described in Chapter 3, the article is concerned with Proactive Supply 
Management, and the minimization of transaction costs is used to support the implementation 
of systems suppliers.  Furthermore, Resource Dependency Theory is then subsequently used 
to illustrate the higher risk expected by reducing the supplier base (the article ends by 
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contradicting its own theoretical findings by referencing a survey performed).  Also Logan 
(2000) uses more theories as TCE, RBT and P/A theory in combination is used to design 
successful outsourcing relationships in the transportation industry.  Logan proposes to use the 
three theoretical frameworks in succession: 1. use RBV to evaluate the competencies of the 
provider, 2. to assess transactions costs in relation to specific investments, and 3. to evaluate 
agency costs and design contracts based on behaviors and outcomes desired.  Albeit the article 
is quite interesting as the outsourcing process is broken down into three distinct decisions 
each theory is only very briefly reviewed and the theoretical underpinning is quite limited. 
In McIvor (2000) the author claims to use TCE as the foundation for outsourcing decisions, 
but seems to work from an understanding of transaction cost that deviate from the one 
described above.  McIvor describe the rationale for outsourcing as: 
“… the company should outsource activities if to carry them out internally 
would require excessive investment to get the lowest unit price.” (p. 23). 
This causes few problems, though, as TCE is not referenced in the model proposed.  Quite 
contrary to the introduction in the article, the model relies heavily on RBT argumentation 
(more on this later in the chapter).  In the follow-up article (McIvor, 2003) the same model is 
used and findings from research within the telecommunications industry is presented.  McIvor 
describes “key issues motivating the company in the outsourcing process” and quite 
interestingly reports the following rationale for reduced risk exposure: 
“Through outsourcing the company is reducing its level of risk.  For example, 
by gradually outsourcing manufacturing processes it is reducing risk by 
converting its fixed costs into variable costs.  In times of adverse business 
conditions suppliers will then have to deal with the problem of excess capacity.  
The company argues that suppliers are better able to cope with demand 
fluctuations through economies of scale and have more scope for alternative 
sources for this excess capacity.” (p. 390). 
This is quite a statement as the outsourcing of manufacturing processes in the long run will 
leave the company “empty” – in the extreme case encompassing only brand ownership.  
Trading fixed costs for variable costs is by no way a panacea for risk mitigation as the focal 
company creates dependencies and removes itself from the upstream (supply) market. 
In Bensaou & Anderson (1999) the arguments are more substantial.  The authors: 
“… try to better understand why buyers post ‘credible commitments’ in the first 
place and why such investments are made in some relations and not in others.” 
(p. 463) 
In order to understand the creation of these dependencies, the authors establish eleven 
hypotheses, and then investigate by means of interviews and surveys.  The hypotheses are 
based on a wide specter of theories: organization theory, industrial organization, institutional 
theory, and transaction cost economics.  Albeit only some of the hypotheses are based on 
TCE36 the use of the theory is quite detailed and thorough, and some of the non-TCE 
hypotheses might be quite interesting from a risk perspective (e.g. hypothesis H6: Thinness in 
                                                 
36 See Table 1 in Bensaou & Anderson (1999), p. 465. 
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Market).  So, even if this last contribution was well founded in TCE the general picture is a 
bit disappointing as TCE is used in a quite superficial fashion. 
5.1.3 TCE and the Supply Chain Risks 
From the descriptions and analyses above it should be evident that TCE addresses the issue of 
risk/uncertainty.  Albeit the uncertainty aspect in the fundamental model is somewhat diffuse 
the distinction is made between general uncertainty, the direct effect (uncertainty concerning 
the outcome of the transactions), and the interaction effect (uncertainty resulting from hybrid 
or market governance): 
”It is sometimes suggested that breach of contract risk affords an additional 
reason for integration: the small supplier of a critical component whose assets 
are insufficient to cover a total damage claim leaves the purchaser vulnerable.  
But this is an argument against small suppliers, not contracting generally; the 
large, diversified supplier might well have superior risk pooling capability to 
that of the integrated firm.  The risks of contractual incompleteness, however, 
remain and may discourage purchasing from large, diversified organizations.” 
(Williamson, 1971, footnote 4 on page 117). 
The relevance of risks and the appropriate response varies with the governance structures, 
which was to be expected.  As described in Figure 5-5 above, higher uncertainty will force 
transactions from the “SCM-type” governance structure, the hybrid form, into either the 
hierarchy or the market.  Interestingly this introduces a conundrum as integration between 
exchange partners represents a form of safeguarding transactions supported by assets of 
medium specificity at the same time as the governance structure is badly suited for just this 
type of transactions under uncertainty.  In case of the absence of uncertainty the transaction 
will (asset specificity set aside) be performed in the market, representing the lowest degree of 
uncertainty. 
Management of the Supply Chain Risks 
This evaluation leads to the following conclusions concerning TCE’s ability to manage the 
identified supply chain risks: 
? Process Risk: the management of the process risks seems to be quite well documented 
as too high frequency of disturbances will lead to a shift in governance structure.  Also 
the uncertainty concept has an impact on the choice of governance structure in case of 
high uncertainty.  Albeit assuming opportunistic behavior the theoretical framework 
does not relate in any way to the cause of the disturbances, and therefore does not 
differentiate between intended and non-intended disturbances. 
? Structure Risk: also the structural risk is, at least to a certain degree, dealt with in 
TCE.  As described above unchecked dependency will lead to the internalization of 
activities.  Or in TCE terms: in case of ‘small numbers bargaining’ and no ‘safeguards’ 
the governance structures ‘hierarchy’ or ‘market’ are preferential, depending on the 
degree of uncertainty and asset specificity.  But, on the other hand the focus on 
minimizing the transaction costs will invalidate e.g. practices of dual sourcing as this 
solution will prove less efficient than the use of a single supplier.  In case risk 
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management should be integrated into TCE at least a cost element holding the risk 
premium should be included in the portfolio of cost elements. 
 
In conclusion, TCE is able to react to increased frequency in disruption, but is less able to 
handle the exit of critical suppliers or customers.  Furthermore, the framework is not able to 
differentiate between intended and non-intended events. 
 
The next theory to be investigated is principal-agent theory. 
 
5.2 Principal-agent Theory (P/A) 
The game theoretic origins of agency theory can, according to Eisenhardt (1989a), be traced 
back to the 1960’s and early 1970’s when economists explored risk sharing among individuals 
or groups.  The core of agency problems is summarized in Fama & Jensen (1983a): 
“Agency problems arise because contracts are not costlessly written and 
enforced.  Agency costs include the costs of structuring, monitoring, and 
bonding a set of contracts among agents with conflicting interests, plus the 
residual loss incurred because the cost of full enforcements of contracts exceed 
the benefits.” (p. 327). 
Arguing that activities can be performed under a variety of organizational forms and claiming 
there is competition among organizational forms for survival in any activity, they continue: 
“Absent fiat, the form of organization that survives in an activity is the one that 
delivers the product demanded by customers at the lowest price while still 
covering costs.” (p. 327). 
In Fama & Jensen (1983b) they continue: 
“An organization is the nexus of contracts, written and unwritten, among 
owners of factors of production and customers.  …  The central contracts in any 
organization specify (1) the nature of residual claims and (2) the allocation of 
the steps in the decision process among agents.  These contracts distinguish 
organizations from each others and explain why specific organizational forms 
survive.” (p. 302). 
An important construct, residual risk is described as: 
“The residual risk – the risk of the difference between stochastic inflows of 
resources and promised payments to agents – is borne by those who contract 
for the rights to net cash flows.  We call these agents the residual claimants or 
residual risk bearers.” (p. 302). 
The continued existence of the company is dependent on making the right decisions: 
“Organizational survival involves a balance of the costs of alternative decision 
systems and systems for allocating residual risk against the benefits.” (p. 307). 
Fama & Jensen argue that the control of agency problems is important when decision makers 
initiating and implementing important decisions are not the major residual claimants.  To 
effectively control the agency problems the four phases in decision making (initiation, 
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ratification, implementation, and monitoring) is proposed split into two terms: decision 
management (initiation & ratification) and decision control (implementation & monitoring) 
each performed by a separate group of individuals in the organization.  The authors then 
investigate under which circumstances the three terms residual risk bearing, decision 
management, and decision control should be separated and when it should be performed by 
the same agent.  These fundamental issues constituted a basis for the development of the 
theoretical framework. 
Two Streams of Research and Theory 
Agency theory is usually divided into two streams: “positive agency theory” and “principal-
agent theory” (Eisenhardt, 1989a).  The two streams share common unit of analysis (the 
contract) and assumptions, but where the former relies more on verbal expositions, the latter 
is more concerned with mathematical techniques.  According to Eisenhardt (1989a): 
“…positivist researchers have focused on identifying situations in which the 
principal and agent are likely to have conflicting goals and then describing the 
governance mechanisms that limit the agent’s self-serving behaviour.” (p. 59). 
The principal-agent researchers are more concerned with a general theory of the agency 
relationship – and are interested in applying the formal theory to other areas after careful 
specification of assumptions.  However, these two streams should not be perceived as 
conflicting, but as complementing each other: 
“…positivist theory identifies various contract alternatives, and principal-agent 
theory indicates which contract is the most efficient under varying levels of 
output uncertainty, risk aversion, information asymmetry, and other 
variables…” (p. 60) 
 
As the purpose of this subchapter is to create an understanding of the theory, the application 
oriented “positivist” stream is excluded from the following description and evaluation. 
 
The Basic P/A Models 
The basic model has two players, the principal who wants a task done, and an agent who can 
perform it.  The theory is concerned with resolving two problems that occur in agency 
relationships: the agency problem and the risk sharing problem.  The agency problem arises 
when there is goal conflict between principal and agent and it is difficult or expensive for the 
principal to verify the actions of the agent.  The risk sharing problem arises when the principal 
and the agent have different attitudes toward risk.  Due to this difference the principal and the 
agent may prefer different actions.  The agency problem is further developed into the moral 
hazard problem, the adverse selection problem and the signaling problem37: 
? The moral hazard problem describes the situation where the principal is unable to verify 
the agents level of effort, and therefore will have to design a contract to induce the agent 
                                                 
37  Other categorizations have been suggested, see e.g. Schuster (1990). 
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to select an appropriate (to the principal) level of effort (van Ackere, 1993).  The 
contract type will depend on various parameters such as the risk attitudes of the 
principal and the agent. 
? The adverse selection problem can be perceived as a special case of the moral hazard 
problem (van Ackere, 1993).  The model now contains more agents, each with a 
different level of ability.  In this model, rather than attempting to induce the appropriate 
level of effort from a specific agent, the principal tries to select an agent with the 
appropriate level of effort.  The design of the contract will thereby aim at getting the 
right agent to accept the contract. 
? Finally, a signaling problem occurs when an agent has private information he wants to 
convey to the principal. 
 
Since the unit of analysis is the contract between the two parties, the objective of the theory is 
to identify the most efficient contract, or relationship, between the two parties, given a set of 
assumptions.  The assumptions in the theory are about people (e.g. self-interest & bounded 
rationality), organizations (e.g. goal conflict among members), and information (e.g. 
information is a commodity).  In its most basic form, the decision to be made is whether the 
contract is to be based on outcome (commissions, stock options, transfer of property rights, 
market governance) or behavior (salaries, hierarchical governance).  The assumptions are 
shown in the table below. 
Table 5-2: Comparison of assumptions (Agency vs. Organizational perspectives)38 
  Perspective 
Assumption Political Contingency
Organization 
Control 
Transaction 
Cost Agency 
Self-interest X   X X 
Goal conflict X   X X 
Bounded rationality  X X X X 
Information asymmetry  X  X X 
Preeminence of efficiency  X X X X 
Risk aversion     X 
Information as a commodity         X 
 
Besides outlining the assumptions Eisenhardt (1989a) develops propositions from the 
literature reviewed.  This introduces new variables to the model, e.g. length of relationship, 
measurability of outcome and task programmability (see Table 5-3 below).  Depending on the 
specific agency problem variables are in- or excluded in the model and used as contingency 
variables or assumptions/preconditions. 
                                                 
38  Source: Table 2 in Eisenhardt (1989a), p. 63. 
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Table 5-3: Variables in Agency Models39 
Variable Value Comment 
Outcome-based (commissions, 
stock options, transfer of 
property rights & market 
governance) 
 
Contract type 
(output from the models) 
Behavior-based (salaries & 
hierarchical governance) 
 
Low  Goal-conflict 
High Assumption in the basic agency model 
Yes Assumption in the basic agency model Information asymmetry 
No  
Short  Relation length 
Long  
Risk averse Assumption in the basic agency model 
Risk neutral  Risk attitude (agent) 
Risk taker  
Risk averse  
Risk neutral Assumption in the basic agency model Risk attitude (principal) 
Risk taker  
Low  Task-programmability 
High  
Low  Outcome-measurability 
High  
Low  Outcome uncertainty 
High  
 
From this portfolio of variables a number of applications have emerged.  According to van 
Ackere (1993) agency theory has been applied to e.g. accounting, industrial organization, and 
marketing.  In Melnyk, Stewart, & Swink (2004) it is argued that agency theory has been used 
within OM to study as diverse subjects as decentralized cross-functional decision-making, 
group technology, international manufacturing, scheduling, and inventory management. 
In this context the application to (design of) supply chains is the primary interest. 
5.2.1 P/A Theory and SCM 
Interestingly, agency theory can be applied internally as well as across company boundaries.  
In the sub-discipline managerial pay, for instance, the principals are the board of directors and 
the agent is the manager, but in e.g. adverse selection the agents may be internal as well as 
external entities.  The theory may be used to decide whether to have certain activities 
performed within an organization or have them outsourced.  Also the mode of cooperation can 
be analyzed or described as the contract type will determine (or assume) access to monitoring.  
The issue of internal and external integration thereby does not constitute a problem, at least 
not at an overall level of analysis. 
Relating agency theory to SCM does raise some issues, though: 
                                                 
39  Propositions from Eisenhardt (1989a).  As described above the variables ‘Goal conflict’, ‘Information 
asymmetry’, ‘Risk attitude (agent)’, and ‘Risk attitude (principal)’ are assumptions in the basic agency 
problem model, with the values ‘High’, ‘Yes’, ‘Risk averse’, and ‘Risk neutral’, respectively.  ‘Contract 
type’ is the output from the model 
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? First and foremost, it is not evident who the principals and the agents are.  Intuitively, 
the first tier supplier is the agent as he is providing components to the final product.  
But the principal might also have agents located downstream, e.g. in the form of a TPL 
provider.  So, the position in the chain does not in itself dictate the distribution of roles.  
Considering even more complex situations like mass customization one may imagine a 
principal-agent model containing multiple agents (own and external) and multiple 
principals (subsidiary and customer)40.  From this setup a large number of distinct 
model configurations can be created by modifying the degree of customization, the 
contact between the end-customer and the external parties, the stock keeping policies, 
type of postponement etc. 
? Secondly, agency theory is dealing with dyadic relationships, and does not (in its 
original/basic form) deal with more levels of participants.  In the adverse selection 
model a choice of one agent from a larger number must be made, in the managerial pay 
scenario multiple principals act as one decision maker.  Even if Agrell et al. (2004) 
introduce a middle-man in their contribution, agency theory does not handle multi-tier 
models well.  In this respect P/A theory resembles TCE. 
? Thirdly, as pointed out by van Ackere (1993), the basic principal/agent model is single-
period.  A number of multi-period models exist but de-composing the models and 
solving them for optimality quickly becomes very difficult. 
? A fourth complaint might be the absence of attention paid to the process orientation so 
often referred to as the most fundamental prerequisite for effective SCM.  The theory 
does not relate to the concept of processes, but to tasks (or activities) alone.  When it 
comes to the point of the “interface” (or relationship) between principal and agent, the 
theory uses the contract dichotomy: behavior-based or output-based contract.  After 
each contract renegotiation for another is performed, supposedly describing the 
“interface” or relationship as shifting from absence to output-based contract to 
behavior-based contract (sequence of types not relevant). 
? Lastly, relating to the dyadic nature of the models, the optimality criteria used is too 
simple for SCM.  The SCM perspective focuses on win-win for the entire chain, 
whereas agency theory is focused on maximizing for the principal, and satisfying for the 
agent(s). 
The theory might thereby not be able to design entire supply chains, but might give an 
indication on which type of relationship is optimal with each supplier and customer on a 
period-by-period basis.  The idea of changing the contract from one period to the next does 
somehow conflict with the idea of integration and relationship-building often associated with 
SCM.  The applicability of the model might improve dramatically in the context of SCM if 
the cost element is divided into a principal and an agent element, and a mechanism to adjust 
the distribution of cost is introduced as well. 
                                                 
40 And this may be further complicated by including corporate as the principal of the subsidiary, having 
corporate acting as both agent and principal in the same model.  As the focus here is on the example of a 
(series of) single transaction(s) this issue is not further elaborated on. 
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5.2.2 Contributions Referencing P/A Theory 
Several contributions referencing P/A theory were identified. 
As mentioned already the arguments put forward in Logan (2000) are somewhat superficial, 
albeit the model itself is quite interesting.  In Agrell, Lindroth, & Norrmal (2004) the authors 
investigate practice of coordination between players in the telecommunications industry by 
creating a three-tier P/A model.  The parameters for the model are clearly and precisely 
described, but the extension of the model from a two-person to a three-person model 
somehow conflicts with (the traditional) P/A models.  It remains unclear if the model can be 
further extended to include whole networks, and if the model then still would have theoretical 
support from P/A theory. 
Table 5-4: Prior Research on Supply Risk41 
PRIOR RESEARCH ON SUPPLY RISK 
Variable Definition Reference 
Supply Risk Sources   
Inability to handle volume demand 
changes 
Demand fluctuations in quantity and type for a component or 
service … 
Failures to make delivery requirements Methods to distribute, handle, and transport inputs … 
Cannot provide competitive pricing The ability to lower the price for the same good or service … 
Technologically behind competitors The frequency of new ideas and emerging technology … 
Inability to meet quality requirements The ability of suppliers to conform to specifications … 
Behavior-based Management   
Supplier certification Identify suppliers’ abilities to meet quality, cost, service, and delivery requirements … 
Implement quality management 
programs 
Implementing programs to improve the abilities and activities 
of suppliers to satisfy the quality needs of the purchasing firm … 
Develop target costing with suppliers 
Setting a planned selling price and subtracting the desired 
profit, marketing, and distributing costs, leaving the required 
manufacturing and procurement costs 
… 
Supplier development Efforts of the purchasing organization to improve a supplier’s performance and/or capabilities … 
Buffer-oriented Management   
Safety stock Additional stock or items for products, supporting activities, and customer service held internally … 
Using multiple supply sources Procurement of a good or service from more than one independent source … 
Requiring suppliers to hold inventory Additional stock or items for products, supporting activities, and customer service held at the suppliers’ firm … 
 
Zsidisin & Ellram (2003) use agency theory to describe the management of supply risk, and 
propose a dichotomy: Behavior-based Management and Buffer-oriented Management, see 
Table 5-4 above.  The list of risk sources is quite interesting, as most of the risk sources have 
both a structural and a process risk component.  The ‘Inability to meet quality requirements’ 
risk source, for example, can be perceived as a process risk as the variation in quality will 
create the necessity to perform quality assurance on receipt, and will thereby create 
fluctuations in the flow of input.  The structural component is represented in the possibility 
that the chosen supplier should have been dropped.  Similarly, ‘Inability to handle volume 
                                                 
41  Source: Table 1 in Zsidisin & Ellram (2003), p. 17. 
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demand changes’ and ‘Failures to make delivery requirements’ have both risk components, 
whereas ‘Technologically behind competitors’ and ‘Cannot provide competitive pricing’ are 
structural risk sources.  The dichotomy for the management of these risks demonstrates the 
difficulty of merging the probability/impact construct with the behavior/buffer construct, and 
at the same time being true to the contract metaphor (outcome/behavior).  Specifically, the 
third strategy in the Behavior-based Management class, the ‘Develop target costing with 
suppliers’ seems more like an outcome type strategy, but does obviously not fall in the 
‘Buffer-based Management’ class.  The strategies in the second class, on the other hand, do 
not fit well with outcome type contract, but rather as mitigation strategies for failing outcome 
based contracts. 
In a later article Zsidisin et al. (2004) use P/A theory to classify supply risk assessment 
techniques.  In the article the authors decompose the basic P/A models put forward in 
Eisenhardt (1989a) and use the individual variables to classify the techniques in play.  Theory 
is not developed and suggestions are kept at the most overall level. 
5.2.3 P/A Theory and Supply Chain Risks 
It is imminent risk has a place within agency theory as risk attitudes of principal(s) and 
agent(s) are variables in the models.  The risk component is quite limited though, as it focuses 
on the contract type proposed by the principal and the risk appetite of principal and agent(s) 
only.  External risk sources are not available in the model albeit their existence is 
acknowledged (the result of an output based contract is not solely ascribed opportunistic 
behavior of the agent).  Or in other words: uncertainty relating to the output of the activities is 
a basic assumption in the model, but external factors are not specified. 
Management of the Supply Chain Risks 
Accepting the dichotomy of output versus behavior based contracts, the ability to manage the 
supply chain risks can be described as follows: 
? Process Risk: According to P/A theory a principal chooses to ‘sell’ the risk of 
deviations to the agent(s).  The added cost could be perceived as an insurance premium 
relieving the principal of uncertainty for the contracted output over the specified period 
of time.  The principal, based on the cost of obtaining access to the behavior of the 
agent, can decide if it is worth to monitor the agent.  Managing the intentional 
disruptions of the contract is thereby directly addressed.  Unfortunately the non-
intentional is less so.  From the agent’s point of view the burden of uncertainty must be 
calculated in when accepting an output-based contract, for the principal the only 
difference between the two contract types is the timing of recognition of an exception.  
In case of a behavior-based contract the principal will monitor the agent’s progress and 
will (immediately) observe the exception, whereas in the output-based contract the 
discrepancy between contracted and delivered output is not recognized until contract 
end.  Obviously, the contract will contain clauses stipulating compensation for non-
performance, but in many cases the claims can not cover the damages.  Therefore, the 
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difference between the two contract types is the time period mentioned above, and the 
resulting safety stock needed to ensure stability downstream.  The contract type will 
thereby describe the attitude towards the poorly performing supplier: the behavior-based 
contract signals inclusion and intent to solve the problem at the source, whereas the 
output-based contract signals exclusion. 
? Structure Risk: The structure risks, on the other hand, are not really addressed as 
contracts are supposed to cover a certain period.  Dropping out of a contract midway is 
not really a concern of the framework, albeit the concept ‘Moral Hazard’ is concerned 
with non-performance.  The intentional exit from a contract might be handled by 
insisting on a behavior-based contract, but this would basically invalidate the theory, as 
all contracts with critical supply chain partners thereby would be behavior-based.  For 
the same reasons as above the enforcement of contracts might have limited effects, 
besides increasing the cost of making a supplier switch. 
 
In conclusion, the usability of P/A theory on the management of the supply chain risks is 
somewhat limited by a number of issues, both in relation to SCM in general and in terms of 
risk management.  Especially the focusing on periodic renegotiation and the implied shifts 
between contract types from period to period conflicts with SCM. 
Of the two risk categories, the process risks are best supported by P/A as moral hazard is 
addressed directly, and an option exists in relation to poor performers.  The structural risks, on 
the other hand, do not really fit with the theory, especially not the non-intentional exit of a 
critical supplier. 
 
The third theory in the analysis, Resource Based Theory, is somewhat different from TCE and 
P/A. 
 
5.3 Resource Based Theory (RBT)42 
The birth of the Resource-Based Theory (RBT) is often attributed empirical problems with the 
dominant strategic perspective of the 1970’s, the SCP paradigm43.  Relying mostly on the 
external side of the SWOT model, the SCP paradigm was unable to explain the stability of the 
variation of performance of companies within the same industry (and having the same size).  
The collapse of the long range planning models paved the way for RBT, turning the focus 
from almost entirely externally oriented to the internal conditions of the firms as well.  In 
                                                 
42  The description of Resource-Based Theory takes the articles in the reader by Foss (1997) as a starting point.  
In this text, the use of the term Resource-Based Theory will be used consistently, albeit some authors use 
the terms Resource-Based Perspective or View. 
43 SCP – Structure, Conduct, Performance.  The SCP paradigm implies that the structural characteristics of an 
industry, particularly the level of concentration of firms and the height of entry barriers, have a significant 
influence on the ability of firms within an industry to price above the competitive price. Consequently, 
these structural characteristics can be expected to determine the performance potential of individual firms.  
Early contributions include Bain (1956) on entry barriers and Caves & Porter (1977) on mobility barriers.  
For a discussion of Effiency versus SCP, see e.g. McWilliams & Smart (1993). 
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terms of the SWOT model, one might say that the SCP paradigm had focused too much on 
opportunities and threats, neglecting the strengths and weaknesses of the individual firm.  
With RBT the conception of firms as anonymous entities is discarded as firms are considered 
fundamentally different. 
A Theory Emerging 
Some disagreement exists over when RBT was born.  Some (e.g. Foss, 1997) say the 1984 
articles “A Resource-Based View of the Firm” (Wernerfelt, 1984) and “Towards a Strategic 
Theory of the Firm” (Rumelt, 1984) started the research stream today recognized as RBT.  
Others claim it was a few years earlier, in 1982, when the articles “Uncertain Imitability: An 
Analysis of Interfirm Differences Under Competition” (Lippman & Rumelt, 1982) and 
“Toward an economic theory of the multiproduct firm” (Teece, 1982) were published.  No 
disagreement, on the other hand, exist on the importance of the seminal work of Edith Penrose 
(1959), who introduced the concept of the firm as 
 “…essentially a pool of resources the utilization of which is organized in an 
administrative framework.” (p. 149). 
More or less ignored for a quarter of a century, her work quickly became the starting point for 
researchers within the emerging field of RBT.  The concept of ‘distinctive competence’ put 
forward by Selznick (1957) also became a central component in the theory, which combined 
strategic management with economics in e.g. the concept sustainable competitive advantage 
(SCA).  RBT’s conception of SCA is based on the before mentioned resources, or rather on a 
subset of resources. To achieve SCA the resource has to be rare and difficult to imitate and 
substitute.  If so, the rent generated from the resource will be long-lived (sustainable). 
From the basic resource-based approach, the theory development resulted in the development 
of e.g. the concepts core competencies (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990) and dynamic capabilities 
(Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997).  Terminology quickly became crowded with competing 
interpretations of terms like capabilities, assets, resources, and competences44 and a precision 
of assumptions and a definition of terminology were needed. 
A Common Frame of Reference 
After briefly commenting on the multiplicity of research strands and the variation in 
terminology within RBT, Peteraf (1993) sets off to develop a general model and create a 
common ground for RBT researchers.  She identifies four theoretical conditions for 
competitive advantage, of which all must be met.  The conditions are: 
1. Heterogeneity 
The resource bundles and capabilities underlying production are assumed to be 
heterogeneous across firms.  Firms with superior resources are able to produce at lower 
                                                 
44 Examples are abundant, e.g. Aaker (1989) who deals with assets and skills instead of resources and 
capabilities. 
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cost and/or higher quality, and are thereby able to earn rent45.  Firms with marginal 
resources will make break-even, whereas firms with inferior resources will not be able 
to make break-even and will have to leave the market (or go bankrupt). 
2. Ex Post Limits to Competition 
Assuming the condition of heterogeneity is met, sustained competitive advantage is 
possible.  If the heterogeneity is short-lived, the rents will disappear as competition will 
drive out the margin e.g. by increasing supply.  Factors limiting the ex post competition 
are imperfect imitability and imperfect substitutability. 
Substitutability being one of Porter’s (1980) “five forces” is well described in the 
literature.  Imitability, on the other hand, has received far more attention within the 
research stream.  Isolating mechanisms include property rights, quasi-rents from lags 
and information asymmetries, producer learning, buyer switching and search costs, 
channel crowding and economies of scale, to name a few (Rumelt, 1984; Rumelt, 1987). 
In addition to these mechanisms, causal ambiguity (Lippman & Rumelt, 1982) prohibits 
competitors to imitate the resource.  Causal ambiguity stems from the uncertainty 
regarding the causes of efficiency differences among firms.  The condition of 
heterogeneity is preserved through the lack of knowledge of what to imitate, and the 
non-recoverable costs of the investigation. 
3. Imperfect Mobility 
Resources are perfectly immobile if they can not be traded.  Examples include resources 
with ill-defined property rights, or resources which are idiosyncratic to the extent that 
they have no use outside the firm.  Furthermore, resources that are firm specific, and 
thereby more valuable for the firm than outside is considered imperfect mobile.  Co-
specialized assets (Teece, 1986) and assets with high switching costs (Montgomery & 
Wernerfelt, 1988) are other examples of assets with limited mobility.  Since the 
resources are bound to the firm for the use over a long period, they may be the source of 
sustainable advantage. 
4. Ex Ante Limits to Competition 
In addition to the previously described conditions, the condition of ex ante limits to 
competition must be met for a firm to have competitive advantage.  By ex ante limits to 
competition it is meant that prior to establishing a resource position, the firm must 
assure the limitation of competition.  If such a resource position is non-defendable, 
competition for the position will occur diminishing the rents to be earned.  Completing 
the picture of the superiority of the resource position is the cost of the implementation. 
In sum, these four conditions must be met in order for the firm to enjoy sustained above-
normal rents. 
                                                 
45 Rents can take two forms: Ricardian rents or monopoly rents.  The former occur when resources are 
heterogeneous, whereas the latter is a product of deliberate restriction of output rather than an inherent 
scarcity of resource supply 
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Figure 5-9: The cornerstone of competitive advantage46 
Heterogeneity
Ex post
limits to
competition
Imperfect
mobility
Ex ante
limits to
competition
COMPETITIVE
ADVANTAGE
Rents not offset
by costs
Rents sustained
within the firm
Rents sustainedRents
(monopoly or ricardian)
 
 
The creation of Ricardian or monopoly rents are ensured by resource heterogeneity, defended 
by the ex post limits to competition.  The imperfect mobility of resources ensures that 
valuable factors remain with the firm, and that the rents are shared.  Finally, ex ante limits to 
competition keep costs from offsetting the rents.  Figure 5-9 above describes the above 
mentioned conditions and their impact on rents.  This attempts to “clean up” or explain the 
ambiguity within RBT was not the only one. 
Two Schools 
According to Schulze (1994) the disagreement on the basic elements in the RBT framework 
goes deeper than definition.  He claims two schools of thought within RBT can be identified, 
the fundamental difference between them being the type of rent emphasized.  The first school, 
labeled the “Structural School”, emphasizes land and Ricardian rents and is commonly used 
in the strategy content literature.  The other is called the “Process School”, it emphasizes 
quasi or efficiency rents and is common in the strategy process research (p. 129).  He further 
claims that the schools have fundamental assumptions on RBT in common, see assumptions 
1-3 in Table 5-5 below. 
                                                 
46  Source: Figure 3 in Peteraf (1993), p. 186. 
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Table 5-5: Assumptions of the Two Schools of Resource-Based Theory47 
Common Assumptions 
1. Differences in resource endowments are causally related to differences in product and service attributes 
(Conner, 1991), and thus to differences in firm performance. 
2. The resources needed to conceive, choose, and implement strategies are heterogeneously distributed across 
a set of competing firms (Barney, 1991, p. 105). 
3. Firms are rent-seekers (Rumelt, 1987, p. 143). 
The Structural Model adds the following as a general assumption 
4. Sustained competitive advantage is feasible if the resources used to achieve that advantage are rare, 
imperfectly mobile and non-substitutable (Barney, 1991). 
The Process Model adds the following as a general assumption 
5. Efficiency rents are routinely available to the firm (Schoemaker, 1990). 
Assumptions 1-4 underlay the structural model.  Assumptions 1-5 underlay the process model. 
 
Assumptions one, two and four fit perfectly with the preconditions for competitive advantage 
put forward by Peteraf, and referenced earlier in this text, whereas the third and fifth 
assumptions fit with Peteraf’s initial assumptions.  The explanation offered by Schulze is 
thereby an explanation of differentiation as a number of attributes differing across schools are 
identified, see Table 5-6 below. 
Table 5-6: Attributes of the Two Resource-Based Models48 
 Process Model Structural Model 
Efficiency of Market System Explicit Semi-Strong 
Analytical Condition Dynamic Equilibrium 
Type of Rents Inframarginal, Land, Efficiency and Ricardian Ricardian and Land 
Managerial Role Create, Upgrade & Replace Discover, Exploit & Protect 
Probability that Managerial 
Action Has Positive Effects Serendipity Luck 
Strategic Emphasis Implementation Formulation 
Analytical Focus Organizational Processes Market Processes 
Principal Authors 
Aaker (1989) 
Schoemaker (1990) 
Teece, Pisano & Shuen (1992) 
Grant (1991) 
Barney (1991) 
Chatterjee (1990) 
Montgomery & Wernerfelt (1991) 
Wernerfelt (1984) 
 
But even if these schools (or strands of research as stated in Peteraf (1993)) exist, there’s 
another challenge in understanding RBT: to overcome terminological ambiguity49 
Ambiguous Terminology 
Despite aiming at creating clarity Peteraf is herself contributing to the terminological 
ambiguity, or so it may seem.  Not defining the terms, one gets the impression that 
capabilities are internal whereas resources may be internal or shared.  Further one gets the 
impression that capabilities support or underlie the resources, and that the resources are 
                                                 
47  Source: Table 1 in Schulze (1994), p. 137. 
48  Source: Table 2 in Schulze (1994), p. 137. 
49 Terminological disputes are often quite visible, see e.g. footnote 23 on page 516 of Teece, Pisano & Shuen 
(1997).  Another example is the use of resources, capabilities, competencies, and assets in Amit & 
Schoemaker (1993). 
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created from capabilities.  But, when referencing Prahalad & Hamel on the term “core 
competencies”, things get really confusing.  She writes: 
“Prahalad and Hamel (1990) describe how core competencies, particularly 
those which involve collective learning and are knowledge-based, are enhanced 
as they are applied.  Such resources may provide both the basis and the 
direction for the growth of the firm.” (pp. 181-182, underlining added) 
and further, commenting on Dierickx & Cool’s (1989) paper: 
“… is a particularly important piece of work because it focuses precisely on 
those kinds of resources and capabilities which are of central concern to 
resource-based theory: nontradeable assets which develop and accumulate 
within the firm.” (p. 183, underlining added). 
In the first instance core competencies are synonymous with resources, in the second assets 
are categorized as resources and capabilities?  Obviously, the terminology on RBT in the 
article is less stringent than the parts on neoclassical concepts.  It remains unclear how assets, 
capabilities and competences relate to each other, and what the characteristics of each class 
are. 
A Hierarchy Proposed 
In an earlier article, Grant (1991) develops a model for strategy formulation using RBT.  The 
model in itself is quite straightforward, what is really interesting is the use of the RBT 
vocabulary and framework.  To Grant, resources and capabilities provide the basic direction 
for the firm’s strategy and are the primary sources of profit (p. 116), but they are not identical 
(p. 118).  A hierarchical structure is clearly introduced when resources are described as 
contributing to capabilities50 leading to competitive advantage.  His stance is clear: 
“But, on their own, few resources are productive.  Productive activity requires 
the cooperation and coordination of teams of resources.  A capability is the 
capacity for a team of resources to perform some task or activity.  While 
resources are the source of a firm’s capabilities, capabilities are the main 
source of its competitive advantage.” (p. 119). 
To Grant, the capabilities are made up of a number of functional capabilities (p. 121), drawing 
on any number of resources, and explicitly equates these strategic capabilities with the “core 
competencies” put forward by Prahalad & Hamel (1990).  But a capability need not utilize 
more than one resource (p. 123), thereby potentially limiting a capability to the activity 
performed in a single functional capability.  So, the difference between simple and strategic 
capabilities may be in the complexity of the coordination and control mechanisms required.  
A case for perceiving capabilities as institutionalized routines is made, describing the 
functional relationship between resources and capabilities as one not pre-determined (p. 122).  
Whether the coordination and control of the use of resources are the capabilities of the firm 
remain unclear, as 
                                                 
50  In Grant (1991) it is noted that in Snow & Hrebiniak (1980) capabilities are called “distinctive 
competencies”. 
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“… the organization’s style, values, traditions, and leadership are critical 
encouragements to the cooperation and commitment of its members.  These can 
be viewed as intangible resources which are common ingredients of the whole 
range of a corporation’s organizational routines.” (p. 122). 
Apparently ignoring the ambiguity in the definitions of the basic elements of the theory, Grant 
proposes a hierarchical approach to strategy analysis see below. 
Figure 5-10: A Resource-Based Approach to Strategy Analysis: A Practical Framework51 
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The link between these concepts is clearly one of cause and effect: with the right resources the 
company has a chance of developing the right capabilities, and from the right capabilities 
competitive advantage can be achieved.  Agreeing with Peteraf (and others) Grant observes 
that sustainability of the competitive advantage is of critical importance, and like Peteraf he 
proposes four criteria: durability, transparency, transferability, and replicability.  Analyzing 
the criteria reveal they are identical, albeit slightly differently described, to the criteria 
proposed by Peteraf52.  So, even if the terminology is still not uniformly used, a level of 
agreement on the basics of the theoretical framework seems to have appeared. 
Supporting the Hierarchy 
The terminology used in Javidan (1998) is coherent with the terminology proposed in e.g. 
Grant (1991).  Similar to Grant, Javidan proposes a model for strategy formulation and gives a 
                                                 
51  Source: Figure 1 in Grant (1991), p. 115. 
52  It is worth noticing that Peteraf (1993) does not reference Grant (1991).  Working separately and almost 
simultaneously they have come to the same conclusions. 
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hierarchy of the concepts within RBT.  His emphasis is the multi-SBU, and in order to enable 
a discussion on the strategy formulation he explains the inter-relatedness of the concepts 
within RBT.  As for other researchers within the field he recognizes the resources as the 
starting point and the basic object in RBT.  He accepts the resource typology (physical, 
human, and organizational resources) put forward by Barney (1991), and introduces a further 
distinguishing characteristic: resource tangibility.  Resources are heterogeneously distributed 
across companies, and the so is the ability to leverage them.  To Javidan (and as depicted in 
Figure 5-10 above) the ability to leverage the resources is perceived as the capabilities of the 
company. 
Figure 5-11: Competencies, capabilities and strategic hierarchy53 
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They are the second level in the hierarchy and consist of business processes and routines that 
manage the resources.  A distinguishing feature of the capabilities is that they are functionally 
based, albeit resources are perceived as shared across the entire company.  The third level in 
the hierarchy is the competency level, which is the coordination and integration across 
functional boundaries of capabilities.  Competencies are considered local to each SBU, 
whereas the last level, the core competencies, describes interaction of competencies from the 
corporations multiple SBU’s.  As such, these definitions do not fit well with the European 
business world, as many European companies are not of comparable size to the American.  
The notion of SBU’s and it’s use as a defining characteristic of e.g. core competencies does 
not make much sense, as smaller (single SBU) type companies thereby would not have core 
competencies.  Nonetheless, the hierarchy established is considered a useful contribution to 
the understanding of (the development of) competencies, and the linking of activities, through 
roles, departments, hierarchical level in the organization and the development of strategy. 
                                                 
53  Source: Figure 2 in Javidan (1998), p. 63. 
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5.3.1 RBT and SCM 
Albeit the theory is primarily oriented towards strategic positioning it does have merits within 
the SCM domain.  Earlier in this manuscript it was described how RBT has been used to 
describe e.g. the emergence of business networks (Hallikas et al., 2004), motives for 
outsourcing (Walker, 1988; McIvor, 2000; McIvor, 2003), and a framework to evaluate 
competencies (Logan, 2000).  The applicability of RBT to SCM does require some comments, 
though. 
Pros and Cons 
First and foremost the application of the theory must ensure unnecessary dependencies are not 
created.  Williamson addresses this issue when comparing resource dependency and TCE: 
“Transaction cost economics employs an efficiency perspective and treats 
dependency as a (broadly) foreseeable condition.  In the degree, therefore, to 
which asset specificity (which is responsible for bilateral dependency) yields 
benefits (added revenues and/or production cost savings) that are not more 
than offset by the added governance costs, added asset specificity is 
deliberately incurred.  Accordingly, farsighted parties purposefully create 
bilateral dependency and support it with contractual safeguards, but only in the 
degree to which the associated investments are cost-effective.  Because price, 
asset specificity, and contractual safeguards are all determined simultaneously, 
calculativeness is the solution to what would otherwise be a problem (unwanted 
resource dependency).” (Williamson, 1993, p. 461). 
This is obviously a consideration for the user of the theory, not the theory itself, albeit it is 
quite problematic (from an empirical point of view) that this issue is not clearly addressed. 
Secondly, the inter-organizational character of resources, as perceived by Peteraf, directly 
addresses the reality of SCM.  The closer integration of businesses in a supply chain is 
reflected in the co-development of products and processes, and co-dependency.  The 
implementation of mass customization for example, might result in the change of the demand 
for inputs, thereby shifting the responsibility of designing more generic modules to the 
suppliers.  In many cases, these changes are so dramatic that on the one hand the payoff is 
intriguing, but on the other they are out of the economic reach of the supplier.  Co-developing 
and strategic partnerships of various kinds are in some instances the cure of this paradox, 
integrating the supplier closely with the customer. 
Lastly, albeit the contributions on outsourcing (or rather: the re-distribution of activities 
across the supply chain) is of relevance to the domain of SCM there is a problem of 
measurability.  The lack of objective criteria from which to evaluate the value or potential of 
the resources and capabilities leaves the companies to evaluate their own uniqueness and 
contribution to their environment.  It should come as no surprise if uniqueness is identified 
and contributions are considered non-trivial.  Another shortcoming is the “corporate view” of 
the company, focusing on core activities and competencies supporting the “mission” of the 
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company.  In a SCM perspective the concept of ‘supply chain’ might improve the 
understanding of the link between activity and achievement of corporate goals54. 
Improvements Suggested (for SCM Usage) 
Redefining RBT to improve the applicability in a SCM context will therefore have to 
emphasize the inter-organizational aspects of resources and competencies. 
First and foremost the framework must better address non-divisionalized companies.  As 
mentioned earlier, the typology presented by Javidan (1998) is of limited use as it stringently 
addresses the hierarchies (strategy and competency) from a multi-SBU perspective.  This 
organizational structure is not “natural” to many European companies, which do not have the 
size of American ditto.  Redefining his framework could thereby discard the “Business 
Strategy (SBU)” step in the strategy hierarchy, and let the competencies relate to corporate 
strategy, and core competencies to the mission statement.  The link from resources to 
capabilities to competencies to core competencies is thereby intact, but the references to the 
strategy hierarchy are altered.  Altering the reference from corporate strategy to competence 
instead of core competence, it is emphasized that core competencies relate to the long-term 
strategic survival of the company. 
Figure 5-12: An Inter-organizational RBT Model 
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Furthermore the realization that core competencies and resources are not necessarily under the 
control of any one company, introducing dual ownership or co-development and co-operation 
must be introduced to the framework as well.  These resources might span from the network 
level (e.g. access to superior supply chain partners due to inclusion in a certain network) to 
the idiosyncratic (exclusive access to the resources of a close supply chain partner).  Core 
competencies might in a similar fashion be created and sustained through cooperation, and the 
creation of rare, un-imitatible, and sustainable core competences may be out of the scope of 
                                                 
54 This links back to the conceptual discussion on multiple supply chains introduced in Chapter 2. 
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the individual company (as described above).  A graphical representation of this alternative 
model is presented in Figure 5-12 above. 
Lastly the previously mentioned concept Dynamic Capabilities (see e.g. Teece, Pisano, & 
Shuen, 1997; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000) might enrich the domain of Supply Chain Design as 
the sustainability of competitive advantage is discarded, and continuous adaptation is needed 
in order to stay competitive.  
5.3.2 Contributions Referencing RBT 
As mentioned above contributions referencing RBT cover quite some ground.  Also here the 
application of the theory describes quite some variation. 
In Walker (1988) the primary aim is to protect the company’s strategic assets by choosing the 
optimal sourcing arrangement.  In contrast, Logan (2000) uses RBT only to evaluate the 
competencies of potential transportation partners.  Hallikas et al. (2004) briefly mention RBT 
in combination with TCE when describing the emergence of business networks.  The use of 
RBT is quite limited, though, as only the competency concept is mentioned, whereas no 
reference to e.g. resources or capabilities supports the arguments. 
Demonstrating a deep understanding of RBT Lonsdale (Lonsdale, 1999) develops a “risk 
management model for outsourcing” (see Figure 3-5).  As already described in Chapter 3 
Lonsdale addresses dependencies stemming from three sources: outsourcing into a limited 
supply market, poor internal alignment, and contractual incompetence in the face of different 
degrees of asset specificity.  Albeit the model might easily be extended to include other 
sources of dependency (e.g. a dependency stemming from width or volume) the contribution 
demonstrates a consistent use of the RBT framework. 
5.3.3 RBT and Supply Chain Risks 
When evaluating RBT for ability to manage the supply chain risks, several conclusions 
quickly emerge.  First and foremost, the theoretical framework will have to be applied against 
a portfolio of supply chains instead of the company as a whole (as mentioned above).  
Depending on the type of company this change will have varying degrees of difficulty.  
Analyzing a divisionalized company with units each having one (or few) supply chain(s) will 
possibly prove less complex than the multi supply chain (but not divisionalized) company.  
The overlapping of activities might intuitively lead to the “wrong” conclusion that these core 
activities support a (the?) core competency, when the opposite might be the case: that these 
activities “taking centre stage” actually restricts the company from developing (new) core 
competencies.  Furthermore it becomes apparent that the theory is not at all oriented towards 
operational issues.  The time perspective is long-term, and the aim is strategic positioning.  
The framework has an inherent measurement problem as the evaluation of future scenarios 
will have to be strictly internal (for competitive reasons).  Lastly, if risk is addressed at all, it 
is the somewhat abstract “risk of loosing or not developing sustainable competitive 
advantage”.  This does in no way support the analysis of types and levels of integration with 
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critical supply chain partners, as core competencies are almost exclusively perceived as 
internal to the company. 
Management of Supply Chain Risks 
Therefore, the following conclusions on the ability to manage the supply chain risks are 
drawn: 
? Process Risk: The theory does not enable the management of the process risks, as 
operational issues are not within focus. 
? Structure Risk: The structure risks are not addressed except for before mentioned “risk 
of loosing or not developing sustainable competitive advantage”.  In case the 
considerations put forward by Williamson (1993) as described above was 
“implemented” the risk of loosing a critical partner would be reduced as the degree of 
dependency towards external partners would be less. 
 
In conclusion, in order to manage supply chain risks RBT does not really have a contribution. 
 
The last framework to analyze is the Interaction Approach. 
 
5.4 The Interaction Approach (IA)55 
The Interaction Approach is synonymous with the network perspective developed by the IMP 
Group (or the Uppsala School), a group of researchers formed in the 1970’s.  Initiated by 
researchers from Uppsala, Sweden the group contained members from the universities of 
Uppsala, Bath, UMIST, ESC Lyon, and Munich.  The group developed a dynamic model of 
buyer-supplier relationships in industrial markets (the Interaction Model) and illustrated its 
applicability through comparative studies of buyer-supplier relationships within and across a 
number of European countries (France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, and UK).  The second IMP 
study had more or less the same focus, but moved to investigate the individual relationship in 
the context of the other relationships a firm may have (Easton, 1992).  The main conclusions 
from these pan-European studies was that buying and selling in industrial markets should not 
be viewed as a series of independent transactions, but rather as a number of episodes in often 
long-standing and complex relationships between the buying and selling organizations. 
Interaction 
A fundamental claim by the IMP Group is that the process of dealing with other companies is 
not a process of action and reaction - it is one of interaction (Ford, 2000).  Relationships are 
not made up of active sellers and passive buyers, but of active buyers and sellers of which 
both may initiate interaction.  Companies are no longer perceived as distinct legal entities   
                                                 
55  The description of the perspective is primarily based on the contribution from the reader on the IMP Group: 
”Understanding Business Markets”, Ford (2000).  As the articles have not been modified for the reader, 
references are made to the original publication, where possible. 
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but as sets of interrelated interactions embedded in networks (Ford, Håkansson, & Johanson, 
1986).  Another claim is that the “faceless” market is an outdated economic assumption and 
instead IMP proposes that companies are embedded in heterogeneous networks (Easton, 
1992).  As stated in Håkansson & Snehota (1989): 
“… when [the focal organization] is gravitating towards a set of other active 
organizations, then analogous environmental conditions can be assumed for the 
whole set of organizations with which the focal organization is interacting.  The 
organization is then embedded in relationships with identifiable counterparts.  
This web of relationships can be called a network.  One of the salient properties 
of such a network consists of the interdependencies between the different 
relationships…” (p. 191). 
The network perspective itself is not a normative framework, but has a strictly descriptive and 
explanatory goal.  But, as argued in Easton (1992), taking the focal firm viewpoint the work 
on exchange relations might have normative implications.  These implications are considered 
external to the industrial network approach, and the work of the IMP Group. 
Central to the network perspective are two models: the before mentioned Interaction Model 
and the ARA model.  These two models go a long way in describing the fundamentals of the 
perspective. 
The Interaction Model 
The dynamic model of interaction contains four elements: the parties involved, the elements 
and processes of interaction, the environment within which the interaction takes place, and the 
atmosphere affecting and affected by the interaction, see Figure 5-13 below. 
Figure 5-13: The Interaction Model (overview)56 
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The process of interaction is described using two variables: episodes and relationships.  The 
episodes are basically the individual exchanges, and are further described by four elements: 
product/service exchange, information exchange, financial exchange, and social exchange.  
                                                 
56  Source: Figure 2.1 in IMP Group (1982), p. 15. 
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These exchanges are critical in the build-up of relationships.  The routinization of exchanges 
over a long period of time leads to clear expectations on both sides.  The institutionalization 
of these roles and responsibilities may be to such an extent they are taken for given.  Besides 
exchanges, adaptations are important in the understanding of the interactions. 
These exchanges and adaptations are dependent on the parties: on their positions in the 
market, on the organizations’ ages, sizes and structures, and on the technologies in use.  
Furthermore, the individuals in the organization and the organization’s experiences are factors 
determining the type of relationship.  The wider context within which the interaction must be 
understood is the environment describing the structural context, and the atmosphere 
describing the relationship context, see below. 
Figure 5-14: The Interaction Model (full)57 
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In this framework of personal and company interactions, relationships and exchanges the 
concept ‘company’ has a new interpretation: 
“… we view companies as sets of interrelated interactions, through which 
capabilities are developed and employed.  Similarly, wider industrial systems 
are seen as networks of inter-related interactions.  In such networks several 
interdependent companies interact in order to influence and adapt each other’s 
future activities and resources.  This implies that the companies have both 
common and conflicting interests.  It may be in the interest of companies which 
are dependent on each other to develop matching activities and capabilities.  To 
                                                 
57  Source: Figure 2.2 in IMP Group (1982), p. 24. 
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that extent they have common interests.  On the other hand, which company is 
to bear the costs of the adaptations and developments necessary for interaction 
to take place successfully is not predetermined.  Thus, all intercompany 
relations have elements of both mutual and conflicting interest and their 
relative importance depends on how the companies view each other.” (Ford, 
Håkansson, & Johanson, 1986, p. 28). 
Summarization of the model’s properties is made in Håkansson & Snehota (1989): 
“1. Business organizations often operate in a context in which their behaviour 
is conditioned by a limited number of counterparts, each of which is unique and 
engaged in pursuing its own goals. 
2. In relation to these entities, an organization engages in continuous 
interactions that constitute a framework for exchange processes.  Relationships 
make it possible to access and exploit the resources of other parties and to link 
the parties’ activities together. 
3. The distinctive capabilities of an organization are developed through its 
interactions in the relationships that it maintains with other parties.  The 
identity of the organization is thus created through relations with others. 
4. Since the other parties to the interaction also operate under similar 
conditions, an organization’s performance is conditioned by the totality of the 
network as a context, i.e. even by the interdependencies among third parties.” 
(p. 192). 
Where the Interaction Model explains the exchanges and adaptations between dyads, the ARA 
model was originally introduced to enable integrated analysis of stability and development in 
an industry (Håkansson & Johanson, 1992). 
The ARA Model 
The model contains three variables: actors, resources, and activities.  Each variable influence 
the others in the overall structure of the networks. 
Actors control activities and/or resources, and as actors can be defined at various 
organizational levels (individuals, groups, part of firms, firms, groups of firms) there is 
inherently confusion over who actually controls which resources.  Views on the control of 
resources will vary, not least due to differential knowledge and the conflicting interests of the 
goal oriented actors.  Conversely, the common interests and the existence of relationships glue 
the actor network together and ensure stability. 
An activity, in turn, occur when 
“…one or more actors combine, develop, exchange, or create resources by 
utilising other resources.” (Håkansson & Johanson, 1992, p. 30).58 
Two types of activities exist: transformation and transfer activities.  The former is always 
controlled by one actor while the latter may be controlled by one or more actors, eventually 
linking the actors together through the combined effort.  Activities might be looser or tighter 
coupled, and be more or less frequently repeated.  A sequence of often repeated, tightly 
                                                 
58  Håkansson & Johanson (1992): ”While stability is generally seen as the opposite to change and 
development this model views stability as vital for industrial development.” (p. 30). 
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coupled transformation and transfer activities is called a transaction chain59.  Such a chain of 
activities involve more than one actor, and demonstrate the interdependency and need for 
adaptations in the network.  This leads to the creation of routines and informal rules resulting 
in a form of institutionalization and stability. 
The last class of variables, the resources, completes the framework.  Resources enable the 
performance of activities, are controlled by one or more actors, and are heterogeneous in 
nature.  Like the actors and activities, the resources are part of a network of resources.  In the 
network, the resources are linked through the mutual control of resources for transfer of 
activities, and by the need for the combination of resources, both in transaction chains and in 
performing activities requiring more than one resource.  See Figure 5-15 below. 
Figure 5-15: The ARA Model60 
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The dependencies in the three layers of the network is further developed in a later contribution 
(Håkansson & Snehota, 1994), introducing the terms activity links, resource ties, and actor 
bonds.  These are defined as: 
“ - Activity links regard technical, administrative, commercial and other 
activities of a company that can be connected in different ways to those of 
another company as a relationship develops. 
 - Resource ties connect various resource elements (technological, material, 
knowledge resources and other tangibles) of two companies.  Resource ties 
result from how the relationship has developed and represent in itself a 
resource for a company. 
                                                 
59  Thought: is “transaction chain: a sequence of often repeated, tightly coupled transformation and transfer 
activities” really an alternative definition of “process”?  The transaction chain indirectly refers to “the long-
linked technology” as described in Thompson (1967). 
60  Source: Figure 2.1 in Håkansson & Johanson (1992), p. 29. 
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 - Actor bonds connect actors and influence how the two actors perceive each 
other and form their identities in relation to each other.  Bonds become 
established in interaction and reflect the interaction process.” (pp. 26-27). 
In this contribution another point is made, that each relationship has multiple effects: effects 
on the immediate dyad, on each participating company and on third parties.  As each 
relationship represents a unique combination of resources and thereby a unique learning 
opportunity for the participants, not only the participating companies but also third parties are 
influenced through other relationships. 
The consequence of this perspective is a more diffuse perception of the boundaries of the 
firm, as stated in Håkansson & Snehota (1989): 
“In comparison with the conventional view of an organization’s boundaries, 
this approach means on the one hand that some of the resources and activities 
traditionally considered ‘internal’ can hardly be controlled and influenced by 
the organization, while a number of what have been considered ‘external’ 
resources and activities do actually constitute an integral part of the 
organization itself and are subject to its influence and control.” (pp. 193-194). 
And consequently, effectiveness also has to be re-interpreted: 
“It is through its relationships with others that the distinctive capabilities of an 
organization are acquired and developed.  It is therefore the activities taking 
place between the organization and the other parties, rather than activities 
within the organization itself, which are the determinants of the bargaining 
position and of the overall effectiveness of the organization in achieving its 
goals.” (p. 196) 
Together, the two models (Interaction Model and ARA Model) present the perspective put 
forward by the IMP Group. 
The last element in the framework is the development of relationships. 
Relationships 
In Ford (1980) the development of buyer/seller relationships is described in a five (four + 
one) stage model using the metaphor “marriage”.  The four first stages describe the 
development from being an unknown supplier to being a member of the network, through 
increased experience, commitment, and adaptations and decreased uncertainty and distance 
(defined as social, cultural, technological, and geographical distance).  In the final stage (stage 
five) the market has stabilized, and all members are institutionalized into stable relationships.  
This last stage is only reached under certain circumstances, and is not necessarily attractive, 
as the institutionalization may limit the organizations possibilities in seeking new suppliers. 
Figure 5-16 below illustrates the typology. 
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Figure 5-16: The Development of Buyer/Seller Relationships in Industrial Markets - Summary61 
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This model has been challenged by various researchers within the IMP Group.  Wilkinson & 
Young (1994) suggest the metaphor “dancing” instead of “marriage”.  They argue dancing is 
a more appropriate metaphor for at least two reasons: 1. relationships do not necessarily 
develop into a stable, happy marriage, and 2. one may have many dancing partners, with 
                                                 
61  Source: Table I in Ford (1980), p. 342. 
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whom different relationship types are experienced.  Hedaa (1993) argues the “marriage” 
metaphor is 
“…a misleading and empirically unlikely ideal type obscuring the more likely 
wigwag movements of strengthening and weakening forces, maybe even with 
intermittent disconnections, impacting the dynamics of quality of 
relationships.” (p. 191), 
and goes on to criticize the use of a life-cycle notion of relationships: 
“In a turbulent world it is very unlikely that so many influence factors work in 
concert to support the life-cycle notion of consecutive stages.  At any point of 
time in the life-course of a relationship, opportunities for strengthening of ties, 
risks for weakening of ties, and threats of exit from the relationship may 
prevail.” (pp. 191-192). 
This is supported by Easton (1992) who argues that the networks themselves do not have a 
life-cycle, do have stability, but are not static.  Relationships are continually changing, partly 
due to external events, partly due to the exchanges taking place. 
5.4.1 IA and SCM 
To many (academics) IA is more or less the (epistemological) foundation of SCM.  Especially 
the early work on SCM focused on trust and the value of long-term relationships.  The trust 
based relationships were considered a pre-requisite for SCM and the main device to enable 
the creation of a stable network, protecting the company from external shocks.  In a sense 
SCM and the network perspective have co-developed from a single-minded focus on the long-
term relationships towards more nuanced view on the relationships and their relevance under 
different circumstances. 
The “stickyness” of business markets is convincingly described in Hedaa (1996).  The article 
describes the efforts by sales forces to gain market share, and documents the reluctance of 
buyers to change suppliers.  This empirical work demonstrated another reality than the one 
modeled in neoclassical economics, where economic optimality is pursued through rational 
choices.  The notion of “stability, not static”, the slow stable development of the network is in 
strong contrast to the neoclassical decision models.  Hedaa (1996) thereby supports the claim 
that relationships are the corporations’ most important resources, and that relationships should 
be maintained on a continuous basis as they are both difficult and costly to establish.  
Paradoxically, the IMP Group does not seem to be interested in investigating the correlation 
between behavior and the effects on the relationships, or on the consequences of e.g. moral 
hazard.  Their persistent claim that relationships develop slowly over time might make it very 
difficult to bridge the gap between the descriptive models and normative concepts. 
Another shortcoming of the network perspective is the absence of interest in the distribution 
of activities across the network, an issue of critical importance of any manager in closely 
integrated networks. 
The final objection raised on this context is the lack of managerial tools in general.  The 
managerial view in the network perspective is definitely one of cooperation and adaptation, 
but does not give any directions as how to achieve the corporations’ objectives.  The 
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management of the network is really a cooperative effort where distinct decisions on common 
strategy are replaced by continuous adaptations. 
5.4.2 Contributions Referencing IA 
Perhaps due to a focus on normative statements and the descriptive nature of IA, no 
contributions in the literature studies are marked as explicitly referencing IA.  It is beyond 
question, though, that the network perspective is a fundamental building block within SCM. 
A quick sweep using the search criteria “IMP” in abstract across the relevant (as described in 
Chapter 1) journals resulted in more than 3000 hits spanning a wide range of subjects, e.g.: 
? Tuominen (1999) - investor relationships are investigated in order to better understand 
the evolving episodes and bonds.  The Interaction Approach (IMP) is one of three 
perspectives used to understand investor relationships, the others being “The Nordic 
School” and “Relationship Marketing”. 
? Johansson & Elg (2002) - the network perspective is used to better understand entry 
barriers at the firm level, and to enhance Porter’s (1985) view on entry barriers in 
important aspects.  Using the Swedish food industry as an example, the impact of 
deregulation following the entry into the free market of EU is investigated, and the 
importance of relationships and their function as entry barriers are described. 
? Karlsson (2003) - uses the network perspective to hypothesize on the management of 
production organizations in networks, the so-called extraprises, by using the 
fundamentals of the ARA model to frame empirics. 
? Benson-Rea & Wilson (2003) - perform an analytical comparison of the 
entrepreneurship literature and the writings of the IMP Group.  They propose a model 
combining IMP’s evolutionary (emergent) approach with the entrepreneurship’s 
revolutionary (intentional) approach to learning in networks. 
? Skjøtt-Larsen (1999) - analyze Transaction Cost Economics, the Network Perspective 
and Resource-based Theory as research perspectives on SCM. 
The list goes on and on. 
5.4.3 IA and Supply Chain Risks 
Thorough analysis of the IMP literature reveals an absence of risk management.  Instead, 
uncertainty has a focal position, at least in the early works (e.g. Håkonsson, Johanson, & 
Wootz, 1976; IMP Group, 1982; & Hedaa, 1993).  In Håkonsson, Johanson, & Wootz (1976), 
three types of uncertainties in the interaction process is identified: 
? need uncertainty is the buyer’s uncertainty of identifying the exact nature of the need, 
? market uncertainty is related to the buyers perception of the suppliers’ ability to deliver, 
and 
? transaction uncertainty, which is the uncertainty of actually receiving the product or 
component ordered. 
These three uncertainties constitute a framework for influencing the buyer, using two abilities: 
the need solving ability and the transfer ability.  The former is made up of characteristics of 
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the products (function, quality etc.) and the services which are rendered in combination with 
the product.  The latter describe the reliability of delivery of the ordered.  The organizational 
design is thereby of critical importance in the interaction process, as the need solving and 
transfer abilities determine the success or failure of the interactions.  As stated in Håkonsson, 
Johanson, & Wootz (1976): 
“By influencing the perceived uncertainty of the buyer in different ways it will 
be possible for the selling firm to bring about various types of behaviour effects.  
The perceived uncertainty can be either increased or decreased depending on 
the contents of the influence tactics.” (p. 324). 
In the typology of exchanges (see e.g. Figure 5-14) all elements reference uncertainty, e.g. in 
the money exchange as currency rate fluctuations or in the social exchange as a remover of 
uncertainty.  Through social exchange trust is created and expectations are adjusted creating a 
stable and reliable room for exchanges. 
Besides the episode level, uncertainty is present in the control element in the atmosphere.  As 
stated in IMP Group (1982), 
“Another important reason for the closer connection with a counterpart can be 
to reduce the uncertainty associated with that input or output by increasing its 
control over the other company.” (p. 22). 
And further on dependency: 
“… the level of dependence on one relationship affects the vulnerability of an 
organization to the exercise of power by its opposite number.  …  It is the 
management of the closeness of the relationship, with its associated power and 
dependence, which is perhaps a crucial aspect of many industrial marketing 
and purchasing strategies.” (p. 22), 
and goal: 
“Summing up this discussion on of the reasons for a close interaction, we can 
conclude that relationships are established and used in order to gain economic 
benefits, lower costs, higher profits, and/or improving the organization’s 
control of some aspect of its environment.” (p. 22). 
Introducing three sources of uncertainty (supplier, customer, and competitor) and two new 
uncertainty types (technical and acceptance uncertainty) Hedaa (1993) extends the original 
typology by Håkonsson, Johanson, & Wootz (1976) briefly described above.  The resulting 
matrix is depicted in Figure 5-17 below.  The uncertainties in the matrix may be matched to 
the four definitions from the risk matrix.  The process risk seems to be covered quite 
extensively, as e.g. market uncertainties (7, 8, & 9) and transaction uncertainties (13, 14, & 
15) seem to translate quite well.  The technical uncertainties (4, 5, & 6) might translate into 
the process risks, albeit the competitor class might be discarded altogether.  If the structure 
component to the risk matrix is dealt with, it must be in the acceptance uncertainty class, for 
customers (10) and/or suppliers (11).  The domain thereby might have a contribution, at least 
to a classification of risk sources. 
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Figure 5-17: Types and Sources of Uncertainties in Relationships62 
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Management of Risks 
But when it comes to the management of risks, it becomes a bit more unclear.  The 
mechanisms of inclusion are clear, though: the slow adaptation process and build-up of 
knowledge and experience leads to trust.  With trust comes the possibility of obtaining “full 
membership” of the network.  Network members are expected to follow a set of rules shared 
by the entire network, so in a sense the “evaluation of the membership application” is a sort of 
risk management.  The question posed by the network is really: “Is this company really 
trustworthy enough to become a member of our network?”  And implicitly to each of the 
network members: “Do I really want to be burdened by this company’s mistakes and financial 
problems?”.  The problems of each network member may become a problem for all in the 
network in the same manner as a distinct advantage for one network member is expected to 
spread to the rest of the network.  One might therefore map a network as consisting of four 
classes of companies: 
1. Non-interacting companies.  Companies with whom no members have interactions, 
perhaps even competitors? 
2. Interacting non-members.  Companies not belonging to the network - either caused by 
earlier refusal or due to limited lack of relevance.  Interaction is characterized by 
safeguards and controls. 
                                                 
62  Source: Figure 4 in Hedaa (1993), p. 200. 
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3. Trusted members.  Companies with whom sufficient experience has been obtained to 
interact with few safeguards and controls.  Perhaps evolving into a “core member”. 
4. Core members.  Companies very important to the network – by size, history, access to 
markets, financial status…  Core members share fate and rely on each other for the 
continuation of their company, and interaction is characterized by exceptions 
management instead of controls and safeguards. 
Spelling out the classes it becomes obvious risk management differs greatly depending on the 
“standing in the network”.  Combining the standing of the focal company (down) with the 
network membership classes (across) a risk management schema might look like Figure 5-18 
below.  The schema describes the intentions of the various network members, e.g. the 
Interacting Non-member who aspires for membership, or the Core Member who is cautious 
about including new members before making sure they pose no threat to the network (and 
themselves).  The schema also demonstrates the absence of risk management between Core 
Members, and the gradual increase in safe guards and controls (or contracts) as membership 
lessens. 
Figure 5-18: Risk Management Schema for Network Membership Classes 
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The model may seem quite straight forward, but one should understand that a company 
might/will be interacting with/in more than one network.  Empirical investigations show 
companies obtain memberships in network to varying degrees - from total embeddedness 
(Core Members) to less so (Interacting Non-members). 
Management of Supply Chain Risks 
From the description of IA it is evident the management of supply chain risks is not 
supported.  The framework relies on the slow adaptation through interaction, creating an 
atmosphere of trust and reliance on good intentions.  The intentional disruptions and intended 
exit of a critical supply chain (network) partner is thereby not within scope of IA.  For the 
unintentional risks, the following can be concluded: 
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? Process Risk: Disruptions to the flow of goods in the network are inevitable, but in case 
of repeated non-performance network partners are expected to offer assistance to solve 
the problem.  Network members are expected to be capable and competent, but 
circumstances outside the control of the individual members might influence the 
performance of the member and thereby the entire network.  Therefore the network is 
committed to support the inflicted network members overcoming the difficulties, of 
whatever nature they might be.  The distinct decision of dropping a non-performing 
network member is not really supported in the framework.  Developments within the 
network are expected to be slow, altering the level of interaction and the controls and 
safeguards in place.  Or alternatively: a non-performing “Core Network Member” might 
experience a degradation of membership to “Trusted Network Member” 
? Structure Risk: As mentioned above IA does not relate to the intended exit of a critical 
partners, but the unintentional (e.g. a bankruptcy) is considered.  Network members are 
expected in the same manner as for disruptions to support the troubled network 
member.  Only in case helping the troubled network member is threatening the entire 
network member might it be considered not to offer assistance. 
 
In conclusion, IA relies on slow adaptations and the emergence of trust between interacting 
parties as a precondition for network membership.  Intentional disruptions or exits are not 
considered at all, but non-intentional are dealt with by means of offering assistance in the 
form of financial, operational or other types of aid.  The core texts reviewed do not offer any 
support to the “strategic management perspective” but insist troubled network members are 
helped unless the survival of the entire network is at stake. 
 
5.5 Conclusions 
From the discussion above the four theoretical frameworks can be mapped against the Supply 
Chain Risk Framework, as promised at the outset of the chapter.  For matters of convenience 
the intentional risks (intentional disruptions and exits) are mapped separate from the un-
intentional ditto, and subsequently compared.  But first the applicability of the theories to the 
domain of SCM is briefly summarized. 
5.5.1 The Frameworks and SCM 
From the analyses and discussions above it became clear that the four frameworks have very 
different contributions to the domain of SCM. 
TCE obviously has strong arguments on the make-buy decision, but has severe shortcomings 
in terms of e.g. one-sidedness, the dyadic perspective, and the focus on cost instead of value.  
On the other hand, analyzing TCE it becomes apparent that frequency of transaction is quite 
important to the understanding of SCM, and that shifts in governance structure can be 
described, in part using the ‘frequency of disturbance’ argument. 
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Also P/A theory has severe problems in addressing the SCM domain.   Perhaps partly due to 
the discarding of the “positivist stream” the theory had little relevance as the basic models 
were difficult to apply.  Problems included confusion as to the distribution of roles (who is 
principal and who is agent), time perspective (single-period versus multi-period/ongoing), 
inappropriate optimality criteria etc.  The contribution of P/A is thereby limited to 
determining the appropriate contract type in the dyadic relationships to customers and 
suppliers – leaving out the rest of the context.  In case context could be built into the models, 
and a (better) mechanism to allocate cost advantages could be introduced, the models might 
be better able to inform the domain. 
RBT and it’s focus on strategic positioning only partly address SCM as the object ‘supply 
chain’ is applied to RBT with some difficulty.  The inter-organizational nature of some 
resources and core competencies conflict with the basic assumptions of the framework.  In 
relation to the design of supply chain, RBT has been applied a number of times, most often to 
offer arguments for evaluation of portfolios of resources or competencies.  A major problem 
in that respect, though, is the lack of objective measures, or even a method for measurability.  
Another serious shortcoming of the theory and it’s focus on core competencies and 
sustainable advantages is the lack of attention paid to the creation of unnecessary 
dependencies when outsourcing activities before ensuring a market for the activities exist.   
The last theoretical framework, IA, is probably the most cited framework within SCM.  The 
framework itself is not normative, but using it may have normative implications.  IA have 
little to offer in terms of methods or recommendations for supply chain design, but simply 
insists companies in networks are interdependent as reciprocal adaptations ensure stability in 
the network. 
These finding are in line with the concerns vented in Chapter 2 (Burgess, Singh, & Koroglu, 
2006; Storey et al., 2006). 
5.5.2 Intentional Disruptions and Exits 
Also in terms of handling the intentional risks, the four frameworks differ greatly. 
In TCE opportunistic behavior is assumed.  Therefore intentionality is not really that 
important – focus is on the outcome and not the behavior.  As described above TCE explicitly 
addresses the process risk as ‘Frequency of Disruptions’ and suggests shift to either market or 
hierarchy to avoid it.  The structural risk, the sudden exit of a critical partner, is addressed but 
only in terms of avoiding bias in dependency.  It is thereby through the management of the 
dependency that TCE tries to manage the intentional exit of a partner.  If it hurts the partner 
economically to exit, he will require a higher benefit of leaving thereby reducing the 
likelihood. 
Also in P/A opportunistic behavior is assumed (see e.g. Table 5-2).  To mitigate uncertainty 
of the contracted activities the principal has a choice of contract type.  In case of a behavior-
based contract the principal obtains access to the agent, making monitoring possible (at a 
cost).  Conversely, the output-based contract postpones the identification of foul play, as the 
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principal in this contract type does not have access to the agent.  Process risk is thereby 
addressed through the choice of contract for each supplier and period.  Agents with a poor 
performance in one period might not be considered for a contract in the next.  Alternatively, 
poor performance might be penalized, if defined in the contract.  The structural risk, on the 
other hand, does not really seem to fit the theory as the consequence of applying the theory 
would result in all contracts (with critical partners) being behavior-based.  Therefore 
contractually defined penalties might be the only means to ensure stability? 
Neither RBT nor IA has a contribution to the management of the intentional risks.  The 
former is focused towards strategic positioning of the company, whereas the latter assumes 
network members behaving opportunistically have been spotted before being included in the 
network.  In RBT the ‘value of the competence’ will deteriorate with increased frequency of 
(intended) disruptions, potentially leading to termination of the business relationship.  In case 
RBT is extended to allow inter-organizational resources and core competencies, the creation 
of such competencies might be perceived as a risk management strategy linking the 
companies together through shared sustainable competitive advantage. 
Figure 5-19: Management of Intentional Supply Chain Risks 
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Mapping the ability to manage the intentional supply chain risks results in Figure 5-19 above.  
As illustrated risks seem to be addressed in the same manner up- and down-stream.  IA might 
in this respect hold a special position as the framework does not discriminate on the position 
in the value creation process.  For P/A this problem is already addressed - as mentioned 
previously it might be difficult in some instances to determine which company is principal 
and which is agent.  Position in the chain does not predict the role in the P/A models.  The 
same goes for RBT.  So, even if the theories might be predominantly used up-stream no 
restrictions on their application downstream have been found. 
Chapter Five – Supply Chain Theories and Risk 
Page 151 
Summing up, the management of the intentional sudden exit of a critical supply chain partner 
is poorly addressed by the four theoretical perspectives.  TCE manages this risk alone through 
manipulating the dependency between focal company and supplier/customer whereas RBT 
relies on the suggested “SCM extension” (shared core competence) to address the risk.  The 
process risk is directly addressed by TCE and P/A both, the former suggesting a shift towards 
hierarchy or market, the latter suggesting choosing a contract type matching the requirements 
and the characteristics of the activities to be performed by the agent. 
5.5.3 Unintentional Disruptions and Exits 
As mentioned above TCE does not address intentionality – but conclusions differ from the 
previous section anyway.  Managing the dependency between the companies does not 
mitigate the risk of an involuntary exit as a company gone bankrupt probably is unable to 
make strategic decisions.  In case of e.g. a takeover the dependency argument might remain 
valid, though, if the buying company is interested in continuing the activities of the taken-
over company.  The management of the unintended process risk is identical to the intended 
process risk, as described in the previous section. 
The arguments in P/A are more or less similar, except here the mechanism in play is the 
enforcement of contractual penalties.  In case of e.g. a bankruptcy it might be impossible to 
avoid the exit whereas the buying company in a take-over might be persuaded to delay the 
exit and honor existing contracts. 
As mentioned already RBT in itself does not address these risks explicitly, but following the 
same line of argumentation as in the previous section the focal company might be willing to 
help a troubled cooperator if core competencies are shared.  As concluded above, the process 
risks might be managed through communicating the decreased perceived value of the 
competencies in play. 
The risk of unintentional exit of a critical network member is managed in IA by collaboration 
between the remaining members in the network.  In case of a take-over the rest of the network 
might not be able to mitigate the situation, but in case of e.g. financial troubles the network 
will expectedly try and mitigate through loans, extended credits etc.  Only in the case where 
the survival of the entire network will be endangered the network members may refuse to aid 
the troubled company.  In case of process risks, disruptions in the flow of materials, network 
members will offer their assistance.  In case the disruptions are not addressed the company 
might be slowly excluded from the network? 
 
Mapping the ability to manage the unintentional supply chain risks thereby results in Figure 
5-20 below. 
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Figure 5-20: Management of Unintentional Supply Chain Risks 
Pu
rc
ha
si
ng
Pr
od
uc
ti
on
S
al
es
/D
is
tr
ib
ut
io
n
Fi
na
nc
e
H
R
M
Et
c…
Pu
rc
ha
sin
g
Pr
od
uc
tio
n
Sa
le
s/D
ist
rib
ut
ion
Fi
na
nc
e
H
RM
Et
c…
Pu
rc
ha
sin
g
Pr
od
uc
tio
n
Sa
le
s/D
ist
rib
ut
ion
Fi
na
nc
e
H
RM Et
c…
Pu
rc
ha
sin
g
Pr
od
uc
tio
n
Sa
le
s/D
ist
rib
ut
ion
Fi
na
nc
e
H
RM
Et
c…
Pu
rc
ha
sin
g
Pr
od
uc
tio
n
Sa
le
s/D
ist
rib
ut
ion
Fi
na
nc
e
H
RM
Et
c…
Focal
company
Tier 1
supplier
T ier 2
supplier
T ier 2
customer
Tier 1
customer
Pr
im
ar
y
ac
tiv
iti
es
Se
co
nd
ar
y
ac
tiv
iti
es
Supplier Failure Internal Failure Customer Failure
Customer ExitSupplier Exit
ManagementManagement Management ManagementManagement
TC E: Shift of governance structure if
’Frequency of Disruption’ is too high.
P/A:  Choice of co tract. Penalties?
RBT: Decreased ’value of competence’.
IA:    Support from network. Slow exclusion?
TC E: Same as ’Supplier Failure’.
P/A:  Same as ’Supplier Failure’.
RBT: Same as ’Supplier Failure’.
IA:    Same as ’Supplier Failure’.
TC E: Dependent on context.
P/A:  Dependent on context. Penalties.
RBT: Shared core competencies?
IA:    Support from network unless
endangering the entire network.
TC E: Same as ’Supplier Exit’.
P/A:  Sa e as ’Supplier Exit’.
RBT: Same as ’Supplier Exit’.
IA:    Same as ’Supplier Exit’.
 
 
5.5.4 Overall Conclusion 
As described in the introduction to the chapter analyses are performed on four theories – on 
their applicability to SCM, and on their ability to address the management of the supply chain 
risks. 
SCM and the Theories 
As concluded in Chapter 5.5.1 the theories predominantly used within the domain address 
SCM in quite different ways.  Each theory is applicable to a certain degree, but each also has 
shortcomings and is only able to address a fraction of the collection of issues: strategy, design, 
process orientation, overlapping networks of business partners etc.  The general applicability 
of the theories can therefore rightfully be questioned, leading to the obvious conclusion that 
the theories address specific problems, not the domain as such.  This finding is perfectly in 
line with Storey et al. (2006): 
“Our review of the literature on supply chain management suggests that the 
field is characterized by idealism and fragmentation.  It uses overlapping 
terminology which is in turn drawn from multi-disciplinary bases.  …  Despite 
recent attempts to map the terrain …  the field remains disparate.” (p. 758). 
The conclusion also finds support in Croom, Romano, & Giannakis (2000a): 
“One of the most significant findings from our literature analysis has been the 
relative lack of theoretical work…  We would argue that theoretical 
development is critical to the establishment and development of supply chain 
management study.  …  [However] what is of concern is the lack of a 
significant body of a priori theory… (p. 75). 
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A first step to establishing a coherent theoretical base might be a somewhat less ambiguous 
understanding of the content and scope of SCM? 
Risk Management and the Theories 
The analyses described in Chapters 5.5.2 and 5.5.3 document the lack of ability to address the 
identified supply chain risks.  Each theory only addresses a part of the matrix, and for most of 
the theories this is achieved only through the suggested extensions to the theory.  It is 
therefore concluded that the logic of risk management is not really integrated into the theories 
used within the SCM domain.  Also for this reason will it be interesting to learn how these 
two disciplines interact in the case companies, where risk management is performed, and to 
which degree of formalization.  More on this in the following chapters… 
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PART III 
 
EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS 
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Chapter 6 Case Study Design 
The purpose of this chapter is to create a basis for answering the last research question by 
designing the research tools necessary to map out the SCM and SCRM practices in the case 
companies.  In Chapter 1 (and Appendix A) the models describing SCM as starting from 
within and extending outside the focal company are questioned.  Instead, the data collected in 
the pilot studies indicates SCM develops in the interfaces between companies first.  Also it 
appears that length of relationship has less than expected explanatory power as all companies 
appear to have long-term relationships1.  Albeit the pilot studies resulted in a redesign of this 
study the objective has not changed – to understand of how SCM and SCRM is practiced in 
Danish manufacturing companies.  Figure 6-1 below illustrates the overall method. 
Figure 6-1: Case Study Method2 
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Below the case study design is explained through detailed descriptions of the theory 
development, case selection, and data collection protocol.  The case study reports are 
documented in Chapter 7; Chapter 8 contains the cross-case report.  Policy implications and 
modifications to theory are described in Chapter 9. 
6.1 Theory (Development) 
As illustrated in Figure 6-1 above the first step is to develop theory.  The figure also illustrates 
how feedback mechanisms influence at various phases of the research process.  In this context 
                                                 
1 The empirics collected in the pilot studies and reported in Chapter 1 and Appendix A seem to support the 
notion of ‘stickyness’ as reported in Hedaa (1996).  Inter-organizational relationships are not discarded 
overnight due to a marginal difference in price (or other attribute), but apparently there is a certain 
reluctancy to terminate relationships. 
2 Source: Figure 2.5 in Yin (1994), p. 49. 
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the pilot studies can be perceived as the first iterations over the initial phase of the process as 
the ‘prevalent theory’ is contradicted.  The fact that ‘the path of evolution’ identified differed 
from the models does not in itself result in a rejection of the constructs of SCM but questions 
in which order or sequence each construct develops.  It may also question whether there is a 
‘natural’ path of evolution – or if the domain is better described by a multiplicity of 
configurations.  Nonetheless, in this context the development of theory refers to the 
development of constructs – not on the creation of new theory per se3. 
Importance of Theory 
In order to investigate the phenomena SCM and SCRM the case study must be carefully 
designed: 
“[The] role of theory development, prior to the conduct of any data collection, 
is one point of difference between case studies and related methods such as 
ethnography … and ‘grounded theory’…  For case studies, theory development 
as part of the design phase is essential, whether the ensuing case study’s 
purpose is to develop or test theory.” (Yin, 1994, p. 27). 
Performing case studies therefore should rely on theory, in the form of propositions, rival 
explanations, or existing theory.  From the outset the design should explicate the research 
questions and propositions, define the unit of analysis, and explain how to link the findings 
with propositions (Yin, 1994, pp. 22-26).  The role of theory also has an impact on the 
method of generalization when doing case study research: 
“A fatal flaw in doing case studies is to conceive of statistical generalization as 
the method of generalizing the results of the case.  This is because cases are not 
‘sampling units’ and should not be chosen for this reason.  …  [T]he methods of 
generalization is ‘analytic generalization’, in which the previously developed 
theory is used as a template with which to compare the empirical results of the 
case study.  If two or more cases are shown to support the same theory, 
replication may be claimed.  The empirical results may be considered yet more 
potent if two or more cases support the same theory but does not support an 
equally plausible rival theory.” (pp. 30-31). 
Case study research thereby differs from experiments in terms of control of the context (the 
environment is not controlled) and experiments and surveys both in terms of generalization 
(cases do not represent the entire population in a statistical sense). 
Theory as Constructs 
As the intent is to understand and document the practices of SCM and SCRM in the case 
companies, each of these complex phenomena is decomposed into a number of constructs, as 
suggested by Burgess, Singh, and Koroglu (2006): 
“Owing to the nature of the field [SCM], a suitable way to present the SCM 
concepts is to logically group them into ‘constructs’ – higher order abstract 
variables that are not directly measurable, but provide a more rounded 
                                                 
3 It is important to understand the intention of this study is to test theory, not generate theory.  In the context 
of the proposed method the development of new theory may take the form of hypotheses for subsequent 
testing. 
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definition of the concepts…  For the SCM field, agreement on a common set of 
constructs does not appear to exist.” (p. 709). 
6.1.1 Constructs for SCM 
Taking a step back and approaching the phenomenon at a more abstract level result in the 
high-level constructs described below.  Inspiration is gathered from previously used SCM 
models, the literature reviews as well as other review articles (e.g. Burgess, Singh, & 
Koroglu, 2006; Chen & Paulraj, 2004; Gibson, Mentzer, & Cook, 2005; Storey et al., 2006)4.  
The following six high-level constructs are considered appropriate for an exploratory study of 
this type. 
The ‘Supply Chain Organization’ 
First and foremost it is of interest to investigate how the companies have organized 
themselves around the entity ‘supply chain’.  In case the company has embraced the strategic 
challenge of relating to supply chains instead of market opportunities, the company will have 
to concurrently consider the internal organization and the up- and down-stream sides of the 
company (e.g. Stevens, 1989; Mentzer et al., 2001).  The existence of a SCM department may 
signal a more credible commitment (see Chapter 5.1) to cooperate with external parties – 
especially if this organizational entity is interacting to obtain shared advantages.  An 
alternative understanding is offered by RBT (see Chapter 5.3) where the consolidation of 
capabilities may evolve into a core competence.  Implementing a SCM department may 
thereby increase the likelihood of establishing true inter-organizational operations. 
Production Philosophy 
The mode of operation is also known as the production philosophy, explaining the methods 
applied to produce the variety of products and overall volume.  Contemporary contributions 
refer to concepts like Leanness or Agility (e.g. Mason-Jones, Naylor, & Towill, 2000a; 
Mason-Jones, Naylor, & Towill, 2000b; Towill & Christopher, 2002) or Responsiveness (e.g. 
Holweg, 2005).  The underlying (operations-oriented) concepts include e.g. Push/Pull5, 
Modularity6, and Postponement strategies7.  As described in Chapter 2 “pure” Push strategies 
are considered “pre-SCM” as they rely on long production series of products not “fitted to” 
the customer.  On the other hand the pure “Pull” strategy is considered “modern” as it relies 
on tight integration with suppliers, information transparency (tradeoff against inventories) and 
fault-free internal operations and suppliers.  Participation in a Pull-type supply chain may be 
explained using P/A Theory (see Chapter 5.2) with the customer (or down-stream supply 
chain partner) being the principal and the upstream supply chain being the agent.  Also in this 
                                                 
4 The development of constructs thereby relies on the ”critical review method”. 
5 For a case study exemplifying this concept, see e.g. Hammel & Kopczak (1993). 
6 Modularity - the principle of decomposing a product into sub-systems, and designing them independently.  
See e.g. Baldwin & Clark (1997) or van Hoek & Weken (1998). 
7 Various types of postponement strategies exist, see e.g. Pagh & Cooper (1998) or van Hoek, Commandeur, 
& Vos (1998). 
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instance TCE may supplement the understanding through the perspective of the ‘Hybrid 
Governance Form’ (again: see Chapter 5.1). 
Process Orientation 
As documented previously process orientation is focal to SCM (e.g. Cooper, Lambert, & 
Pagh, 1997; Hewitt, 1994; Lambert, Cooper, & Pagh, 1998) in order to achieve the smoothest 
operation and shortest lead time possible.  In most (early) SCM models processes cross 
organizational boundaries (e.g. Stevens, 1989; Mentzer et al., 2001) but as discussed in 
Chapter 2 this proposition may very well be due to an immature understanding of the SCM 
processes.  As illustrated in Figure 2-9 processes have different “lengths” and the logic of 
their “connectedness” vary from process to process.  The “Supplier Relationship 
Management” does not connect to the supplier’s “Supplier Relationship Management” 
process but (hopefully) to the “Customer Relationship Process”.  The only process 
“connected” from tier to tier in the supply chain is the “Fulfillment Process”.  As process 
orientation thereby is an inherently company internal aspect (of SCM) the inter-company 
process integration is described separately (under ‘External Integration’, see below).  Process 
orientation is thereby evaluated from the organizational setup (i.e. use of cross-functional 
teams) and from the list of processes supplied by interviewees8.  The removal of functional 
silos within the company may be understood through TCE (see Chapter 5.1) as an “intra-
organizational vertical integration”.  Alternatively the process of organizing around a process 
(instead of a function) may be viewed as a P/A problem (see Chapter 5.2) – having the 
process owner acting as the principal and the participants being the agents (with their 
functional references intact). 
IT Support 
The use of IT is routinely claimed to be a pre-requisite for SCM (e.g. Christopher & Towill, 
2001; Mentzer et al., 2001; Schary & Skjøtt-Larsen, 2001) – some even claim the use of IT 
may promote SCM (e.g. Jayaram, Vickery, & Droge, 2000; Stefansson, 2002).  Potentially 
supporting internal and external integration, the role of IT must be evaluated to understand to 
which extend the “system” (the supply chain(s)) is automated as SCM requires information to 
be exchanged in a smooth and timely manner (e.g. Auramo, Kauremaa, & Tanskanen, 2005; 
Bagchi et al., 2005).  In case IT integration is tight (no systems de-coupling) e.g. orders “wash 
through” the system as a tidal wave, enabling the entire system to act as one (e.g. Boyson & 
Corsi, 2001; Christiaanse & Kumar, 2000).  Coordination across legal boundaries is almost 
cost-free up to confirmation of transactions – enabling high quality and early information 
sharing.  Within the individual company the use of integrated applications like ERP supports 
transparency and enables better monitoring and control of processes (e.g. Akkermans et al., 
2003; Forza, Romano, & Vinelli, 2000) thus supporting the removal of functional silos (as 
mentioned above).  Both internally within the company and across legal boundaries the 
                                                 
8 As process orientation in some companies (see Appendix A) is merely a rephrasing of typical department 
names, a critical evaluation of the processes is needed. 
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impact of information transparency may be explained by means of P/A theory (see Chapter 
5.2).  Enabling online and (more or less) cost free access to information from the agent the 
monitoring cost of the principal is largely reduced thereby removing a major obstacle for this 
contract type. 
External Integration 
As already described above (early) models of SCM relies on external process integration even 
if evidence of process integration per se is scant (e.g. Bask & Juga, 2001).  Most agree 
integration of the physical flow and the information flow are essential to SCM (e.g. Morash & 
Clinton, 1998; Frohlich & Westbrook, 2001) and case studies document how IT integration 
speeds up the fulfillment process within various industries (e.g. Ferdows, Lewis, & Machuca, 
2004; Towill, Childerhouse, & Disney, 2002; Wilson & Clarke, 1998).  Besides process and 
IT integration “the network effect” is often mentioned as a primary driver for supply chain 
integration – often using trust-based relationships as the integrative mechanism (e.g. Bagchi et 
al., 2005; Sahay, 2003).  The “traditional” determinant for trust in relationships is 
“relationship length” – even if evidence compromising this proposition exists. 
The concept Collaborative Planning, Forecasting, and Replenishment (CPFR) may enrich the 
understanding of the integration of supply chains (e.g. Fliedner, 2003; Simatupang & 
Sridharan, 2005; VICS, 2004).  Albeit CPFR is normally considered a concept emerging from 
a certain practice (like e.g. ECR) it might be used to describe the level of collaboration 
between supply chain partners.  The concept draws on a number of constructs, see Table 6-1 
below.  The reliance on IT integration is obvious as the information sharing (at least on a 
continual basis) would be impossible without automation.  The second and third dimensions 
in the table above might be translated into ‘Coordination’ whereas the fourth and fifth are 
oriented towards alternative goals/outcomes of the collaboration.  The last two dimensions do 
not describe the practice but are the output or explanation of the model proposed. 
Table 6-1: Dimensions of different levels of CPFR9 
Dimensions Basic CPFR Developed CPFR Advanced CPFR 
1. Shared information Sales orders and 
confirmation 
Inventory data 
Demand data 
Order planning data 
Promotion data 
Production data 
Demand data 
Order planning data 
Promotion data 
Production data 
2. Degree of discussion No Some Frequently 
3. Co-ordination/synchronisation No Some All activities 
4. Competence development No No Knowledge 
5. Evaluation No No Experiences 
6. Type of relationship Transactional Information sharing Mutual learning 
7. Theoretical explanation TCA Network Resource- and 
competence-based 
 
Combining the dimensions as discussed above and introducing a time perspective, the model 
might be further developed, see Table 6-2 below.  
                                                 
9 Source: Table I in Skjøtt-Larsen, Thernøe, & Andresen (2003), p. 537. 
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Table 6-2: Collaboration Model 
Dimension No CPFR Basic CPFR Advanced CPFR 
Information Sharing None Periodic Online/Continual 
Coordination None Periodic Continual 
Alternative Goals N/A No (Secondary) Yes (Primary) 
 
The categories are renamed changing the lowest level to ‘No CPFR’.  This category denotes 
relationships where no information sharing and no coordination take place (and therefore no 
alternative goals can exist).  The next level of collaboration is characterized by periodic (e.g. 
monthly) exchange of information and coordination between supply chain partners.  At this 
level alternative goals (e.g. competence building, network sharing) is secondary as the focus 
is on fulfillment (only).  The highest level of collaboration in contrast is characterized by 
alternative goals as companies are tightly integrated through continual information sharing 
and coordination. 
Each of the two suggested constructs (length of relationship and collaboration) may be 
explained in theoretical terms.  The former may be understood through IA, see Chapter 5.4) 
which relies on the social interaction and resulting adaptation/integration to explain network 
structures.  Trust plays an important role within this framework as it explains the (slow) 
integration of network members – and the absence of contracts within closely knitted 
networks.  This explanation may be supplemented by P/A theory – as the closeness of the 
network may enable cost-free monitoring.  The latter construct is explained in Table 6-2 
above by references to three of the four frameworks reviewed in Chapter 5. 
Inter-organizational Management 
Borrowing from the before mentioned models by Stevens and Mentzer et al. (and many 
others) it seems evident the inter-organizational component has to be investigated as well.  
The extent of the “extraprise” (e.g. Karlsson, 2003; Geary, Childerhouse, & Towill, 2002) 
might be explained in a number of ways, here it is chosen simply to investigate if/how 
management and control is performed in union with suppliers and customers.  The traditional 
“stand-alone” production unit will communicate through orders only, whereas the network-
oriented company might share production plans, strategic information and perhaps even 
capacity and employees with participating companies.  In a sense this element might also 
describe “the boundary of the network”. 
The Resulting Set 
From the categories described above the following list of high-level constructs are derived: 
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Table 6-3: SCM Constructs 
Construct Description 
Supply Chain Organization Describes how the company has organized around the task of performing SCM. 
Production Philosophy Describes the production philosophy (or philosophies) in place. 
Process Orientation Describes the process (or processes) in place as well as the related organizational set-up (e.g. cross-functional teams etc.). 
IT Support Describes the IT systems supporting the internal and external integration. 
External Integration Describes the (type of) integration with external parties. 
Inter-organizational 
Management 
Describes the practice of planning, control and/or management across legal 
boundaries. 
 
The content of each construct is developed through inducing the empirical data collected from 
the case companies, thereby creating a multi-level hierarchy (as in Appendix A). 
6.1.2 Constructs for SCRM 
As for SCM also within SCRM a number of constructs need to be identified to guide the 
development of the research tool.  But in contrast to SCM little knowledge on the 
management of supply chain risks exists – as documented in the literature reviews in Chapter 
3 and Chapter 4.  The constructs for SCRM therefore will appear slightly more exploratory 
and have less theoretical foundation than the SCM constructs. 
Risk Management Organization 
The investigation of SCRM practices starts out in a manner similar to investigating SCM: by 
querying for formal organization and/or positions.  In e.g. Chopra & Sodhi (2004) the 
existence of an organization-wide understanding is required for supply chain risks to be 
managed efficiently.  Referencing the Alberquerque incident (see Chapter 1) they claim: 
“Like Ericsson smart companies do not want to wait for lightning to strike 
twice before taking action.” (p. 61). 
The proposition to implement formal risk organization is supported by Harland, Brenchley, & 
Walker (2003) and by Zsidisin et al. (2004) who use formal organization as an indicator for 
the level of supply risk management.  In Rice & Caniato (2003) training and the existence of 
positions within risk management are perceived as proactive risk management and a 
prerequisite for safe operation; in van der Horst & Beulens (2002) supply chain organization 
and governance structures are of primary interest.  Finally, as documented in Norrman &  
Jansson (2004) the mitigation of the Alberquerque incident included development and 
implementation of an enterprise-wide organization and processes to identify, assess, and 
manage supply chain risks. 
Risk Types and Management Effort 
Following the description of the formal organization it seems logical to describe the types of 
risks managed locally within the investigated part of the organization.  Several contributions 
outlining typologies of (supply chain) risks exist, e.g. Cavinato (2004), Chopra & Sodhi 
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(2004), and Spekman & Davis (2004).  In this context the use of the categories introduced in 
the Risk Matrix (Structure versus Process Risks10) seems appropriate. 
Naturally the perspectives on how to manage risks differ greatly: in Christopher & Lee (2004) 
development of confidence through visibility and control in the supply chain is perceived as 
the primary mechanisms to risk mitigation whereas Chopra & Sodhi (2004) suggest a list of 
risk mitigation strategies and van der Horst & Beulens (2002) and Geary, Childerhouse, & 
Towill (2002) suggest managing sources of uncertainty.  Both Hauser (2003) and Spekman & 
Davis (2004) consider SCM an “extended system” and emphasize the importance of “building 
risk management into SCM”. 
Risk Identification and Assessment 
Also relevant when unraveling the nature of risk management within operations the 
characteristics of the sub-processes risk identification and risk assessment might reveal 
insights into the overall practice (e.g. Chopra & Sodhi, 2004; Lee & Wolfe, 2003).  These 
processes may be directly observable in contrast to e.g. the management process which may 
be completely embedded in the practice in question11.  The investigation of the risk 
identification and risk assessment is an investigation of the formalization of the risk 
management practices.  Whereas the risk management process might be more or less formal 
risk identification will lose its justification if not performed periodically or in conjunction 
with e.g. major investments, restructuring etc.  Performing risk identification in a less 
stringent manner will reduce the relevance of the task as management will react according to a 
false image of the risk landscape (e.g. Harland, Brenchley, & Walker, 2003; Hauser, 2003).  
The lack of periodic assessment of the identified risks will similarly distort the picture as 
prioritization based on outdated information might be detrimental to creating stability (e.g. 
van der Horst & Beulens, 2002).  It might also be relevant to analyze where within the 
company the risk identification and risk assessment take place – if it is performed close to the 
risk (within the domain) or from a distance (outside the domain). 
Supplier Risk Management 
Finally, supplier risk management is investigated as a separate element in the overall risk 
management analysis12.  Especially the perspective on single versus dual/multiple sourcing is 
relevant (e.g. Chopra & Sodhi, 2004; Martha & Subbakrishna, 2002) but also flexibility in 
sourcing arrangements (e.g. Rice & Caniato, 2003; Lee & Wolfe, 2003) is important.  The 
focal element in this analysis is whether or not a segmentation model is used as a structured 
way of selecting, evaluating, and developing suppliers (see e.g. Kraljic, 1983; Bunn & Liu, 
1996; Zsidisin, Panelli, & Upton, 2000; Harland, Brenchley, & Walker, 2003).  Using 
                                                 
10 See Figure 2-11. 
11 In case management of a specific risk was addressed by a change to a process, the risk management process 
is not observable after implementation.  In contrast the sub-processes Risk Identification and Risk 
Assessment will most likely be directly observable. 
12 As mentioned elsewhere the choice was made to focus upstream. 
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supplier segmentation models thereby might support differentiated management of suppliers 
potentially enabling a differentiated approach towards supply (chain) risks13.  Besides 
segmenting and performing differentiated management of the supplier portfolio, external 
audits of operations might shed some light over risk mitigation in inter-organizational 
systems.  As each company is victim to the performance of each of its critical suppliers the 
procedures for supplier auditing is deemed relevant for the analysis of risk management 
practices (e.g. Zsidisin et al., 2004). 
The Resulting Set 
From the categories above the following list of high-level constructs is derived: 
Table 6-4: SCRM Constructs 
Construct Description 
Risk Management Organization Describes how the company has organized around the task of performing SCRM. 
Risk Types and Management Efforts Describes the types of risks (from the Supply Chain Risk Matrix) acknowledged and the associated management effort. 
Risk Identification and Assessment Describes the sub-practices of risk identification and assessment. 
Supplier Risk Management Describes how supply risks are managed. 
 
6.2 Case Selection 
The next step in designing the case study is to select cases: 
“When using a multi-case design, a further question you will encounter has to 
do with the number of cases deemed necessary or sufficient for your study.  
However, because a sampling logic should not be used, the typical criteria 
regarding sample size also are irrelevant.  Instead, you should think of this 
decision as a reflection of the number of case replications – both literal and 
theoretical – that you would like to have in your study.” (Yin, 1994, p. 50). 
As no rival theories are defined per se, external validity is the main driver for the number of 
theoretical replications: 
“When you are uncertain whether external conditions will produce different 
case study results, you may want to articulate these relevant conditions more 
explicitly at the outset of your study and identify a larger number of cases to be 
included.” (Yin, 1994, p. 50). 
External conditions must therefore be explicated to ensure appropriate case selection. 
6.2.1 External Conditions (for SCM and SCRM) 
Conditions relevant to the practices of SCM and SCRM may include: 
1. the size of the company might have an impact on the resources available for staff 
functions, 
2. the number of direct competitors and the history of competition might influence the 
need to lock in critical suppliers (and customers), 
                                                 
13 See Chapter 3.3.2 for a discussion of supply (risk) management. 
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3. recent accidents might impact resource allocation, increasing the focus on risk 
management, 
4. the complexity of internal processes might increase the awareness of complexity in the 
environment and thereby impact the risk management practice, and 
5. the nature of inputs (simple versus complex, or standard versus unique) might influence 
the supplier base and thereby the SCM practice, and furthermore the perception of 
supply risks. 
Albeit this list is undoubtedly incomplete it introduces too many variables.  The first 
examples are justified by an assumption of larger companies having more resources available 
(e.g. Chopra & Sodhi, 2004) and might have a longer time horizon on investments in 
processes and technologies.  whereas the fourth and fifth are based on an assumption of 
higher levels of complexity require more risk management (e.g. Harland, Brenchley, & 
Walker, 2003; Ottesen & Gronhaug, 2002e; Perrow, 1984).  From a SCM perspective the 
fourth argument might be relevant due to the need for precision of internal processes when 
dealing with unique/complex inputs (here it is assumed complexity in input leads to 
segmentation of supply market – basically the specialization argument, see Gripsrud, Jahre, & 
Persson (2006)).  The last example points towards ‘internal SCM’, assuming internal 
integration support complexity in processes (e.g. Storey et al., 2006; Simatupang & Sridharan, 
2005).  The second and third examples do not combine SCM with SCRM and may thereby be 
removed from the list.  External conditions (subjectively chosen) for this study are thereby: 
 
External Condition 1: Size of Company. 
External Condition 2: Complexity of Processes. 
External Condition 3: Complexity of Inputs. 
 
Recruiting SCM Companies 
Furthermore it is deemed critically important to include “Best in Class Supply Chain 
Management” companies in the convenience sampling as to ensure variation across the case 
companies.  A corresponding variation across SCRM practices would have been preferable, 
but none such mechanism could be identified.  Therefore only a fourth (and not a fifth) 
condition is added to the list above: 
 
External Condition 4: SCM Award Winning Company. 
 
Due to the use of analytical generalization (in contrast to statistical generalization, see above) 
each external condition is evaluated separately.  For each external condition the convenience 
sample should contain at least 2-3 cases to allow for variation within each group.  Weighing 
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this argument against the level of existing knowledge and the effort needed for each case (e.g. 
Eisenhardt, 1989b; Dyer & Wilkins, 1991) a convenience sample size of ten case companies 
is considered sufficient. 
6.2.2 Case Selection Method 
The convenience sampling must be performed in a manner ensuring above mentioned criteria 
are met.  As only two (‘Size’ and ‘SCM Award’) of the four external conditions are readily 
available “from outside the company” the classification process is split in two, see Figure 6-2 
below. 
Figure 6-2: (An Iterative) Case Selection Method 
Classification I:
• Size?
• SCM Award?
Classification II:
• Complexity(I)?
• Complexity(P)?
Outside / Distance
Population
(Danish
Manufacturing
Companies)
Participating
Companies
Inside / Interaction
Goal: Even split 
Large/Small, and SCM 
Award/No SCM
Award
Goal: Even split 
Complex/Simple Input 
and Complex/Simple 
Processes
Goal: Ten participating companies
 
 
As shown in the figure above the case selection method is thereby iterative as the second 
evaluation needs to be performed before another company can be included.  Companies are 
therefore included one at a time. 
Case Selection Process 
In order to meet the fourth external condition half the companies were picked from the lists of 
award winning companies, winning either The Danish Logistics Award or The Post Denmark 
Logistics Award.  The former is depicted in Table 6-5 below, the latter in Table 6-6 
(participating companies are highlighted). 
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Table 6-5: The Danish Logistics Award14 
Year Company 
2005 Vest-Wood A/S 
2004 Netto A/S 
2003 Oticon A/S 
2002 LK A/S 
2001 Grundfos A/S 
2000 Arla Foods A/S 
1999 Carlsberg A/S 
1998 Olicom A/S 
1997 Coloplast A/S 
1996 Bang & Olufsen A/S 
1995 Voss-Atlas A/S 
1994 Herning Galvanisering A/S 
 
Table 6-6: The Post Denmark Supply Chain Award15 
Year Large Company Small or Medium-sized Company 
2005 Fritz Hansen A/S Bolia.com 
LINAK A/S (manufacturing) 2004 
Sanistål A/S (trading company) 
Skagenfood A/S 
Gate Gourmet Scandinavia (manufacturing) 2003 Coop Denmark A/S (trading) Dekra Automotive Services A/S (trading) 
 
For each of the companies the remaining three external conditions are determined according 
to the following guidelines. 
Criteria for Size 
Albeit revenue is the standard measure for size16 the SCM context calls for a more structural 
argument for size.  The following variables are used to determine size: 
? Number of Local HQ’s (Hubs) 
? Number of Subsidiaries / Sales Offices 
? Number of Distributors / Representatives 
Table 6-7 below contains the result of the classification for size.17 
                                                 
14 Source: www.logistikkonferencen.dk. 
15 Source: www.supplychainprisen.dk. 
16  The definition of SME used within EU uses number of employees and either turnover or balance sheet total.  
For more info, please see Szabo (1998). 
17 The reason for the two groups (large and small) not being equal in size (six large and four small companies) 
is due to the need to “balance” according to the other two variables, and due to delayed confirmation of 
participation from another two case companies (who ended up declining the invitation to participate). 
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Table 6-7: Classification for Size18 
 No of local No of subs / No of distributors /   
Company HQ / hub ? sales offices ? representatives ? Other ? Size 
Bang & Olufsen 2 30 20 Prod., Show Rooms Large 
Brüel & Kjær 8 48 77 Service Centers Large 
Coloplast 3 26 49 Production Large 
Dyrup 0 8 15 Production Large 
Fritz Hansen 0 7 400 Show Rooms Small 
Linak 1 26 7 Production Large 
Novozymes 0 18 0 Production Large 
Oticon 1 15 72 Production Small 
RIEGENS (1) 2 0 Production Small 
SDC Group 0 5 0 Production Small 
 
Criteria for Complexity 
As mentioned previously the inclusion of companies were based on a preliminary evaluation 
of complexity in input and processes.  As both of these criteria need a more thorough analysis 
access to the company is a pre-requisite for classification.  Upon obtaining access to the case 
company evaluating inputs and processes for complexity should be possible.  But since no 
generally acceptable constructs for measuring complexity in neither input nor process was 
identified, the classification is left to the subjective choice of the researcher. 
6.2.3 Learning Points 
One of the first learning point was the (in hindsight) obvious fact that complexity in process 
might vary greatly across supply chains.  And since a company might (and certainly many do) 
participate/have multiple supply chains, the model needs to distinguish between supply 
chains.  Pondering the criteria for determining whether there are three or four supply chains 
(or business models) in a company reveal that the case studies challenge the classification.  As 
described in Gardner & Cooper (2003) the exercise of mapping a number of supply chains 
might result in numerous iterations ultimately leading to either despair or a simpler model 
than desired.  A second learning point was that complexity in process might not be that easily 
described (‘Simple’ or ‘Complex’).  In several companies the process performed by the 
technology is deeply complex and relies on extreme precision.  In these cases, complexity is 
embedded in the manufacturing process, whereas the process as understood in a SCM context 
(see Chapter 8.1.2 for a thorough discussion of the term process) is simplified as a direct 
result. 
Classifying the Case Companies 
For each supply chain the complexity of input and process were evaluated, see Table 6-8 
below. 
                                                 
18 Analysing the companies by turnover and number of employees would place Brüel & Kjær in the group of 
smaller companies.  The rest of the companies would not change classification. 
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Table 6-8: External Conditions per Supply Chain 
Company Size Supply Chain(s) Input Process SCM Award 
Bang & Olufsen Large All Complex Simple Yes 
‘Project Sales’ & 
‘Customer Project’ Complex Complex Brüel & Kjær Large 
All Other Complex Simple 
No 
Coloplast Large All Simple Simple Yes 
Dyrup Large All19 Simple Simple No 
Fritz Hansen Small All20 Simple Simple Yes 
LINAK Large All Simple Simple Yes 
Novozymes Large All21 Simple Complex (embedded) No 
Oticon Small All Complex Complex (embedded) Yes 
‘Project’ Simple Complex RIEGENS Small All Other Simple Simple No 
SDC DANDISC Small All Simple Complex (embedded) No 
 
In order to obtain one set of external conditions per case company the above listed values are 
manipulated in the following ways: 
1. The ‘Process’ construct is split into two constructs ‘Process’ and ‘Manufacturing 
Process’, the latter describing the complexity of the manufacturing process.  As a result, 
both constructs can hold the values ‘Simple’ and ‘Complex’. 
2. For each company having more than one supply chain, the most “advanced” value is 
kept.  For Brüel & Kjær, for instance, the company ends up with the values ‘Large’, 
‘Complex’, ‘Complex’, and ‘Simple’ (for the external conditions ‘Size’, ‘Input’, 
‘Process’, and ‘Manufacturing Process’, respectively). 
Table 6-9 below holds the resulting set of external conditions per company. 
Table 6-9: External Conditions per Company 
Company Size Input Process Mfg. Process 
SCM 
Award 
Bang & Olufsen Large Complex Simple Simple Yes 
Brüel & Kjær Large Complex Complex Simple No 
Coloplast Large Simple Simple Simple Yes 
Dyrup Large Simple Simple Simple No 
Fritz Hansen Small Simple Simple Simple Yes 
LINAK Large Simple Simple Simple Yes 
Novozymes Large Simple Complex Complex No 
Oticon Small Complex Complex Complex Yes 
RIEGENS Small Simple Complex Simple No 
SDC DANDISC Small Simple Complex Complex No 
 
Participation 
Even if most invited companies accepted the invitation almost all had concerns.  First of all 
the workload for the companies is non-trivial.  Insisting on interviewing key personnel was a 
                                                 
19 Actually another supply chain exists but since it’s quite marginal it’s left out. 
20 The production of very expensive (primarily wooden) products is best described as crafts-based production.  
The other two supply chains differ in distribution solution alone. 
21 The two supply chains are identical in respect to external conditions. 
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cause for discussion in several of the companies.  A second (and perhaps the most critical) 
concern was the subject of the research project: some companies were reluctant (to say the 
least) to share information on their risk management practices22.  Once recruited to the study, 
though, each company appeared to be quite committed. 
6.3 Design of Data Collection Protocol 
As illustrated in Figure 6-1 the next step is to design the data collection protocol.  For studies 
of exploratory nature the use of semi-structured interviews is uncontroversial; to that end a 
questionnaire containing mostly open-ended questions is developed.  The purpose of the 
questionnaire is to enable an understanding of each case company on the defined constructs as 
well as collect other background information.  A part of the questionnaires is thereby directly 
linked to the high-level constructs described in Chapter 6.1. 
The Questionnaire(s) 
Following the obligatory test of the questionnaire it becomes apparent the questionnaire needs 
to be further developed.  The exploratory nature of the study combined with complexity of the 
phenomena under investigation and the inter-organizational nature of SCM calls for empirical 
triangulation (Yin, 1994, p. 92).  Within each company the persons responsible for SCM and 
Purchasing (respectively) are chosen as interviewees23.  The original questionnaire is kept 
more or less unchanged (see Interview Guide I in Appendix G.1), and two more 
questionnaires are developed: one oriented towards the more detailed issues within 
Purchasing (Interview Guide II – Appendix G.2) and another focusing on the appropriateness 
of the SCM and SCRM practices (Interview Guide III – Appendix G.3).  Interview Guide I is 
used with both SCM and Purchasing staff, but the interview within Purchasing is further 
supported by Interview Guide II.  The last interview guide is used with both groups24. 
Two Rounds of Interviews 
Due to the sensitivity of the research subject it was a priority to try and establish a “safe 
environment” for the interviewees by e.g. motivating them to share their experiences of “near 
misses” or discuss commonly known cases and drawing parallels to the case company.  In the 
initial stage of the data collection therefore only Interview Guides I and II were used – and at 
the slightest hint of conflict or uneasiness the interviewer would change topic (within the 
frame of the interview guide).  Following each of the initial interviews the researcher would 
place a telephone call to clarify some detail thereby offering another opportunity to strengthen 
the relationship between researcher and interviewee.  Also this would constitute an 
opportunity to clarify any information shortages resulting from the above mentioned process.  
Only later in the project once a relationship was established the interviewee would be more 
                                                 
22 When presented the subject of the research project and the preliminary interview plan three potential 
companies declined. 
23 In a few of the case companies a larger group of employees have participated in the study.  A complete list 
of interviewees and interviews is presented in Appendix H. 
24 See Appendix G for details. 
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directly confronted with “tough questions” (Interview Guide III).  Table 6-10 below shows 
how the interview guides were applied during the two rounds of interviews. 
Table 6-10: Application of Interview Guides25 
Round Interview Guide SCM Interviewee Purchasing Interviewee 
I: SCM & SCRM Practices Yes Yes 
II: Supply Risk Management  (Yes) 1 
III: Appropriateness of Current Practices   
I: SCM & SCRM Practices (Yes) (Yes) 
II: Supply Risk Management  Yes 2 
III: Appropriateness of Current Practices Yes Yes 
 
Validating the Information 
Before interviews are conducted background information is collected by the use of various 
sources: trade journals, media databases (e.g. Info-media), company databases (e.g. 
Amadeus), annual accounts, and published case studies on the selected companies (e.g. 
Bernhard, 1988; Helbo, Jakobsen, & Gammelgaard, 2004).  In order to ensure validity 
whenever possible “proof” of statements from the interviewees is sought – in the form of 
organization charts, process documentation, external reviews etc.  Also the two sources of 
information (SCM and Purchasing staff) are validated against each other and against 
alternative sources of information available.  In case of discrepancies, focused attention is 
given to those issues during the second round of interviews. 
6.4 Documenting the Cases 
The last step before the cross-case analysis is to write up the case study reports.  Again 
referring to the exploratory nature of this study the case reports are aiming at creating an 
understanding of the company as each company is perceived as a unique entity with unique 
attributes and explanations.  The case reports may therefore differ from each other, both in 
length and structure, but will all contain the following information: an outline of the company 
history, a description of the range of products or the technology central to the company, recent 
developments as well as a view of the financial situation.  Furthermore each case naturally 
describes the current SCM and SCRM practices. 
 
                                                 
25 Not in all companies this quite time consuming procedure could be adhered to.  Please refer to Appendix H 
for a complete list of interviews. 
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Chapter 7 Case Studies 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the case studies.  Each case study will contain a 
(brief) explanation of the company’s history and an overview of the main financial key 
figures.  This introduction is followed by a more thorough description of the practices within 
SCM and SCRM.  The descriptions of the practices vary from case to case but the description 
of the SCM practice contains a description of the underlying production philosophy (where 
possible) and a graphical representation (a SCM Diagram) of the supply chain(s) identified1. 
Sources of Information 
The major sources of information are naturally the interviewees within each case company.  
The historical element in the description of the companies in this chapter is based on 
information supplied by the companies themselves, Bernhard (1988), and an analysis of the 
business periodical “Børsens Nyhedsmagasin”.  For some of the case companies information 
on the purchasing practice is derived from Helbo, Jakobsen, & Gammelgaard (2004).  
Specific issues are investigated using the media database INFOMEDIA2.  Financial data is 
from Amadeus3 (updated 2006-07-16). 
 
                                                 
1 The SCM Diagrams focus on the structural aspect i.e. the participants in the chain.  This is naturally a trade-
off against other parameters like product types or demand patterns (to name a few) – but a necessary one as 
complexity makes it impossible to include all relevant factors. 
2 For more, please refer to www.infomedia.dk. 
3 For more, please refer to amadeus.bvdep.com. 
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7.1 Bang & Olufsen A/S 
The company’s founders Peter Boas Bang and Svend Andreas Grøn Olufsen met during their 
studies in the early 1920’s at Århus’ Electro Technical School, and quickly realized that they 
shared a common interest in radio technology.  A few years after their studies, the two 
engineers met up again and after some initial experiments the company Bang & Olufsen a/s 
was founded on November 17th, 1925. 
Growth & Crisis 
Up to the Second World War the company grew steadily.  The German occupation and the 
restrictions on imports were constraining the company, but these inconveniences were 
incomparable to the bombing and destruction of the factory on February 14-15th, 1945.  
Construction drawings and models had been moved to safekeeping in private homes, and 
construction of a new factory started the following day.  After the war sales increased rapidly 
as restrictions gradually were removed.  During the 1950s the product portfolio grew to 
contain televisions, microphones and gramophones.  Following the debate on joining the 
Common Market, Bang & Olufsen decided to direct its attention toward the European market.  
At the same time, the product designs received massive criticism which ultimately led to the 
company’s renowned cooperation with famous designers.  During the 1960’s the wide spread 
net of agents established previously was reduced, replacing agents by subsidiaries.  The 
internationalization was supported by e.g. “The Seven CIC’s” (Corporate Identity 
Components) describing the company’s goals and personality.  The 1970’s saw the 
introduction of “The Beocenter Group”, an initiative aiming at creating a dedicated, voluntary 
chain of specialty shops, more closely cooperating with Bang & Olufsen.  In return for their 
loyalty and agreement to following certain design and layout instructions, the shops obtained 
a number of benefits.  Amongst other dramatic changes, the customer focus was changed 
from the exclusive clique of Hi-Fi enthusiasts to all music lovers – a new and far larger target 
group.  During the 1980’s competition from Asia threatened the company through declining 
loyalty from the distribution network and falling revenue (Groes, 1991).  The company 
reacted too slowly to the crisis and the funds ran out.  In the end, new funds had to be raised 
through a strategic alliance with Philips.  Those funds quickly ran out as well. 
New Management 
In May 1991, the Board installed a new management team headed by Anders Knutsen.  The 
first priority was to cut costs, and to do it quickly (Vestergård, 1992b).  The plan “Break Point 
1993” aimed at re-vitalizing B&O and securing its independence – and it was efficient.  To 
minimize costs and increase flexibility stock keeping at the subsidiaries was eliminated, the 
production paradigm was changed from make-to-stock to make-to-order and the distribution 
strategy was changed to direct distribution.  Staff was cut in the subsidiaries, central staff 
functions re-created, and a number of executives were laid off.  Already in 1993 the company 
was making money, and the surplus was doubled the following year (Højbo, 1996).  Further 
efficiencies were obtained through focused outsourcing.  This extensive restructuring of the 
Chapter Seven – Case Studies 
Page 175 
logistics system earned the company the Danish Logistics Award in 19964.  By 1997 the 
company had consolidated its earnings and was able to buy back the 25% of the shares sold to 
Philips in 1991, and by 1999 the company decided to focus on USA as the next big market for 
its products (Evert, 1999). 
Financial Status 
When Anders Knutsen in 2001 chose to resign as CEO, he handed over a company in good 
shape to his successor.  The financial results in the last 2-3 years of his leadership were not as 
impressive is the first years at B&O, but this was primarily due to very large but essential 
investments (Bundgaard, 2001).  When looking at the turnover, profit and number of 
employees for the past five years, it seems the turbulence has subsided, see Table 7-1 below. 
Table 7-1: Financial Profile – Bang & Olufsen A/S5 
End Date Turnover Profit Before Tax No. of Employees 
2005-05-31 3.742.200 387.100 2.311 
2004-05-31 3.612.700 340.500 2.717 
2003-05-31 3.974.200 290.100 2.803 
2002-05-31 4.212.000 225.600 2.908 
2001-05-31 3.810.000 224.100 2.780 
2000-05-31 3.722.400 316.800 2.783 
 
Outsourcing Electronics 
Following a series of organizational changes Bang & Olufsen sent out a press release on 
March 18, 2004, explaining how the electronics factory in Skive had been sold to 
Flextronics6, a supplier for more than 10 years.  Ownership to buildings and equipment was to 
be completed by the end of the month at the same time as the employees were formally being 
transferred to their new employer.  Bang & Olufsen had decided it was no longer in the 
electronics manufacturing industry, and had therefore decided to let others manage these 
activities7.  In the press release John Bennett-Therkildsen (Director, Operations - Bang & 
Olufsen) explains: 
“In today’s competitive global marketplace, we see the need to work closely 
with a company like Flextronics because we believe that by using their world-
class EMS [electronic manufacturing services] capabilities, they will be able to 
help us fulfill our objective in strengthening the profitability and agility of our 
company, and in addition, we believe that this is a great way of ensuring long-
term survival of the electronics factory in Skive.  For these reasons, 
transferring the factory to Flextronics makes obvious strategic sense.” 
                                                 
4 For more info, please see www.logistikkonferencen.dk. 
5 Figures in thousands DKK. 
6 For more info, please see www.flextronics.com. 
7  The activities taken over by Flextronics represent approx. 65% of the value of electronics components used 
by Bang & Olufsen.  Another 15-20% is supplied by a long term partner in Malaysia.  The remaining 10-
15% is supplied by various suppliers, as special competencies/technologies are required. 
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As part of the overall transaction the two companies entered into a five-year manufacturing 
agreement with projected annual value of DKK 510 million.  To Flextronics, taking over the 
factory in Skive is quite an opportunity.  In the press release Mike McNamara (Chief 
Operating Officer – Flextronics) is quoted: 
“We believe this long term agreement makes both strategic and financial sense 
as it builds on a long-standing relationship between the two companies.  …  
Additionally, this provides Flextronics with a potential opportunity to expand 
our business relationship by increasing our service offering to Bang & Olufsen 
and other Danish companies.  From a financial standpoint, it makes sense 
because we receive a long-term manufacturing agreement with all of the 
required contractual protections for acquiring a facility from a customer while 
providing us with our required return on invested capital and an operating 
margin in excess of our expected EMS average because of the complexity of the 
product build.” 
The uniqueness of the competencies at the factory is well recognized, in the press release 
Peter Thostrup (Executive Vice President - Bang & Olufsen) states: 
“It is, of course, an important decision to transfer a factory like Skive.  The 
factory possesses unique competencies as well as dedicated employees who 
have served Bang & Olufsen for many years.  However, we believe the 
partnership with Flextronics will provide the factory with the best possible 
opportunities to retain and enhance its competitiveness.” 
The outsourcing of this vital part of the manufacturing process is thereby done with the full 
recognition of the magnitude of change.  The core competence of the company is no longer 
the manufacture of cutting edge products, Steen B. Jørgensen (Director, Logistics - Bang & 
Olufsen): 
“We are no longer a manufacturing firm, in the old sense of the word.  Our 
core competence is treatment of aluminum surfaces – a competence which is 
unchallenged in the world.  …  In reality, for a long period of time we were in a 
market where we could not compete, we produce in way too small batch sizes to 
ever obtain economies of scale.” 
More or less at the same time as the transfer of the electronics factory, a part of the assembly 
of mechanical parts was moved to a newly created factory in Slovakia. 
Product Portfolio 
Where the operations thereby have been simplified, the product portfolio has been extended.  
Today the product range covers music systems, televisions, loudspeakers, as well as 
telephones and IT-related products (e.g. BeoPlayer™ and BeoLink PC2™).  Furthermore 
Bang & Olufsen has diversified into related business areas like ICEpower8 (design and 
manufacture of amplification and modulation components) and unrelated like Bang & Olufsen 
Medicom9 (compliance devices like tablet dispensers, inhalers, injection systems etc.) 
(Erhardtsen, 2000).  Furthermore existing products are being applied in new contexts as Bang 
& Olufsen recently entered the luxury yacht installation business, and entered into 
                                                 
8 For more info, please see www.icepower.bang-olufsen.com. 
9 For more info, please see www.medicom.bang-olufsen.com. 
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partnerships with car manufacturers like Ferrari and Audi.  The latter example actually draws 
on the competence of the related diversification as ICEpower technology is used in producing 
the components for the audio solution for the Audi A8. 
Organization 
Figure 7-1: Organization Chart – Bang & Olufsen Group10 
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Still based in Struer, the organization shows a strong commitment to innovation as the 
company has not only a department for Product Development, but also for Innovation, and 
New Business Development, the latter two being under the direct management of Torben B. 
Sørensen (CEO) (see Figure 7-1 above). 
Purchasing, Logistics, Assembly, Customer Service etc. are co-located under Operations, 
whereas Sales is placed under National Sales Offices and Marketing is co-organized with 
Communication.  The Slovak plant is placed under Operations. 
                                                 
10 Source: Peter S. Hune, Bang & Olufsen. 
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Supplier Management 
With the reconfiguration of the company and the outsourcing of activities came a need to 
radically reduce the supplier base. 
Figure 7-2: Bang & Olufsen's Supplier Segmentation Model11 
KEY SUPPLIER SYSTEM SUPPLIER
STANDARD SUPPLIER CAPACITY SUPPLIER
Product characteristics:
– Technologically complex products with complex
interfaces (OEM products)
– Technological development can not easily be
influenced
Market characteristics:
– Market-driven component development and price
– Concentrated market with few established players
Supplier characteristics:
– Large companies and few alternatives
– B&O is a very small customer
Competence characteristics:
– Supply interface
– Technological competence
– Absorption competence
Product characteristics:
– B&O specified items
– Complex supply (in terms of production or
management)
Market characteristics:
– Development is driven by B&O’s requirements.
Ideally by several similar customers
– Few/no alternative suppliers when the supplier is 
chosen for a task
Supplier characteristics:
– B&O accounts for a large proportion of the supplier’s
turnover
– Typically relatively small companies
Competence characteristics:
– Integrative interface
– Relationship competence
– Joint development competence
Product characteristics:
– Technological products but with simple interfaces
– Highly standardised products and services
– Low engineer input and expertise required
Market characteristics:
– Stiff competition on the market
– Several suppliers able to supply
Supplier characteristics:
– Low switching costs
– Low negotiation power
Competence characteristics:
– Simple interface
– Production competence
– Flexibility competence
Product characteristics:
– Standard process with well-defined interfaces
– B&O-specified items where the process is market-
driven
Market characteristics:
– The price is determined by cost
– B&O often accounts for a small proportion of the
supplier’s turnover
Supplier characteristics:
– Large or small companies, but several suppliers
– Low negotiation power
– High dependence on B&O
Competence characteristics:
– Transfer interface
– Flexibility competence
– Know-how transfer competence
– Transfer of process know-how
BS
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When interviewed in 2004 Klaus K. Knudsen (Director, Purchasing) explained: 
“Earlier suppliers were often selected by developers based on either a need for 
a very specific component, or due to the product developers preferences, he 
might have worked with the supplier in a previous job.  There were no 
incentives to reduce the supplier base, so it just kept growing.  …  At the time I 
                                                 
11  Source: Bang & Olufsen.  See also Møller (2003). 
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started in this job, the purchasing department had lost control over the supplier 
portfolio, and we needed to get an overview.”12 
A supplier segmentation model was put in place in 2001, categorizing the suppliers based on 
the investments made by the supplier and Bang & Olufsen, see Figure 7-2 above.  The 
horizontal axis in the model represents the suppliers’ investment, the vertical B&O’s 
investment.  Standard suppliers are thereby suppliers of commodities where neither the 
supplier nor B&O make specific investments.  Conversely, System suppliers deliver B&O 
specified complex components or sub-systems based on investments on both parties.  Besides 
the investment categories, each cell has a number of distinct characteristics on Product, 
Market, Supplier, and Competence13.  Each supplier belong to one of the categories in the 
model above – and for each supplier the four stakeholders Supply, Quality, Cost, and 
Technology14 must work together to ensure an optimal sourcing solution. 
Before the segmentation model the purchasing department perceived almost all suppliers as 
either Key or System suppliers, but the analysis revealed the opposite was the case.  Most 
suppliers were either Standard or Capacity suppliers, and it was realized that resources had 
been spent on building and sustaining relationships with the wrong suppliers.  Having fewer 
than expected Systems or Key suppliers in the portfolio was a pleasant surprise, though, Klaus 
K. Knudsen comments: 
“When relying on an external partner you trade off control for cost.  …  We 
have had Systems suppliers for many years, so we are used to living with the 
uncertainty.  Within the last couple of years, we’ve ‘survived’ two fires at our 
suppliers, and one bankruptcy – you really validate if procedures are in place 
when these things happen.” 
Relying on e.g. Philips for components for a number of important products does not seem to 
constitute a problem: 
“We rely on Philips to supply these critical components, but there’s no 
alternative.  We might choose another supplier but then we probably would 
have to redesign our product.  But when we look for components for a new 
product we obviously try to avoid introducing new sole/single suppliers to the 
supplier base.  We try to minimize the number of suppliers in the top two cells 
of the model”. 
The model was subsequently modified several times, and is today the fundamental framework 
for supplier management at Bang & Olufsen. 
                                                 
12 According to Helbo, Jakobsen, & Gammelgaard (2004) Bang & Olufsen in 1993 had 1000 suppliers of 
direct inputs.  Today the company has less than 300. 
13  Confronted with the possibility that the characteristics of a supplier “not fitting” the model, Klaus Knudsen 
comments that it is quite rare the characteristics point towards more than one cell.  In his experience the 
product characteristics leads to the Market, Suppler, and Competence characteristics, at least in the medium 
to long run.   
14 The four stakeholders translate into the following departments: Supply = Logistics (Operations), Quality = 
Quality (Operations), Cost = Purchasing (Operations), and Technology = Technology & Innovation 
(Product Development), see Figure 7-1. 
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Sourcing Strategy 
When describing the sourcing strategy, Peter S. Hune (Senior Manager, Purchasing) makes 
direct reference to the segmentation model: 
“We believe we should always have a readily accessible alternative source for 
input from Standard and Capacity suppliers.  When we are dealing with Key 
and System suppliers we are often dealing with either single or sole sourcing, 
and in this area we are currently changing attitude.  Whereas we earlier were 
reluctant to change supplier we are now working on altering our procedures to 
perform a thorough performance evaluation and supplier selection prior to 
putting any product in production.  By doing so, we hope to reduce dependency 
to one supplier – and to not put ‘all our eggs in one basket’.” 
Continued Outsourcing 
Albeit the intent is to minimize the number of supplier in the top two cells of the 
segmentation model, the current trend is to outsource more and more complex 
tasks/components, unavoidably creating further dependencies.  The shift is primarily taking 
place from the Capacity supplier segment to the System supplier segment, outsourcing B&O 
specific items.  The intent of this continued outsourcing is to simplify internal operations as 
System suppliers are expected to manage their own supply chains, Peter S. Hune: 
“By shifting from Capacity suppliers to System suppliers we end up with less 
inventory as System suppliers are expected to manage their own supply chain.  
…  We really have no choice but to outsource more, as the number of variants 
is increasing.” 
Peter S. Hune goes on to explain how the spare parts guarantee varies from product group to 
product group, and how the burden of keeping stock for the spare parts guarantee is shifted to 
the supplier when possible.  He foresees further outsourcing changing the current status of the 
supplier base (18 Key suppliers, 17 System suppliers, 115 Standard suppliers, and 132 
Capacity suppliers).  So, relying on single or sole suppliers are more or less “the rules of the 
game” to Bang & Olufsen, putting pressure on the Purchasing department to ensure stability 
in input at the same time as cost must be kept under control. 
Inventory Management 
One way of dealing with these uncertainties is of course to build inventory, but as input gets 
more and more complex the value of the inventory increases dramatically.  Therefore the use 
of inventory as a means to handle uncertainty is less of an option for Bang & Olufsen than for 
other companies15.  If Bang & Olufsen for instance had the possibility to implement 
modularity in their products to any extent, the inventory costs might be more reasonable.  But 
since this is not an option, Bang & Olufsen more and more often asks the suppliers to hold 
this stock. 
                                                 
15 The use of inventory as a means of insurance has a special meaning at Bang & Olufsen as they offer a 12 
years spare parts guarantee.  Previously when a product was taken out of the product portfolio, spare parts 
were bought from suppliers and stored in special containers.  Today, Bang & Olufsen has differentiated the 
spare parts guarantee by product class, and tries to persuade suppliers to hold this inventory. 
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Supplier Evaluation 
To ensure this inventory is managed in a reasonably manner, and to ensure stable production, 
potential suppliers are visited and evaluated according to a framework (see Figure 7-3 below). 
Figure 7-3: Bang & Olufsen’s Basic Risk Assessment Questions16 
Risk Assesment of suppliers 
 
Questions: 
1. Does the company have a Risk Management function with delegated responsibility? 
2. Does the company have a Risk Report? 
 
Production area 
3. Are the production areas divided into independent fire sections? 
4. Has an automatic fire alarm with transmission to the fire brigade been installed? 
5. Has an automatic fire ventilation been installed in the roof? 
6. Is there a doubling of important production equipment? 
7. Are identical production lines (or lines which can be readjusted) placed in several 
independent fire sections or on other adresses? 
8. Are the tools that are not in use placed in an independent fire section? 
9. Are there any external production possibilities or another producer with whom an 
agreement has been made about mutual assistance in case of loss of production 
capacity? 
 
Stocks 
10. Does the stocks constitute any independent fire sections? 
11. Has an automatic fire alarm with transmission to the fire brigade been installed? 
12. Has an automatic water sprinkling system with alarm transmission to the fire brigade 
been installed? 
13. Has an automatic fire ventilation been installed in the roof? 
14. Have the stock been physically secured against theft and with alarm to a protection 
acency? 
15. Has the company carried out a corresponding analysis of its own suppliers, and what 
was the result of the analysis? 
 
Consequence of stop in business operation 
16. If the worst thinkable damage occurs in your company, including failure of any possible 
precautionary measures, how long time will it take before you are capable of supplying 
to the full extent? 
17. Has a minimum stock been build up? 
If yes, how long time will it cover? 
Where is the storehouse situated in proportion to the production area? 
Has this been included in your answer to item 16? 
 
03.06.02/PDA  
The framework was developed by Kim B. Hansen (Legal Council): 
“The framework is the result of years of work, albeit it is still a ‘work in 
progress’.  The intent is to map out the problem areas, primarily in inventory 
management and production.  …  Actually the framework was developed for 
                                                 
16  Source: Bang & Olufsen. 
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use in our own plants as this was my primary responsibility earlier, but it 
obviously has relevance for dealing with suppliers as well.” 
When interviewed in 2004, Klaus K. Knudsen and Peter S. Hune explained how the risk 
assessment has relevance in supplier management: 
“The questionnaire is used to identify problem areas, and to assess the severity 
of the problems.  At this time we have not integrated this tool in the 
segmentation model, but we routinely visit the suppliers.  The original 
questionnaire was developed further to include e.g. questions on the suppliers 
practice on Risk Management.” 
When interviewed in 2005, Peter S. Hune explains how the framework is used primarily upon 
supplier selection: 
“The yearly evaluation is basically a desk job – we do not have to go and visit 
the suppliers.  But for some of the most critical supplier we go anyway, and in 
that case we naturally use the framework as a tool…” 
Albeit not used systematically in the purchasing department the questionnaire does add value 
when discussing potential for improvement with suppliers. 
Measuring Severity 
The measure of severity is the same internally as externally, days of interruption, but besides 
the benefit of knowing the risk exposure and using that to direct attention and enforce 
changes, there’s another, more directly measurable impact of performing the supplier 
certifications, Kim B. Hansen: 
“When we visit critical suppliers, we often go together with representatives 
from our insurance company.  The consequence of implementing corrective 
measures and negotiating changes to routines at the suppliers’ is a reduction in 
insurance premium – the ‘safer’ suppliers we have and the better we know 
them, the lower the cost of insurance.” 
Identifying the critical suppliers is therefore an important task, which is done in a procedure 
containing several steps: 
1. First the product portfolio is analyzed to find the products contributing most to 
turnover. 
2. Then suppliers to these products are identified, and the inputs are analyzed to create a 
list of non-commodity items. 
3. From this list each supplier is evaluated to find out time required to redesign the 
finished product or to find an alternative solution. 
4. Finally an impact value is put on each supplier and the suppliers are ranked, creating a 
prioritized list of suppliers (and critical items). 
Having identified the critical suppliers, the before mentioned questionnaire (shown above in 
Figure 7-3) can be applied. 
Being a Small Customer 
But not all suppliers volunteer their participation in these assessment schemes, Klaus K. 
Knudsen comments: 
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“We are in the unpleasant situation that in certain segments we are 
dramatically smaller than our suppliers.  E.g. when we buy components from 
Philips, we are forced to try to remain an attractive customer.  The easy answer 
is obviously to give Philips access to our technology, but the challenge in our 
work is to persuade them to go along with our assessments etc.  …  Most of the 
times the larger suppliers do not want to spend time on being certified by us, so 
we rely on larger companies having sound processes.” 
The paradox is that Bang & Olufsen actually buys systems (in contrast to components) when 
they at the same time try to remain an attractive customer by giving the appearance of being 
innovative itself.  Peer S. Hune is convinced the innovativeness of the company helps 
retaining the larger suppliers: 
“Often with the smaller suppliers they are quite dependent on Bang & Olufsen 
for revenue, but for the larger suppliers I can see two reasons: 1. It is beneficial 
to have Bang & Olufsen on one’s list of reference customers, and 2. Bang & 
Olufsen helps the suppliers develop through the high technical and quality 
demands we place on our suppliers.  …  The suppliers do not always see the 
second benefit, but they definitely see it in retrospect.” 
Questioned on the risk of exposing too much of the core competencies of a company when 
working closely with suppliers, Peter S. Hune responds: 
“We in the purchasing department are very aware of not exposing the ‘DNA of 
the company’ – and we are quite aware some of our high tech suppliers do the 
same.” 
To Steen B. Jørgensen working closely with suppliers is a precondition when designing the 
company’s supply chains. 
SCM Practice 
As activities are outsourced the company becomes more and more dependent on external 
partners for critical input.  Predictability internally as well as externally becomes of utmost 
importance as inventories are transferred from the sales companies to the suppliers.  The 
increasing use of System and Key suppliers increase the need to integrate, and therefore 
suppliers’ IT systems are integrated with Bang & Olufsen’s, and plans and forecasts are 
shared.  Through web-enabled applications suppliers can keep track of changes to forecasts 
and actual orders, and can plan accordingly.  In a similar manner, the B1 stores are integrated, 
and given access to Track & Trace information on customer orders. 
According to Steen B. Jørgensen also the characteristics of the products enhance the 
importance of logistics performance when supplying end-products to B1 stores or directly to 
the end-consumer: 
“Our business setting is very vulnerable in the sense our products are ‘life style 
products’ which mean the customer doesn’t really need them…  The customers 
pay a high price, and if performance does not match their expectations, they 
will not come back.  …  The B1 stores are independently owned, and they need 
to make money.  Therefore poor logistics performance would be devastating for 
our business model – if we [SCM/Logistics] do not perform well, we might 
loose the business.” 
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Changing the distribution and inventory management philosophy was thereby a bold move 
taking the sensitivity of the market into consideration. 
Figure 7-4: Bang & Olufsen – Supply Chain Concept17 
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As illustrated in Figure 7-4 above the Supply Chain Concept implemented combines push and 
pull strategies.  ‘Supply’ consisting of the factories is responsible for the (large batch size) 
production of semi-finished products, whereas ‘Assembly’ is responsible for taking the 
product from the “anonymous” decoupling point stage to end product as specified in the 
customer orders.  Only few products are delivered directly from external suppliers or the CE 
factory to the distribution nodes.  The last portion of the conceptual organization is the 
‘Distribution’ part, responsible for delivering end-products to customers or sales outlets.  All 
distribution is processed through the two distribution centers covering Europe (and Asia) and 
USA, respectively.  In Asia, Bang & Olufsen is experimenting with creating Master Dealers, a 
notion describing a local agent holding the right to sell Bang & Olufsen products in the 
designated region for an agreed period of time. 
Inventory is thereby kept in the central warehouse in Struer, in the Chicago warehouse, at 
selected sales companies outside Europe and USA and at Master Dealers in Asia.  Only at the 
central warehouse does manufacturing postponement take place, further strengthening the 
effect of the risk pooling18. 
                                                 
17 Source: Steen B. Jørgensen, Bang & Olufsen. 
18 Risk Pooling - the principle of aggregating independent and unrelated fluctuations (in demand) to reduce 
overall variation.  In inventory management the term described the principle of centralizing the inventory at 
fewer sites, thereby minimizing the safety stock needed for a certain service level.  For more, see e.g. Hill 
(2005) or Stevenson (2005). 
Chapter Seven – Case Studies 
Page 185 
The concept also contains three processes, which are quite different from each other.  The 
Planning process is split between Demand Planning (performed by the sales companies and 
verified by the customer centre) and Production Planning (performed at Operations in Struer 
alone).  The second process, Order Handling, is initiated in the outlets and processed by 
Operations, either pulling the product from inventory or initiating the customization of a 
semi-finished product (depending on price and volume of the end-product).  The last process, 
Business Process Development, is oriented towards the continual development of the 
operation in itself. 
Supply Chain Diagram 
An alternative way of depicting the companies’ supply chains is demonstrated in Figure 7-5. 
Figure 7-5: Supply Chain Diagram – Bang & Olufsen19 
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Applying the method briefly described in the introduction leads to a Supply Chain Diagram 
containing four supply chains: American, European, Sales Company, and Asian. 
The American supply chain differs from the European supply chain by utilizing a third party 
distribution centre in Chicago.  In Europe, all distribution is direct from Struer to the B1 
stores or in some instances directly to the consumer.  Only in countries with limited dealer 
coverage and/or problematic distribution may sales company hold inventory.  Lastly, the 
Asian Master Dealers are allowed stock keeping, albeit it is primarily at their own risk and 
expense.  The input-side is decoupled from the downstream side as no distinct correlation 
between suppliers and customers or products can be identified.  Where ever possible suppliers 
are asked to stock their input to Bang & Olufsen at the latest stage of production.  This 
                                                 
19  In this model, the circle denotes Operation/Production, the triangle denotes Inventory, and the square 
denotes Postponement/Customization.  This typology is used throughout this chapter. 
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business model is obviously quite fragile as pressures from customers and dependencies on 
suppliers are both high. 
SCRM Practice in Logistics? 
As described earlier Steen B. Jørgensen fully embraces the current trend of outsourcing, from 
outsourcing of the warehouse management in the USA to the sales of the electronics 
manufacture plant to Flextronics.  He emphasizes that the IC industry itself is a risk-ridden 
industry in the sense that no surplus capacity exist.  The capital intensiveness of the industry 
requires a very high utilization rate to ensure a reasonable return on investment, therefore no 
excess capacity exist.  In that respect, Bang & Olufsen is a hostage of the IC industry as are 
all companies requiring IC’s in their products.  So, even if he recognizes the strategic nature 
of the activities and the threats to the company, he insists that further outsourcing is beneficial 
to the company.  This is naturally “hollowing out” the company, in the sense fewer and fewer 
activities are performed in-house.  But this is also considered an inevitable consequence of 
global competition, Steen B. Jørgensen: 
“When ever a competence is profitable it must be kept in-house, if possible.  …   
But most often, the volumes we require are too small…  We have to outsource 
the activities we performed previous, simply due to global competition and 
scale economies.  …  This does not mean we have lost control, altogether.  In 
molding, for instance, we make sure we own the tools…” 
Coordinating with suppliers and making sure quality is acceptable thereby becomes critically 
important – and is enhanced by Bang & Olufsen’s decision to accept working with sole 
suppliers.  Steen B. Jørgensen believes that this practice results in increasing risk but that: 
“…the implementation of first tier suppliers requires a lot of resources from 
both parties to create the appropriate relationships, thereby creating an exit 
barrier.  …  We have no formal risk management organization; risk 
management is part of everybody’s job!” 
To him the most critical risk is the risk of deteriorating logistics performance, disappointing 
the end-customers.  To mitigate this risk a system for ordering and shipment monitoring is 
available to all B1 stores across the world, enabling them to control their orders are being 
processed as expected.  Furthermore stringent forecasting procedures support the production 
planning and inventory management when in- and out-phasing products.  Even if these (and a 
long list of other) risks are identified and acknowledged, no formal SCRM is taking place.  
KPI’s20 are continuously monitored and responses are described, but the environment or the 
internal operation is not analyzed for other risk sources/mechanisms. 
SCRM in Purchasing? 
The purchasing organization, in contrast, subscribe to a much more formalized approach to 
SCRM.  As described above the segmentation model could be used in the continued 
                                                 
20 KPI - Key Performance Indicator.  At Bang & Olufsen the KPI’s ‘Delivery Precision’ and ‘Quality’ in their 
most generic forms are collected and monitored.  
Chapter Seven – Case Studies 
Page 187 
evaluation of suppliers.  At present it is only used (stringently) at supplier selection, and when 
dealing with the five-ten most critical suppliers. 
As described in Figure 7-3 the suppliers are requested to supply information on organization 
and reporting in relation to risk management, the production, the stock keeping practices, and 
the estimated consequences of an interruption.  Upon acceptance and inclusion in the supplier 
portfolio, the suppliers’ performance is collected and used in the periodic evaluations. 
SCRM in Legal? 
Besides the management of (supply chain) risks performed by the purchasing and logistics 
departments described above, risk management takes place in the staff function ‘Legal’ as 
well.  The risk management task is here split between the two groups, one group oriented 
towards facilities management, the other towards operational (or business) risks.  The head of 
the latter of the two group, Kim B. Hansen was the original architect of the risk questionnaire 
(see Figure 7-3 for the current version used with the suppliers). 
Kim B. Hansen explains how the model has evolved: 
“Previously I was responsible for the operational risk management at the 
plants, but after the implementation of Klaus’ model [for supplier base 
segmentation] the tools I developed have been modified to support the 
management of supply risks.  …  The purchasing department uses my model, 
and so do I, but we use it differently.” 
As described above Kim B. Hansen uses a method of ranking the most critical suppliers to the 
most important products, whereas Purchasing uses the model mostly at supplier selection.  
Responding to a question on the distribution of contracts across the supplier portfolio, Kim B. 
Hansen explains that quite recently they (the ‘Legal’ function) has started looking at this as 
well, as to minimize the impact of a supplier exit.  Besides selecting the best performing 
supplier it will soon also be of relevance how dependent Bang & Olufsen already is of the 
supplier.  The goal is not to remove risk taking in the company – Kim B. Hansen insists risk 
taking is critically important to Bang & Olufsen: 
“Uniqueness is a must for a company like Bang & Olufsen, without uniqueness 
we’re dead for sure.  When we develop new products we make sure the designer 
are not restrained by current knowledge or procedures – they are de-coupled 
from the technical organization.  …  If we used our engineers to do product 
design, you can be sure we would get great products – but they would not be 
[as] innovative.” 
Uniqueness is therefore a prerequisite for successful innovation – and the organization must 
be ready to handle it. 
 
Summing Up… 
As described above Bang & Olufsen has undergone dramatic changes during the past 15 
years.  The company has changed its distribution and inventory management strategies, and 
has outsourced large parts of the previously manufacturing oriented company.  The Bang & 
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Olufsen of today is deeply dependent on its suppliers to provide not only inputs but also 
competencies critical to the products in Bang & Olufsens’s portfolio. 
The increasing number of variants of products has led Bang & Olufsen to ask suppliers to 
hold inventory, at least for the fastest moving products.  Production for most products is 
performed against a continuously updated forecast, replenishing the few warehouses left.  
More expensive or slow moving products are produced to order.  Overall, the redundancy in 
the business model, both in terms of quantity and time, has decreased resulting in an increased 
pressure to operate with a high degree of precision and predictability. 
The practice of SCRM is spread over multiple functional areas.  As Logistics defined the 
major risk as ‘poor logistics performance’ their use of KPI’s can be regarded as risk 
management of the process risks.  In Purchasing this information is used when dealing with 
suppliers, e.g. at the periodic meetings.  The segmentation model described in Figure 7-2 form 
a basis for differentiating the management of suppliers, but for some reason the model is only 
used when selecting new suppliers.  In Legal the model has a similar impact albeit the 
approach is somewhat different.  Here the model is used to pinpoint relevant suppliers for 
further analysis, as described above.  Risk Management in general is not integrated as 
Financial Risk Management is performed separate from the management of business risks. 
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7.2 Brüel & Kjær Sound and Vibration Measurement a/s21 
The founders of the company, Per Brüel and Viggo Kjær got to know each other during their 
studies 1932-1938 at the Polytechnical University of Denmark where they both studied to 
become engineers.  The two men agreed to jointly start a company designing and 
manufacturing acoustical measurement equipment.  The mandatory military service and the 
start of WW2 meant delays to their plans, but as they intended to get some experience before 
starting their own company the delay was not critical.  Per Brüel went to Sweden where he 
studied and taught, first in Stockholm and subsequently in Gothenburg.  Viggo Kjær got a job 
in the radio industry.  Both had ample opportunities to do research. 
The first equipment was designed and manufactured as early as 1942, in the basements of 
their respective addresses.  After the war the small-scale production in Sweden was moved to 
Denmark where export to the Nordic countries was now possible.  During the 1950’s the 
company developed measurement microphones of high quality as well as calibration 
equipment.  Exports continued to increase and Brüel & Kjær became synonymous with high 
quality vibration measurement equipment. 
The company continued its stable growth, and developed products in a steady flow.  Approx. 
15-17 percent of the turnover was re-invested in product development, which was perceived 
as crucial for the continued growth of the company.  The 1960’s saw an increased focus on 
airport noise, a market Brüel & Kjær addressed with specific products.  The digitalization of 
the 1970’s resulted in even more accurate new equipment and the redesign of selected 
products.  The next decade saw the introduction of products of increased technical 
complexity, such as equipment to real time and continued analysis of noise.  The decade also 
saw the first products for sound measurement for the automobile industry. 
Economic Crisis 
By the early 1990’s the company experienced its most severe crisis (Laursen & Vestergård, 
1991b).  Sales had been declining for some years and major investments in product 
development were failing.  The management was unable to intervene as the two founders 
could not agree on at least two strategic decisions: the strategy for the alternation of 
generations and whether or not to accept the infusion of foreign capital.  Kjær wanted the 
heirs, his daughter and Brüel’s son, to take over as managing directors, but Brüel disagreed.  
He believed that they did not have sufficient experience and insight to ensure the continued 
survival of the company.  Furthermore Brüel wanted to bring in foreign capital and new 
competencies, Kjær wanted to resolve the problems internally.  The outcome of the struggle 
was first the demotion of Brüel (Laursen, 1991; Laursen & Vestergård, 1991c)22 followed by 
the take over by the major investors (Laursen & Vestergård, 1991a).  Few months later Kjær 
was fired, a new CEO was hired and the following year the company was sold to financial 
                                                 
21 Description supplemented with material from www.bksv.com. 
22 Brüel later founded a new company, Brüel Acoustics, continuing his life-long interest in acoustics 
(Vestergård, 1994). 
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investors (Vestergård, 1992a).  The crisis led to extensive outsourcing following the dogma of 
the time: “convert fixed expenses to variable ditto”.  At that time approx. 80% of product 
value was created internally but this was to change.  Manufacturing was outsourced wherever 
possible leaving only items without alternative manufacturing options, e.g. the production of a 
special thin gold foil for high precision microphones. 
The company has since been re-structured and a number of activities have been sold off.  The 
former pride of the company, the manufacture of the products, is now completely outsourced 
leaving only simple assembly and testing to be performed at the site at Nærum, Denmark.  
Product development is still a major activity, though, but the focus has narrowed.  The 
organization is depicted in Figure 7-6 below. 
Figure 7-6: Organization Chart – Brüel & Kjær23 
 
 
As illustrated above the company has a traditional functional structure, emphasizing 
technical/domain expertise over intra-organizational cooperation.  The requirements for 
technical competencies obtained from external parties are visible in the split in the purchasing 
department between the strategic and technical purchasers, and in the existence of the quality 
department. 
Financial Status 
The outsourcing naturally meant a substantial reduction in the number of employees, a 
number that has remained relatively stable in recent years.  The profit before tax, on the other 
                                                 
23 Source: Henrik Jeppesen, Brüel & Kjær.  Emphasis is on purchasing/operations. 
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hand still shows dramatic swings, as documented in Table 7-2 below.  Apparently not even 
the dramatic reduction of activities (through outsourcing) and the portfolio of alliances have 
enabled the company to generate stable results.  Turnover is increasing at a steady rate, but 
costs are fluctuating. 
Table 7-2: Financial Profile – Brüel & Kjær Sound & Vibration Measurement A/S 
End Date Turnover Profit Before Tax No. of Employees 
2004-12-31 673.158 80.087 477  
2003-12-31 642.020 33.342 476  
2002-12-31 613.214 -16.156 485  
2001-12-31 653.942 -69.755 537  
2000-12-31 687.223 81.119 514  
1999-12-31 543.411 38.030 494  
1998-12-31 527.772 72.065 549  
 
Alliances 
At the same time as the company outsourced activities, it entered into partnerships to 
strengthen its competitive position through a wider and deeper product portfolio, and a better 
international coverage in terms of sales companies and representatives. 
One such partnership, and probably the most important one, was the 1999 alliance with 
ENDEVCO.  ENDEVCO’s expertise in shock and vibration measurement combined with 
Brüel & Kjær’s acoustic proficiency and product marketing/distribution network gave 
customers a single-source supplier that they could depend upon for quality products, on-time 
delivery, and outstanding technical support. 
To obtain access to software for laser scanning and structural analysis Brüel & Kjær joined 
forces with Maul-Theet Systeme in 2002.  The partnership gives Maul-Theet access to the 
world wide Brüel & Kjær sales organization, and obliges Brüel & Kjær to develop Maul-
Theet as the European competence centre within their niche.  Maul-Theet was an obvious 
partner as the company was already known to Brüel & Kjær through the 1999 agreement to 
distribute the VPI+ generation of laser scanning vibrometers developed jointly by Ometron 
and Maul-Theet.  Also in 2002, Brüel & Kjær teamed up with DMGR and Stapelfeldt in the 
“Prediction Partnership”, a partnership aiming at creating the world’s foremost solutions 
within environmental noise prediction software. 
A number of similar partnerships exist with Acoustics Engineering (Dutch company 
developing acoustics software and equipment), Listen Inc. (Boston based company who 
developed SoundCheck™ - an electro acoustic production line testing system for 
loudspeakers, microphones, hearing aids, telephones and other acoustic transducers), ODEON 
(a spin-off from The Technical University of Denmark who developed the software ODEON, 
a software system for professional modeling of acoustics in auditoria, concert halls, theatres 
and other large rooms, as well as prediction of noise in the industrial environment), 
SoundShip (a Danish company designing and producing inexpensive, attractively designed 
sound level indicators),  and TIRA (a German company manufacturing various types of 
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vibration test equipment).  In 2004 an estimated 30% of revenue was generated from “alliance 
products” – either final products or components used in the final assembly. 
Production (Assembly & Test) 
The majority of sold products are standard, enabling batch production and stock keeping.  At 
Brüel & Kjær production of standard products is performed against an aggregated forecast 
which is updated weekly.  Based on an annual sales forecast, a seasonality index and an 
expected distribution across the product portfolio, production orders are generated and carried 
out.  To minimize the likelihood of shortages the MRP procedures takes a safety stock (and 
thereby lead times of all dependent requirements) into consideration when generating work 
orders.  But since the company is engaged in custom designs and project sales as well, 
production also takes the form of prototype production and production against firmed orders 
as well.  In case project orders have long lead times, the requirements will just merge with the 
“normal requirements”, but in case lead times are comparably short, it will place a demand on 
supplier for quick and precise delivery of the requested sub-assemblies and components.  In 
case the requested components have a high consumption rate, inventory is most likely 
available at Brüel & Kjær, but in case the components/subassemblies are either non-standard 
or only rarely used inventory is most likely not to contain any/enough quantity to fulfill the 
project order.  Brüel & Kjær therefore has to depend heavily on their suppliers in order to 
participate in this type of sales.  Prototype production often follows its own logic and may be 
characterized by short lead times or not, it varies by case. 
Products at the Cutting Edge 
Being a producer of complex products at the cutting edge Brüel & Kjær prior to the crisis and 
subsequent outsourcing had excessive capital tied up in inventory.  The gospel of the R&D 
department was that if the company wanted products at the cutting edge, the developers 
needed freedom to design the products without interference from purchasing or finance.  The 
enthusiasm for creating the best products led to “overkill” in design where even simpler 
components were designed in-house instead of using standard components.  This practice 
naturally led to inventory build-up, both due to the uniqueness of the components for each 
product, and due to batch sizing when purchasing components from external suppliers.  The 
argument on cutting edge products and uniqueness in components is accepted by Henrik 
Jeppesen (Global Purchasing Manager): 
“If you want to design products that give the company a competitive advantage, 
and stays in the market for an acceptable period of time, you probably have to 
accept to use a certain amount of unique components.  We [purchasing] just 
don’t agree with the R&D department on how many unique designs are 
needed.” 
Quoting several examples of over-design, he continues: 
“You have to draw a line in the sand, and convince people that this is an 
acceptable level of complexity or uniqueness or whatever.  We all agree that we 
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need product complexity, but we need to handle it in a reasonable fashion.  To 
me, Design For Manufacture24 is such a method.” 
Advocating the implementation of Design For Manufacturing (DFM), Henrik Jeppesen 
explains how the re-design of products might lead to lower cost and less complexity: 
“Due to regulations like RoHS25 and WEEE26 we have to re-design a number of 
products in the near future.  When doing so, we will look for commonalities and 
make sure we only accept unique components where applicable.  …  
Component portfolio will be minimized perhaps enabling scale economies.” 
This also poses an opportunity for supplier base reduction. 
Supplier Segmentation 
Irrespective of the ongoing top management attention the supplier base is not segmented 
properly, according to Henrik Jeppesen, who perceives the current framework as quite 
rudimentary.  The suppliers are categorized into a simple typology of: 1. Strategic, 2. Tactical, 
and 3. Other, but the framework has limited explanatory power. 
The group of strategic suppliers consists of suppliers of “critical components to critical 
products”.  The criticality of end product is determined by the revenue contribution or 
innovativeness/novelty of the product, whereas the criticality of the component is determined 
by an appreciation of whether the component can be supplied from another source.  Henrik 
Jeppesen comments: 
“It is difficult to trust this classification when you know how subjective it is.  
What started out as a critical component or competence might not be so any 
longer – but we check too infrequently to have a real overview.” 
The same objection could be made to the two other categories, since a common 
competence/input might have become scarce or supplied by a single supplier without Brüel & 
Kjær realizing it.  What remains a fact is that supplier selection is based almost solely on 
technical competency27. 
Improving Supplier Management 
The first logical step in improving the relevance of the supplier segmentation model is to 
ensure correct classification.  But Henrik Jeppesen insists future practice should go even 
further: 
“What is really interesting is whether the supplier is interested in developing 
the relationship with Brüel & Kjær, e.g. by participating in joint product 
development.  We need to reduce the supplier base and suppliers not willing to 
                                                 
24  DFM – Design For Manufacture, see e.g. Whitney (1988). 
25  RoHS – Restriction of Hazardous Substances.  Described in the Directive 2002/95/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 27 January 2003, see europa.eu.int/eur-lex. 
26  WEEE – Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment.  Described in the Directive 2002/96/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 27 January 2003, see europa.eu.int/eur-lex. 
27 Previously it was almost a requirement that the supplier should be based in Nærum.  Undoubtedly, at some 
stage Nærum was the “silicon valley” of acoustical measurement technology, but no more… 
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increase the value they add will probably be phased out or change 
classification [become a capacity supplier].” 
To Henrik Jeppesen the current model for segmenting and managing suppliers falls short due 
to the absence of a continued evaluation of the suppliers, and in its lack of differentiation of 
procedures for evaluation.  Another problem is the ignorance towards the strategic choice that 
new products must not use components for which there is only one supplier.  In other words: 
the company has recognized the problem of supplier dependency, but has failed to implement 
the corrective measures.  On the process level, current practices are somewhat generic as all 
suppliers are evaluated for delivery precision and quality (broadly defined).  Furthermore, due 
to the complexity of the end product and of the purchased components, all components are 
quality checked.  Luckily, not too often do quality problems arise, and when it does the 
problem is sometimes in the design of the product.  Quality problems are meticulously 
registered along with the corrective measures taken.  This enables the engineers and product 
developers to improve designs in the future and enables matching the capabilities of each 
supplier with requirements in the various components. 
To Henrik Jeppesen, the reduction of the supplier base is a step in the right direction: 
“We currently have 300 suppliers, and that is quite few compared to the early 
1990’s where we sourced IC’s and a wide range of electronic components.  
Now we source entire components instead.  Still the 300 suppliers are way too 
many to manage – if you want to cooperate.  Therefore the further reduction 
will prove beneficial to Brüel & Kjær.” 
Currently a process of evaluating the suppliers is being performed - during the first half of 
2005 two local suppliers have been replaced. 
IT Integration 
For a high tech company, Brüel & Kjær has a relatively low level of IT usage.  Production 
and planning is performed at headquarters using a customized Oracle application.  Sales 
orders and forecasts (and certain types of customer information) is sent from the sales 
companies, who perform Customer Relationship Management (CRM) and simple Order 
Management in a customized Siebel application.  Besides the integration between 
headquarters and the sales companies, little integration exists. 
Henrik Jeppesen describes the planned implementation of EDI: 
“Currently we are aiming at implementing EDI.  …  We expect that two of our 
suppliers will have the competence to participate at this stage.  The next step is 
to implement VMI, but this is somewhere down the line…” 
It is hoped that in the future suppliers will be better equipped to participate in e.g. IT projects 
- that the suppliers will mature beyond the products they participate in producing.  In general, 
though, Brüel & Kjær has very technically competent suppliers, even if they are not in the 
forefront of IT and process management practices. 
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Supply Chain Design for Vulnerability? 
During the first interview at Brüel & Kjær in 2003 Ole Bjørn (Strategic Purchasing Director) 
described how the outsourcing in 1992 resulted in the company being left very vulnerable. 
The extensive use of outsourcing naturally induced risks onto the company: 
“Following the outsourcing enforced on Brüel & Kjær by its creditors we have 
been in a terrible situation as we operate at the mercy of our suppliers.  We 
have no means of mitigating the risks of disruptions, except for the input we 
have to buy in bulk.  At several instances suppliers have stepped in and helped 
us when a critical supplier has failed.  We have no real explanation for their 
behavior.” 
Elaborating over this issue Henrik Jeppesen offers an explanation: 
“Recent interviews with the 30 largest suppliers have shed some light over 
these incidents.  First and foremost out suppliers perceive our brand name to be 
of value for them.  Being a supplier to Brüel & Kjær sort of certifies them as 
technically competent and reliable.  Secondly, being a supplier to Brüel & Kjær 
they get access to the latest technologies and thereby stay at the cutting edge in 
their field.” 
If this is true, then perhaps Brüel & Kjær operates under less risk than previously assumed?  
The company at least was able to cope with the discontinuation of one of their strategic 
partners, ENDEVCO.  Henrik Jeppesen explains how the planned cooperation failed due to 
lack of commercial success: 
“The alliance was entered into before I started with Brüel & Kjær … but it was 
apparent the commercial value of the alliance was less than expected.  The fit 
between their products and our distribution network simply proved 
inappropriate, for reasons probably only partially understood.  Some have 
claimed the ENDEVCO products sold in the network required more competence 
and service than what was possible – others have disagreed.  …  Perhaps their 
technical competence was lower than initially assumed?”. 
Dropping these products and phasing in own products must have been quite a task, but 
apparently this was dealt with rather smoothly: 
“As far as I know the transition took place over a period of time, and was quite 
undramatic.  …  For the most part the ‘distanglement’ did not require any 
structural changes, and resembled a simple exchange of suppliers.  …  We still 
carry some of their end products and buy few of their components for our end-
products, but most of the components we required are sourced elsewhere or 
produced by us.” 
Albeit surprisingly resilient in terms of exit from strategic alliance, certain activities need to 
be audited for stability and accuracy, namely the inbound quality inspection. 
The Criticality of Inbound Quality Inspection 
With the 1992 outsourcing, both process and structural risks increased for Brüel & Kjær: the 
process risk increased since the input became more complex and inventories were cut 
reducing the buffering capability.  On the structural side, as more competencies were 
outsourced, the company lost direct control over critical process and technologies.  Even if the 
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company already before the forced outsourcing had relied on external competencies, the 
company now placed its fate in the hands of its suppliers. 
Interestingly, the increased risk and thereby the criticality of risk management did not have 
any organizational consequences in terms of positions or departments created for the 
integrated management of risks.  But certain functions have been altered to fit this new reality, 
e.g. input control, which is now seen as one of the most critical functions in the company.  
Henrik Jeppesen states: 
“Paradoxically, the positions in quality control are often considered less 
attractive, even if the activity is of critical importance to the company.  …  Due 
to the comparable high cost of input and the following value adding during 
assembly, it is critically important to accept only fault-free components.  But 
the jobs in quality control are still considered low prestige.” 
Being a supplier of world class products, the company naturally can not accept failures in any 
of their products.  Therefore the outsourcing has had a contra-intentional effect: quality 
management have had to keep a high level of competency in the technologies outsourced.  
Confronted with this paradox, Henrik Jeppesen reciprocates: 
“We are quite aware of this issue – but there is no way around it.  If you want 
to outsource the production of complex components and you want a failure rate 
of zero, you need to be very good at quality control.  This means that you have 
to be very good at the technologies and possibly of the manufacturing processes 
you have outsourced.  Of course we are more vulnerable now than before, but 
we have perhaps 2 people employed now where we previously had 40 or 50 
[within a certain technology].” 
Since the insourcing of these technologies is not an option, the current practice of extensive 
inbound quality inspection is critically important and non-dispensable. 
SCM Practice 
As shown in Figure 7-6 the company does not as yet have a department for or positions within 
SCM, but as one of the current strategic objectives of the company is cost and supplier base 
reductions, Henrik Jeppesen foresees the implementation of a SCM department: 
“So far, the company has survived on long-term relationships with very loyal 
suppliers and customer, but little has been done to further integrate these 
critical partners.  …  Management has defined the strategic goals: to lower cost 
and to decrease the number of suppliers.  ...  Within the next years I predict 
organizational changes to support this process.” 
Purchasing is under dramatic change as well.  The purchasing departments in the European 
sales companies are being closed as purchasing is being centralized at Headquarters in 
Nærum.  Furthermore the distribution in Europe is being changed to direct shipments from 
Nærum, where possible28.  The European sales companies are thereby quite dramatically 
reduced in size and responsibility.  For the US and Asia these alterations are not possible at 
this moment, though, thereby creating a distinct difference between the European sales 
company supply chain and the supply chains for the other regions. 
                                                 
28  This is quite similar to the changes taking place at Bang & Olufsen in the 1990’s, see Chapter 7.1. 
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Besides sales companies, Brüel & Kjær sell their products through agents in markets that can 
not support the presence of a sales company29.  Sale in this channel is normally based on 
direct orders, thereby resembling the new European setup.  Agents do normally not hold 
inventory and are only rarely involved in the customization and installation of products. 
Figure 7-7: Supply Chain Diagram – Brüel & Kjær 
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The last supply chain depicted in Figure 7-7 above is ‘Customer Projects’, a department 
solely running development projects for customers.  The projects range from automobile 
design, over engine sound design to developing measurement equipment for test of hearing 
aids, sound meters etc. 
SCRM Practice 
As for SCM, SCRM is not observable in the organization chart either.  Prior to the 1992 
outsourcing most activities were performed in-house, thereby giving control to local 
management at every level.  Dependency of other companies was ceteris paribus much lower 
at that time as critical competencies were situated in-house.  Keeping safety stock went a long 
way in ensuring stability and buffered from external shocks of both the input and output side 
of the company.  The risk response for some reason did not change: still inventory was used 
                                                 
29  Actually, the centralization of purchasing and change to distribution might change the cost structures 
enough to justify extending the network of sales companies. 
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as the only means of risk management. As a direct result of the outsourcing, the inventory 
now changed from consisting of raw materials, WIP, and finished products to containing 
much less raw materials and as few WIP and finished goods as possible.  Inventory was 
reduced in the sales companies as risk pooling advantages were reaped by shipping directly 
from headquarters (central warehouse) whenever possible. 
Probing further into the practices of the use of safety stock reveals that the practice varies 
greatly from product area to product area.  Henrik Jeppesen explains: 
“The use of safety stocks is not based on general principles, but is primarily 
driven by the different people responsible for the various products.  …  
Therefore, in certain areas we are holding excessive safety stock, whereas other 
products are not covered at all.  …  We have performed our risk management 
[safety stock keeping] in a haphazard non-coordinated way.” 
Henrik Jeppesen goes on to describe how suppliers are supposed to hold approx. one third of 
the safety stock quantity calculated by Brüel & Kjær: 
“I believe we actually have only two or three suppliers who hold safety stock 
for us, but in principle all suppliers could be asked to do this.  …  It’s only the 
really critical components we monitor this closely.  …  Assembly, for instance, 
could be moved tomorrow.” 
As safety stock calculations are based on the time it takes to put an alternative into operation 
and since the use of sole/single sourcing is quite common safety stock (where calculated at 
all) can be quite excessive.  Henrik Jeppesen has no explanation as to why dual/multiple 
sourcing is not current practice, but emphasizes that: 
“The general rule is that no new product is to contain components or other 
types of input, for which there is only one source.  …  Furthermore, all new 
products must be specified according to international standards to guarantee 
the possibility to move production from one supplier to another.” 
Henrik Jeppesen ponders: 
“Many of the initiatives started before I was employed 9 months ago are really 
sound, but for some reason they are so unevenly implemented.  …  This really 
complicates things…” 
The Way Forward 
As Henrik Jeppesen sees it, the company must be driven by innovation, by the desire to and 
interest in designing the best products.  But to ensure there’s a market for the manufacturing 
of the products, he emphasizes that the design output must meet international standards for 
documentation, and that the designs are not super-optimized towards a certain supplier’s 
technological capabilities.  He furthermore emphasizes that SCRM is important, but that it is 
innovation and not risk management that should drive the redesign of the company’s 
processes and products! 
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Summing Up… 
The case study above has many characteristics in common with the previous case study.  Both 
companies were dramatically altered 10-15 years ago due to financial problems.  In both cases 
the solution was a dramatic outsourcing, freeing up finances to save the companies.  In both 
companies the initial outsourcing has led to more outsourcing – and thereby dependencies 
towards external parties.  But as identical the early history is, the more dramatic is the 
difference in terms of management of the uncertainties introduced.  At Brüel & Kjær the 
former Strategic Purchasing Director, Ole Bjørn explained at the very first interview that the 
current situation of intense dependency of suppliers was deeply unsatisfactory.  But, as he 
explained it, there were (and was) no way out of that dilemma.  At Bang & Olufsen the 
viewpoint is somewhat different as “hollowing out” of the company is perceived as inevitable. 
Brüel & Kjær’s strategic response is also dramatically different from Bang & Olufsen.  Where 
Bang & Olufsen has used knowledge of “core technologies” to diversify into related 
industries (luxury boating, luxury cars), Brüel & Kjær has chosen to use their sales company 
network to enter into alliances with producers of related (but not competing) products and get 
a better ROI of their network.  Also in terms of SCRM the two companies could not be more 
different: Bang & Olufsen has really taken the challenge to obtain control over their suppliers, 
whereas Brüel & Kjær apparently has no positions and no procedures for operational risk 
management, and no strategic management relating to the management of the structural risks. 
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7.3 Coloplast A/S 
The history of Coloplast starts in 1954 when Nurse Elise Sørensen conceived the idea for the 
first attachable, disposable ostomy bag.  After being turned down by a number of potential 
manufacturers, Elise Sørensen finally persuaded the owner and manager of Dansk Plastik 
Emballage, Aage Louis-Hansen, to produce a relatively small batch.  The immediate success 
caused the bag to be put in production and Coloplast A/S was subsequently established in 
1957.  Output volumes increased rapidly and by the end of the fifties two thirds of the 
produced Coloplast ostomy bags were exported through distributors.  Following a number of 
years of continued growth Coloplast A/S was registered at the Copenhagen Stock Exchange 
in 1983.  Since then the company has grown further and has expanded its network of 
subsidiaries, distributors, and representatives across the world.  By the late 1990’s a number 
of mergers and acquisitions added to the product portfolio and enhanced Coloplast’s position 
on the international market for its products.  Table 7-3 below gives more detail. 
Table 7-3: Milestones – Coloplast A/S30 
Year Description 
1954 
Visiting nurse Elise Sørensen pays a visit to plastics manufacturer Louis-Hansen.  She shares with him 
her idea for a disposable plastic bag for ostomists.  Elise's sister has had ostomy surgery and is very 
uncomfortable with the devices available.  At first, Aage Louis-Hansen lets down her proposal; but his 
wife Johanne, who has nursing experience, favours the idea. 
1957 
Aage Louis-Hansen and his team at Dansk Plastic Emballage in Copenhagen suburb Gentofte are 
tremendously busy manufacturing the new disposable ostomy bags.  One in two bags is exported.  In 
September, a statutory meeting is held and Dansk Coloplast A/S is founded. 
1961 Dansk Coloplast moves from the factory in Gentofte to new premises in Espergærde. 
1966 The factory at Thisted, Jutland, begins operations. 
1970 Over the next 25 years, with Folmer Halskov at the wheel, Coloplast was to scale up sales hundredfold. 
1978 Sales subsidiaries are established in France and Great Britain. 
1983 Ostomy Products Division is complemented by a new division for the business areas Continence Care, Wound Care and Skin Care. 
1983 Coloplast's share is admitted for listing on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange. 
1985 Folmer Halskov initiated the wording of Coloplast's first Mission.  In 1985, few Danish companies have committed their mission to paper. 
1987 Continence and wound care products are manufactured at the plant in Kokkedal. 
1989 Coloplast sets an objective of achieving a turnover of three thousand million by year 2000. This landmark was achieved before schedule in 1998/99. 
1991 The Humlebæk factory begins operations. 
1992 
A new product division for breast care is established.  Mastectomy, as the new product area was 
initially called, spent its first years in business as foster child with the Ostomy Products Division (from 
1990). 
1994 Coloplast acquires Amoena Corporation, USA.  At the same time, Coloplast acquires one third of the shares of Amoena GmbH.  The remaining shares are acquired on 1 October 1996. 
1995 After 25 years at the wheel, Folmer Halskov hands over to Sten Scheibye in February 1995. Coloplast acquires Sween Corporation.  This acquisition adds the business of skin care to the portfolio.
1996 Coloplast starts ostomy production in China and textiles production in Costa Rica. 
1997 Coloplast wins the Danish Logistics Award. 
1998 Coloplast acquires shares in the German Home Supply + Care Group and in American Sterling Medical Inc. 
1999 Coloplast exceeds the three billion turnover mark.  A new objective is set to achieve 6bn in 2005. 
                                                 
30  Source: www.coloplast.com. 
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Table 7-3 (cont’d) 
Year Description 
2001 
New sites become operative in Mørdrup and Kvistgård. 
Coloplast acquires SSL International plc's continence business.  Later that same year, the remaining 
shares of Sterling Medical, USA, and the majority of the shares of the HSC Group, Germany, are 
acquired. 
2002 
Coloplast divests its consumer products business.  In May, agreement is reached with American 
pharmaceuticals company Johnson & Johnson, for them to take over Coloplast Consumer Products 
A/S.  Factory in Hungary begins operations. 
2003 
Coloplast announces its new objectives for 2008: revenue exceeding DKK 9bn and a profit margin of 
18%.  The company is restructured into five business areas: Ostomy, Continence Care, Wound Care, 
Breast Care, and Skin Health. 
2005 
Coloplast adapts matrix organization form to better support the international markets.  Skin Health 
and Wound Care are combined into Wound & Skin Care (and Breast Care is kept out of the matrix 
organization). 
 
Coloplast continues to grow and win market shares within most business areas, at the same 
time as new products are introduced at a steady pace.  Turnover and number of employees are 
increasing, both due to organic growth as well as mergers and acquisitions as described 
above.  Table 7-4 below contains financial details. 
Table 7-4: Financial Profile – Coloplast A/S 
End Date Turnover Profit Before Tax No. of Employees  
2005-09-30 6.528.000 885.000 6.159  
2004-09-30 6.069.000 899.000 6.085  
2003-09-30 5.669.000 878.000 5.774  
2002-09-30 5.624.000 1.238.000 5.285  
2001-09-30 4.069.000 624.000 4.115  
2000-09-30 3.603.000 478.000 3.778  
1999-09-30 3.065.000 452.000 3.721  
 
Product Portfolio 
From the first simple ostomy bag the company has extended its product portfolio, primarily 
evolving from the adhesives technology, but also aiming at creating a complete product 
portfolio for key customer groups.  The adhesives in use are of the hydrocolloid class, 
pressure sensitive adhesives in which small particles of absorbing particles are 
homogeneously imbedded.  The hydrocolloid adhesives are specialized skin adhesives having 
the ability to absorb moisture, to transmit excess moisture and to stabilize and cushion the 
skin.  The knowledge of this type of adhesives is a very important core competence as it is 
intensively and continuously researched and used in a large share of the products.  In 2003 
this development led the company to restructure into the following five business areas: 
? Ostomy products for people whose intestinal outlet has been surgically rerouted 
through the abdominal wall. 
? Continence care products for people with bladder control problems. 
? Wound dressings for chronic wounds. 
? Skin care products for prevention and treatment. 
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? Breast forms and special textiles (swimwear and lingerie) for women after breast 
surgery (are marketed under the AMOENA brand31). 
The first two business areas belong to the ‘Chronic Care Division’ whereas the latter three are 
Strategic Business Units (SBUs).  Distribution of revenue and operating profit is described in 
Table 7-5 below. 
Table 7-5: Revenue by Business Activities32 
Business Area Share of Revenue Business Area Class Share of Operating Profit 
Breast Care 7.4 % 
Skin Health 4.6 % 
Wound Care 12.2 % 
SBU’s 7.5 % 
Ostomy 39.4 % 
Continence Care 23.6 % Chronic Care 92.5 % 
 
The company was restructured again in 2005, more on this below. 
Markets 
Coloplast operates in a truly global market.  The entire market relies on reimbursement from 
social security schemes as only a small portion of current patients would otherwise be able to 
afford Coloplast’s products.  The special characteristic of this type of products is that the 
choice of product is heavily influenced by the caretaking personnel and that shifting from one 
product to another is very unlikely (unless of course the current product fails repeatedly).  So, 
to enable sales the nurses and medical doctors are encouraged in various ways to suggest the 
use of Coloplast’s products.33 
Table 7-6: Market Share34 
Share of Market  Business Area Coloplast Competitors  
Ostomy 28 % 72 %  
Continence Care 46 % 54 %  
Wound Care 16 % 84 %  
Skin Health 4 % 96 %  
Breast Care 45 % 55 %  
 
Coloplast is an important player in at least three of the five business areas, see Table 7-6 
above.  The company has not been able to penetrate the markets in Wound Care and Skin 
Health business areas, primarily due to the distribution methods (more on this below). 
As indicated in the history of the company (see Table 7-3 above) exports was an important 
distribution channel from the start, but it was not until 1978 sales subsidiaries were opened.  
                                                 
31  Please refer to www.coloplast.com and www.amoena.com for more information. 
32 Figures from Coloplast (2004), p. 11. 
33  The ethical issues concerning the relationship between Coloplast and the caretaking personnel has been a 
“hot” issue a number of times.  As recent as on June 8th 2005, this issue was once again in the media as the 
practice of hiring caretaking personnel as consultants in Norwegian hospitals was questioned (Dahlager, 
2005). 
34 Figures from Coloplast (2004), pp. 12-19. 
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Albeit exporting to countries outside Europe has taken place since the 1950’s, the European 
market continues to be the most important (perhaps also for income per capita reasons?).  The 
distribution of revenue across geographical markets is shown in Table 7-7 below. 
Table 7-7: Revenue by Market35 
Geographic Market Distribution of Revenue  
Europe 81 %  (hereof 2 % in Denmark)  
The Americas 13 %  
Rest of the World 6 %  
 
Organization 
Also the network of subsidiaries, distributors, and local hubs has evolved over the years.  The 
distribution network covers all continents, and also production has been dispersed.  Currently 
production takes place in Denmark, China, Costa Rica, Germany, Hungary, and USA.  
Subsidiaries exist in 29 countries, three of which operate as local hubs – and an additional 49 
countries are being served through distributors or representatives.  In the USA, Germany and 
the UK Coloplast owns distribution companies delivering products and services direct to end 
users.  Following the restructuring in 2005 the company is now structured as a matrix, 
combining business area and geographical region, see Figure 7-8 below. 
Figure 7-8: Coloplast Group Structure36 
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Operations are “truly global” as each operational function has global responsibility, supported 
by Staff functions and Group Management.  Breast Care is perceived as separate from the 
other divisions mentioned above, and Wound Care and Skin Health have been combined in 
Wound & Skin Care. 
                                                 
35 Figures from Coloplast (2004), p. 20. 
36  Source: www.coloplast.com. 
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SCM Organization 
The restructuring naturally impacted the SCM organization which is a part of ‘Global 
Operations’.  In the current structure each of the three “core” divisions has distinct 
management with direct reference to Johnny Nielsen (VP, Supply Chain Management).  
Besides these logistics managers (and a fourth, responsible for Consumables) the SCM 
organization entails Supply Chain Operations, Logistics Coordination, and Logistics 
Development, see Figure 7-9 below. 
Figure 7-9: Coloplast SCM Organization37 
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The implementation of SCM at Coloplast is thereby based on formal organization38.  
Obviously not apparent in the figure above is the fundamental process underlying the SCM 
concept: the Order Fulfillment process.  The focus on fulfilling customer requirements has a 
long history at Coloplast, developing from the Closed Loop Distribution model through every 
iteration of the business model.  This focus is shared across business units and the process is 
monitored according to standard KPI’s and reported periodically to all relevant decision 
makers.  Using such a stringent model has its benefits: 
“We have had reporting for many years, naturally, but since we started using 
our KPI hierarchy we seem to be better able to pinpoint problem areas.  …  But 
we are not done yet – the model is evolving, supporting new goals…”  (Johnny 
Nielsen) 
Currently the KPI hierarchy has four levels and approx. 15 distinct measures, and is split at 
the top into the two ‘branches’ Delivery Performance and SCM Costs. 
                                                 
37 Based on material supplied by Johnny Nielsen, Coloplast. 
38 Coloplast has for many years been a frontrunner within logistics in Denmark.  Prior to implementing a SCM 
organisation the logistics department managed a replenishment concept called Closed Loop Distribution. 
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SCM and the Value of a Relationship 
The view on inter-organizational relationships is somewhat divergent from the common 
gospel.  In the initial interview Johnny Nielsen commented: 
“As I see it there’s no value in a relationship in itself.  …  I fully realize I 
contradict the prevalent dogma but must insist the value of relationships is 
overrated.  …  The reality of the matter, for us, is that if the supplier does not 
lower the unit price after recovering the development costs, the order is given 
to a supplier who can produce at a reasonable cost.” 
Johnny Nielsen insists innovativeness is very important, but that cost does have first priority: 
“If the supplier does not understand the mechanics of the industry, we are not 
going to have a long business relationship.  …  Basically, we should kick out all 
suppliers every two-three years – that’s the easiest way to get a real price 
reduction.” 
Perhaps due to the nature of their products and their supply market, relationships are of less 
value for Coloplast than for other companies? 
The Importance of Quality 
Undoubtedly an important innovation in 1954, the ostomy bag in today’s world of high-tech 
products seems almost comically simple.  The product is basically a plastic bag with an 
integrated hose.  But comparing with competing (and cheaper) products, the Coloplast 
products stand out as e.g. the surface of before mentioned ostomy bag is produced using a 
certain technique to minimize irritation of the skin.  The basic product is quite simple, but the 
total product is somewhat more sophisticated as it may include e.g. coatings or skin care 
products for increased comfort.  Besides comfort, product quality is of critical importance due 
to the nature of the product.  The production technology applied and processes implemented 
must ensure product failures are kept at the absolute minimum. 
Apparently quality problems are rare, Johnny Nielsen comments: 
“It is no problem to find suppliers producing to the high quality standards 
required.  The production technology is well known, and the products we 
acquire are not the most sophisticated, from a production technology 
perspective.  …  But since we have to make sure the supplier can produce to the 
quality standard, we have to spend quite some time monitoring their operation 
and testing the result before we feel we can rely on their competence.” 
The worst imaginable situation to Johnny Nielsen is the situation where a full batch of a 
product is defective in some way, and that the batch has already reached the users: 
“Just imagine the loss of confidence we would experience if such a situation 
occurred.  Our major concern is threefold: product quality, product quality, 
product quality.  …  Also delivery performance is important…” 
It is therefore important that products are not designed in a way which introduces failures.  So 
even if the technologies and production processes involved with the (basic) product, a lot of 
work is put into testing and verifying the manufacturability of the product. 
Purchasing offers a different perspective on the sourcing requirements, Roland V. Pedersen 
(Purchasing Manager): 
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“In general the input we require is getting more and more complex as both we 
and supplier develop e.g. coatings for catheters.  More and more inputs are 
protected by patents, and it is a constant challenge for us to evaluate if we need 
to buy patents from suppliers.  …  From a product development perspective our 
supply segment resembles the pharmaceutical industry more and more.” 
Purchasing and Logistics agree on the “goal” of this continuous development: to reward the 
innovative supplier and at the same time ensure the innovative product is made available in 
the “standard” supply market within a reasonable timeframe. 
Supplier Segmentation 
As hinted above not all suppliers are expected to participate in innovation, the supplier base is 
segmented into two classes: 
? Innovative supplier who either initiate innovation themselves or agree to participate in 
projects set up by Coloplast.  This type of supplier will normally be compensated for 
successful innovations, above the cost of the innovation. 
? Standard (or capacity) suppliers who are able to produce in a high quality according to 
specifications.  They may work for Coloplast for a long period of time, but should not 
expect any special treatment as they are intended to be fully replaceable. 
Few suppliers fall outside this simple typology, e.g. Dow Chemicals and BASF who are much 
larger than Coloplast.  With both these companies Coloplast have experienced problems 
during negotiations, Roland V. Pedersen explains: 
“BASF used to produce a unique glue substance which was used with the 
uridom products, but decided to discontinue this production.  We tried to 
persuade BASF to change their minds, but no luck.  We then tried to buy the 
patent, but still: no luck.  They had absolutely no arguments when declining our 
requests.  …  It was probably just a policy decision…” 
Johnny Nielsen describes another situation: 
“When negotiating with Dow Chemicals we have encountered certain problems 
in terms of price negotiation.  They [Dow] know we depend on their product, 
and rightfully feel quite confident we will not spend money and resources on 
developing an alternative product, taking the remaining patent period of their 
product into consideration.  …  The fact that our demand has increased by 50% 
per year for the last years does not have any impact – they are really not 
interested in wasting any resources in accommodating us.  …  This product 
must be quite profitable for them – but it is simply not their segment.” 
Coloplast (unlike e.g. Bang & Olufsen as described previously) is not able to persuade or 
influence their large suppliers to accommodate their requirements. 
Supply Chains 
Combining the supplier categories with production units and distribution channels described 
above result in Figure 7-10 below. 
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Figure 7-10: Supply Chain Diagram – Coloplast  
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Supplier Management 
Even if Coloplast has its challenge in influencing BASF and Dow Chemicals it has been quite 
successful in shaping the supply base, though.  Like many other companies Coloplast over the 
last five years have reduced their supplier portfolio considerably.  Following the trend of 
“competence-thinking” the weaker suppliers have been weeded out and their business shifted 
to better performing ones.  This has strengthened the input-side of Coloplast to its current 
level of competence, enabling Coloplast to further develop the methods and procedures for 
interacting with suppliers.  The downside of this supplier concentration is recognized by the 
VP (SCM): 
“Of course, reducing the supplier portfolio leads to the risk of placing all ones 
eggs in one basket.  We try to ensure suppliers are solid, well-run companies 
with no liabilities.  …  Suppliers are evaluated in a continuous basis.” (Johnny 
Nielsen). 
Verifying the solidity of the suppliers is an integrated part of the standard procedure for the 
purchasing department: 
“Upon performing our annual evaluations with our most important suppliers 
we obtain financial keys figures – and these are used actively during the 
evaluation.  …  Of course we are more thorough when evaluating new suppliers 
than suppliers we know, but key figures are included in the annual evaluations 
for all major suppliers.” (Roland V. Petersen). 
Implied in the above quote is the fact that suppliers once accepted will be given more lenience 
in terms of evaluating e.g. financial figures than suppliers not yet worked with - creating a 
“stickyness” in the network.  Roland V. Petersen comments: 
“In principle I agree with Johnny [Nielsen] – we should get rid of suppliers 
periodically in order to cut costs.  But this is just not practical as we are not 
very good at implementing new suppliers.  It may take as long as 1 – 1½ year to 
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get the supplier up and running – and we do not even have very sophisticated 
systems.” 
Johnny Nielsen agrees: 
“Basically, we have not looked at that process for perhaps 10 years.  We have 
no KPI’s for it.  …  If we were able to do this better we could get 20-30% cost 
reductions when negotiating frame agreements instead of the annual 2%.” 
IT Integration 
To further lowering unit costs, a current project is aiming at increasing the purchased volume 
managed through VMI from 60 to 80%.  The technical solution is quite unsophisticated as the 
application simply informs the supplier and the purchaser responsible within Coloplast when 
inventory level for the relevant item number drop under the agreed minimum level.  
Furthermore the supplier have access to the current inventory level, and can use this 
information (together with the forecasts) to plan his production and replenishment of the 
consignment inventory at Coloplast. 
SCRM Practice? 
Albeit both interviewees consider Risk Management to be of utmost importance no formal 
organization or positions exist.  Both refer to e.g. the production manager for questions on 
risk management in the plant, and to corporate finance for issues regarding e.g. currency risks, 
but none of the interviewees have any knowledge on routines and procedures crossing 
departmental boundaries.  Within Logistics Risk Management translated into performing 
periodical (yearly) analyses of delivery precision and inventory levels.  The analyses take 
their starting point with the strategic products (here: high volume products and new product 
with high potential) and contain calculation of business impact of changing inventory level 
and/or handling method (VMI versus non-VMI).  In Purchasing the management of risks is 
somewhat more complex, or at least inter-organizational, as risk management takes two 
forms: an impact calculation and a process evaluation, both considered integral elements in 
supplier management.  Consequences of supplier failures are routinely calculated for strategic 
suppliers, and same suppliers are evaluated in terms of factory safety and fire prevention as 
described in the Danish legislation.  Furthermore financial figures are evaluated, as described 
above. 
The company is thereby characterized by a very fragmented and functionally oriented 
approach to risk management.  When questioned on the most critical risks for the company as 
a whole, both respond with either very overall risks or risks central to their role/responsibility 
only.  The only risks the two departments seem to share are not even considered risks, but 
oversights in the development of the supplier management practice: the process to integrate 
new suppliers (as described above) and the process of updating product documentation as 
innovations occur and products are enhanced39: 
                                                 
39  Which are structural and process risks, respectively.  Fits perfectly with the Supply Chain Risk Matrix. 
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“In many cases the product specification on file does not match the components 
produced or purchased as innovations are implemented in the products on a 
continuous basis.  When documentation then is neglected it becomes very 
difficult to switch suppliers as documentation is out of synch with the factual 
requirements.” (Roland V. Petersen), 
and 
“Accepting innovations from a supplier will definitely influence the dependence 
in the favor of him [the supplier] and enforce more dependability if we are not 
able to make a credible threat [of switching to an alternative supplier].  …  By 
accepting innovations we are in fact being trapped – if we are not careful.” 
(Johnny Nielsen). 
Innovation and continuous improvements thereby have the dual effects of improving 
competitiveness and increasing lock-in. 
 
Summing Up… 
Coloplast has a long history of quite advanced logistics solutions, supporting their extended 
network of distributors and sales companies.  In contrast their SCRM practice seems to be 
quite basic and functionally oriented.  Albeit their process orientation seems to be deeply 
rooted at least within the operations part of the company, the process is not supported by 
SCRM across departmental boundaries (and beyond).  Only exception is the supplier audit 
taking place annually with strategic suppliers, evaluating both performance and the suppliers’ 
sites/processes. 
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7.4 Dyrup a/s 
Dyrup a/s is one of the prestigious older Danish companies, established as early as 1928 by 
Dyrup, Monberg and Thorsen.  Since then the company has undergone some major changes, 
these are briefly described in Table 7-8 below. 
Table 7-8: Milestones – Dyrup A/S40 
Year Description 
1920's S. Dyrup & Co. A/S was founded in 1928 by Sigurd Dyrup, Axel Monberg and Ejnar Thorsen. 
1930's Dyrup supplies the anti-corrosion paint 'Stålhud' (Steelskin) for the Little Belt Bridge and the Storstrøm Bridge. Enamel paints are marketed. 
1940's Production and administration are brought together on a 120,000 m2 site in Gladsaxe. In 1947 Tintas Dyrup in Portugal is established in collaboration with Højgaard & Schultz. 
1950's 
The first plastic paint is introduced on the Danish market. The wood care product BONDEX is 
launched. Dyrup starts making printing inks. This activity is divested in 1996. A new factory is 
opened in Naples, Italy. 
1960's Dyrup is in charge of the construction of factories in Egypt, Angola and Iran. All factories have been sold off, although the factory in Egypt still works under license from Dyrup. 
1970's Dyrup establishes its own plant in Gladsaxe for production of emulsions for plastic paints. Dyrup assists in the establishment of a paint and varnish factory in Saudi Arabia. 
1980's 
Together with its French agent, Tollens, Dyrup acquires a paint and varnish factory in the USA. Dyrup 
sells its shareholding in 1992. A new business concept is launched in Denmark. A number of 
independent paint retailers join the concept. Dyrup acquires a 50% stake in a paint wholesaler in 
Odense, Denmark, which becomes the basis for the establishment of a range of paint centers in 
Denmark with sales to the professional market. 
1990's 
Dyrup introduces a completely solvent-free paint. Dyrup acquires several production facilities, e.g. 
Xylochimie S.A. in France and GORI all-wood international in Denmark. In 1992 and 1994, 
respectively, Dyrup Deutschland takes over distribution of BONDEX and GORI in Germany. 
Dyrup establishes a company in Poland, which commences paint production in 1996. 
2000 
The sale and distribution of Dupont auto varnishes is discontinued. 
 Dyrup implements a new market strategy as a basis for future growth and increased earnings.
The work on the creation of a single unified corporate image that makes Dyrup stand out as one 
company with one corporate culture commences. 
2001 
New varnish production is established in Lodz in Poland. The varnish production in Mennecy in 
France is moved to Lodz. The remaining production is relocated to Albi in France or outsourced, and 
the Mennecy factory is closed down in December. 
A new Dyrup Tinting system with new eco-friendly colorants is introduced. 
2002 
124 New Shop-in-Shops are implemented around Europe, a great takeoff for the new in-store concept 
that inspires and guides consumers in the process of choosing colors for their homes. 
GORI, Dyrup’s oldest brand, celebrates its centenary. 
The French headquarters are moved to new modern facilities in Malmaison outside Paris. 
With the re-launch of the corporate web site (www.dyrup.com) the first step in the direction of a new 
online presence is taken. 
2003 
Dyrup celebrates its 75th anniversary by hosting a wide range of activities in all subsidiaries, for 
employees and customers both. 
The company enhances its presence in France by adding the application areas Paint to the palette. 
The implementation of the new Brand Strategy is initiated. 
Dyrup is awarded the Copenhagen Municipality Environmental Award 2003. 
 
As described above the company has undergone quite a lot of change and is undertaking quite 
a number of initiatives.  But considering the changes taking place, the overall financial 
indicators have remained surprisingly stable over the past years.  As shown in Table 7-9 
below only PBT has fluctuated – in 2001 and 2004. 
                                                 
40  Source: www.dyrup.dk. 
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Table 7-9: Financial Profile – Dyrup A/S 
End Date Turnover Profit Before Tax No. of Employees  
2004-12-31 1.668.200 82.100 1.107  
2003-12-31 1.724.100 115.200 1.152  
2002-12-31 1.722.300 116.200 1.178  
2001-12-31 1.670.400 63.600 1.212  
2000-12-31 1.642.200 110.200 1.222  
1999-12-31 1.594.700 103.700 1.220  
1998-12-31 1.527.400 107.300 1.212  
 
Markets 
As described in Table 7-8 above the markets have changed over time.  Today the largest 
markets are France (440 mill. DKK) followed by Denmark (390 mill. DKK), Germany (245 
mill. DKK) and Portugal (245 mill. DKK).  Other countries contribute with 355 mill. DKK41.  
Products are sold through three channels: 
? DIY (primarily through large international chains).  In Denmark Dyrup’s products are 
sold through SILVAN, in France through Castorama, and in Germany through GOBI 
and Bauhaus. 
? Professional Users (wholesalers, builders’ merchants, and outlets owned by Dyrup42). 
? Industrial Customers (mostly manufacturers of e.g. windows and doors). 
The former two represent 42% each, leaving 16% of revenue for the Industrial Customers.  
The DIY is growing, but may be threatened by the concentration is the segment.  Working 
with the large international chains has the benefit of reaching a large share of the DIY market, 
but prices are challenged continuously.  Partly addressing the price problem a “second 
generation” shop-in-shop concept is being rolled out, enabling the end-customer to obtain 
advice and guidance in using the products.  Industrial Customers are serviced by Dyrup itself 
and is categorized into two groups: sawmills requiring impregnation products and wooden 
product manufacturers requiring surface products. 
Product & Production Process 
The generic product can be broken down into four components: binders, pigments, 
solvent/water, and additives.  The production process differs between the two product 
technologies: water-based and solvent-based.  For the water-based products, the production 
process itself is quite simple as it consists of a simple mixing process.  For the solvent based 
production the process is somewhat more complex as the mixing has to be performed at 
certain temperatures and pressures.  Both production processes in themselves do not take long 
(4-6 hours), but the intense sampling and testing procedures required to ensure a consistent 
high quality of the products, extends the production process to take 48-72 hours for water-
based and 24-48 for solvent-based products.  Besides the production process and the sampling 
and testing the facility (tanks, pipes etc.) has to be flushed and cleansed regularly. 
                                                 
41 Source: Dyrup (2005). 
42 Dyrup owns 14 outlets in Denmark and 7 in Portugal. 
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Product Portfolio 
The product portfolio consists of two main areas: wood care products and paint.  The latter is 
often divided further into water-based and solvent-based paints.  In part due to regulations and 
legislation43 the solvent-based paint products are being replaced by the more environmentally 
friendly water-based alternative44.  This is to a certain extent being countered by customer 
preference, Henrik D. Nielsen (Supply Chain Director) explains: 
“Paint is most often water-based whereas wood care products are solvent-
based.  This is primarily due to customer preferences as customers expect the 
‘solvent smell’ in wood care products and expensive paint.  We even have 
competitors who add the ‘solvent smell’ to their water-based products in order 
to persuade the product to buy product.  …  With the advanced components we 
have at our disposal today only very few ‘standard’ products really need to be 
solvent-based.” 
Besides these two product categories the company sells various types of special paints and 
accessories, and even occasionally produces products for special applications such as coatings 
for acid tanks. 
Brands 
Primarily due to takeovers the company previously has supported a (large) number of brands.  
But due to a more focused brand strategy the company today tends to invest in fewer brands 
in order to obtain better awareness and higher recognition levels of the company’s products.  
A number of smaller brands have therefore been removed from the portfolio leaving only 
Dyrup, Bondex, Gori and Xylophene as the major brands accounting for approx. 80% of total 
revenue.  Bondex and Gori are intended as international brands, focusing on the DIY and 
Professional Users segments, respectively.  The Dyrup45 and Xylophene brands are major 
brands in Denmark/Portugal and France, respectively, supplementing the Gori and Bondex 
brands.  Besides these four major brands sales in smaller markets is supported by local brands 
where these have high recognition levels. 
Competition 
Even if Dyrup has quite an extensive reach internationally as well as breadth in product 
portfolio, they are not the leaders within their industry.  Comparing to e.g. AKZO Nobel, ICI 
or La Farche Dyrup seems quite small, but in reality they are midsize.  In terms of competitive 
position Dyrup is at a disadvantage compared to these large companies, Henrik D. Nielsen 
comments: 
                                                 
43 E.g. the VIC directive (exhaust of gasses). 
44  In 2002 Dyrup invested in a company developing a method to treat wooden components with an 
environmentally friendly solvent free wood care product.  Unfortunately the company went into bankruptcy 
in the fall of 2003.  Dyrup lost a considerable investment but was not deterred - they insists on trying again 
as soon as an appropriate partner appear. 
45 In Denmark the most popular brand is GORI, but the brand is under attack by Flügger - as illustrated by the 
press releases and the following retractions from Flügger (Munch, 2006; Ritzau, 2006). 
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“They [the large competitors] have the advantage of controlling the entire 
supply chain.  We are being pressured by e.g. the retail chains all the time.  …  
Even Flügger, who is present in the Nordic countries only, is in a better 
position in terms of controlling the supply chain.” 
Nis Petersen (Corporate Purchase Officer) further elaborates: 
“The large retail chains are really powerful.  Sales currently is split between 
40% special offers, 30% discounted sales, and 30% normal price.  This really 
hurts us, but at the moment there’s nothing we can do about it.  …  The large 
retail chains insist on private labeling, but that’s stealing your money.  …  To 
survive in this market we need strong brands ensuring a high and stable price.  
The shop-in-shop concept, for instance, is helping us strengthen our brands.” 
In the other distribution channels the competition is a bit more relaxed and margins are 
comfortable high.  Overall most of the competition is from smaller local companies. 
The Network 
As described above in Table 7-8 the company has sales companies across Europe (see Figure 
7-11 below). 
Figure 7-11: Dyrup’s Group Structure46 
Dyrup S.A.S., France
Capital: 4,0 mio €. Owner share 100%
DIP Veraline S.A.S., France
Capital: 6,9 mio €. Owner share 100%
Dyrup GmbH, Germany
Capital: 1,5 mio €. Owner share 100%
Dyrup NV, Belgium
Capital: 0,8 mio €. Owner share 100%
Dyrup Sp. z. o. o., Poland
Capital: 4,9 mio PLN. Owner share 100%
Dyrup Färg AB, Sweden
Capital: 0,5 mio SEK. Owner share 100%
Tintas Dyrup S.A., Portugal
Capital: 2,6 mio €. Owner share 100%
Pinturas Dyrup S.A., Spain
Capital: 0,3 mio €. Owner share 100%
Dyrup GmbH, Austria
Capital: 0,2 mio €. Owner share 100%
Dyrup AS, Norway
Capital: 0,7 mio NOK. Owner share 100%
Various smaller or dormant companies
Owner share 100%
Dyrup A/S
Capital: 100,0 mio DKK
 
 
Besides sales companies the company has licensing agreements in Saudi Arabia and Egypt, 
and distributors in Ireland, UK, Italy, Switzerland, Greece, Hungary, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. 
                                                 
46 Source: Dyrup (2004), p. 29. 
Risk Management in the Supply Chain 
Page 214 
Production 
During the past years the company has chosen to consolidate production facilities.  In 
Denmark the production in Kolding was consolidated with the existing production at Søborg, 
in France all production taking place in three sites was closed and consolidated at a new site.  
This leaves only five production sites: one plant in Denmark (Søborg) and four in Europe: 
Poland (Lodz), France (Albi), Spain (Barcelona), and Portugal (Lissabon).  At the sites in 
Spain and Portugal only water based products are produced whereas the production in Lodz is 
half water based and half solvent based products47 and the production in Albi is almost 
entirely solvent-based.  In Denmark both solvent and water-based products are manufactured. 
Besides the types of products produced at each site, also the degree of exporting varies 
greatly.  At the sites in Poland and Denmark more than 50% of the production is exported, 
whereas production in France, Portugal, and Spain are almost entirely for their local markets. 
Local Recipes 
Only to a very limited degree can production be moved from one factory to another, Henrik 
D. Nielsen: 
“First and foremost the production sites differ in terms of technology.  …  
Second, a large part of the production is based on input from local suppliers – 
and due to variations from supplier to supplier we are too dependent on these 
smaller local suppliers.  …  We have to develop new recipes if we want to move 
production – and that’s quite costly.” 
Dyrup thereby misses out on basic scale opportunities and advantages arising from running a 
multi-site operation.  Whereas postponement might help flattening out demand peaks in other 
companies it would not work at Dyrup, primarily due to the integral nature of the production 
process48 and the bulkiness of the product.  For slow-movers the problem might be further 
emphasized by the issue of durability as minimum batch size is approx. 6.000 liters. 
The irony of it all is that the problem (to a certain degree) is self-inflicted, Henrik D. Nielsen: 
“The main reason for this problem was negligence when performing the 
acquisitions during the 1990’s.  When taking over these sites we probably 
should have analyzed the supplier portfolio - and made sure the production 
technology was aligned where possible.  But growth was more important at that 
stage…” 
Size is not the only problem, though, in relation to the supply base. 
Supply Base 
Dyrup shares fate with many other Danish companies in the sense their suppliers are much 
larger than themselves.  To Henrik D. Nielsen this is quite frustrating: 
                                                 
47  Most of the solvent-based production was moved from Denmark to Poland when production was 
consolidated in Søborg. 
48 The production process does not have any “natural” decoupling points.  Furthermore, as the product is filled 
into consumer-oriented packaging (buckets) the brand is included in the production process. 
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“Among our fifty largest suppliers we are able to influence two!  …  I have 
never previously experienced such a degree of dependency on suppliers.  …  Of 
course we can not influence suppliers like BASF or Beyer, even our supplier of 
packaging material is much larger than us – we account for 4% of their 
revenue.  …  In a sense we are only operating at their mercy.” 
Nis Petersen comments further: 
“We are unable to influence BASF who owns the patent.  They are very aware 
of the market situation – they slowly lower the price in order to keep 
competition out of the coming market.  …  Beyer does not accept any 
negotiation on price; they are simply reaping the diminishing market…” 
But not only the larger suppliers are causing problems, Nis Petersen: 
“In principle we only have unique suppliers – once the recipe is accepted we 
are locked in.  …  The wave of acquisitions during the 1990’s made the 
portfolio grow quite a bit – and since then we have done little to optimize the 
portfolio.  …  Current changes in legislation create an opportunity to weed out 
redundant suppliers by re-designing a select set of recipes.” 
Redundancy is not the only problem, Nis Petersen: 
“We have certain additives which are input to some 250 products.  We have to 
start monitoring those inputs quite closely – and adjust our inventory 
management accordingly.  …  Inventory management principles should reflect 
the relationship between importance, cost, retention level, and replenishment 
time for alternative.  …  The risk you take is inversely proportional with the 
inventory levels.” 
As risk apparently correlation (inversely) with inventory levels and the number of suppliers of 
any given input might affect the availability, supplier management must be critically 
important? 
Supplier Management 
Nis Petersen explains how the suppliers are managed without the use of models: 
“We really don’t need model to tell us how to manage our suppliers – we just 
need common sense.  …  We are in market with reasonably high margins, 
there’s no incentive to take any chances to gain one or two %.  …  We are very 
pragmatic; we make sure our suppliers understand how important they are to 
us.” 
The supply market does offer some challenges, though.  Due to specialization in e.g. 
production of binders the market consists of very few players causing problems for Dyrup: 
“The binders we used were all produced by one company which was traded 
among venture funds.  …  This shortsighted perspective led to a lack of 
investments and in the end the company went bankrupt.  …  A current example 
is Sigmi Color – we might be interested in acquiring the wood care division to 
protect our market position.  We ourselves contribute to the conflicting 
rationales: competency versus ROI.” (Nis Petersen) 
Suppliers may be treated according to their importance but this is not structured in models or 
documented in any way.  This does not prove to be a problem, though: 
“We haven’t experienced a crisis we have not been able to successfully deal 
with!“ (Nis Petersen) 
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A reactive approach to supplier management seems to be working well? 
Dyrup’s Supply Chains 
Even if the supply base is not formally segmented it is essential to distinguish between local 
and global suppliers, as the latter support production from common recipes (as contrasted by 
local recipes).  On the downstream side three supply chains are recognized: Sales Companies, 
Distributors, and Industrial Customers.  Combining this information enables the mapping of 
Dyrup’s supply chains – see Figure 7-12 below. 
Figure 7-12: Supply Chain Diagram – Dyrup 
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Besides before mentioned supply chains Dyrup also have the ‘Licensee’ business.49 
Supply Chain Practice 
Besides the reduction of the supply base a number of initiatives are being undertaken within 
the SCM domain.  The most dramatic is the implementation of a central SCM department, 
and the insourcing of production planning and procurement.  Only sales and marketing (and 
required support functions) are retained in the sales companies – both being coordinated from 
HQ.  Coordination of production will also be performed from HQ as will the initiative to 
outsource non-core activities.  Currently all distribution is outsourced, and in France even 
warehousing is handled by an external party.  Figure 7-13 below depicts the organization. 
                                                 
49  Depicted in the above model by a dashed line as it is not a real supply chain – the entire operation is 
handled autonomously. 
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Figure 7-13: Organization Chart – Dyrup50 
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Logistical integration is absent and EDI is only used to a very limited extent.  The level of 
integration is perceived as unsatisfactory, Henrik D. Nielsen: 
“We intend to improve within this area, but have certain issues we have to 
address first.  …  After aligning our own operations we might start working 
more closely with suppliers, but we probably need IT to support this…We need 
to first simplify and standardize before we can integrate…” 
Forecasts are received from the larger customers but these are almost worthless as they are 
rather imprecise.  As a consequence all production is against forecasts – which are only rarely 
updated as a result of a customer forecast.  Campaigns are “built into” the forecasts so even 
the ramp-up of e.g. new products is driven by forecast.  Besides the campaigns also the 
“natural” demand pattern for the products results in very large inventories – an issue found 
very difficult to amend, Henrik D. Nielsen: 
“The easiest way to reduce inventory is to remove brands or product categories 
or to trim the portfolio within each brand – but all these approaches are 
deemed invalid as it would hurt our competitive position.  Furthermore, for 
most products the marketplace contains a competing product so we are stuck.  
We simply have to keep all these SKU’s in stock.” 
It is hoped the centralization of production planning will result in decreasing inventory levels 
across all sites. 
IT Usage 
The use of IT is quite limited.  The system in place is an old-fashioned, silo/module oriented 
application BPCS, offering little in terms of interdepartmental reporting and process support.  
                                                 
50 Source: Henrik D. Nielsen, Dyrup and www.dyrup.com. 
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The application has been targeted for replacement by an ERP system a number of times, but 
so far the investment has been postponed.  To enable better reporting a web-based reporting 
tool has been put in place, supporting marketing, production, and procurement alike. 
“The Bucket Incident” 
So, even if the SCM practice seem quite simple as each production basically was an 
autonomous entity with a single well-known production technology and a rather limited 
number of long-term suppliers, challenges existed. 
At the initial interview with Dyrup Finn Aa. Andreassen (Logistics Manager)51 described 
some of the problems he was currently struggling with.  Some time earlier, a supplier of 
packaging material (pre-printed buckets) had let Dyrup know that they had decided to 
discontinue the production of the buckets.  In an act of good faith they gave Dyrup a warning 
of 1½ years to prepare for the switch of supplier, and agreed to let Dyrup place bulk orders 
just before discontinuation top extend the “switch-over period”.  The bucket was not 
considered unique as size, material, and shape were more or less standard - but the bucket had 
product information, company logo etc. printed on the side.  After a thorough search in the 
market for a replacement supplier for buckets with print on the side, the company was quite 
stunned to learn that no suppliers of such products existed within a reasonable distance to the 
production sites.  Some suppliers of buckets existed, of course, and since they promised they 
would be able to produce buckets with print in an acceptable quality, a supplier was chosen 
and test production soon after began.  It quite quickly became apparent that the printing of 
product information and the logo’s etc. was somewhat more complex than first assumed as 
text and logo was smurred.  The issues were resolved in the end but it took the company more 
than two years to have an acceptable solution in place52. 
Another Example… 
Another example is the case of the French company producing acids for driers (component in 
paint and wood care products).  The company was the sole supplier of this component and 
was located in a small city in rural France.  The outbreak of Legionnaire’s Disease coinciding 
with the election for local government resulted in a bit of a panic and all industrial production 
was temporarily shut down.  Following a very long (and politically motivated?) investigation 
it was decided to revoke the license to produce the driers.  Luckily Dyrup had stocked up on 
this component and was able to get by until a new supplier could be identified 
                                                 
51 The majority of interviews on SCM related issues were performed with Henrik D. Nielsen as Finn Aa. 
Andreassen left the company in late 2003. 
52 Quite interestingly Finn Aa. Andreassen, Henrik D. Nielsen, and Nis Petersen all had different recollections 
of the circumstances around Metropack.  The former described the case as a planned discontinuation of a 
product, the second described it as a bankruptcy, and the latter described the root cause as not being a 
logistical problem, but a problem of resistance against change… 
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SCRM Practice? 
Only quite recently has Risk Management received any attention.  During the initial interview 
with Henrik D. Nielsen in 2004 he described the current practice: 
“The approach to risk management has traditionally been very reactive – 
incidents were the sole source to improvement.  E.g. the strike in 1998 resulted 
in the creation of a contingency plan for production and distribution.  …  
Currently we have no risk management personnel within logistics/SCM but a 
position referencing Top Management was filled December last year [2003].  
So far we have seen no concrete results…“ 
He goes on to describe how the cost of insurance (Loss of Production) is not a trigger for this 
initiative and explain how the board has insisted on focusing on risk management as a result 
of the decision to centralize all production in Denmark at the site in Søborg.  Nis Petersen 
disagrees: 
“We have identified only one driver for Risk Management: insurance.  Besides 
this issue we really do only have to fear shortage of inputs.  …  We do not have 
to fear e.g. bankruptcies amongst our suppliers - BASF and Beyer are both very 
solid companies.  …  For the rest of it – it is really a matter of adjusting 
inventory management principles and inventory levels according to usage and 
the supply situation…” 
Nis Petersen thereby seems to have opinions directly contradicting the opinions put forward 
by Henrik D. Nielsen – and ends the interview with a warning53: 
“The more lean a company gets, the more it relies on very few people.  This 
should really be taken into consideration when implementing such changes 
[centralization of production in Søborg]…” 
When re-interviewing Henrik D. Nielsen in 2005 the Risk Management practice is still 
absent: 
“We still have seen very few results [from the Risk Management initiative] 
besides from achieving lower insurance premiums.  A short list of risks has 
been documented and we have to report certain key figures periodically.  But 
we have no proactive Risk Management practice in place.  …  We have 
contingency plans in place, though – and can react pretty effectively to e.g. a 
fire.” 
Working with Risk Management at Dyrup has had its advantages: 
“It has enabled us a clearer picture of our IT situation – and in the longer run I 
believe it will enable us to look further ahead when setting goals and 
developing strategies…” (Henrik D. Nielsen) 
 
Summing Up… 
Dyrup is presently changing their SCM practice in order to cut cost and improve customer 
service.  The nature of the product limits the extent to which production can be optimized as 
                                                 
53 Nis Petersen also describes how the management incentives schemes are increasing risk and cost.  
Management allegedly is measured on inventory levels as by end of year.  Therefore production is idle in 
November and December – and operates double shifts in January and February. 
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e.g. production postponement is probably unrealistic due to transportation costs.  Inputs may 
be standardized, though; a level of standardization of production equipment will enable 
standardization of recipes enabling shifting of production from one plant to another. 
On SCRM little is currently being done.  Results from the Risk Management initiative are still 
absent – and there are no indications focus will be on the supply chain risks. 
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7.5 Fritz Hansen a/s 
Fritz Hansen, the founder of the company, registered as a master cabinetmaker on October 
24th, 1872 in Copenhagen.  He initially specialized as a manufacturer of furniture parts such 
as chair legs, balusters and iron frames.  In 1915, after many experiments, the first Danish 
chair in steam bentwood was launched at Fritz Hansen's new factory in Allerød north of 
Copenhagen.  It was an immediate success, and in the next decades many pieces of functional 
furniture in steam bentwood followed.  In the mid 1920’s Fritz Hansen started a productive 
teamwork with leading furniture architects and designers.  This teamwork is directly 
observable in the product portfolio which is made up of famous designs of classic and 
contemporary Danish and foreign designers such as Arne Jacobsen, Piet Hein, Poul 
Kjærholm, Hans Sandgren Jacobsen, and Kasper Salto.  Over the years Fritz Hansen a/s has 
built up a comprehensive collection of furniture designs from the solid wood classics of the 
1930’s to completely new stacking chairs and advanced office chairs – all based on a 
minimalist and functional design philosophy. 
A Crisis Emerges 
During the 1990’s the company experienced serious difficulties.  Sales dropped and the costs 
were increasing and in 1998 a new managing director (Jacob Holm) was appointed.  Problems 
were addressed promptly: 
? The sales problem was addressed by investments of approx. DKK 100 million in the 
foreign markets Japan and USA and by strengthening the effort in southern Europe.  
The select group of local representatives was supported by the setup of show rooms 
and the appointment of two new sales executives to cover USA/Canada and UK, 
respectively. 
? The cost problem was addressed by means of outsourcing and downsizing.  
Questioning the acclaimed core competences of the then traditional manufacturing 
oriented company had surprising results as it was realized upholstery no longer was a 
core competence.  Except for upholstery of high quality leather items, there were no 
(quality) problems in outsourcing this competence.  Other parts of the company (e.g. 
the smithy) were outsourced as well, but more importantly: the focus of the company 
was changed from being manufacturing oriented to sales and marketing oriented. 
Alongside these changes the plant at Vassingrød (FCA) was established.  Being a highly 
automated (process-oriented) and specialized manufacturing plant it represents an investment 
of DKK 200 million.  The decision to build the plant was taken prior to the above described 
changes and based on an anticipation of steady growth in the sales of the Series 7 products54, 
chairs manufactured using an updated version of the steam bending technology which started 
the company.  The plant was opened in 2002, and after some initial problems it is now 
operating to specification.  Unfortunately, the demand for those products has turned out to be 
quite a lot lower than expected.  The plant is therefore only operating in one daily shift instead 
                                                 
54  For more info, see www.fritzhansen.com. 
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of the expected two or three daily shifts.  This production still accounts for approx. 40% of 
total turnover55.  The outsourcing of activities led to the initiation of the LEAN project in 
2001, and more dramatic changes to the “old” manufacturing plant (FCL), co-located with 
headquarters in Allerød. 
LEAN Manufacturing 
Following the successful outsourcing of most of the manufacturing activities (and the shift in 
procurement from raw material to components) the next step for Fritz Hansen a/s was to 
minimize inventory costs by implementing LEAN Manufacturing.  This meant getting rid of 
all WIP inventory and to change the production philosophy from product- to process-
orientation56, from batch-production based on forecasts to production against firm orders. 
Figure 7-14: Goals for Fritz Hansen's LEAN project57 
Goals for the LEAN project: 
? Shipping Precision ≥ 96% 
? Claims ≤ 2.5 % 
? Cost of Goods Sold – yearly decrease of 2% 
? Order Cycle changed from 15 weeks to less than 5 weeks. 
 
 
Stock keeping of finished goods was abandoned and the layout of the factory was changed as 
a single-string conveyor system was installed.  Work stations were designed for the initiation 
of the production order, for the kitting operation, and for the assembly, quality assurance, and 
packaging operations.  Planning and production systems were integrated, and barcode 
scanners were installed.  Distribution was outsourced to two TPL’s: Windum for local 
distribution and Leman for the rest of the world.  As both operate warehouses consolidation of 
orders and sometimes larger projects is done at their site by means of interim warehousing. 
Outsourcing the Production of Tables 
Considered a core competence the production of tabletops (at the plant FCB) was outsourced 
at a somewhat slower pace.  At first production of standard tabletops was outsourced to a 
trusted supplier.  After a period of time the supplier was trusted to produce even the special 
tabletops for customer orders, and finally the supplier was offered to buy the machines and 
tools, in turn for guaranteed turnover with Fritz Hansen a/s.  All tabletops are now purchased 
from this supplier who generates approx. 25% of his turnover from orders with Fritz Hansen. 
                                                 
55 The FCA plant is of marginal interest to this study (except for the fact it represents a distinctively different 
business model) and is therefore only referenced when necessary.  
56  For a description of these OM concepts, refer to e.g. Hill (2005) or Stevenson (2005). 
57  Source: Henrik Holm, Fritz Hansen a/s. 
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Early Problems 
It was decided initially to do a partial implementation of the lean principles to get some 
experience before implementing them across the product portfolio.  A few of the top selling 
products were selected and the suppliers of the main component (e.g. seats) were approached 
and introduced to the ideas of lean manufacturing.  All were quite excited about the idea and 
of the opportunity of being more closely integrated with Fritz Hansen. 
It quickly became obvious that the suppliers had made promises they could or would not 
keep.  Henrik Holm (Logistics Manager) commented during an interview in 2004: 
“We really made an effort in explaining the principles, but they may not have 
understood the consequences… We have worked with some of these suppliers 
for years and years, but they still decided not to accommodate our wishes…  
We have been able to work with some of these suppliers, and have them 
minimize their order sizes to e.g. one order per week, instead of one order per 
month – and that’s still an improvement…” 
Besides identifying Supply Partners the other suppliers had to be managed better as well as 
the inventories were cut dramatically.  At the start of the Lean project the inventory was at a 
staggering DKK 70 million – cutting the inventory level had consequences for the through-
put of the assembly plant.  Marianne  Thompson (Supply Chain Planner): 
“We realized that we had to update all the BOM’s58 as we kept running out of 
items for the assembly operations.  It was quite a lot of work…” 
The updating of master data had the desired effect: the dependent requirements were now 
correct, but the problem with lack of delivery precision became a bigger and bigger problem 
for the Supply Chain Planners.  Marianne Thompson: 
“For some reason we still experience halting the assembly line due to a 
shortage…  It’s strange we are not able to solve this problem…” 
Rudi Kjeldsen (Supply Chain Planner) offers an explanation: 
 “…every time we investigate [the shortage] we conclude it is down to the 
delivery precision of the supplier.  We have done our jobs – but the supplier 
fails to deliver on time, or lets us know too late that he can not meet the 
deadline.” 
When a shortage occurs, the result is a pile-up of semi-finished products in production areas.  
The production does not come to a complete halt though, as people can be asked to perform 
other activities, such as assist in the assembly operations not performed using the conveyor 
system.  Alternatively personnel can be transferred to the packaging area, or be asked to 
perform a general clean-up or perform a cycle count on a section of the assembly line 
inventory.  Solving the problem of poor delivery performance is made difficult by several 
factors, Bo Rasmussen (Factory Manager) explains: 
 “Some of the suppliers are so much larger than Fritz Hansen that it is quite 
difficult to put pressure on them.  We had one incident where we tried to put 
                                                 
58  Bill-of-Material – a production document containing the specification of input required for the manufacture 
of the top level item.  Used by planning systems such as MRP to identify “dependent requirements” i.e. 
inputs to the production.  For more info, please refer to e.g. Hill (2005) or Stevenson (2005). 
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pressure on a supplier to increase quality and delivery precision.  
Unfortunately, all they said was: ‘Fine, you can pick up your moulds later 
today’.  That called for some fine diplomacy, but we managed to save the 
relationship and get a better service.” 
Supply Management 
Apparently this ‘lock-in’ situation is not uncommon at Fritz Hansen, Bo Rasmussen: 
“We really do not have that many commodity suppliers.  Most of the input we 
get is unique…  In principle we might have alternative suppliers for all 
aluminum items, for instance, but a tool still cost approx. DKK 500.000”. 
The Supply Chain Planners agree that some products might be “over-designed” as even non-
visible bolts for a couple of products have to be made special.  Apparently over-design of 
products is a bit of a company joke, as the supply chain planners comment keeping a deadline 
is unheard of in the product development department.  Marianne Thompson: 
“It has no consequence for the product developers to miss a deadline, even if it 
has severe impacts on our [the Supply Chain Planner’s] jobs.  …  We struggle 
to meet the final deadline, but it’s become increasingly difficult with R&D’s 
overrun of deadlines…” 
One way of simplifying the job is to use systems suppliers, as this will minimize the supplier 
portfolio and ensure high availability of a wider range of input.  Even after discussing the 
risks of integrating with a systems supplier, Rudi Kjeldsen insists: 
“But, if we choose to work with e.g. Sanistål59, we are able to finance their 
overhead by the discounts they get from being a bigger customer.  …  All other 
things being equal, the improved delivery precision must improve our own 
operations.” 
Freeing up time is essential to the Supply Chain Planners: 
 “The way we divide the work between us does have its disadvantages60….  As 
we are responsible for a range of finished products we never have the time to 
fully understand all the markets we are in…  We do not have the time to 
investigate what is going on within e.g. small-items plastic molding.” 
And further that it does not have any appeal to re-structure the supplier base: 
“There’s no reward in analyzing the supplier base…  We have discussed it a 
number of times, and still it is not being done…” 
Certain improvement with supplier management has taken place, though: 
 “Earlier we did not have a say on the choice of suppliers for new products, the 
product developers were doing that themselves, and we were being told when it 
was too late to change anything.  Now, at least we are involved in the process, 
and the product developers have to have strong arguments to introduce new 
suppliers.  Earlier, whenever we got a new product developer he or she would 
bring along a whole set of suppliers he was used to working with.” 
                                                 
59 Danish wholesaler within HVAC, steel and other metals, tools, machinery, and technical products.  For 
more info, please refer to www.sanistaal.dk. 
60 Supply Chain Planners are each responsible for a part of the product portfolio. 
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So, implementing LEAN meant dramatic changes and was a catalyst for discussing more 
overall, strategic issues.  Diplomacy was also needed internally within Fritz Hansen. 
Production in Denmark? 
During these changes discussions on the rationale behind the production/logistics setup took 
place.  It was no longer evident that products actually had to flow through the plants in 
Denmark.  In case the component, e.g. the seat of a lounge chair, was manufactured outside of 
Denmark, and all that remained to be done was to fasten the foot of the furniture, this might 
just as well be done at the supplier’s site? 
Bo Rasmussen and Marianne Thompson recall: 
“It was especially the people from Sales & Marketing who worried over the 
impact of loosing the ‘Made in Denmark’ tag.  Even in the Japanese markets 
the do not want to see ‘Made in Hong Kong’ - even if the quality is the same.” 
Jacob Pedersen (Supply Chain Coordinator) supplements: 
“…it really does not make sense to perform the assembly here, it might just as 
well be done by the manufacturer, or by the TPL… We polish the product and 
pack it for distribution – adding that Fritz Hansen feeling…” 
The marketing people had their way and instead of outsourcing the entire operation, the plant 
was changed into an assembly operation. 
LEAN Today 
Since the initial round of interviews in 2004 the implementation of LEAN has progressed 
quite successfully.  The goals for the project have been reached and as many as 5-8 suppliers 
are now certified Supply Partners.  They are all trained in the LEAN principles and their IT 
systems are integrated with Fritz Hansen’s forecasting system.  Surprisingly, the company 
does not want to convert all suppliers to Supply Partners, Henrik Holm explains: 
“Not everybody can become a Supply Partner.  It depends on the market the 
supplier is in.  …  If the inputs delivered are standard, there is no reason to 
enter into a partnership.  …  As a supplier you will need to be able to 
participate in product development, and are most likely involved in more than 
one critical product already.” 
Being a Supply Partner is thereby a special privilege for the select few, who in return are 
expected to be in the forefront of their field and willing to participate in joint product 
development61. 
The push-principle is fully implemented as only interim inventory exist at the distributors 
warehouses.  All orders are produced against firmed customer orders, and orders are shipped 
either to the selling partner or directly to the project site or to the end consumer.  The only 
manufacturing remaining in Allerød is the production of slow movers, certain leather items, 
                                                 
61 The supplier base is thereby in reality only segmented into Supply Partners and Others.  Before LEAN the 
company had A, B, and C suppliers but introducing Supply Partners has collided so fundamentally with the 
previous typology that it has lost meaning.  Currently, Henrik Holm is working on redefining the A, B, and 
C classes. 
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production of the very expensive pieces, and of all-wood furniture.  All fast-movers are 
assembly-only freeing up space and capacity for production of before mentioned items. 
LEAN Impacting Product Development 
Product development has also been influenced by the implementation of LEAN.  The 
customer orientation implied has had very direct consequences for the design methodology, 
Thomas Touborg (Supply Chain Director) explains: 
“At some stage we inquired the sales and marketing about introduction of the 
new products, and they jumped at the chance to change the practice.  They 
asked for (and got) a more market oriented approach to new product 
introduction.  …  Currently, we have two introduction periods: October 1st and 
April 1st.” 
Thomas Touborg explains how previously the designers had more or less free hands to 
continue developing on products: 
“Of course they had deadlines, but when they realized they could not meet a 
deadline, it was just changed.  …  They had no incentive to stick to the plans 
made and agreed upon, and they obviously were more interested in designing a 
beautiful product than making sure the logistics and production issues were 
resolved…” 
Now, product developers must have all specifications ready and to hand over one year before 
the products launch date.  Deadlines can not be moved, and it is considered critical if 
deadlines are not met.  This has resulted in product development routinely setting up 
alternative plans when encountering problems in designing the products.  Late changes are 
only accepted if functioning solutions exist already, and major changes to a design will 
require the project plan to be altered making sure at least one solution will be available at the 
hand-over date62.  Furthermore suppliers play a much more central role in product 
development now than before, as they participate from start till end. 
Due to the criticality of taking logistics and production issues under consideration when 
designing products, parts of product development is now part of the SCM department, see 
Figure 7-15 below. 
Customers, Partners & Competitors 
Sales is more or less evenly divided between project and consumer sales, but all sales is 
processed through a partner.  The network covering the world consists of approx. 400 partners 
(hereof 70-80 in Denmark).  Currently the company is focusing on strengthening the 
consumer sales through more aggressive marketing. 
The partners are not franchisees in a system like McDonald’s but are all independent furniture 
retailers, marketing a wide range of products.  Partners are expected to maintain a certain 
standard and to present the products of Fritz Hansen in a certain way, and are offered help e.g. 
in decorating their shops.  The partners are the only outlet for Fritz Hansen’s products and 
                                                 
62 One might say that processes and routines in product development have been changed to include 
management of the risk of not meeting the deadline? 
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partners are therefore expected to be able to carry out sales to end consumers, architects or 
facilities managers, and government purchasers. 
Paradoxically, the company does not perceive itself as competing with other furniture 
manufacturing companies.  Thomas Touborg: 
“Our primary competitor is AUDI, or so we like to say.  …  If handed 100.000 
DKK, some people would like to refurbish their kitchen, some would like to 
trade the old Passat in for a new Audi, and still others would prefer to buy 
something for their living room.  …  We would like the consumer to pay 
attention to the Fritz Hansen brand instead of noticing the products.” 
In a way the product portfolio is both a blessing and a curse as (at least some of) the products 
are so well known they basically sell themselves.  The Fritz Hansen brand thereby gets buried 
under the brand names of their products. 
The Organization’s Structure 
As illustrated below in Figure 7-15 the company has a traditional functional structure.  Not so 
common though, is the fact that SCM has replaced Logistics, Purchasing, and Production, 
implying a process orientation in fulfilling customer needs.  And as described above, the SCM 
department encompasses Development & Quality as well. 
The sales department has the responsibility of managing the Fritz Hansen brand as well as 
managing the before mentioned 400 partners.  To ensure a proper contact between HQ and 
partners, the department is structured around markets, ensuring knowledge of the local 
context when interacting with partners. 
Somewhat surprising the IT function is placed under the responsibility of the Finance 
department, a constellation that went “out of fashion” many years ago.  For many companies, 
the Finance department was the first place where IT was put into use, and therefore IT was 
often placed under the responsibility of the head of Finance.  But since then the accounting 
task has become more or less standard (at least from an IT perspective), lessening the 
necessity of having IT close to Finance.  Often modern companies find it more beneficial to 
have the IT department being integrated into the market oriented departments, e.g. Purchasing 
or Sales, or in the SCM department63. 
                                                 
63  The author has worked with the IT field for more than 15 years.  The comments are based on his general 
knowledge of the field. 
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Figure 7-15: Organization Chart – Fritz Hansen64 
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Product Portfolio 
As described previously the product portfolio contains a lot of designs from the 1930’s 
onwards by famous Danish and foreign designers.  Even if some of the products are 
considered “classics” the product portfolio needs to be updated continuously.  This is 
achieved in the following three ways: 
1. young, upcoming designers send designs to Fritz Hansen, 
2. designs already in production at other furniture manufacturers are bought, and 
3. Fritz Hansen decides to supplement the portfolio by inviting known designers to 
participate in developing new products. 
For all products put in production a royalty fee is paid out to the accredited designers, in 
return for which Fritz Hansen has the right (and obligation) to produce and market the 
products, normally for a period of 70-80 years65. 
Financial Status 
In the five year period since the turn-around was initiated the turnover has fluctuated between 
DKK 344 million (1999) and DKK 425 million (2001 and 2002) of which approx. 70 % are 
                                                 
64 Source: Thomas Touborg, Fritz Hansen a/s. 
65 Obviously, contracts are somewhat more sophisticated than indicated here.  Normally Fritz Hansen would 
be obliged to advertise for the product in specified countries using specified channels of communication.  In 
case of declining or otherwise disappointing sales, the designer (or the heirs) has a right to revoke the 
contract, and go to some other furniture manufacturer. 
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generated from exports.  The number of employees has decreased steadily from 331 (1999) to 
the current approx. 220. 
Table 7-10: Financial Profile – Fritz Hansen a/s 
End Date Turnover Profit Before Tax No. of Employees  
2005-06-30 395.775 19.792 204  
2004-06-30 351.885 17.361 204  
2003-06-30 378.991 12.413 235  
2002-06-30 425.854 9.303 279  
2001-06-30 425.202 26.327 311  
2000-06-30 365.423 23.410 304  
 
SCRM Practice? 
As illustrated in Figure 7-15 above, there is no department for (Supply Chain) Risk 
Management.  But as described above a number of changes in processes as well as 
organization structure is directed at managing identified risks.  The company naturally 
manages the traditional risks: the risk of a customer not paying the bill, the risk of a fire in the 
factory, the risk of fraudulent behavior in finance etc.  These routines are in place, but Fritz 
Hansen has definitely gone further in trying to ensure the stability of its operations.  Thomas 
Touborg explains the developments taking place right now: 
“Of course we have insurance covering the destruction of the factory.  But the 
insurance will only cover the direct costs, not the loss of market share.  …  We 
estimate the consequence of an absence from the market of 18 months 
[estimated time to rebuild the factory] will cost us 50% of our market.  …  We 
therefore are working on creating small-scale exemplary supply chains.” 
He continues to explain how the critical products are going to have a back-up supply chain, 
preferably by existing suppliers.  In case of an accident, the supplier will be asked to ramp up 
their production capacity, to enable Fritz Hansen to supply to the most important customers. 
So even if the company is quite sophisticated in terms of risk managing their supply chains, 
there are still things to take a closer look at, e.g. the dependency of suppliers.  Henrik Holm 
describes how the practice has changed: 
“After your last visit, we have changed our view on who we want partnerships 
with.  As we discussed it may be a waste of resources to build and maintain a 
partnership with a supplier in a perfect market – there are no advantages!  …  
What is really troubling is the fact that we have created some of this 
dependency ourselves!“ 
Whether they like it or not Fritz Hansen is dependent on a number of suppliers, and like other 
companies described they have chosen to hold meetings regularly with the most important 
ones.  Before each meeting the latest financial statements are analyzed to see if the company 
is making enough money, Henrik Holm: 
“From the financial statements we calculate a couple of KPI’s – this gives us 
an idea of their financial state, if they are making money or not.  …  In case 
they are not making money, we either try to help or are cautious on making 
commitments.” 
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Thomas Touborg: 
“We intend to have a dialogue with all our critical suppliers, and make sure we 
are perceived as a good customer.  If they do not consider us an attractive or 
important customer, we’d better find a means to mitigate that.” 
Summing up, the risk management practice at Fritz Hansen is somewhat fragmented.  But 
some of the practices under way is quite sophisticated, e.g. the creation of ‘redundancy supply 
chains’ and the risk management implemented in the integrated product development. 
SCM Practice 
Considering LEAN a sort of SCM, Figure 7-16 below illustrates the supply chains identified 
at Fritz Hansen. 
Figure 7-16: Supply Chain Diagram – Fritz Hansen66 
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As the A/B/C typology for suppliers is currently under revision, the supply side is depicted as 
consisting of Supply Partners and Other Suppliers only.  With the re-introduction of the 
A/B/C (or some other?) typology, the supply chain diagram will have to be changed. 
As described, the changes to production philosophy, inventory management practice and 
supplier management has not occurred out of the blue, but has been supported by formal 
organization (see Figure 7-16 above).  Details of the SCM department are depicted in Figure 
7-17 below. 
                                                 
66 Actually the two sites have two distribution channels each, but it seems irrelevant to draw four supply 
chains.  Alternatively, the production taking place in Allerød is actually split into assembly (for the majority 
of products) and crafts-based production (for the very expensive wood products).  Therefore a third supply 
chain might be included in the figure. 
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Figure 7-17: Organization Chart (SCM) – Fritz Hansen67 
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The two manufacturing unit (FCA and FCL) are quite different as FCA is cost minimizing by 
producing few products on a highly specialized and automated setup.  The other unit (FCL) 
which has implemented LEAN has digressed to low-tech assembly and a flexible setup 
supporting “batch sizes of one”.  The quality and development functions are available to both, 
as is access to the logistical setups with distributors and the partner network. 
From the first interviews in 2004 to the last performed in August 2005, the company has been 
able to successfully turn around the operations at FCL to support the ideal of zero inventory, 
shorter order cycles, lower costs and higher precision in outbound shipments.  KPI’s collected 
to support the continued improvements include Cost, Flexibility, Shipping Performance, Total 
Order Cycle, and Quality68. 
The system relies on IT support, which is provided by a modified MOVEX application in 
concert with a “home grown” application giving customers and suppliers access to relevant 
information.  Customers can see their orders and have access to “Track & Trace” functionality 
whereas suppliers have access to their performance evaluations and outstanding orders. 
Still Just Work in Progress… 
A lot of work still lies ahead as the supplier base has to be re-structured to support the Supply 
Partners and the product portfolio needs to be analyzed for critical products needing supply 
chain redundancy.  Henrik Holm and Thomas Touborg concur: 
“Albeit the progress we have made, we still have our work cut out for us: we 
need to ensure stability through making sure our suppliers consider us an 
                                                 
67 Source: Thomas Touborg, Fritz Hansen a/s.  Numbers in brackets denotes number of direct subordinates. 
68 The KPI’s all have precise translations in the system, e.g. Cost is really Total (or Landed) Cost and Quality 
is measured as number of claims against number of deliveries. 
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attractive customer.  Furthermore we need to investigate if we are dependent 
on the right suppliers?” 
 
Summing Up… 
Also Fritz Hansen has undergone dramatic changes, and also for Fritz Hansen the catalyst was 
financial problems.  The analysis of the value of perceived core competencies revealed that 
the world had changed, and that the company needed to alter the business model.  Not much 
could be done in relation to the FCA plant (the highly specialized plant producing chairs 
based on the bent wood technology), but the production at the FCL plant could be altered.  
The solution chosen to address their problems was somewhat more conceptual than the 
previous case studies, as they chose to implement LEAN Manufacturing (albeit modified 
during the implementation).  At the most overall level this solution implemented resembles 
the changes implemented at Bang & Olufsen: inventories are removed, and distribution is 
changed to direct shipment.  But since the inventory keeping of finished products is (almost) 
completely abolished, Fritz Hansen’s solution is more extreme than the others described. 
Obviously this business model results in a “lock-in”, at least in the short run.  Selected 
suppliers are educated to participate in the JIT operation, systems are integrated, and 
distribution solutions are designed.  The operation is altered from a manufacturing operation 
to simpler assembly, retaining only manufacturing of the very expensive products and slow 
movers.  After the inevitable start-up problems the final assembly performed at the FCL plant 
is now proceeding with acceptable results. 
Again the level of formal risk management and SCRM is surprisingly low – especially due to 
the insights into the problems and challenges of running a LEAN operation acknowledged by 
both Thomas Touborg and Henrik Holm.  As operations will break down if only one of the 
suppliers exit the network, Fritz Hansen is in continuous contact with the supply partners – 
ensuring problems are solved as quickly as possible. 
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7.6 LINAK A/S 
Much has happened since Christian Jensen, the grandfather of LINAK's present Director and 
Owner, established the company in 1907.  At that time the company manufactured flat belt 
pulleys, V-belt pulleys and grinding mills for preparation of corn and forges to technical 
schools - something quite different from the state-of-the art products which are manufactured 
at LINAK today.  In 1976 as a newly graduated mechanical engineer Bent Jensen, the present 
CEO and owner of LINAK, took over the company, Chr. Jensen and Sons, after his father.  
Bent Jensen was not overly enthusiastic about becoming the owner of the family company 
with 7 employees.  He would have preferred to go abroad to work, but his father succeeded in 
persuading him to stay at home.  Bent Jensen gave himself 5 years to develop a new product 
and used the time to also rationalize the existing production before he in 1979 got the right 
idea - the linear actuator. 
The Linear Actuator 
An actuator is a unit which converts the operating voltage from the control box into a (linear) 
movement.  It consists of three principal elements: motor, gear, and a spindle.  To control the 
length and speed of movement the product comes with a control box and a control.  The 
“original” invention was the linear actuator, but since then rotary actuators have been added to 
the product portfolio along with twin actuators, various types of built-in actuators and a wide 
range of accessories.  The possible application of the actuators are many as lifting capacities 
range from 200 N – 10.000 N, furthermore some actuators are built for high temperatures or 
other harsh conditions.  The portfolio consists of more than 10.000 different articles including 
customized combinations and various accessories.  Supplying components for use in other 
companies’ products classifies LINAK as an original equipment manufacturer (OEM).  With 
an actuator representing as much as 30-40% of the cost price of the end product, LINAK has 
to ensure the competence marketed through the components is cutting edge. 
Milestones 
Since LINAK began manufacturing linear actuators in 1980 the company has grown rapidly.  
The expansions in Denmark and abroad have resulted in LINAK being the world leader in 
designing and manufacturing electric actuator systems.  The LINAK of today is quite far 
removed from the smithy started by Christian Jensen in 1907.  The development from local 
smithy to international company has not been without dramatic changes.  Important 
milestones in the company’s development are listed in Table 7-11 below. 
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Table 7-11: Milestones – LINAK A/S69 
Year Description 
1907 The company is founded by the grand father of current owner/CEO. 
1976 Bent Jensen takes over the company. 
1979 Bent Jensen invents the linear actuator. 
1980 The linear actuator is put in production. 
1984 The company changes its name to LINAK A/S.  (LINear AKtuator) 
1985 LINAK opens its first sales office abroad, in Sweden. 
1986 
An electronics department is added to the organization.  In the years to come the electronic controls 
become a more and more important component in the products, and intense development is performed 
within the electronics field. 
1989 A separate company for sales in Denmark was created.  LINAK Denmark A/S is situated in Silkeborg.  Actuation systems for hospital and care usage are introduced. 
1990 LINAK opens its first subsidiary abroad, in Great Britain.  The company is situated in Smethwick, West Midlands.  Since then LINAK has opened one or two subsidiaries each year all over the world. 
1992 The company is awarded “The Golden Anvil” by a regional newspaper, JydskeVestkysten.  This award is the first of many awards won in the following years. 
1995 The company receives the “Mads Clausen Award of Honour”70. 
1998 The DESKLINE system is developed.  The company receives “The Award of Honour” from The Danish Society of Polio and Accident Victims. 
1999 
A factory producing the CARELINE and HOMELINE products for the US markets is opened in 
Louisville, Kentucky.  LINAK is awarded “Entrepreneur of the Year” by the accounting and 
consultancy firm Ernst & Young. 
2000 
LINAK is awarded “The Mark of Honour of King Frederik the 9th for meritorious effort for Danish 
exports” by His Royal Highness Prince Henrik of Denmark and is awarded “Workplace of the Year 
2000” by the General Workers Union in Denmark. 
2001 
The company reached an annual turnover of 1 billion DKK.  The daily financial paper “Børsen” 
awards LINAK “Gazelle Company 2001”. 
The BPR project “Efficient Organization” is initiated. 
2002 A new round (!) factory is opened - all production of DESKLINE products is moved to this unit.  The DESKLINE division is a reality. 
2004 LINAK is awarded Post Denmark’s “Supply Chain Award”. A new class of products, TwinDrives, is introduced in the HOMELINE division. 
2005 As the first Danish company, LINAK obtains approval to export to China.71  
 
As described in Table 7-11 above LINAK has followed the traditional path for 
internationalization found in so many Danish companies.  With the opening of the first sales 
office in Sweden in 1985 and the first subsidiary in Great Britain in 1990, LINAK started the 
dramatic expansion of the geographical coverage. 
Business Process Reengineering 
After a long period of constant expansion and increase in turnover (and a more or less 
constant cost rate) in 2000 costs were increasing.  LINAK was under increasing pressure from 
low cost producers in Eastern Europe and the Far East, and managerial intervention was 
needed.  Management developed and analyzed a number of scenarios – hereunder moving 
parts of the production to Hungary.  The analysis showed that approx. 20% of the cost price 
was salary, and after adding increased transportation cost etc. it was estimated that savings in 
                                                 
69  Source: www.linak.dk and www.linak.com. 
70 Mads Clausen is the CEO of Danfoss, another prominent Danish company. 
71  By January 1st 2005 a new law was put in effect making it possible for companies to obtain approval to 
export goods to China.  Up till then only locally produced products could be marketed.  LINAK was the 
first Danish company to obtain this approval, and number 41 in the world!  LINAK has plans to start 
production in China within the next three to five years. 
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the range 5-6% could be achieved.  After discussing the situation with employees and the 
labor unions, it was decided to try and fight back instead of simply outsourcing the cost 
problem.  After a preliminary analysis it was decided to initiate a project, the Business 
Process Reengineering project, to alter the cost structures by changing the way production and 
sourcing was carried out.  In the project no less than eight separate sub-projects were 
identified, the two most radical were to redesign the company’s processes and to organize 
around four product divisions: CARELINE/MEDLINE, TECHLINE, DESKLINE, and 
HOMELINE (see Table 7-12 below). 
Table 7-12: LINAK’s Product Divisions72 
Business Area Description  
CARELINE / 
MEDLINE 
The MEDLINE & CARELINE Division provides products 
for use in hospital and health care applications, thereby 
giving comfort for both patient and caregiver.  Products are 
applied to e.g. hospital beds and dental chairs. 
 
TECHLINE 
The TECHLINE Division is focused on providing products 
for use in industrial equipment like machinery & 
workspace, building & construction, and mobile equipment.
 
DESKLINE 
Due to the DESKLINE system people can sit or stand 
comfortably at their office or workplace as the DESKLINE 
system makes it possible for manufacturers of desks and 
other pieces of office equipment to install sophisticated 
motorized systems that provide optimum ergonomics and 
adjustable desk applications.  
The key is to improve ergonomics at work by enabling the 
workplace to be adjusted to each individual, instead of 
making him or her adjust to the workplace. 
 
HOMELINE 
By means of LINAK HOMELINE system, it is possible to 
enjoy the pleasures of comfortable and adjustable pieces of 
furniture at home. Moreover, the high force capacity makes 
it possible to incorporate HOMELINE actuators in chairs, 
beds, recliners, couches, massage chairs or other pieces of 
furniture used in private homes for comfort purposes. 
However, the number of applications of the HOMELINE 
system in the home is endless.  
 
Each product division was to have its own cost and profit centre structure giving each a 
degree of autonomy and responsibility for profitability.  Besides the product divisions two 
“feeder units” (Electronics and Spindle Production) should supply the product divisions with 
control boxes and spindles, respectively.  As an extra spin on the setup the product divisions 
are not obliged to buy in-house, making sure the “feeder units” can compete on market terms. 
                                                 
72  Source: www.linak.com. 
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Albeit DESKLINE represented less than 20% of the turnover, it was the first product division 
to completely separate its activities from the rest.  As early as 2002 all activities relating to 
DESKLINE in 2002 was moved to the facilities, a new round factory.  The cooperative 
intentions of the changes were “built-in” as the building contained few walls, and all desks 
were placed adjacent to the production to allow all employees to understand the job content of 
their colleagues (thereby killing off the normal rumors of inefficiencies and slackness of other 
departments).  The same is planned for the other product divisions but is currently on hold 
due to discussions on cost/revenue allocation principles. 
LEAN - From PUSH to PULL 
Following the initial results from the BPR project it was decided to implement LEAN 
Manufacturing.  The rationale behind the decision was not only to lower cost of e.g. 
inventory, but also to use the concept to make LINAK better able to handle the demands from 
the marketplace: shorter lead times, smaller batch sizes etc.  To achieve this goal the 
production was split into assembly and component production.  The production philosophy 
was changed from a PUSH concept supported by the extensive use of MRP-systems to a 
customer oriented PULL system.  The order cycle was changed from 6-8 weeks to 3 weeks 
and the production cycle was changed accordingly from 3 weeks to 1 week73.  The change 
from PUSH to PULL was facilitated by the implementation of a Kanban system74 which has 
even been extended to include a number of the suppliers. 
Morten S. Raahede (Logistics Manager) describes the outcome of the LEAN project: 
“The employees most probably knew productivity was too low – and they 
accepted the need to improve radically.  …  It took us only three month to 
reduce the cost price by 50% - and this was achieved by simple process 
changes and changes to the production planning.  …  The good thing is that 
people are really proud of the improvements they have taken part in.” 
This quick win was somewhat countered by the need to invest in e.g. better IT systems but the 
productivity improvement has been secured – the current turnover by employee of 1.2 mill. 
DKK and a lowered cost for components add up to an overall improvement of 40% in the 
period 2002-2005. 
Network 
The network is continuously expanding; currently (mid-2006) the company has 25 
subsidiaries and 9 distributors.  Especially with the last couple of years the expansion has 
been quite dramatic – in the 2004 annual accounts the company had only 15 subsidiaries (see 
Figure 7-18 below).  Production takes place at two sites: Nordborg (DK) and Louisville 
                                                 
73 Order Cycle - the minimum time needed to fulfil an order – the time from the order is placed to the earliest 
possible delivery time.  The production cycle is the time from the production order is initiated till the order 
is completed (ready for shipment).  The production cycle is thereby a part of the order cycle.  For more on 
these issues, please refer to e.g. Hill (2005) or Stevenson (2005).  
74 Kanban - a simple control system, often used in concert with Just in Time (JIT).  For a description of the 
concept, please see e.g. Hill (2005) or Stevenson (2005). 
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(USA).  The latter produces for the American market only75 whereas 90% of the production in 
the former is exported. 
Figure 7-18: Legal Structure – LINAK76 
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75 Currently manufacturing competencies are at a lower level in the US than Denmark.  Therefore only 
relatively simple products are manufactured at the US plant.  A few high-volume products are being 
redesigned to enable manufacture at Louisville. 
76 Source: LINAK (2004), p. 5. 
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LINAK Today 
The strategy developed back in 2000 was a successful one.  The negative financial 
development was stopped – and the company has been able to continue the aggressive 
expansion.  In Table 7-13 below the financial key figures for the last years are listed. 
Table 7-13: Financial Profile – LINAK A/S  
End Date Turnover Profit Before Tax No. of Employees  
2005-06-30 1.476.121 210.821 1.275  
2004-06-30 1.315.542 152.015 1.185  
2003-06-30 1.142.107 94.908 1.142  
2002-06-30 1.141.411 136.377 1.105  
2001-06-30 1.015.611 131.980 1.005  
2000-06-30 780.352 100.305 823  
 
Both turnover and number of employees have increased steadily with no fluctuations.  PBT 
has increased with a rate higher than turnover, with one major fluctuation (2003).  Especially 
the development within the last two years holds promise of future results. 
Markets 
The market in general is growing but the situations differ across geography.  In Asia and USA 
the market is increasing whereas Europe is stagnating.  The most important countries in terms 
of turnover are USA (22%), Germany (14 %), Denmark (12 %), Sweden (10%), UK (also 
10%), and France (8%).  Turnover across product divisions also displays heterogeneity as 
DESKLINE accounts for 18%, MEDLINE/CARELINE accounts for 70%, TECHLINE for 
9%, and HOMELINE for 3% of turnover. 
Also market position differs across product divisions, ranging from market leader 
(MEDLINE/CARELINE) to new entrant (HOMELINE).  The customer portfolio in the 
MEDLINE/CARELINE consists of five very large internal companies and a number of 
medium size national companies producing equipment (primarily beds) for hospitals.  A very 
little share of products is sold to smaller producers.  LINAK is also the largest supplier within 
the DESKLINE segment where the typical customer is a medium size producer of office 
furniture.  These products are primarily sold in Europe but the sales in USA is growing.  In 
contrast, LINAK is a small player in the two other segments, TECHLINE and HOMELINE.  
They differ greatly, though, as quantity sold in TECHLINE is low and level of modification 
high, whereas HOMELINE is precisely the opposite. 
Competition 
The competition similarly differs across product divisions.  Only the largest (and most 
professional) companies are able to service the largest segment, MEDLINE/CARELINE, due 
to the high standards of quality defined by customers and regulatory bodies in countries 
across the world.  In other segments regulatory requirements are less strict giving access to 
smaller competitors. 
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Overall the three largest competitors are Okin, Dewert, and SKF/Magnetic – their revenue 
ranging from 350 to 600 mill. DKK77.  The rest of the competitors are either specialized in a 
sub-segment or oriented towards a national/regional market.  In USA a few very large 
competitors supply actuators within the TECHLINE segment. 
The biggest threat in terms of competition is the threat from “copy cats” in China, companies 
specializing in copying existing designs and manufacturing them at very low prices.  LINAK 
has tried to have a few of these companies prosecuted but this has turned out to be very 
difficult and very expensive.  So far no effective way of dealing with this issue has been 
found. 
Customers 
As is the case for many suppliers to OEM’s the customer portfolio is dominated by few 
customers.  At LINAK the four largest customers account for 40-45% of the largest segment 
(MEDLINE/CARELINE) representing approx. 28-32% of total turnover.  To a certain extent 
this problem is diminishing as LINAK has entered growing markets which are commercially 
unrelated to the MEDLINE/CARELINE segment.  If these markets develop as expected the 
dependency of these four customers thereby will diminish, but until then they are critically 
important to LINAK.  To address this issue LINAK has developed the “Brick Wall Strategy” 
aiming at integrating closely with important customers to keep competitors at distance and 
decreasing the probability of losing the business.  
Production Setup 
The production setup is definitely geared for expansion.  As previously mentioned an actuator 
consists of the following components: motor, gear, spindle, control box and control – but not 
all these components are produced at LINAK.  All motors and gears are purchased from a few 
very large producers whereas spindles are to a large extent produced in-house.  This 
production is performed on fully automated equipment, just requiring the dimensions of the 
spindles and enough input (steel bars) to complete the order.  Another component mostly 
produced in-house is the control box.  To stay as independent as possible from the IC-marked, 
the company has decided to keep the production of control boxes in-house as well.  Currently 
product developments are creating more generic control boxes for use with a bigger portion of 
the actuator mechanics ensuring the number of control boxes to be produced is minimized.  
Morten S. Raahede explains: 
“We are fully aware our production is by no means cost optimal, but it ensures 
stability.  …  We are not dependent on the very unstable IC industry, and that’s 
a necessity when lead times are short and product development is ongoing.  …  
The current challenge is to build more generic control boxes.  …  Then we can 
even build-up a small safety stock to ensure continued delivery of end-products 
in times of shortage.” 
                                                 
77 Source: Morten S. Raahede, LINAK.  For more information on these companies, please refer to 
www.okin.de, www.dewert.de, and www.magnetic.skf.com, respectively. 
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Where components are produced in-house the scheduling resembles when acquiring inputs 
from external parties: in as small batches as possible.  Small inventories (called supermarkets) 
de-couple the (small) batch production in the feeder units from the assembly units – and 
everything except the ‘main component’ passes through the supermarkets.  Large batches (and 
large quantities purchased) are place in “normal” inventory and the supermarkets are 
replenished from here. 
Assembly 
With the implementation of LEAN came the introduction of U-cells, assembly/production 
cells shaped like the letter U.  These production cells are characterized by high flexibility and 
adaptability to the production of smaller batches of actuators.  Each cell is manned by one or 
more persons, carrying out either all the operations or only a part of the operations needed to 
complete the component.  Due to continuous rotation between tasks each employee is able to 
perform all functions in the cells and therefore it is quite simple to switch between small and 
large batches by simply adding or removing personnel in a cell. 
The production cells (U-cells) are serviced by a so-called “water spider” who has the 
responsibility to keep production going at the designated cells.  This means making sure 
there’s enough input to the cell to communicate with e.g. engineers if there is a problem in the 
production. 
Requirements across Product Divisions 
The demands placed on LINAK across the four product division vary greatly.  The demands 
placed on LINAK with regards to the CARELINE/MEDLINE product division are primarily 
demands for high quality and a high number of variants.  Conversely within DESKLINE the 
number of variant is quite low, but competition is fierce.  In the HOMELINE division the 
demands are primarily for low prices.  In the TECHLINE division, batches are often smaller 
as components are applied to expensive machinery, and there’s neither price competition nor 
demands for short lead times.  For all but TECHLINE there is a demand for short lead times 
and high delivery precision. 
Currently, the CARELINE/MEDLINE is the most important division, but LINAK has high 
expectations for the DESKLINE and TECHLINE.  In the HOMELINE division a new class of 
products, TwinDrives, was introduced in 2004 and expectations are high here as well. 
Sourcing 
To support the production in meeting these requirements the sourcing strategy defines how 
input is secured.  At LINAK the sourcing policy dictates outsourcing and a reduction of the 
supplier base in order to support the further development of the logistics system: 
“If we are supposed to lower inventory and decrease lead and throughput times 
we need to work more intensely with our suppliers.  Since this work is quite 
time consuming we need to reduce the number of suppliers.  …  Luckily we have 
now agreed to systematically reduce the supply base.” (Morten S. Raahede) 
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So far the supplier base has been reduced from approx. 200 suppliers to 122 (end 2005).  
Within some areas the reduction has been quite radical, e.g. electronics where currently two 
suppliers (backed up by one more) supply all electronics components.  Other areas are a bit 
more complex, e.g. the molded parts where tools might cost as must as 1 mill. DKK and be 
developed for specific equipment (owned by the supplier).  In this case it will take longer to 
decrease the supplier base. 
Another aspect making it difficult to drop suppliers is the company’s position in the 
community, Morten S. Raahede explains: 
“When I first started here most of the suppliers were ‘old buddies’ of the owner 
or even the owner’s father.  They have developed their business over many 
years in parallel with LINAK, and they expect it to stay like that.  …  We’ve 
been told that it’s OK to drop an ‘old buddy’ if he continues to perform badly 
after many warnings – but it has to be done with great care.” 
The new sourcing policy is not well received at Purchasing: 
“We do have a policy but this is just a piece of paper – reality is somewhat 
different.  …  When trying to source an item we end up with the usual suppliers 
as they are the only ones we know who are able to follow our procedures, and 
know how we work.  …  The negative side of working so stringently with 
suppliers is that you limit the market.  ……  In Purchasing we would like to 
have 3-4 suppliers per input, but the sourcing policy does not allow this.” (Paul 
Frees, Purchasing Director) 
The high demands placed on the suppliers in terms of quality, documentation and adherence 
to protocol (processes) thereby limit the competition.  This mechanism is further enforced by 
the increasing time pressures (Time-to-Market). 
So, on one hand apparently volume goes to the ’usual suspects’ in the supplier base and on the 
other hand Purchasing would like to have more alternatives.  Apparently too few suppliers 
have the required competences?  It seems the quarrel between Logistics and Purchasing is 
about the core issue, the suppliers’ competency level; and the disagreement is about the 
approach to address this issue. 
Both agree the issue stem from the customers’ influence on product development. 
Product Development 
Being an OEM require LINAK to have engineers and designers working on adapting existing 
products into customers’ designs, or on designing new products78.  At LINAK approx. 40 
designers and engineers in Denmark and USA are constantly working to do just that.  Morten 
S. Raahede comments: 
“When analyzing the product portfolio it is apparent we have focused on 
fulfilling the customer requirements by creating new variants.  We have spoiled 
the customers by abiding them every time.  …  In some markets creation of new 
                                                 
78 Approx. 70% of the resources spent within R&D is spent on customer projects applying the actuation 
technology to the customers’ designs.  The last 30% is spent on technology projects - designing new 
products or developing new application areas. 
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variants was probably used as a competitive mechanism.  …  We have to reduce 
the number of variants – or at least try to implement postponement…” 
To Paul Frees the breadth of the product portfolio79 is a natural result of being an OEM’s: 
“In our market we have to develop the product the customers demand.  That’s 
the name of the game.  …  Most of our products are customer-specific – this is 
simply the reality of it.  …  As a consequence probably 95% of our inputs are 
specific to us – perhaps even to the product…” 
Recently the product development process was altered to include both Purchasing and 
Logistics – with the aim of reducing the number of unique inputs: 
“Our job is to tell Product Development where the required competences are 
available in our supplier portfolio.  …  As the lifetime of products are 
shortening and product development is speeding up we need this information 
readily available.” (Paul Frees) 
Logistics have a different perspective: 
“Products need to be designed for manufacture and components need to be 
reused across products.  Furthermore products need to be prepared for 
postponement.  …  We have been allowed to initiate a project on a ‘product 
configurator’ and newly designed products need to support this initiative.” 
Purchasing and Logistics thereby have their work cut out for them. 
Supplier Selection & Evaluation 
Following the reduction of the supplier base a stringent procedure for evaluating the supplier 
before inclusion in the portfolio has been put in place.  As the focus is on continuous 
reduction of the supplier base only very rarely are new suppliers admitted.  Existing supplier 
are being evaluated – both as a part of an annual evaluation and also in an attempt to map out 
competencies: 
“We are working on a model describing the competencies of our suppliers.  It 
will not contain any classes as such but a qualitative indication of their 
competency level.  …  The matrix could show current volume on the one axis 
and their competency level on the other.” (Paul Frees) 
The size of the task at hand is fully realized, Paul Frees: 
“It is not going to be easy to measure the competency – and to describe it to the 
other stakeholders, but we might try and use some of the categories from the 
annual evaluation form: quality, precision etc and then add special abilities…” 
As for the annual evaluation tools have been developed and the process is well in place: 
“The annual evaluation combines hard facts with subjective evaluations.  We 
intend to measure their impact on us – and the value they bring.  …  We have 
defined threshold each suppliers needs to perform above – if this is not the case 
Purchasing will investigate.” (Morten S. Raahede) 
The metrics used are depicted in Figure 7-19 below. 
                                                 
79 As much as 80% of the orders are for customer-specific products. 
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Figure 7-19: Supplier Performance Metrics – LINAK80 
Metrics 
 
 
E
xc
el
le
nt
 
G
oo
d 
A
ve
ra
ge
 
N
ot
 
ac
ce
pt
ab
le
 
C
ri
tic
al
 
 
 
(5) (4) (3) (2) (1) 
Performance Measure Unit      
Overall annual cost 
reduction % > 5 4-5 2-4 < 2 0 
Payment terms Days > 60 46-60 45 30-44 <30 
To ability to develop and 
improve services Subjective      
Delivery & Quality 
Agreement   Yes  No  
Audit result from LINAK 
audit Score (%) > 90 75-90 55-74 31-54 < 31 
Environmental 
management system  
ISO 
14001 
Plan. 
ISO 
Env. 
aware 
No 
plan 
Public 
order 
Drop out in production PPM < 50 51-500 
401-
3.000 
3.001-
10.000 
> 
10.000
Problem solving regarding 
quality issues Subjective      
Communication regarding 
quality issues Subjective      
Delivery performance 
% 
delivered 
as agreed
> 99 98-99 92-97 85-91 < 85 
Delivery time Days 1 2-10 11-15 16-20 > 20 
Communication regarding 
logistics Subjective      
 
Resulting classification 
 
Score Supplier class 
52-59 A - supplier 
52-51 A – supplier 
31-41 B – supplier 
21-30 C – supplier 
13-20 C supplier 
  
Purchasing would like to have a credible threat e.g. to insource the activity in case the 
supplier does not perform satisfactorily over a period of time: 
“In principle most of the inputs could be produced in-house but we are not 
allowed to insource any activities.  The policy clearly states all non-core 
activities are to be outsourced, irrespective of the efficiency of the supply 
market.” (Paul Frees) 
                                                 
80 Source: Morten S. Raahede, LINAK. 
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A consequence of the sourcing policy is thereby that unique inputs are outsourced and it is up 
to Purchasing to ensure stable supply from the market as inhouse competencies are not 
maintained. 
SCM Practice 
Even if the company does not have a SCM department or any positions referencing SCM their 
practices on LEAN and their organizational design earned the company the Post Denmark 
Supply Chain Award in 2004.  Besides cutting costs the implementation of LEAN also had 
the consequence of forcing the company to re-think their processes and the way they do 
business across their network.  Figure 7-20 below depicts LINAK’s supply chains. 
Figure 7-20: Supply Chain Diagram – LINAK 
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Even if relationships with suppliers and customers are long-term the level of integration is 
quite limited.  Albeit the company has implemented an ERP system (Axapta) to support the 
LEAN processes the company does not exchange EDI documents.  A web-portal enables the 
sales companies to place orders but no external customers are allowed access. 
Cooperation with suppliers is influenced by the effort to reduce the supplier base – only the 
most competent (logistically and in terms of product quality etc.) are retained.  The 
electronics suppliers are the most advanced as they more or less run LINAK’s inventory of 
these components.  LINAK simply forward the demand forecast for the following week to the 
supplier who then use this information to replenish the inventory81.  For molded parts 
deliveries are made daily as these parts are relatively cheap and bulky making the storage cost 
– item cost ratio unfavorable.  Few of the suppliers are allowed to produce the items in batch 
according to confirmed forecasts but delivery is made against request only.  Integration with 
suppliers is thereby driven by the LEAN implementation: 
                                                 
81 LINAK can intervene and have deliveries from day to day. 
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“We are getting more closely integrated with suppliers – and we are reaping 
the benefits.  …  But this integration is not due to a strategic approach to 
supplier management – it has developed from the interaction between Logistics 
and the suppliers in making the LEAN processes work…” 
The goals set up for the LEAN implementation are being met – but there are still challenges… 
Challenges in Logistics 
According to Morten S. Raahede the approaching deadline for the implementation of the 
ROHS and WEE directives constitute the major challenge within Logistics.  The breadth of 
the product portfolio and the current practice of modifying any product and storing it locally 
(at sales company level) make the task almost unmanageable: 
“We have to verify our products meet the requirements [of ROHS and WEEE] – 
and in many instances we have to redesign the product.  The task at hand is 
enormous.  …  On the other hand, it gives us an opportunity to reduce the 
number of variants.” (Morten S. Raahede) 
The sales company stock of products which have only one customer is naturally a problem in 
itself, but having to analyze each and every product for compliance with the directives 
prompts Morten S. Raahede to propose radical changes: 
“We should take this opportunity to weed out any unwanted variants, centralize 
the warehousing, and implement postponement.  The ‘product configurator’ 
will enable us to develop customizable products to a higher degree than 
today…” 
These changes will most likely trigger a reaction from the customers – therefore the most 
important customers82 have been interviewed on the issue.  So far a solution of direct delivery 
from Nordborg and safety stock at the customers’ sites is being discussed.  If this is 
implemented the cost reduction will be substantial.  Opportunities for reusing existing designs 
might also arise as lower cost prices might encourage other customer to accept minor 
redesigns in their end product. 
Reducing the number of variants does not only have to do with the physical dimensions or 
shape of a component, in the case of the generic control box it has to do with functionality.  
Unfortunately this initiative was unsuccessful: 
 “Product development ran amok – to cost was way too high and it took too 
long.  …  Apparently they felt a need to design everything themselves, even the 
power supply.  …  If they had been able to carry out their task our work would 
have been reduced substantially – now we’re back to square one…” 
So, even if the solution is identified (and in principle quite simple) the implementation 
sometimes turns out to be somewhat more problematic… 
SCRM Practice? 
The company does not have a risk management practice – except for the supplier management 
described above: 
                                                 
82 The six largest customers (each representing a turnover of min. 30 mill. DKK per year) have assigned a Key 
Account Manager. 
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“We currently have a supplier who is experiencing financial problems.  
Purchasing naturally keeps a close eye on this – and we are ready to step in if 
needed.  Besides from this instance we really do not know how ‘dangerous’ 
each supplier is to us – we don’t know the impact of a supplier failure.” 
(Morten S. Raahede) 
Purchasing concurs: 
“We really do not have a problem – we’ve never experienced a production stop 
due to a supplier going bankrupt.  …  Nobody knows what the risk is, really.  …  
So we have to safeguard against it instead – implementing redundancy like we 
do with the Chinese suppliers.” 
No forum for a more strategic approach to risk management exists.  In the production, 
naturally risk management does exist, e.g. in the form of fire extinguishers and exception 
management in relation to the production and assembly processes.  But at LINAK as for most 
other companies the risk management is “built” into the manufacturing practice – and is based 
on regulatory standards.  A pro-active approach to SCRM is absent. 
 
Summing Up… 
LINAK has accomplished to implement a lot of changes within the last five years – in terms 
of implementation of LEAN, ideas on process improvements, and on integration with key 
supply chain partners.  They have been able to control their costs and work with the union to 
retain production in Denmark.  Opportunities still exist in aligning processes and integrating 
with the (larger) customers. 
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7.7 Novozymes a/s 
The Danish pharmaceutical companies Nordisk Gentofte A/S and Novo Industri A/S, 
established in 1921 and 1925 respectively, were merged in 1989 into Danish Novo Nordisk 
A/S.  Eleven years later the increased worldwide demand for enzymes justified the creation of 
a separate organization, and in November 2000 Novozymes a/s was established by way of a 
de-merger from Novo Nordisk A/S.  The history of the company is briefly described in Table 
7-14 below. 
Table 7-14: Milestones – Novozymes a/s83 
Year Description 
1925 Novo Industry A/S is established. 
1939 
Thorvald Petersen, one of the founders of Novo, was worried that WW2 would cut off supply of 
pancreat glands, which was used to produce the enzyme trypsin.  Research for alternative methods of 
extracting the enzyme for leather softening was initiated. 
1941 More or less by accident, the enzyme extraction process was discovered.  The new enzyme was named Trypsin Novo. 
1952 Novo develops its first fermented enzyme Thermozyme, enabling large-scale production of enzymes for industrial use.  The enzyme is used for starch removal. 
1961 Dr. Hallas Møller takes over as CEO. 
1962 
The company enters the detergent industry as it is approached by Carlsberg to reproduce an enzyme 
used in their production.  Researchers discover the enzyme is good at removing obstinate blood and 
sweat.  The resulting product, Alcalase, is incorporated in Bio-tex. 
1963 Alcalase is marketed, creating one of the landmarks in the development of detergents.  The product removes all types of protein-based stains such as grass, blood, egg, and perspiration.  
1965 The company enters the alcohol industry by the introduction of Amyloglucosidase Novo, an enzyme which breaks down starch into glucose. 
1967 
Novozymes opens a new enzyme factory in Copenhagen, Denmark. 
Novozymes buys Schweizerische Ferment AG (SFAG) and establishes a sales office in Mainz, 
Germany. 
1969 
The world's largest enzyme production factory in Kalundborg, Denmark starts production. 
At the same time sales plummets due to the speculation by the influential Ralph Nader on the health 
implications of handling and potentially also using detergents containing enzymes.  Employees were 
laid off, and financial disaster was lurking. 
1971 
Following a complaint by Ralph Nader to the American Food and Drugs Administration (FDA), it was 
concluded that the use of enzymes in detergents is safe, and that they should play a bigger role in the 
future.  Sales soon rose again. 
1972 The cost-efficient detergent enzyme Savinase (a.k.a. The White Tornado) is launched. 
1973 The enzyme Termamyl is launched.  It is intended for automatic dishwashing, and is especially good at removing starch-based stains, as pasta, potato, gravy, chocolate, and baby food. 
1979 Novozymes opens an enzyme factory in Franklinton in North Carolina, USA. 
1981 Mads Øvlisen takes over as CEO from Dr. Hallas Møller. 
1982 As a result of 15 years of research, dust-free enzymes in the form of granulate is marketed. 
1984 The first enzyme for industrial use produced by genetically modified organisms (GMOs), Maltogenase, is launched. 
1987 An detergent enzyme, Celluzyme, that makes fabric maintain its colours longer is launched. 
1988 An enzyme for removing fat and another for treatment of denim is launched. 
1989 
Novo Industry mergers with the pharmaceutical company Nordisk Gentofte A/S, creating Danish 
Novo Nordisk A/S. 
An enzyme factory in Curitiba, Brasil is opened. 
1990 Interested in the biotech industry, the company buys California-based Entotech.  The company is used as a research unit. 
 
                                                 
83  Source: www.novozymes.com and Thomas Videbæk, Novozymes. 
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Table 7-14 (cont’d) 
Year Description 
1992 
More enzymes are introduced, but more importantly: the cloning system Expression Cloning is 
developed.  It enables the quick and safe transfer of useful enzymes identified in other organisms into 
a growth media.  Also this year the Environmental Committee was established dealing with 
environmental and sustainability issues. 
1994 Novozymes publishes Denmark's (and one of the world's) first environmental report. 
1995 A joint venture in China is established. 
1996- 
1998 
More enzymes are introduced for bleaching, fat-removal, and for washing clothes at lower 
temperature.  Earliest initiatives relating to SCM. 
1998 An enzyme manufacturing plant is opened in Tianjin, China. 
1999 The company implements Triple Bottom Line. 
2000 Novozymes was established as an independent company following a demerger from Novo Nordisk.  Steen Riisgaard becomes president and CEO of the new company.  The SC Organization is created. 
2001 
Following the demerger a new strategy is launched: to expand outside the enzyme industry.  Initialliy 
this means the introduction of industrial microorganisms. 
Novozymes buys Sybron Biochemicals in Virginia, USA - now Novozymes Biologicals. 
2002 
The acquisition of US based George A. Jeffreys and Interbio strengthens Novozymes’ position within 
industrial microorganisms. The two companies were integrated into Novozymes Biologicals. 
Novozymes acquires the activities of BioGaia Fermentation, Sweden - now Novozymes Biopharma. 
The acquisition marks Novozymes’ first step into the pharmaceutical field. 
2003 The biological solution are further strengthen by the acquisition of Semco Bioscience and Roots.  Both companies becomes part of Novozymes in Salem, USA. 
2004 Innovation never stops: a new stain fighter, Stainzyme, is introduced.  It removes difficult stains in cold water, and retains the colours of the fabric. 
  
Today Novozymes is the world’s leading manufacturer of enzymes and micro organisms with 
an overall market share of approx. 40%.  Headquartered in Bagsværd, Denmark, the company 
employs approx. 3.900 people worldwide, hereof approx. 2.100 in Denmark.  Turnover has 
been increasing steadily and exceeded DKK six billion in 2004, see Table 7-15 below. 
Table 7-15: Financial Profile – Novozymes A/S  
End Date Turnover Profit Before Tax No. of Employees  
2005-12-31 6.281.000 1.150.000 4.023  
2004-12-31 6.024.000 1.081.000 3.928  
2003-12-31 5.803.000 1.015.000 3.814  
2002-12-31 5.642.000 900.000 3.629  
2001-12-31 5.271.000 871.000 3.349  
2000-12-31 5.033.000 705.000 3.204  
 
The Product 
The core product, the enzyme, is actually proteins that are found in every living organism: 
man, animals, plants and micro-organisms.  They are part of the all vital biological processes 
in cells and have the function of de-composing organic material into its most basic 
components.  Enzymes have been used in the industry for more than 60 years, speeding up 
various biological processes by acting as a very potent catalyst.  The most popular application 
areas for enzymes are detergent, textile, and food & feed, but enzymes are also used in many 
other areas.  One of the most positive aspects of using enzymes is the reduction of water, 
energy, and raw materials consumption when applied within an industrial setting.  
Furthermore by being bio-degradable replacing traditional synthetic chemicals with enzymes 
helps protect the environment. 
Chapter Seven – Case Studies 
Page 249 
The Production Process 
The production of enzymes for industrial use is quite simple, at least at the conceptual level.  
Most of the inputs to the manufacturing process are quite basic as main ingredients are 
commodities like corn, soy, starch etc.  And in principle the production process is quite basic 
as well, but in practice it is requires an extremely complicated and well run production 
facility.  The entire process is automated and controlled by IT systems only requiring 
intervention in case of exceptions. 
The process consists of three parts: 
1. Fermentation: 
Following inoculation in a flask the fermentation process is initiated in the plant. On a 
base of various natural ingredients such as potato starch, water, sugar, etc., the micro-
organism now forms the basis for the fermentation process that produces the required 
enzyme on a large scale. 
2. Recovery: 
After fermentation the enzyme is separated from the residual substances. 
3. Granulation: 
The third and final step at the site is granulation. Here the enzymes are sealed in a wax 
coating.  Following the production process the enzymes are packed into boxes (40 kg), 
drums (200 kg), or “big bags” (1000 kg). 
Of the three phases in the production fermentation is the most difficult part.  Even under the 
best of conditions the fermentation can be unsuccessful resulting in the loss of the entire 
batch.  Also the recovery phase shows a degree of variation.  In total the production cycle may 
well have an average of 10 weeks, but may vary from 8-12 – and still be considered within 
control.  This places production planning in a tight spot: 
“It’s all about keeping production up and running.  …  It really is pointless to 
optimise on these automated processes – the real money is on the process itself.  
If we could ensure more stability or even shortening the production process that 
would make a difference…  Currently we are further enforcing the use of 
standard inputs – perhaps this will lead to more stability…”  (Thomas Videbæk, 
VP, Supply Chain Operations) 
Besides the standard products84 Novozymes also customizes products (blends) for the 
individual customers or even develops special products (granulates).  In both cases the 
customer lead time is between one and five days – whereas production cycle is approx. 10 
weeks.  Therefore Novozymes has a fair amount of money tied up in inventoried produce. 
Product Portfolio 
The product portfolio is split into two business areas, micro organisms and industrial 
enzymes, the former representing a mere 5% of revenue85.  The industrial enzymes can be 
                                                 
84 Approx. 2/3 of sales is standard products, the rest is customized produce. 
85 The micro organisms are only included in the introduction part of the case study as this part of the business 
is managed in a more or less separate organisation. 
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further divided into food (24%), feed (12%), detergents (34%), and other technical enzymes 
(25%).  Micro organisms are used for various purposes such as aqua culture production, 
cleansing of waste water, and as a component in cleaning products.  The food enzymes are 
used within the baking, brewing, alcohol, juice, and wine industries, as well as other food 
categories including the dairy sector and the food oil industries.  The feed enzymes are 
primarily sold in Latin America and Asia where the enzymes are used to e.g. enhance the 
extraction of proteins in the production of animal feed material.  Enzymes are used in all 
modern detergents, a market experiencing a high degree of innovation and a relative high rate 
of new product introductions.  The last category, other technical enzymes encompass many 
application areas, such as fuel ethanol production, pharmaceutical production, leather 
treatment, and the textile industry.  The product portfolio consists of 600+ products which are 
created from the 75-100 semi-finished crude components from bulk production.  These 600+ 
products are input to thousands of customer products – and due to their criticality to 
Novozymes they are protected by a multiplicity of patents86.  Each of these basic recipes are 
expected to be relevant for up to 30 years have an expected validity and when required 
Novozymes customizes or even develops special products for its customers. 
Sourcing 
In terms of sourcing Novozymes is in a unique situation as the de-merger described earlier 
was only partial: a considerable portion of the sourcing is performed through the parent 
company, more specifically through the department Novo Nordisk Service Partner (NNSP).  
For reasons of scale economy the supply of non-critical items are managed through NNSP, a 
practice not without consequences for Novozymes: 
“The items supplied through NNSP are supposed to be non-critical, but a 
recent analysis showed a share of the items is semi-critical.  Since we do not 
have a choice to source these items ourselves we are in a tight spot as we are 
responsible for ensuring supply.”  (Ken Friis, Purchasing) 
Besides the ‘inconvenience’ of lack of control the practice of indirect procurement has had 
negative impacts when being audited (supplier certification): 
“We had one incident in relation to the required [manufacturer’s] certification.  
We are very thorough when it comes to adhering to standards and regulations – 
but we received a less than perfect score because we were not in direct control 
over the pest control which was outsourced by NNSP.  …  The problem was 
quickly remedies – but the rating stood…”  (Ken Friis) 
Even if most of the inputs purchased are very basic single sourcing does take place.  It is not a 
strategic choice per se but a result of long term relationships with a number of suppliers.  
Single sourcing is not considered a problem: 
“We have no problem with using single sourcing.  BASF for instance is the sole 
supplier of a certain input to our products, but since they produce it a several 
                                                 
86 As each “basic recipe” has an expected lifetime of 30 years, patents are not able to protect the innovation 
for the full period of usage. 
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plants in Germany we are pretty well covered in terms of ensuring the supply.  
We also buffer, just in case…”  (Ken Friis) 
As mentioned the majority of inputs are basic agricultural products and since the current 
supply meets demand at an acceptable price, in the long run the specialization in the 
agricultural industry might threaten the profits generated at Novozymes.  Already there are 
alternatives to the basic inputs: 
“If we wanted we could save some money short-term by buying inputs designed 
specifically for our production, but we have chosen not to.  We believe as much 
value adding as possible should be performed within our company – and 
choosing the most basic input ensures competition in the market place.” (Ken 
Friis) 
In principle Novozymes could establish their own production of agricultural products but 
have chosen not to – for reason of core competence.  Sourcing is global, and Purchasing is 
becoming part of the global organization: 
“When we source from third world countries we use the Triple Bottom Line87.  
We are very serious about of corporate social responsibility and work from 
very stringent ethical guidelines” (Ken Friis) 
Overall sourcing for the production is perceived as rather standard with the clear objective of 
ensuring supply at the lowest possible cost. 
Markets & Competitors 
Novozymes stands out from its competitors by spanning all four product areas.  Even so the 
company is the global market leader within both business areas, see Table 7-16 below. 
Table 7-16: Market situation for Novozymes a/s88 
Enzymes  
Technical Food Feed 
Microorganisms 
Market share 50 % 35 % 45 % 50 % 
Competitors Genencor DSM, Danisco, AB Enzymes BASF, Danisco 
A number of smaller 
companies 
 
At the aggregated level Novozymes is estimated to hold a 44% share of the global market for 
enzymes, and 50% for micro organisms (as illustrated above).  The main competitors within 
enzymes are DSM (5%), Genencor (18%), and BASF (5%).  The most important markets for 
Novozymes are Europe, North America, and Asia. 
The Organization 
As illustrated in Figure 7-21 below the Board of Directors at Novozymes consists of the CEO, 
two Vice Presidents and four Executive Vice Presidents.  SCM is not present at this level but 
                                                 
87 Triple Bottom Line – usually means expanding the traditional company reporting framework to take into 
account not just financial outcomes but also environmental and social performance.  For more, see 
Elkington (1998). 
88 Source: Thomas Videbæk, Novozymes a/s.  See also Novozymes (2005), p. 11. 
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at the level below where responsibility is delegated from the four Executive Vice Presidents 
to the twelve Vice Presidents89.  SCM has reference to Peder Holk Nielsen, Execute Vice 
President for Sales and Marketing. 
Figure 7-21: Organization Chart – Novozymes 
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The Network 
Besides HQ in Bagsværd Novozymes have two other sites in Denmark and subsidiaries in 
thirty other countries.  Production takes place at all three sites in Denmark (Bagsværd, 
Fuglebakken, and Kalundborg) and at sites in Brazil, China, Sweden, and USA.  The plants in 
Kalundborg, North Carolina, and China are all large-scale multi-purpose plants, whereas the 
plant at Fuglebakken produces in small batches only.  Much simpler facilities in Mexico and 
India perform blending and packaging operations of semi-finished produce from the “full 
functionality” sites.  Both these sites operate to fulfill local demand only.  Besides the 
warehouses at the production sites, warehousing is also performed in Singapore and at two 
sites in Eastern Europe.  Research and development is performed at multiple sites in 
Denmark, Japan, China, and USA. 
SCM Practice 
The company has worked with SCM since 1996 with the creation of the Supply Chain 
Organization at Novo Nordisk.  The first goal was to implement centralized warehouse 
management which was achieved during a project in 1997 – 1998.  The de-merger in 2000 
resulted in the creation of the Novozymes Supply Chain Organization, which still 
encompasses the downstream side of the business only.  Neither Bulk Production nor 
Purchasing is part of the Supply Chain organization.  When the SC organization takes over 
the product is has gone through the first two phases (Fermentation and Recovery) but has not 
yet been granulated.  Based on the customer requirements the SC organization granulates the 
produce, and packs and distributes it.  Some customers use the product within their own 
production whereas others use Novozymes’ products in the end product.  In the case of the 
                                                 
89 Besides these twelve VP’s located at HQ each of the sites across the world might have one or more VP’s. 
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former Novozymes performs consultancy-type support as the try and optimize the customers’ 
production processes.  These two types of customers are depicted in the diagram below. 
Figure 7-22: Supply Chain Diagram – Novozymes 
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Besides aiding the customers in optimizing their production Novozymes tries to integrate 
logistically with their customers by means of VMI and other types of IT and process 
integration.  Following an update of their SAP system Novozymes now offer their customers 
collaborative planning and forecasting in their APO90 application.  The company has 
ambitions within this area: 
“Today almost all production is against forecasts, but we would like to change 
that as inventory costs are very high.  …  We have started mixing granulates 
against orders instead of against forecasts.  Inventories have been cut 
dramatically due to this process change.  …  This type of postponement of 
course requires a very low variation in output – if we have to perform 
continuous control the process wouldn’t work.”  (Thomas Videbæk) 
By implementing this type of postponement91 the company has to be very certain their 
forecasts on the basic components is accurate: 
“It is very important for the SC Organization to give precise forecasts to the 
Bulk Production.  We are very good at the aggregated level – and at the level 
we keep stock.” (Thomas Videbæk) 
Besides forecasting Novozymes also offers easy integration through the use of Business 
Content, an open interface supported by the SAP application.  Alternatively the customers can 
use a web application to monitor the progress of e.g. their orders. 
For the larger customers Novozymes even offers to partake in research and development 
activities ranging from developing a new mix from existing components to developing a new 
                                                 
90 APO – Advanced Planning and Optimizing.  Planning module in SAP for multi-site planning and 
optimization of production and distribution.  For more, please see www.sap.dk. 
91 The SC Organization is being measured on a number of KPI’s, e.g. inventory value, days of sale, delivery 
reliability, throughput etc.  The KPI ‘Master Plan Schedule Adherence’ monitors SCO’s forecast for Bulk 
Production.  
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enzyme92.  Novozymes thereby distinguishes itself from the rest of the industry as it is the 
only company with resources to perform projects of this scale (and number). 
Major Risks 
The overarching risk source for Novozymes relates to the core of its technology: the genetic 
modification.  Even if the technology has been used for a long period of time it is still 
perceived as dangerous: 
“We have to be very cautious when communicating about GMO’s – in Europe 
this is really a hot topic.  …  That is why we do not address Food & Feed in 
Europe, in the US and in Asia it is not a problem at all.  Europe is not ready for 
GMO products within Food & Feed.” (Thomas Videbæk) 
Ken Friis concurs: 
“There is the theoretical risk of breach of containment when doing R&D – that 
the wind might spread genetically modified seeds.  So we have to be very 
careful when performing these projects – we work with NGO’s all over the 
world.  Europe is not ready for these types of products, at all…” 
Both interviewees agree sourcing is not really problematic: 
“The inputs we need in the SC Organization is basically packaging material 
and the outputs from Bulk Production.  Sourcing from our perspective is really 
simple.” (Thomas Videbæk) 
Ken Friis does not see sourcing as a critical risk: 
“We do not have a problem with single sourcing as these few companies are 
very large and stable corporations, like BASF.  For each of these products we 
have confirmed the supplier has redundancy in their operation…  For the rest 
of the input, it’s really very basic inputs which are bought in a market”. 
But the suppliers are monitored on a continuous basis, as is the markets. 
SCRM Practice? 
So, even if only few risks are identified risk management is needed, as described above.  
Currently risk management is performed by two separate entities: financial risk management 
and insurance contracting takes place under ‘Legal’ at corporate level, whereas the 
commercially oriented issues are dealt with by ‘Issues Management’ under ‘Corporate 
Communications’.  The latter is a forum where issues like acquisitions, child labor, and new 
customers are dealt with.  The Committee is cross-departmental in order to ensure all 
perspectives are covered before implementing new procedures across the entire company: 
“Whenever we want to alter the way we do business or alter e.g. the use of 
suppliers we let the committee evaluate the initiative.  Currently e.g. all new 
customers have to be evaluated.  One of the most important assets for 
Novozymes is the brand name – we are really careful about the way we 
communicate and operate in the global economy.” (Thomas Videbæk) 
Ken Friis comments: 
                                                 
92 The  
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“We have to make sure our products are not being used to criminal or 
unethical ends.  Above all else we have to protect our brand…  In that respect, 
Risk Management is one of the most important things we do…” 
 
Summing Up… 
From a risk perspective Novozymes is in a unique situation as the operational risks appear 
trivial.  Inputs are simple, suppliers are plenty, and unique inputs are few (and acquired from 
large, stable companies).  Their entire business is threatened by public opinion as the 
company is very aware – unfortunately the company is much too small to influence the 
agenda on a global or even European scale.  The relevance of a well run logistical system is 
therefore quite important as this minimizes the probability of major accidents at customers’ 
sites.  Choosing their customer carefully and working with the operations people at the 
customers’ sites is thereby not only a matter of offering a value adding service to the customer 
– it might also be perceived as a type of risk management.  Perceiving the inter-organization 
integration through this lens describes the integration of SCM and Risk Management of both 
process and structure… 
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7.8 Oticon a/s93 
Following the coronation of crown princess Alexandra in London in 1902 Hans Demant, a 
then manufacturer and marketer of bicycles in Odense, traveled to London to obtain a hearing 
aid as the one used by the queen.  The apparatus, called the Akoulallion, was purchased to 
help his hearing impaired wife Camilla overcome her handicap.  Hans Demant was soon 
contacted by others interested in buying a hearing aid - and that was the start of what was to 
become Oticon a/s.  The company has developed dramatically over the years, Table 7-17 
below shows some of the major milestones. 
Table 7-17: Milestones – Oticon a/s94 
Year Description 
1904 
Oticon is founded in Odense on June 8th, 1904, by Hans Demant, who is then a representative for 
General Acoustics.  Hans Demant obtains the agency for Acousticon’s hearing aids.  After a couple of 
years the company is relocated to Copenhagen. 
1910 Following the death of Hans Demant, his son William takes over the company.  In the following years William Demant obtains the agency for Acousticon products for the Nordic countries. 
1920s 
The company opens up to foreign markets as sales offices in Oslo, Stockholm, Helsinki, and St. 
Petersburg are established.  Production facilities are expanded, and the products are registered with the 
Danish Patent Office. 
1930s 
The product portfolio now consists of hearing aids, church hearing aids, and hospital systems (incl. 
patient radio receivers).  Following the import restrictions enforced in the early 1930s, Oticon starts 
light manufacturing and assembly of the imported products. 
1940 
Due to the Second World War importing goods from the USA is impossible.  Oticon therefore expands 
it’s assembly operation into production of hearing aids by copying the Acousticon product.  The 
‘Danish verion’ of the product is named ‘Acousticus’. 
1944 Oticon opens its first subsidiary, in Sweden. 
1946 The first real Oticon hearing aid, Oticon model TA, is introduced. 
1952 The Danish competitor Danavox wins the government contract for 1.500 hearing aids, forcing Oticon to focus on exports to make up for lost sales. 
1953 The introduction of the transistor meant much smaller hearing aids.  Oticon’s model T3 was one of the first hearing aids in Europe to use the transistor technology. 
1956 
Due to disagreement between William Demant, factory manager Christian Tøpholm, and export 
manager Erik Westerman, the latter two leave the company to establish Denmark’s third manufacturer 
of hearing aids, Widex. 
1957 William Demant and wife Ida Emilie transfer their Oticon shares to a fund, which is later becomes known as the Oticon Fund.  Ida Emilie Demant dies. 
1960s Oticon continues to grow.  The company relocates to Klædemålet, where the production area exceeds 3.000 m2. 
1963 The three Danish manufacturers of hearing aids establish OTWIDAN, an organization to manage bidding and development for the government contracts. 
1964 
In 1964 Oticon Nederlands B.V. is established and during the following three years the subsidiaries 
Oticon Inc. (USA), Oticon AS (Norway), Oticon S.A. (Schweiz) and Oticon GmbH (Germany) are 
established. 
1970s 
The factory in Thisted is opened, and the former Rolls-Royce factories in Scotland are taken over.  
Subsidiaries in Italy, Japan, England, Scotland, France, and New Zealand are established as well as the 
Danish sales company Oticon Danmark A/S and an independent company for managing exports: 
Oticon Export A/S. 
1977 A new independent research unit, Eriksholm, is established.  Oticon is now the world’s largest manufacturer of hearing aids. 
1979 Oticon celebrates its 75th anniversary.  William Demant dies, aged 91. 
                                                 
93  The description is supplemented with information from Oticon Fonden (2004) and Hald & Hedegaard 
(2004). 
94  Source: www.oticon.dk. 
Chapter Seven – Case Studies 
Page 257 
Table 7-17 (cont’d) 
Year Description 
1980s 
During the 1980s Oticon undergoes dramatic changes.  Deficit reaches 46 mill. DKK in 1987, and a 
new management is brought in.  Oticon Holding is established.  The company changes from 
perceiving itself as a high tech company to an audiologically oriented company. 
1985 Due to unsatisfactory results the management of the company is taken over by Palle Rasmussen, who has been accountant for the company and a member of the board for years. 
1987 
Lack of innovation has led the company to have “too few products”.  Misreading the potential in the 
ITE technology gives the American competitor Starkey an advantage. 
The “gang of four” who has led the company since the 1960s agree to part ways with Oticon. 
1988 Lars Kolind is employed as CEO to perform a turn around of the company. 
1990s 
Some of the most radical changes in the company’s history take place in the 1990s. The company 
relocates to it’s new corporate headquarters located on Strandvejen in Copenhagen.  Oticon becomes 
internally renowned as the ‘spaghetti organization’. 
1991 
Oticon introduces the world’s first fully automated hearing aid, MultiFocus.  This hearing aid is the 
first not to have a volume control.  Project “330” is initiated, aiming at improving productivity with 
30% over a period of three years. 
1992 
Niels Jacobsen, Lars Kolind’s co-CEO, succeeds in stopping the cash drain, which has been plaguing 
the company since the mid-1980’s.  In the years to come capital is accumulated, enabling takeovers of 
related businesses. 
1995 
Oticon Holding – later known as William Demant Holding – is registered at the Copenhagen Stock 
Exchange.  The Swiss company Ascom Audisys (today Bernafon) is taken over.  This is the first of a 
series of 30-40 acquisition made in the following years. 
German Siemens and American Starkey are market leaders. 
The production of amplifiers for the hearing aid is placed in a separate sister company, DanHybrid 
A/S95.  The intent is to commercialize the competences within amplification (in miniature). 
1996 Another revolutionizing introduction is made with the product DigiFocus – a fully digital hearing aid with a new audiological rationale called ‘Adaptive Speech Alignment’. 
1997 
Lars Kolind resigns as CEO, and Niels Jacobsen takes over full responsibility. 
Oticon adds ‘Personal Communication’ to its business area with the acquisition of Phonic Ear, a 
specialist within FM and wireless technologies. 
1998 A long-term supplier of electronics components is merged with DanHybrid, creating the company DancoTech A/S.  The new company supplies all hybrids for the William Demant Group. 
1999 
Oticon changes from being a niche to full-line supplier of quality hearing aids.  Hearing aids Ergo and 
Swift are introduced to cover low and medium price segments.  Swiss Phonax launches an aggressive 
attack on its largest competitors Widex and Oticon. 
The business area ‘Personal Communication’ is strengthened with the acquisition of the Danish 
company Danacom which manufactures headsets. 
2000 
Innovation continues with the introduction of the worlds (till date) most advanced hearing aid, Adapto.  
The magazine Forbes places Oticon amongst the top 20 best companies in its class. 
The business area ‘Diagnostics’ is added with the acquisition of the company InterAcoustics. 
English distributor Hidden Hearing is acquired, giving better access to the English, Irish, Portugese 
and Greek markets.  Also in the USA market position is improved through acquisition of the 
distributors AVADA and AHAA. 
2001 
Innovation continues with the introduction of the worlds (till date) most advanced hearing aid, Adapto.  
At DancoTech the production of standard electronics components is dropped, as it focuses solely on 
the production of micro electronics. 
2002 Oticon, in cooperation with GN Resound and Widex, helps establish Centre for Applied Hearing Research (CAHR)96 at the Danish Technical University (DTU). 
2003 William Demant Holding A/S wins the prestigious award European Company of the Year – an award previously given to i.e. Nokia, BMW and Hugo Boss.  Oticon wins the Danish Logistics Award97. 
2004 Oticon introduces the hearing aid Syncro, the world’s first hearing aid using Artificial Intelligence (AI). 
 
                                                 
95 For more into, please see www.dancotech.dk. 
96  For more info, please see www.dtu.dk/centre/cahr.aspx. 
97  For more info, please see www.logistikkonferencen.dk. 
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The lack of innovation thereby was close to causing the company to succumb but the 
corrective measures taken up through the 1990s and in the beginning of the new millennium 
changed the fate of the company and made it prosper. 
Mergers and Acquisitions 
Up till 1995 the company expanded solely through organic growth, but the acquisition of the 
Swiss competitor Bernafon started a wave of mergers and acquisitions.  Smaller companies 
within the hearing aid industry was acquired in order to obtain market share or to gain access 
to markets, companies in related industries were acquired to obtain synergy. 
Whereas Bernafon remained a more or less independent under the control of William Demant 
Holding, other companies seized to exist as they were merged into existing companies.  The 
brand name Bernafon is maintained due to differences in products and segments addressed: 
Oticon focuses on the high-end segment, Bernafon on the middle segment. 
The major companies in the new business areas ‘Diagnostics’ and ‘Personal Communication’ 
likewise remained relatively independent, but all companies share support functions/services 
like Finance, IT, and Logistics98.  Figure 7-23 below illustrates. 
Figure 7-23: Overall Structure of William Demant Holding99 
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Since the turnaround the company has experienced only progress in turnover, profit and 
number of employees, see Table 7-18 below. 
                                                 
98  This case study focuses on Oticon a/s and will only reference the other business areas where necessary. 
99  Source: Figure 1 in Hald & Hedegaard (2004), p. 98 (translated). 
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Table 7-18: Financial Profile – Oticon A/S  
End Date Turnover Profit Before Tax No. of Employees  
2004-12-31 1.944.738 700.239 1.082  
2003-12-31 1.606.020 558.681 994  
2002-12-31 1.497.519 514.589 908  
2001-12-31 1.433.089 434.277 892  
2000-12-31 1.197.231 342.874 795  
1999-12-31 898.251 207.017 755  
1998-12-31 750.881 143.491 690  
 
The Market & The Network 
The market Oticon operates in has changed dramatically over the past decade or so.  From 
consisting of more than 100 manufacturers, today the market consists of approx. 30 
manufactures with more than 85% of the market is in the hands of six players100 (Oticon is 
currently among the top three).  Demand for hearing aids in recent years has stagnated, but 
since less than 10% of people in need of a hearing aid actually owns or has access to one, 
potential is enormous.  Oticon does not sell directly to the end-users though, but to the hearing 
clinics.  This customer base in principle is not restricted by geography, but due to e.g. levels 
of wealth and cultural aspects currently customers are primarily from Europe and North 
America.  Therefore acquisitions have focused on creating an efficient distribution network on 
these continents (e.g. the acquisition of the distributors AVADA and AHAA in the USA).  
The network had been expanding rapidly for some years, and by 2001 the organization in 
Thisted was overburdened. 
Outsourcing of Logistics 
Supporting the network of sales companies and distributors with more and more frequent 
shipments was becoming quite some task, and in 2001 Oticon decided to outsource the in- and 
outbound logistics for the hearing aids business units (Oticon and Bernafon).  The chosen 
outsourcing partners was Wilson Logistics Group, but before entering into this agreement, 
five of the most prominent TPL providers represented in Denmark were invited to Oticon to 
present their visions, competencies and proposals for solutions. 
Several of the companies were potential candidates for the contract, one of the important 
reasons for choosing Wilson Logistics was that Wilson had Scandinavian staffs in most local 
offices, thereby facilitating easy communication.  Another reason was that Oticon due to the 
scale of Wilson’s operation got a high priority as a key customer101.  This means that the 
personnel in various airports and destinations are giving Oticon’s shipments high attention 
                                                 
100 Three of the six are Danish: GN Resound, Widex, and Oticon.  The other three are Siemens, Phonak, and 
Starkey. 
101 Oticon has tried to use Deutsche Post, but changed again after two months because of a perceived lack of 
focus from Deutsche Post. 
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and priority, reducing disruption in distribution whenever possible.  The TPL contract runs for 
4 year with yearly renegotiations of rates and other conditions102. 
Both parties have adapted processes and routines to support the cooperation: Oticon has 
ensured uniformity in requirements across product ranges and destinations Wilson has 
established an Oticon Help Disk, which is answering all inquiries from Oticon’s customers. 
Furthermore, Oticon informs Wilson about campaigns, product introductions etc., so that 
Wilson can allocate specific resources to take care of shipments with high priority, and ensure 
space in aircrafts. 
Organizing Logistics 
At the time the transportation was outsourced to Wilson responsibility for logistics was placed 
in three groups: Inbound Transports, Logistics, and Outbound Transports103.  But as a 
consequence of the outsourcing these groups were initially merged into one group called 
Purchasing, and subsequently split into the three teams: Purchasing/Procurement, Supply 
Chain Planning, and Logistics. 
Supply Chain Planning has the responsibility to create the master schedule, whereas Logistics 
schedule orders from this plan.  Purchasing/Procurement is responsible for ensuring supply, 
for quality management, and for managing the supplier base.  The Logistics team is 
responsible for initiating delivery, which is done through the ERP system.  Wilson receives 
information of any outgoing deliveries, and expedites these transport orders according to the 
following rules: 
? Direct deliveries, where the order are transferred from the sales subsidiaries directly 
through the ERP-system to the Miniload software. These orders are picked and 
dispatched the same day with a delivery service of 24 hours within EU. 
? Daily shipments to the large subsidiaries with an order cycle time of two days. 
? Weekly shipments to Oticon’s middle-sized subsidiaries overseas. 
? Several weekly shipments to the largest subsidiaries. 
Products 
As described in Table 7-17 above new products are introduced at a steady pace.  Oticon 
introduces two-three types of hearing aids per year.  It also introduces a new generation of 
hearing aids approx. every three years, all with five years of service coverage.  Each product 
adds new features or enhances features of existing products, the generic hearing aids can be 
described by its main components: microphones, loudspeakers, integrated circuits, hybrids, 
and shells, see Figure 7-24 below. 
                                                 
102  Initially the agreement covered only the hearing aids business units (Oticon and Bernafon), but has 
subsequently been extended to cover other units as well.  As the agreement is based on an open-books 
principle and a “cost plus” pricing scheme, it is in the interest of William Demant Holding to have as many 
as possible of its businesses using Wilson Logistics. 
103 As a reminiscence of the “spaghetti organization” the company does not have any organizational charts.  
Interestingly, the organization is still structured in formal entities, but is not documented. 
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Figure 7-24: Generic Product for Oticon104 
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Oticon currently has more than 110 product families, with each family having some 50 
different hearing aids.  It currently has about 32.000 item numbers, of which about 18.000 
item numbers are in stock.  Of these 18.000 items approx. two thirds are purchased.  All item 
master data is stored in a centralized ERP (MSG-PRO) system, which tracks and traces the 
critical components at the receiving dock as well as the correct usage of the components.  
Virtually all products are bar coded. 
The product portfolio consists of two distinct groups: hearing aids placed behind the ear 
(Behind-The-Ear, BTE) and hearing aids placed in the ear (In-The-Ear, ITE).  Albeit the 
former is sometimes referred to as the “old” technology the market for this category of 
hearing aids is still enormous. 
Production 
Contradicting the company’s self image as “a maker of customized solutions rather than a 
producer of components”, the company has production of components, sub-assemblies, and 
finished products in Australia, Poland, Scotland, and Denmark. 
The distribution of activities across the production sites has changed dramatically within the 
last two years, as the current dogma is to produce the more complex products (along with 
small batches) at Thisted in Denmark.  The production of standard components/products in 
large quantities has been transferred to Brisbane (Australia) and to a lesser degree to Krakow 
(Poland) and Hamilton (Scotland).  The production in Krakow is primarily sub-assemblies, 
whereas the production in Scotland has been extended to include BTE as well as ITE 
production.  The output from the production in Krakow is distributed to the other 
manufacturing units as output from Krakow is input to the production performed at the other 
                                                 
104  Source: Sketch supplied by Oticon. 
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sites.  As mentioned in Table 7-17 above, all production of hybrids is performed at the sister 
company DancoTech whereas the integrated circuits are supplied by Knowles and Sonion.  
Besides these units a large number of ITE laboratories service the various regions across the 
world. 
Product Development 
At Oticon the product development is integrated in the sense that besides R&D, both 
purchasing and production is represented on the projects.  The group works together as a 
team, and has regular meetings with suppliers and in-house engineers.  Projects naturally 
differ according to content, but two indicators have become very important: 
? Time-to-market (due to shorter product life cycles) and 
? Time-to-volume (to obtain economies of scale). 
Oticon does not participate in joint product development with competitors.  However, often a 
supplier is shared with the competitor(s), so in order to gain some control of the innovative 
technological content of its components, Oticon pays for tooling of new components (at the 
supplier’s site).  Oticon has full ownership of the tooling and has purchasing agreements 
when joint product development projects take place with suppliers. 
Oticon aims to stay as independent as possible, but due to the requirements placed upon e.g. 
integrated circuits, only one or perhaps two suppliers in the world can produce components 
for the latest products, at the required quality.  The long-term cooperation with Cicorel has 
these characteristics.  What might be referred to as “diseconomies of innovation”105 does 
apply for Oticon who has only exemplary production for this class of input. 
Process Strategy / Layout 
The production philosophy at Oticon is Mass Customization106.  By producing in batch to 
obtain economies of scale and a subsequent customization for the individual customer, the 
determination of the decoupling point is critical.  For some types of products, a value stream 
analysis would be required to determine this point, at Oticon this analysis is restricted by the 
customization possibilities of the products.  In logistics terms the concept of Mass 
Customization implemented at Oticon is thereby a combination of a push and a pull principle, 
see Figure 7-25 below. 
                                                 
105  Diseconomies of Innovation - the phenomenon that companies are forced to outsource critical activities due 
to the resources required to maintain competencies and/or technology to perform the activities in a cost 
efficient manner.  Please note: this is but a suggestion, no other “formal” term was found describing the 
phenomenon. 
106 Mass Customization – an operations concept from the automobile industry giving customers the choice of 
customizing their end product at no added cost (the flexibility is built into the process).  For a thorough 
description of the concept, please see Pine II (1993). 
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Figure 7-25: Oticon's Generic Production Process (BTE)107 
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The decoupling point and the “push side” of the production processes differ between the BTE 
and ITE technologies.  For both types of hearing aids, the customization is based on the 
choice of product (type, brand etc.) and of the electronic profile obtained from the hearing test 
performed at the outlet. 
For BTE type hearing aids, the customization takes place when the product is programmed 
and the color is determined (“shells” exist in a number of colors).  Basically, the pre-
assembled hearing aid can “become many products” depending on the programming and 
branding taking place.  The process is described in Figure 7-25 above. 
For the ITE type hearing aids the process is slightly different as the hearing aid is made to fit 
the customer’s ear.  At the hearing clinic, the technician makes a “model” of the ear, either 
using computer-based laser technology (SLA) or by means of a plastic material.  Depending 
on the technology in use, the model of the ear is either e-mailed or snail-mailed to the 
associated ITE laboratory, where the shell is produced.  Following the production of the shell 
the forwarded electronics (the assembled hybrid) is mounted in the shell, the hybrid is 
programmed, possibly laser engraved, and finally shipped to the hearing clinic. 
Economy of scale is guaranteed through batch production in the push part of the process, 
whereas customer satisfaction and differentiation is obtained in the pull part of the process.  
Obviously value of semi-finished goods inventory must be balanced with capacity planning in 
production, to ensure total cost is minimized. 
                                                 
107 Source: Figure 4 in Hald & Hedegaard (2004), p. 105 (translated). 
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A prerequisite for this production philosophy is modularization, ensuring the re-use of generic 
components in many end products.  This reduces the number of components thereby lowering 
the cost of production as well as inventory.  The trade-off as in increased costs for quality 
management on these generic components, and probably a higher development cost per 
component as well. 
Performance Measurement 
Besides the above mentioned indicators, Oticon is measuring a number of logistics key 
performance indicators (KPI’s).  Where possible KPI’s are based on 18 months of data, and 
are updated once a month.  There are a total of 72 measurements or indicators for the supply 
chain management.  Collecting this information leads to the rating of each supplier, which is 
also performed once a month.  An evaluation report is sent to the each supplier, creating a 
shared basis for discussing performance and incentives for improvement, where appropriate. 
Supplier Selection & Management 
Also during supplier selection stringent procedures are in place108, as e.g. each supplier is 
visited by purchasing and technical (production) staff to ensure the supplier will be able to 
produce to the required high standard.  Furthermore their financial data is evaluated to ensure 
the management of the company is competent and that the financial situation of the company 
will not jeopardize stability in supply.  In case the supplier passes these tests, Oticon sets 
goals for the supplier which are subsequently communicated during a personal meeting.  
Marianne K. Borum (Purchasing Manager) comments: 
“We do not do all these things to scare the supplier to perform well – we 
actually do collect the KPI’s and evaluate the suppliers as described.  …  We 
really have the intent of helping the suppliers in case of e.g. quality problems – 
we’d rather help an existing supplier to perform better than select a new one.  
…  Conversely, we’ve had a number of instances where we have not been able 
to help the supplier, or the supplier has declined our offer of assistance.  The 
supplier then seizes to work with Oticon.” 
But naturally not all suppliers are equally important to Oticon; the customer base of approx. 
250 suppliers is therefore segmented.  Currently the segmentation model contains the 
following categories: 
1. Critical suppliers, 
2. Non-critical suppliers, and  
3. Trivial suppliers. 
There are 15 critical suppliers, supplying components such as integrated circuits, EMC, 
customized, and unique components.  Oticon has close cooperation and partnership with these 
suppliers because they usually handle designs that are dedicated to Oticon.  Several of them 
are sole source suppliers.  An example is the collaboration between William Demant and US-
                                                 
108 Marianne K. Borum explains how the quality system contains documents describing procedures and 
routines for e.g. supplier selection.  The system itself is quite unstructured as documents are placed in 
various locations on Oticon’s intranet and shared disk drives.  A part of the material is contained in e-mail 
communication between members of the management group. 
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based Starkey about a small FM receiver to be clicked on the hearing aids to improve the 
hearing at conferences etc., where FM compatible microphones are installed. 
Further complicating the management of the suppliers is 1. the heterogeneity of the supply 
base (approx. 20 suppliers account for 70% of the purchasing volume), and 2. the fact that 
Oticon is a small company in a niche market relying on very large suppliers.  Neither of these 
circumstances are a result of a deliberate choice by Oticon, but simply characteristics of their 
context. 
Whereas the former can not be mitigated, the latter complicating fact is countered by the 
attractiveness of Oticon.  Marianne K. Borum: 
“Even if we are a small company in the electronics industry, our suppliers 
consider us an attractive customer as they get access to innovation when 
working for us.  …  We are a source of inspiration to them, and we push their 
capability by insisting on our high quality standard.” 
So, even if Oticon is a minor player in several of their suppliers’ industries they are quite 
successful in making the suppliers accept the contractual terms, the continued evaluation and 
monitoring, and (in many instances) to hold inventory for Oticon. 
Sourcing Strategy 
The sourcing strategy will therefore inevitably accept the reliance on sole suppliers.  
Marianne K. Borum: 
“The strategy is not formally written down, but we all know it.  …  Being in the 
market we are in, we have to accept that fact that sometimes there is only one 
supplier for a certain input.  In such a case we try to make them hold inventory 
for us.  …  But we prefer having more than one source for the input.  Take 
Knowles and Sonion for example.  Even if we decide to give a contract for an 
item to Knowles, we at the same time let Sonion know that there is a market for 
the item.  We have experienced ending up in a monopolistic situation with 
Knowles, we try to avoid that in the future.  …  But using sole or single 
suppliers is an inevitable situation for us – we simple can not produce every 
unique item ourselves.” 
The use of single or sole suppliers is perceived as an unchangeable characteristic of the 
business, as engineers continue to design even more complex, smaller, and sophisticated 
products at the cutting edge. 
IT Solutions 
As mentioned above, Oticon has integrated its processes by means of implementing an ERP 
system some years back.  External integration is in place by means of exchange of EDI 
documents, and Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI).  The purpose of VMI is to aid critical 
suppliers with their forecasting and production planning.  The VMI solution gives suppliers 
automatic notification when the inventory level gets below a certain quantity, calculated from 
weekly demand figures.  Currently, there are about 12 suppliers using VMI, representing 
approx. 80% of the purchasing value.  To ensure suppliers understand the criticality of using 
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the information made available buy the VMI solution, suppliers are educated benefits and 
correct use of VMI (e.g., for production planning and preventing bullwhip effect). 
On the downstream side, a web-enabled application is available to customers.  Approx. 50% 
of all orders are placed in this system, and transferred to the ERP system by means of an 
application called VIDELITY. 
SCM Practice 
Performing SCM is considered a core competence at Oticon.  Peter Finnerup (VP, Logistics): 
“We are all about SCM; it’s the most important function in the company.  If we 
can not keep our promises to our customers, we’re dead.  …  Lead times are 
getting shorter all the time – we have to meet the customers’ expectations, and 
to make sure we do it every time.” 
To meet the customers’ expectations, the logistics system has been redesigned several times, 
as described above.  The three teams (Purchasing/Procurement, Logistics, and Supply Chain 
Planning) support each other to ensure as smooth and efficient a flow as possible.  The 
complexity in the flow of each hearing aid is not considered a problem, Marianne K. Borum: 
“I believe one of the things characterizing Oticon is our ability to adapt to new 
demand or requirements.  …  We have the will to keep on improving the way we 
do things – and we are getting better at predicting changes in our environment.  
…  We adjust the organization on a continual basis.” 
Inquiring about the level of integration with suppliers and the supplier with who to integrate, 
Peter Finnerup comments: 
“We have chosen to work with certain suppliers - that supports our strategy.  …  
When we design hearing aids, the print for the hybrid is so small only one or 
two factories in the world can produce them.  And even they sometimes have 
problems meeting our quality standards.  …  When we design the prints so 
small, we’re overstepping the boundary from technology to art – once the 
production is up and running, it can not be transferred, not even to another 
factory with the exact same equipment.” 
Having minimized inventory and chosen to support shorter and shorter lead times, the need 
for on-site support when problems occur has forced the decision to co-locate the 
Logistics/SCM teams with the production in Thisted.  Differentiating between subsidiaries 
and distributors, the supply chain mapping of Oticon might look like Figure 7-26 below. 
Not shown in the diagram is the TPL supplier Wilson Logistics, who in-sourced all 
transportation as described earlier.  Wilson was initially chosen over Deutsche Post as it was 
critically important to Oticon to be a large and important customer, but when Wilson was 
taken over by TNT, Oticon paradoxically chose to stay with their current setup.  The decision 
was justified by Oticon by having their logistics manager Carsten Hedegaard represent the 
customer perspective in the realignment of processes and services between TNT and Wilson 
in the months before the actual takeover.  Following this exercise TNT and Oticon decided to 
continue the partnership, and Oticon subsequently transferred its courier shipments from DHL 
to TNT (see e.g. Mikkola & Skjøtt-Larsen, 2006). 
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Figure 7-26: Supply Chain Diagram – Oticon a/s (BTE) 
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SCRM Practice? 
One might expect that the complexity and the competitive pressures in their market had 
caused Oticon to implement structured and formal risk management (SCRM) for their 
operations, but Peter Finnerup stated at the initial interview: 
“We have no risk management in our area [SCM/Logistics].  We do not need to 
create another administrative hierarchy - it’s all about having the right 
processes and doing your job right.  …  If we had risk management we would 
need to document what we do – instead of just doing it.”109 
Later interviews have documented that risk management actually does take place, even if no 
formal organization exist.  Especially in respect to supplier selection and evaluation, the 
company has quite stringent procedures as described above.  The finance department performs 
a risk analysis of suppliers by evaluating the financial reporting, and the suppliers are 
frequently visited by Oticon’s auditors.  And interestingly, the company’s auditors have 
interviewed selected employees on the subject of Risk Management, Marianne K. Borum: 
“Actually, quite recently I was interviewed by our auditors concerning our 
procedures for Risk Management, but I’m unsure if this was initiated by the 
auditors themselves or if Top Management had requested the investigation.” 
So, summing up, the risk management practice is strictly informal as no organization nor 
positions exist.  In case an initiative is taken from Top Management, it is not communicated, 
and currently there is no link between the traditional financial risk management activities, and 
the informal SCRM practice focusing on safeguarding the extended enterprise.  Furthermore 
the sourcing strategy does not aim at decreasing the risk by e.g. in-sourcing unique activities. 
 
                                                 
109 At a later stage, Peter Finnerup modified this statement, hinting that of course Risk Management was 
performed by all employees as an integral element of the job. 
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Summing Up… 
Also Oticon has undergone dramatic changes during the last years.  The growth has placed 
heavy demands on the company, but Oticon has been able to deal with them.  Perhaps the 
“organic” organizational type with no organizational charts and a team orientation has 
enabled the company to quickly adapt to changes.  For Oticon as for other companies in the 
study the selection and cooperation with suppliers is of vital importance, as the technologies 
behind the product has become too expensive to maintain for Oticon itself. 
A consequence of the autonomous nature of the organization is a lack of control and a drift in 
procedures and routines, internally as well as with suppliers and customers.  As in the case of 
Wilson even trivial tasks become unique as the companies adapt to each other.  In conclusion: 
what appears to one of the major strengths of Oticon, its culture of autonomy and absence of 
hierarchy and formal roles, can also be perceived as its Achilles heel as it may result in 
unnecessary dependencies. 
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7.9 RIEGENS a/s 
From humble beginnings, RIEGENS have emerged as a successful leader within the European 
lighting industry.  Founded in 1956 the philosophy of the company was to develop technically 
evolved products and manufacture them to the highest quality standards.  The current owner 
and CEO, Frank Skovsager, bought the company in 1970, and relocated the company in 1976 
to its current location in Egestubben, Odense. 
In the beginning all sales was domestic, primarily through the two large wholesalers Solar and 
Louis Poulsen.  These two players dominated the Danish market and RIEGENS was therefore 
quite dependent on them.  Conversely, especially Louis Poulsen quickly became dependent on 
RIEGENS, as they allowed RIEGENS to produce products sold under the Louis Poulsen 
name.  Export took off in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s – at first through Louis Poulsen, 
but later through a Swedish/Finnish wholesaler Elektroskandia as well.  In the UK the 
products were sold through a number of smaller manufacturers of related products 
complementing the product portfolio of both parties. 
Up through the 1980’s and the 1990’s the support of the export sales varied, in periods 
supported by sales offices and direct sales efforts, at other times supported by before 
mentioned wholesalers only.  The increased domestic and export sales enabled the 
development of the manufacturing facilities by investing heavily in technology.  The company 
further strengthened its’ position in the market by taking out a patent on a central element in 
all overhead lighting cabinets: the reflector.  Besides producing for use in RIEGENS’ own 
products, the reflectors became a steady source of income as the patent protected the 
competence. 
International Ambitions 
The continued growth also allowed for an attempt to establish international manufacturing in 
Turkey.  The joint venture which was set up in 2001 intended at producing RIEGENS’ 
standard cabinets for the Turkish construction industry, but due to unexpected stagnation in 
construction combined with an increased rate of inflation the joint venture was terminated in 
2004. 
The 2002 acquisition of IBL Specification, a former trading partner who got into financial 
troubles, was more successful.  The company, located in Braintree, UK, resembled RIEGENS 
as it produced its own line of standard products and participated in projects ranging from 
supermarket stores to the prestigious Petronas Towers development in Malaysia.  The 
company which employed more than 100 people and was a well established supplier to the 
British lighting market was renamed RIEGENS LIGHTING Inc. and was fairly quickly 
integrated in the RIEGENS group.  Getting access to the UK market through the original sales 
force from IBL was only one of the advantages of the acquisition, capacity utilization another.  
Having similar manufacturing setups, it was fairly easy to begin utilizing non-allocated 
capacity by posting production orders across from Denmark.  And if the production is slightly 
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less efficient at Braintree, the lower labor cost (approx. 30% lower) more than offsets the 
added transportation cost. 
Following this success, RIEGENS has embarked on another joint venture, this time in 
Slovakia.  In order to stay competitive, the company has decided to start production there, 
Claus Jensen (VP, Sales) comments: 
 “The joint venture in Slovakia is perceived as low risk, since we co-establish 
us with companies we know [from Denmark].  Slovakia is perceived as being 
closer to Denmark [than the Far East].  The idea is to produce some of the low-
cost items there, and ship them directly to the customers.” 
Production thereby takes place at four sites: at Egestubben, at Braintree (UK), in Slovakia, 
and at Næsby Maskinfabrik (also located in Odense).  The latter is a small machining shop 
which was acquired in the 1980’s.  The production at Næsby Maskinfabrik is part non-related 
finished products and part semi-finished products.  Næsby Maskinfabrik A/S is connected 
with the RIEGENS companies through MS Invest Odense A/S110. 
Figure 7-27: RIEGENS Group Structure111 
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Organization 
Viewing the organization chart of RIEGENS a/s it becomes apparent that the company is a 
traditional entrepreneurial manufacturing company.  The company is functionally oriented 
with a number of department heads, responsible for their respective functional areas. 
                                                 
110  MS Invest Odense A/S is owned by Majbritt Skovsager, the daughter of Frank Skovsager.  She is active in 
RIEGENS A/S as Head of Sales Support.  LKE Electric Europe A/S imports electric components, and is 
owned by Frank Skovsager and Kaare Wagner, a member of the board of RIEGENS A/S.   
111  Source: www.riegens.dk. 
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Figure 7-28: Organization Chart – RIEGENS112 
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It is apparent that neither SCM nor Risk Management is formalized in the organization chart.  
The international ambitions are only detectable in the Sales & Export department where part 
of the personnel is dedicated large customers (Key Account Management), and others are 
responsible for a certain country.  Not shown in Figure 7-28 above, the purchase of IBL also 
meant a substantial increase in sales force as twenty people are servicing customer in the UK.  
Adding the sales people in Denmark, the two representatives in Sweden and the three in 
Norway, the creation of a professional sales organization is no longer an insurmountable task.  
There are no current plans for doing so, but the dependency of Louis Poulsen is lessening as 
sales management competencies builds up. 
Product Portfolio 
The product portfolio is split into three: 1. standard cabinets for overhead lighting, 2. unique 
lighting solutions for e.g. corporate headquarters, and 3. high quality products for interior 
industrial lighting.  Each of these three sections of the product portfolio is directed towards a 
distinct market, a distinctiveness that is directly observable in the physical layout of the 
production in Egestubben. 
The production of standard cabinets takes place in a separate building, which was built 
specially for this purpose113.  The aim is to produce with as low cost as possible.  For this type 
of products, RIEGENS’ strategy is to offer a product which is of a superior quality compared 
with the competitors’ offerings, but at comparable (albeit slightly higher) price.  The 
competing products all come from China, but RIEGENS still clings on to a share of this 
market. 
The production of the unique products, which is performed on a project basis, is also located 
in a separate building.  In this building prototypes are developed and manufactured, and even 
the final products (except in rare cases) are produced here.  This type of production is crafts 
based and rely solely on the competencies of the skilled designers and craftsmen. 
The last group of products is the standard items, often grouped in product lines by design.   
Some of these products are designed by the product development departments at RIEGENS, 
                                                 
112 Source: RIEGENS. 
113 And as of July 1st, 2005 these products are produced in Slovakia as well. 
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some are designs bought from external designers, and others have originated from some type 
of cooperation with either customers or architects/entrepreneurs. 
Production is quite standard as no postponement or modularization has been implemented.  
Projects are obviously made to order, and so are the standard cabinets, whereas the portfolio 
products are made for stock (and occasionally against large orders). 
Customer Base 
The customer base has changed quite a bit over the past years.  Solar, formerly an important 
customer, is no longer doing business with RIEGENS, and Louis Poulsen who accounted for 
65% of total turnover in 2002 no longer dominate the customer portfolio.  With RIEGENS 
LIGHTING accounting for one third of turnover from a wide range of customers, the 
customer portfolio is now much better balanced.  Now Louis Poulsen “only” accounts for 
another third of the total, Elektroskandia for 20% and the rest distributed over projects and 
small customers. 
The reduction in dependency has not changed the contractual relationship between RIEGENS 
and Louis Poulsen.  It is still based on a rolling five year contract which is re-negotiated every 
two-three years.  The contract is obviously only a fragment of the long-term relationship, but 
both parties insist on documenting the agreement.  The agreement with Elektroskandia is 
likewise documented by means of contracts.  As relationships with both companies are long 
term, and since both companies are well established in the market periodic financial checks 
are not performed, but the well-being of the companies is closely followed through various 
contacts in the companies. 
Financial Profile 
Despite the turmoil following the UK takeover and the Turkish joint venture, the company 
had continued it’s stable operations.  The number of employees has fluctuated around 200, the 
operation in Braintree having a further approx. 100 people employed.  As the company had 
always had a policy of disclosing as little information as possible, only profit before tax is 
available. 
Table 7-19: Financial Profile – RIEGENS a/s 114 
End Date Turnover Profit Before Tax No. of Employees  
2005-12-31 177.503 2.263 214  
2004-12-31 159.453 4.025 194  
2003-12-31 n.a. 996 184  
2002-12-31 152.380 1.855 212  
2001-12-31 n.a. 6.001 224  
2000-12-31 n.a. 9.174 196  
1999-12-31 n.a. 6.369 192  
1998-12-31 n.a. 7.120 179  
 
                                                 
114 No data available on RIEGENS LIGHTING INC., UK. 
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Modes of Production 
Not observable from the figures above, the trend in the project market is shifting towards 
short lead times.  Producing (and designing) to order this constitutes a real threat to the 
project sales, but so far revenue is increasing and capacity is sufficient.  The production of 
standard cabinets are also performed against firmed orders, as RIEGENS does not have 
warehousing capacity for this rather bulky, low revenue type product.  Orders are placed far in 
advance and are delivered in containers.  The standard/portfolio products are produced to 
stock (and occasionally against large orders). 
In contrast to many other companies, RIEGENS have never had the need to outsource 
production, except for the use of capacity suppliers.  The core processes in the production are 
quite basic and easily accessible in the market, many of the activities performed in-house can 
be outsourced with relative ease. 
Supplier Management 
The approach to supplier management has changed quite a bit over the past four years.  
Henrik Jacobsen (Purchasing Director) describes the practice in place when he joined the 
company in 2001 as: 
“The R&D department was free to use any supplier they liked.  …  The entire 
supplier base was unstructured, and there were no deliberate strategies or 
procedures for supplier management.” 
He was quite aware of the task ahead: 
“We needed to do a proper analysis of the entire product specification database 
to weed out unnecessary suppliers.  Given the time, we might re-design 
products for better use of standard components.  …  Current procedures are 
only tolerated due to a lack of resources…” 
The fix to the problem was a concentration of the supplier base, initially by working closely 
with the two largest suppliers, OSRAM and Philips: 
 “We have chosen to work with two strategic suppliers, OSRAM and Philips, as 
they cover approx. 90 % of the items we need.” 
Surprisingly, RIEGENS does not share fate with B&O in terms of being a small customer at a 
much larger supplier, as the purchase volume makes RIEGENS a pretty important customer.  
Henrik Jacobsen: 
“We really do not have problems getting the attention of OSRAM or Philips, we 
are the eighth largest customer within electronics components in Europe.” 
These two critical, strategic suppliers were not monitored: 
“We do not perceive using strategic suppliers as risky.  Both Philips and 
OSRAM are very big and well established companies…  Furthermore they are 
direct competitors as approx. 80% of the items we buy from them can be 
supplied by them both.  …  From time to time we move business from OSRAM 
to Philips or vice versa, depending on their performance and prices.  This gives 
them an incentive to perform well.” 
As for evaluating the financial results of suppliers, Henrik Jacobsen was confident that: 
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“…monitoring the financial results of supplier by e.g. subscribing to some 
credit information company does not make any sense.  Normally information 
about troubles in a company would be received too late for the information to 
be useful.  Instead we keep in contact with our suppliers and get the 
information we need through e.g. having frequent meetings at their sites.” 
Instead of periodic evaluation, RIEGENS had chosen to keep in continuous contact with the 
most critical suppliers.  Formal meeting were held 2-4 timer per years, covering a wide range 
of subjects within purchasing and product development. 
Expanding the ‘Select Few’ 
Interviewing Henrik Jacobsen in 2005, the sourcing strategies have evolved further: 
“We now have a setup of 6-8 ‘lead suppliers’ as we call them.  …  They 
represent a total of 70% of all input [to the production]  …  After analyzing the 
inputs we require we have evaluated our suppliers and selected a ‘lead 
supplier’ for each category.  ..  The real advantage of this supplier 
concentration is on logistics.  The selected suppliers are reliable, delivering on 
time, and in the right quantity and quality.  In principle we have redundancy as 
we have a number of alternative suppliers…” 
They still evaluate the suppliers through continuous contact and 2-4 meetings per year, and 
have extended the sourcing to China and Slovakia, as described above.  The 6-8 select 
suppliers forward a copy of their financial statement, but the skepticism towards this type of 
reporting has not changed.  Henrik Jacobsen insists: 
“This type of external fiscal reporting has limited value as it will most often be 
outdated when it is made available to us.  We really need to now what is going 
on right now, at the suppliers.  …  Listening to the grape wine is better than 
reading their financial statements, but even better is having direct contact [with 
the supplier].” 
Besides evaluating the soundness of the supplier companies, the performance of each supplier 
is evaluated on delivery precision and quality.  Only very rarely do quality problems emerge, 
and they are most often quickly resolved.  Delivery precision is likewise of minor concern.  
Only on project sales can delivery precision be problematic, due to the shortening of lead 
times and uniqueness of input. 
The Use of Information Technology 
As for IT integration, RIEGENS operates at a very low level.  Internal systems are based on 
an outdated technology, as modules in the system are not integrated in the same manner as 
any modern ERP system.  External integration is almost absent as it was realized that the 
benefits were marginal.  Henrik Jacobsen explains: 
“We realized that the advantage was in invoicing, not in order management.  
So we’ve stopped the implementation of EDI with our suppliers – only one of 
them has a setup.” 
In contrast to other companies, RIEGENS does not share e.g. production plans with suppliers 
or participate in any other kind of ‘Open Books Policies’: 
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“More and more revenue is generated from project sales.  And since lead times 
are decreasing it does not make any sense to share production planning 
information, at least not for this part of the production.” 
The company thereby has no IT support for internal integration – and apparently does not 
support its external relationships by means of IT? 
SCM Practice 
Apparently each member within the RIEGENS family is an autonomous unit - at least it is not 
identifiable in the organization chart where the responsibility for coordinating with e.g. 
Braintreee is placed.  So, internal coordination is either not present or strictly informal? 
According to Henrik Jacobsen it is not a problem that SCM is not apparent in the organization 
chart: 
“I believe all companies perform SCM, at least to a certain extent.  …  Some 
companies try to work with the concept theoretically.  …  We are more 
pragmatic – we cooperate with both suppliers and customers as we’ve always 
done.  We try to understand our suppliers’ sourcing problems and try to help 
them.  And we work closely with customers to understand how we better can 
fulfill their needs.  We work in both directions in the supply chain.  …  But we 
do not have the need to use the term SCM…” 
The company has certain practices which encompasses more departments, has long-term 
relationships with customers and suppliers, and tries to accommodate the partners with which 
it has integrated relationships.  Describing the company in terms of supply chains is thereby 
no problem, see Figure 7-29 below. 
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Figure 7-29: Supply Chain Diagram – RIEGENS 
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SCRM Practice? 
In RIEGENS risk management is reduced to the practices of individuals, as no department 
and no position for the management of the company’s risks exist.  When querying the 
interviewees about risk management they both concur that risk management is of critical 
importance.  Claus Jensen explains how risk management is used when evaluating 
(investment) alternatives: 
“I my opinion we did all the right things when we worked on the project in 
Turkey.  We had no chance of foreseeing the downturn in the Turkish 
construction segment.  …  We did not perform stringent risk management 
routines, but we talked about a lot of scenarios, and the outcome was far from 
the worst case scenario.  …  Of course it is a shame that the project was 
stopped, but that’s the way it is.” 
Conversely, Henrik Jakobsen perceives risk management as an embedded element in supplier 
management as the ongoing evaluation aims at identifying weaknesses in the supply system: 
“Albeit we only rarely experience delivery or quality problems we continue to 
collect the data.  That’s just the way it’s done.” 
He also elaborates over the generic problem of dependency: 
“That is really tricky – determining how close a relationship should be.  It’s at 
the core of buying.  …  The closer a relationship is, the more difficult it is to 
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dissolve.  …  In reality, relationships display a degree of inertia - we seem to 
stick with what we know, even if we are not completely satisfied.” 
And over the practice of having close relationships with suppliers and customers: 
“You might say that having frequent meetings with suppliers is a form of risk 
management as it is the best forewarning of problems ahead.  …  The trouble of 
it all is that close relationships are not easily dissolved.” 
The paradox is thereby described: the closer the relationship, the more critical the need to 
perform risk management (SCRM).  In this instance the risk management takes the form of 
close interaction, further enforcing the closeness of the relationship. 
 
Summing Up… 
Different from most of the other companies in the study, the focal operation has not changed 
much over the past years.  Instead RIEGENS have “experimented” with foreign ventures – 
with mixed results.  The failing of the Turkish joint venture did not deter the company from 
investing in Slovakia, and from further developing the operation at Braintree. 
The company claims not having implemented SCM (or rather: “most companies probably 
relate to SCM in one way or another”), but if the operation at Næsby is observed without 
interaction, one would undoubtedly come to the conclusion that RIEGENS have worked with 
SCM, and for long.  The structuring of the company according to the product portfolio, the 
long relationships with suppliers and customers, and the degree of collaboration (primarily on 
projects, though) would suggest so. 
SCRM, on the other hand, is somewhat less sophisticated as no structures, procedures or 
routines for the identification, assessment and monitoring exist. 
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7.10 SDC DANDISC A/S 
Operating in a market driven by technology, the history of SDC DANDISC is closely linked 
to the development within IT and media technology, see Table 7-20 below. 
Table 7-20: Milestones – SDC DANDISC A/S 115 
Year Description 
1940s 
In the 1940s, data was mostly stored on punched cards and punched paper tape. The punched cards 
and tapes are the distant relatives of the modern CD and DVD disks, which use small ‘punched’ pits to 
store information. 
1951 UNIVAC 1 (universal automatic computer), which is also the first computer to use magnetic tape for storage. 
1956 In 1956 IBM introduced the RAMAC (random access method of accounting and control) - the first commercial hard disk drive. 
1961 The first hard disk drive with the air-bearing slider was introduced, advancing hard disk drive technology towards much higher recording densities and reliability. 
1962 The laser diode was invented (also in IBM) becoming the fundamental technology for read-write optical storage devices. 
1963 IBM introduced the first storage unit with removable disks (IBM 1311), effectively ending the era of the punched-cards. 
1967 
The next major achievement came in 1967 the form of digital audio demonstrated by NHK (Japan 
Broadcasting Corporation). From this point in time, high-quality audio technology became digital. A 
mix of sound and picture eventually gave birth to a new - non-mechanical (like the gramophone) and 
non-magnetic (like the tape) technology - the compact disk, or CD. 
1970 The portable storage was born with the invention of the floppy disk. 
1977 Three Japanese companies - Sony, Mitsubishi, and Hitachi, demonstrated their optical digital audio disk (DAD) systems which used large disk, about 30 cm in diameter (like the LP records). 
1979 The VHS (originally Vertical Helical Scan, later changed to Video Home System) format is introduced in Europe. 
1982 The CD (Compact Disc) media is introduced. 
1985 The “High Sierra Group” meeting leads to the introduction of the CD-ROM format. 
1987 
A 1-gigabit-per-square-inch magneto-optical recording with a blue-wavelength gas laser was 
demonstrated. A few years later, in , the same recording density barrier was broken for magnetic 
recording with the help of the first magneto resistive (MR) head. 
The company SDC is founded.  At this time only the VHS format is replicated.  DANDISC was 
created at the same time focusing on replication of CD’s.  In the following years SDC takes over 
smaller VHS facilities in Denmark, and establishes good contacts to the film industry. 
1995 The DVD (Digital Versatile Discs) format is introduced.  The organization “DVD Forum” is founded116. 
1996 The two companies SDC and DANDISC merge.  The new company replicates both CD and VHS formats. 
1997 SDC buys the company CD Plant Group which has plants in Sweden, England and Switzerland.  CD is thereby the dominant business area within SDC. 
1998 
The first DVD-ROM drives became available for the computer users. 
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) was signed into law by President Clinton on October 
28, 1998. The legislation implements two 1996 World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 
treaties: the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty. The 
DMCA has significant impact on how the data is distributed, copied, and stored. 
1999 
The Munich based company Videoprint is taken over. 
After the motion picture industry spent years negotiating the encryption standard for digital video 
discs (DVD), a small group of Norwegian hackers released a program, called DeCSS, which can break 
the encryption on almost any DVD disk. 
2000 SDC centralizes its production of CD’s and DVD’s in fewer facilities to enable better utilization of production capacity and to increase flexibility. 
2003 SDC continues to develop its services and new formats (Babydisc, Lotto-CD etc.) are introduced.  SDC’s strategy is to become the leading innovative media partner. 
                                                 
115  Source: www.sdc-group.dk & www.usbyte.com (edited together, material on SDC in bold). 
116  For more information, see www.dvdforum.org. 
Chapter Seven – Case Studies 
Page 279 
As hinted in the table above, SDC DANDISC is a replicator of CD’s, DVD’s and VHS tapes.  
The company describes their value chain as illustrated in Figure 7-30 below. 
Figure 7-30: SDC VALUE CHAIN117 
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Based on the customer’s input and requirements SDC can help the customer perform editing, 
premastering, or mastering of the material before the media is reproduced.  Various types of 
supplementary material (inlays, booklets etc.) can be printed and packed with the data bearing 
media, which can be shipped to the customer or directly to the customers’ customers. 
The operation in itself is more or less identical to all other players in the market, including the 
two largest competitors DCM Digital Communication Media AB and TOCANO A/S. 
Reproduction & Mastering 
Two distinctly different processes exist for the reproduction of discs: duplication and 
replication.  When duplicating discs the starting point is an existing disc from where an 
“image” is read and subsequently burned onto another disc.  The process is suitable for low 
quantity or when fast delivery is key.  In all other circumstances replication is preferred. 
When replicating discs the starting point is the information, not necessarily in disc format.  
Depending on the type of information, e.g. music, films, games, financial reporting etc. 
editing, mastering and/or programming may be required.  Once the material is completed and 
approved a target (or a glass master) is produced, enabling the molding and further production 
of the discs.  The processes for replication of CD’s and DVD’s in principle are the same, but 
the technical formats differ as well as the number of layers in each disc. 
The technique for the reproduction of VHS tapes is similar to the duplication process 
described as an existing tape is the starting point.  A VHS tape (the master) is loaded into a 
machine which then records the content onto a number of other tapes. 
So, depending on the reproduction process the mastering must take different forms.  The input 
differs as well: for VHS input include cassettes and so-called pancake (the magnetic tape onto 
which the information is stored), for duplicated discs the input is a standard “no-name” disc, 
and for replication the inputs are granulate, silver, glue, and lacquer. 
The Replication Process 
Replicating CD and DVD is basically a sophisticated form of plastic molding with a couple of 
other processes embedded.  The process varies over the media type, for CD’s the production 
steps are as follows: 
1. Granulate is heated and sprayed into a mould. 
2. The disc is covered by a thin layer of silver. 
                                                 
117  Source: www.sdc-group.dk. 
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3. The disc is covered in lacquer. 
The process in its entirety is performed on one machine in one fully automated, continuous 
process taking a total production time per disc of approx. 2½ seconds.  Input is simple: 
granulate, silver, glue, and lacquer, output is semi-finished discs.  Subsequent to the 
replication process, the discs are printed upon using one of two techniques.  The production of 
e.g. inlays or covers is done by an independent “in-house” printing operation118, having 
integrated their processes with SDC to ensure minimal processing time119. 
For DVD-5’s (single layer DVD’s) the production is more complex as a transparent disc is 
glued onto the metal surface before the lacquer is applied.  For double-layered DVD discs (the 
so-called DVD-9’s) the production process is even more complicated (or rather the machines 
producing the discs are) as yet another layer of disc with metal coating is placed between the 
first metal coating and the transparent disc.  Printing and packaging is identical across media 
type. 
Besides above mentioned services SDC offers copy protection products for both CD and 
DVD formats as well as distribution & logistics.  SDC thereby “goes full circle” from the raw 
material to the delivery of the finished product. 
Organization 
As illustrated in Table 7-20 above, the technology has evolved quite rapidly.  Even if SDC 
entered the market as late as 1987, they are currently supporting three generations of 
technology (VHS, CD & DVD) plus additional variants.  The speed of technological change 
has forced SDC and the rest of the players in this market to continuously adapt technology, 
structure and scale in order to survive in the very competitive industry. 
The transition from new-comer to the largest media replicator in Scandinavia has been a 
turbulent one.  To obtain market share, cost advantages, and competences the company has 
performed a number of merger and acquisitions over the years. 
But the reverse has also taken place.  Following the down turn in the VHS market, the VHS 
replication plant in Brabrand, Århus was shut down in 2004 when all VHS duplication was 
centralized in Täby, Sweden.  The activities in Finland were sold off in the same year, to the 
then managing director, Ilkka Immonen. 
Also in 2004, the activities in the UK were “sold off” to the software company Thamesdown 
Software Fulfilment, at the same time obtaining 25% of the shares in the parent company 
(which was renamed Thamesdown SDC Limited). 
                                                 
118  Actually, the printing operation is a tenant at the Sakskøbing plant, but operates independently as they print 
e.g. books and brochures for other customers. 
119  Processes are to be kept as rational as possible, keeping total turnaround times to a minimum.  Customers 
requiring extremely short turnaround times (< 24 hours) the company has a service offering called Quick 
Service.  Using this service a customer can have a smaller number of units duplicated (in contrast to 
replicated) at a marked up price. 
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The merger between SDC and the second largest replicator in Scandinavia DCM Digital 
Communications Media AB was almost a reality, but didn’t go through due to unsuccessful 
price negotiations120. 
This series of adaptation to the extremely competitive and price sensitive market, resulted in 
SDC having locations in four countries121: 
? Denmark: Copenhagen (headquarters) & Sakskøbing (CD/DVD replication), 
? Germany: Munich & Leipzig (both sales), 
? Norway: Oslo (sales), and 
? Sweden: Borås, Göteborg, Malmö, & Stockholm (sales) & Täby (VHS duplication). 
At all sales offices Quick Service (duplication of smaller batches of CD’s and DVD’s) is 
available. 
This continued adaptation has resulted in a steady decline in turnover and moderate swings in 
profit, see Table 7-21 below.  As a result of an increased degree of automation the number of 
employees has declined steadily during recent years. 
Table 7-21: Financial Profile – SDC DANDISC A/S  
End Date Turnover Profit Before Tax No. of Employees  
2004-12-31 519.634 15.837 426  
2003-12-31 552.022 32.610 471  
2002-12-31 598.156 -16.096 504  
2001-12-31 635.228 -38.094 560  
2000-12-31 705.735 -19.375 620  
1999-12-31 687.944 25.207 639  
1998-12-31 687.967 -2.472 698  
 
Customer Base 
Until recently the customer base was quite heterogeneous as the German media conglomerate 
Technicolor accounted for approx. 50% of the turnover on CD/DVD replication.  Technicolor 
used SDC as a capacity supplier and distributor in the Nordic countries, primarily for products 
from the American movie industry.  Technicolor had been a customer for quite some time, 
and the cooperation was fault and problem free.  This caused Jesper Boysen (CEO) in 2004 to 
explicate his confidence in a continued business relationship: 
“We have a long-term relationship with Technicolor.  They are tough 
negotiators and they know we need their business.  …  They know what they 
want to pay for our services, but they also know they can not themselves 
distribute their products in Scandinavia.  They’ve tried that before, and that did 
not go well at all.” 
                                                 
120  As late as July 2005 the acquisition of Digital Communication Media AB was completed.  This gives SDC 
a clear advantage as DCM has a good position within the audio industry, complementing SDC’s position 
within games and movies.  The last local competitor, TOCANO, is after the merger but a marginal player in 
the Scandinavian market. 
121  SDC still cooperates with the sales office in Finland as well as the UK organization. 
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This judgment turned out to be incorrect, since Technicolor in 2004 chose to start moving 
production of DVD’s and CD’s to Poland.  Apparently the competence for distribution in 
Scandinavia was no longer needed?  The annual contract was renewed for 2005 only, with a 
set limit as usual, but fair warning was given that the contract would expire without renewal 
by the end of 2005. 
Paradoxically the contact persons at operational level at Technicolor were quite discouraged 
by the strategic decision to no longer use SDC.  So much so that they decided to build 
inventory with the products planned for production at SDC, resulting in the contract limit 
being reached in May of 2005.  The loss of Technicolor obviously constituted a major 
problem as high utilization is needed to ensure survival in the industry122. 
SDC still produces and distributes VHS products for Techniciolor, but the turnover is 
marginal.  No other customer dominates the customer base, but a few of the remaining 
customer are relatively larger than the rest.  These customers include e.g. the Danish film 
companies and magazine publishers Bonniers and Gyldendal.  For this group of customers 
relationships are long-term, but as Ernest Fuller (Production Manager) states: 
“In this industry nothing is ‘safe’ – competition is intense, and has changed 
from local, to Scandinavian, to European.  This means that we are now 
competing with e.g. the Swedish company PolyVox, and the German companies 
ODS, SinRam etc.  On the other hand we’re extending our sales organization to 
address their customer base as well.” 
So far, SDC has been successful in penetrating selected European markets. 
Investing in Technology 
Jesper Boysen explains the mechanisms of strategizing within the media replication industry: 
“When running a company in this industry, it all about ‘reading the curves’.  In 
the mid 1990’s a series of badly timed investments almost drove the company 
into bankruptcy.  …  You may have an interest in a certain customer segment, 
and that’s fine, but by the end of the day it’s all about scale.  You need high 
utilization to be profitable – all the time.” 
He continues to explain the criticality of determining when to invest in new technology and 
how to set prices.  As the life time of a media technology is decreasing and the cost of 
machinery for duplication/replication is increasing, it is a matter of accumulating enough 
capital to invest in the next generation of technology.  Timing the entrance into new 
technology and setting prices is therefore of critical importance. 
As illustrated in Figure 7-31 below it is a continuous struggle to minimize cost and increase 
revenue, just to stay in the market.  Henrik Frandsen (Purchasing Manager) explains how the 
company is determined on surviving by being more efficient than its competitors: 
“We have no strategy department.  …  We do what we can to trim the 
organization and processes to cut costs and add value to our customers.  …  
                                                 
122  Perhaps this was the decisive factor in the purchase of DCM in July 2005.  With the purchase the customer 
base was increased, ensuring sufficient scale and an attractive balance across movie and games/music 
customers. 
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The margin is extremely low - we’re only making money as long as we have 
high utilization.” 
Investing in new technology is obviously critical importance, but so is the exit of old 
technology.  Despite the recent transfer of the VHS production from Brabrand to Täby, SDC 
DANDISC is following the development in the VHS market quite closely, to ensure optimal 
timing of the exit, Ernest Fuller: 
“As the VHS market is steadily becoming more and more uninteresting, we 
constantly monitor [the activities in Täby].  …  We are ready to shut down [the 
VHS production] when it is no longer profitable.” 
The decreasing life span of technologies and the increased importance of timing when 
entering into and exiting from a technology is illustrated in Figure 7-31 below. 
Figure 7-31: Business Cycle for the Media Industry 
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Also specific to the replication industry the cost-price gap creates ample opportunities for 
fraudulent replication, a problem addressed by the independent industry organization IFPI. 
IFPI 
The entire industry is under the supervision of International Federation of the Phonographic 
Industry (IFPI)123, an organization controlling if the non-authorized replication takes place.  
Normally, the ownership structure of a replication right might be very complicated.  Movies 
                                                 
123  For more information, please see www.ifpi.com. 
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for instance, might be the property of Nordisk Film, which may have sold off the right for 
replication for e.g. a five year period.  As bundling may increase the value of each right, it 
may be in the interest of the replication right owner to “rent out” the replication right for e.g. 
2 years for a specific market.  The replication right structure may thereby be very complicated 
and quite difficult to unravel.  It is therefore the current practice in the industry that the 
replicators themselves do not verify if the replication right is actually the property of the 
customer, but lets the customer sign a contract stating that the customer takes full 
responsibility if property tights have been violated. 
Henrik Frandsen reports one instance where IFPI made inspection: 
“Some time ago we actually had a case where the replicated material was 
violating property rights.  The customer was a Russian living in Sweden who 
ordered the replication of a larger portion of classical music.  He presented us 
with a contract documenting the property rights, and he subsequently signed 
one of our standard contracts.  Some time later IFPI recognized that the 
property rights were violated, but luckily we had all paperwork in place and did 
not get fined.” 
Referencing situation where competitors were fined, Henrik Frandsen explains why following 
the process for ensuring liability is minimized (if not avoided) is critical.  Adhering to 
processes for all orders is thereby not only a means to reduce turnaround times - it is also risk 
management. 
Supplier Management 
As described above input to the production is both relatively simple and the number of items 
purchased is very limited.  None of the primary inputs are scarce, and there are multiple 
suppliers for all items.  Granulate, for instance, is currently bought from Bayer but previously 
GE supplied this input.  Ole Holm (Purchasing Assistant) explains current practice: 
“Currently we buy granulate on three month contracts.  Every time the contract 
is about to expire we investigate prices, and from that analysis another three 
month contract is offered.  Bayer currently has the best products, but there are 
other equivalent products.” 
Albeit many alternatives exist, some input are marginally better performing, Ole Holm states: 
“Apparently, the product Bayer has at the moment is the best product for our 
machines.  The people in the production will object if we choose another 
brand.” 
Inputs are thereby substitutable, but since it takes time to adjust and calibrate the machines, 
the price difference must have a certain size for the shift in input to make sense.  The 
company has not integrated with any suppliers of input to the production, neither socially, 
process wise or by the use of IT. 
The only risk element in relation to input is the oil price.  Ernest Fuller explains: 
“Even if most if not all of our input is pretty standard, the price depends on the 
price of oil.  …  We therefore negotiate prices every quarter.  …  We have no 
means of influencing the market, we are way too small, but at least it [the fixed 
price] gives us a sort of stability.” 
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Also ensuring stability is the fixed conversion rate between the Danish Krone and the Euro, as 
most trade is done in Euro.  The imports from China is decreasing with the downturn of the 
VHS market, thereby simplifying the logistical setup. 
SCM Practice 
The company does not perform SCM but has a truly process oriented company as described 
above.  The company’s various setups can be illustrated as below. 
Figure 7-32: Supply Chain Diagram – SDC DANDISC A/S 
Consumer
Consumer
Consumer
Production Only
Private
Direct Distribution
Distribution
?
?
Reproduction
Rights Owner
Suppliers
Artists ?
?
Capacity
Suppliers
Reproduction
Rights Owner
Wholesaler
SDC
Reproduction
Reproduction
Rights Owner
 
 
Unlike most of the companies in the study, SDC DANDISC claims not having implemented 
SCM.  Albeit being the most clearly process-oriented company in the study, the company 
insists on not using SCM, and explains the process orientation as a means to minimize lead 
times, not to facilitate cross-functional integration.  The company thereby shows some of the 
“classic” signs of SCM without having done anything to implement it. 
The supply chain depicted in Figure 7-32 above thereby is a bit illusory – but hopefully brings 
an understanding of the operation of the company across.  The first supply chain, ‘Production 
Only’ describes the traditional operations task.  The supply chain ‘Distribution’ only differs 
from this supply in shipping address (and perhaps in ordering method), the supply chain 
‘Direct Distribution’ describes a more complex setup as the customers of the Reproduction 
Rights Owner (who is the customer of SDC DANDISC) is made known to SDC DANDISC.  
The last supply chain, Private’, is radically different from the others; first and foremost in 
order size and frequency, and also in use of the product.  Orders are most likely quite small 
and infrequent, as the materials are often used for e.g. the financial statements or support 
materials for e.g. tender material. 
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Besides the production of which 90-95% is finalized within 24 hours of receiving the order, 
the company offers the use of a customer buffer inventory.  The inventory is integrated with 
production planning and has its own small inventory management module, by which the 
customer can have access to the inventory information for their goods. 
The buffer inventory system is physically located at the plant in Sakskøbing, and is supposed 
to support back-catalogue items as well as new releases.  The intent is a win-win situation 
where SDC DANDISC is allowed to produce in larger quantities, and the customer can have 
their items shipped very quickly as only packaging and distribution is needed.  A further 
advantage for the customers is the possibility of postponement as the disc alone can be put in 
stock, postponing the country specific packaging.  So far the offering has been less popular 
than expected, but the system works as designed and the few customers using it are content. 
SCRM Practice? 
Not surprisingly to Jesper Boysen the major risk facing SDC is ‘misreading the curves’ – 
making the wrong investment or missing the timing of an investment.  The risk is illustrated 
above (see Figure 7-31), but apparently has no formal response except the ‘gut feel’ of the 
CEO and trusted employees. 
To Henrik Frandsen the major risk has to do with contamination of material.  The worst 
conceivable scenario is readily described: 
“Just imagine the effect of having material from a ‘blue movie’ put on a Walt 
Disney disc.  Especially in the US such an incident will enable the consumer to 
sue Walt Disney for a tremendous amount of money.  To ensure this does not 
happen, certain customers will require their media replicators to not reproduce 
certain types of material.  …  We do not reproduce adult material at all – if we 
did we could not work for Technicolor [who deals with the major Hollywood 
studios].” 
Measures taken to handle this risk are therefore pretty dramatic as the entire adult 
entertainment segment (which is very lucrative, according to Henrik Frandsen) is avoided.  
For other types of material, planning methods ensure that a sequence of production orders will 
be sequenced according to rating, minimizing the damage of mixing discs and packaging. 
But the risk most visible to the visitor at the plant in Sakskøbing is the risk of disclosing non-
released material.  The plant itself is surrounded by a tall spiked fence and outside normal 
operating hours the area is secured by movement sensors and security guards with dogs 
patrolling the area.  Visitors and employees alike are all subject to physical controls upon 
leaving the facility ensuring the confidential or otherwise non-released information is kept on-
site.  Not visible to the naked eye safety measures go even further as all e-mail traffic is 
monitored as well. 
To production manager Ernest Fuller risk management is primarily oriented internally.  He 
considers risk management a focal element of his job, ensuring predictability and stability in 
the production.  He describes how SDC DANDISC currently is negotiating with other 
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replicators to stand by in case of problems in production124.  He furthermore explains where 
risk management is taking place in the organization: 
“Formally we have no risk management function, but risk management takes 
place in various parts of the organization.  When managing customers, 
especially new ones, we perform credit checks.  In case the check is not 
satisfactory, we ask the customer to pay in advance or upon shipment.  …  In 
relation to the supplier, there is really not a lot to be done as we are so much 
smaller than our suppliers.  …  And finally, currency risk is minimal as almost 
all transactions are done in either Danish crowns or Euro.  There’s really not 
that much to be done.” 
Commenting on current practices of production and the risk management, Ernest Fuller 
emphasizes again that he (and the rest of management at SDC DANDISC) really is focused 
on Risk Management albeit not formalized. 
Summing Up… 
Insisting, like RIEGENS, on not performing SCM the company is the most process oriented 
company in the study.  The process and the decision points are described in considerable 
detail on the company website, describing lead times, alternative delivery processes etc. 
The production technology at first glance appears complex but soon one realizes complexity 
is handled by highly sophisticated machines – employee interference in the replication/ 
duplication process is minimal.  Inputs (direct input, that is) are trivial as multiple suppliers of 
the very few input needed exists, and contracts are negotiated on a quarterly basis. 
The use of the highly specialized and sophisticated equipment is both the “curse and blessing” 
of the industry, where the well run company makes investments with appropriate timing, and 
other succumbs.  As illustrated in Figure 7-31 poor timing might severely damage the 
company – and a lot of effort goes into safeguarding the investment decision is accurate. 
SCRM takes second (or third) place but remain important (as documented by the loss of the 
largest customer) but not formalized, documented, or audited. 
                                                 
124 Which may be perceived as a structural response to either a process or structural incident. 
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Chapter 8 Cross-case Analysis 
The purpose of this chapter is to answer the fourth and last research question: 
Research Question 4: How do the case companies perform SCM and 
SCRM? 
 
First the SCM and subsequently the SCRM constructs are analyzed for all participating case 
companies.  Thereafter the overall results from the two practices are compared.  Finally the 
results are validated by means of empirical triangulations. 
8.1 Evaluating SCM Practices by Constructs 
The practices described in the previous chapter span a wide range in terms of organization, 
complexity, external pressures, competencies, strategies employed etc.  Each case has its 
unique characteristics which will be explicated in the analysis below. 
8.1.1 Construct ‘Supply Chain Organization’ 
As described in the case studies in previous chapter most of the case companies (seven of the 
ten) perceive themselves as performing SCM, albeit in quite different ways and apparently to 
attain different goals.  Some consider the close interaction with suppliers as being SCM, 
whereas others refer to e.g. the implementation of LEAN Manufacturing.  Only few 
companies have “SCM terminology” implemented in their organization charts and most still 
reference typical functional departments like Purchasing, Production, and Distribution. 
An exception is Coloplast where ‘Supply Chain Management’ is clearly represented in the 
formal organization charts (see e.g. Figure 7-9).  The SCM department is responsible for 
sourcing and manufacturing, and distribution to the sales companies.  The customer contact is 
thereby not included in the SCM concept in place at Coloplast. 
Another exception is Fritz Hansen who has ‘Supply Chain’ as one of four major departments 
(see Figure 7-15).  As illustrated in Figure 7-17 the SCM department is responsible for 
production (both plants), and for ‘Development’ and ‘Quality’.  As the ‘Sales & Brand 
Management’ department is responsible for project sales and support of international and 
national representatives, ‘Supply Chain’ does not support the sales/marketing aspect of the 
operation but remains in control over Sourcing, Production, and Distribution. 
In contrast, Oticon does not have an organization chart at all, but describes their SCM 
organization by three ‘teams’: Purchasing/Procurement, Logistics, and Supply Chain 
Planning.  The teams have the overall responsibility for the Mass Customization production 
philosophy implemented.  They are responsible for the push portion of the process, to keep up 
inventory levels on modular components and for ensuring process lead times are adhered to 
when customizing the end customer’s product. 
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Shifts in Organizational Level 
Looking beyond the snapshots as described in the organization charts, a few companies reveal 
similar dynamics.  At Dyrup the shift between SCM as a staff function supporting 
autonomous plants and SCM as a strategic function coordinating activities is quite distinct.  
The organizational change mentioned in the case study makes Henrik D. Nielsen overall 
responsible for sourcing, operations, and distribution world-wide.  A similar change took 
place recently at Coloplast, where Johnny Nielsen was made responsible for all operations 
and distribution (to the sales companies). 
Companies Not Working With SCM 
Of the ten case companies, three companies (Brüel & Kjær, RIEGENS and SDC DANDISC) 
claim not working with SCM.  Each offers a distinct explanation: 
? At Brüel & Kjær the lack of SCM is attributed the quite diffuse organizational 
development taking place.  Henrik Jeppesen describes the practices in place across 
departments as being primarily determined by the idiosyncrasies of powerful 
individuals instead of an overall design of the company. 
? At RIEGENS Henrik Jakobsen perceives SCM as a generic concept, not a distinct set of 
principles.  He insists RIEGENS has done nothing to implement SCM, but “probably 
most companies relate to SCM in one way or another”. 
? At SDC DANDISC the concept is rejected as they perceive themselves as a traditional 
manufacturing unit (albeit CEO Jesper Boysen insists the company is a service 
company). 
It is therefore quite interesting that RIEGENS has the most customer/market-oriented 
organization as it has distinct organization for Portfolio items (which are produced against 
inventory levels), Standard items (low cost overhead cabinets) which are produced against 
large orders on an almost continuous basis, and Project items which are uniquely designed for 
each order and therefore made-to-order.  Similarly interesting is the effect of the tight 
deadlines enforcing close internal integration at SDC DANDISC.  This integration is not 
defined from an appreciation of improved performance or the benefits of cooperation, but for 
a need to accommodate the requirements in the market.  And even if processes are 
communicated externally, internal organization is still strictly functional. 
Companies Working With SCM 
All in all the companies’ implementation of SCM differ greatly and only four companies 
(Coloplast, Dyrup, Fritz Hansen, & Novozymes) have implemented what one might call 
‘Formal SCM’ – and at Dyrup the organization is still very young.  It seems that SCM 
develops from the bottom up, matures, and subsequently “takes over” the overall 
responsibility of the original ‘sponsor department’.  The only exception seems to be 
Novozymes, where the implementation of SCM was ‘top down’ - after careful and thorough 
analysis.  A summary of these two constructs along with the evaluation of formalization of 
SCM is presented in Table 8-1 below. 
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Table 8-1: Summary of ‘Supply Chain Organization’1 
Company SCM? SCM Organization Formal SCM 
Bang & Olufsen Yes 
A formal SCM organization as such does not exist, but the SQCT 
stakeholders (Supply, Quality, Cost, and Technology) are obliged 
to cooperate to create optimal sourcing solutions for all products.  
The ’Supply Chain Concept’ mentioned in Chapter Seven 
encompassing most departments at Bang & Olufsen Operations 
a/s (see Figure 7-4) is thereby not a strictly formal structure. 
No 
Brüel & Kjær No 
No, but it may be implemented in the near future.  The intended 
implementation will/may include Design For Manufacture (DFM) 
– a technique aiming at ensuring “easy” manufacturing and 
assembly.  Exactly how this corresponds to SCM and which 
organizational consequences it will have is unclear. 
No 
Coloplast Yes 
As described in e.g. Figure 7-9 SCM is directly identifiable in the 
formal organization chart.  Johnny Nielsen was recently made 
responsible for the global supply chains – and the development is 
ongoing.  Currently, the largest challenge is the migration from 
local warehousing to the central warehouse in Germany, and the 
transition from production against forecast to order production. 
Yes 
Dyrup Yes 
Currently plants are operating as traditional manufacturing stand-
alone operations, with local management and autonomy.  Recent 
(October 2005) changes will affect this drastically as it has been 
decided to implement a centralized SCM organization with 
responsibility for both production and procurement.  The intent is 
to speed up a much needed update of the logistical systems and to 
ensure better usage of capacity across plants. 
(Yes) 
Fritz Hansen Yes, LEAN 
An SCM organization is in place, encompassing production at the 
two factories as well as Purchasing, Quality, and Development 
Management.  The two plants operate quite differently, though.  
(The chair production plant is left out of the rest of the analysis). 
Yes 
LINAK Yes, LEAN 
No SCM organization exists, Logistics is situated under 
Production.  The feeder units (Electronics and Spindles) operate 
on market terms, offering its output to the divisions. 
No 
Novozymes Yes 
Supply Chain Operations is directed downstream.  SCO receives 
produce from bulk production, creates the customized end-
product and distributes to customers. 
Yes 
Oticon Yes 
Albeit the company does not use organization chart it is evident 
the ‘Teams’ structure support the Fulfillment meta-process.  The 
entire operation is designed for quick order fulfillment, relying to 
a certain extent on external parties. 
No 
RIEGENS No 
Paradoxically, the company is organized around the three distinct 
types of products: Standard (low cost) overhead cabinets, 
portfolio products, and projects.  Furthermore both customer and 
supplier basis are quite stable. 
No 
SDC DANDISC No 
Each function: Production Preparation, Production, and 
Distribution operate under very strict deadlines, ensuring a quick 
turn-around.  But there’s no real adaptation or integration 
between the departments, except for production planning. 
No 
 
SCM - An Alternative Organizational Entity 
It seems that in some companies (Bang & Olufsen, LINAK, and Oticon) the SCM operation is 
organized not as a formal entity but as a more or less formalized structure outside of or in 
addition to the formal system.  E.g. in Bang & Olufsen, logisticians have worked with SCM 
                                                 
1 The ‘SCM?’ column describes the self-perception by the interviewees, i.e. whether they believe their 
company performs SCM. 
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for many years, but this has still not resulted in the formation of a SCM department or a VP 
position within the domain.  Nonetheless it is evident that companies do work with SCM even 
if no formal organization or positions exist referencing the domain.  At LINAK the company 
is undergoing structural changes as the implementation of product divisions is still 
incomplete2, at Oticon the absence of a SCM department might be expected as the level of 
formalization is kept at an absolute minimum. 
Matching the Fulfillment Meta-process 
Besides understanding whether a formal or informal SCM organization exists at the case 
companies, it seems relevant to analyze to which extent the area of responsibility matches the 
“Fulfillment Meta-process” described in Chapter 2.  The analysis obviously is only relevant 
for the companies working with SCM - therefore the companies rejecting SCM are excluded 
from the analysis documented in Table 8-2 below. 
Table 8-2: Coverage of the Fulfillment Meta-process 
Company SCM? Formal SCM? Sourcing Production Distribution 
Bang & Olufsen Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Brüel & Kjær No No N/A N/A N/A 
Coloplast Yes Yes Yes Yes (Yes) 
Dyrup Yes (Yes) (Yes) (Yes) (Yes) 
Fritz Hansen Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
LINAK Yes No No Yes Yes 
Novozymes Yes Yes No (Yes) Yes 
Oticon Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
RIEGENS No No N/A N/A N/A 
SDC DANDISC No No N/A N/A N/A 
 
Actually at most of the companies the SCM practice covers the meta-process quite well.  But 
since the analysis above focus on the main operation (HQ) alone it might be misguiding.  In 
case it is extended to show the entire scope of the fulfillment system, the picture would be less 
rosy. 
As described above SCM at Coloplast ends at the sales company level, in reality de-coupling 
the “within ownership network” supply chain at the sales company inventory3.  Other 
examples include Brüel & Kjær, Dyrup, and LINAK.  For the B-2-C supply chains (e.g. Bang 
& Olufsen’s Sales Company & European supply chains, both Fritz Hansen’s supply chains, 
and the fitting process in Oticon’s supply chains) this decoupling obviously does not occur. 
Sales/Marketing and SCM Organization 
As mentioned in a number of the cases the sales/marketing function is decoupled from the 
SCM implementation, especially for the multinational companies.  At Bang & Olufsen, for 
instance, the Supply Chain Concept ensures delivery to end-consumers, dealers, and 
                                                 
2 Unfortunately the primary contact at LINAK, Morten S. Raahede, left the company by late 2005, before this 
issue could be investigated further. 
3 Actually the inventory is being centralized at the new central distribution hub.  This might lead to changes 
to the scope of the SCM practice and the “length” of the processes. 
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warehouses, but does not contain any of the sales/marketing activities.  Coloplast is identical 
in this respect as their SCM concept ends at the sales company level.  In contrast all 
companies performing customer project (Brüel & Kjær, LINAK, and Novozymes4) are 
interacting directly with the customers.  In all three examples the interaction is direct, not by 
proxy as at e.g. RIEGENS5.  It seems evident the “project type” supply chains thereby differ 
from “normal operations” (the long-linked technology) in terms of customer/consumer 
participation – and in support of sales/marketing.  In “normal operations” sales/marketing is 
perceived as separate from the fulfillment system (SCM). 
8.1.2 Construct ‘Process Orientation’ 
As briefly referenced in Chapter 1 and described in detail in Appendix A, companies’ 
definition of processes does not “fit” well with the literature.  In the literature the processes 
are expected to cross functional silos, and perhaps even extend beyond the boundaries of the 
company.  In the pilot studies a number of the participating companies claimed to work 
process oriented, but the analysis revealed that processes in some instances simply were a 
restatement of typical department names.  This was one of the major criticisms of the existing 
models - it is therefore of critical importance to understand how the case companies 
understand process-orientation, whether they find it relevant to implement, and if already 
implemented the names and content of the processes. 
The level of implementation of processes and the understanding of the term ‘process’ span a 
wide range: 
? At Bang & Olufsen the four processes mentioned are quite different from each other as 
one is periodic and tactical (Planning: Demand and Production), one is continuous and 
operational (Order Handling) and one is (presumably) aperiodic and tactical (Business 
Process Development).  The notion of process referenced in the ‘Supply Chain Concept’ 
is thereby quite abstract.  One might make the distinction between the overall 
(strategic?) concept of Business Process (see e.g. Hammer & Champy, 1993; Hammer, 
1996) and the process concept inherent in the SCM domain (see e.g. Davenport, 1993). 
? Also at Novozymes the notion of process is somewhat ambiguous as Thomas Videbæk 
identifies at least three different types of processes: the manufacturing process, the 
customer service process, and the supply chain planning process.  Here the process 
typology is extended with the production process introducing activities not performed 
by human actors. 
Less ambiguity might be expected when implementing a process-based production philosophy 
like LEAN Manufacturing, but at Fritz Hansen, Henrik Holm is not really sure how process 
orientation actually fit with the LEAN concept: 
“Well, at the core of the LEAN concept is an idea of process and the 
unhindered flow of materials, but when we talk about processes we often talk 
                                                 
4 Also RIEGENS and SDC DANDISC perform customer projects, but they do not perform SCM. 
5 At RIEGENS customer projects are often managed by e.g. architects or construction companies.  In many 
of these projects, RIEGENS have limited access to the end-user of the facility under construction. 
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about inter-organizational processes.  When we deal with our Supply Partners, 
we try to make the way we work, the processes, fit together.  Therefore talking 
about processes and LEAN is somewhat difficult, but I guess we have just one 
process, then: fulfillment.” 
At LINAK, also using LEAN, the setup is more complicated as separate entities produce 
certain product categories, and few entities operate as feeder plants.  In both cases the 
processes are non-distinguishable from the production process. 
At Brüel & Kjær, Dyrup, RIEGENS, and SDC DANDISC process orientation is absent.  
Table 8-3 below summarizes the findings. 
Table 8-3: Summary of ‘Process Orientation’ 
Company Process Orientation Process(es) 
Bang & Olufsen 
The ‘Supply Chain Concept’ contains three 
(four) processes, but they are fundamentally 
different from each other.  It seems quite 
unlikely these processes are linked into the work 
performed in the organization besides at the 
most overall, abstract level. 
Demand Planning (Sales Org’s & 
Customer Centre), Production Planning 
(Operations in Struer), Order Handling 
(Dealers & Logistics), and Business 
Process Development (all?). 
Brüel & Kjær 
No, the company is a traditional manufacturing 
firm, even if manufacturing has been 
outsourced.  In the project department the work 
is of a more iterative character. 
N/A 
Coloplast 
Yes, the company aims at altering the current 
practice of “soft ownership” to “hard 
ownership” by ensuring both competence and 
responsibility at Process Owner level. 
Processes are not named, but start and 
end at customer order entry in the sales 
companies.  Is translated into: Order 
Fulfillment. 
Demand forecasts are processed at HQ 
after inputs from the sales companies. 
Dyrup 
No.  The company is a traditional manufacturing 
firm, with a distinct separation between e.g. 
production and sales. 
None currently, but processes might be 
implemented as the SCM organization 
matures… 
Fritz Hansen 
Yes, the ‘standard operation’ is based on a well 
defined process, but it is perceived as LEAN 
instead of a process as such. 
Manufacture of special/ expensive products is 
not process oriented. 
Fulfillment? 
LINAK Yes, as defined by the LEAN implementation. Fulfillment? 
Novozymes Yes, but in various ways as described above. Customer Service, Fulfillment, and SC Planning. 
Oticon Yes, the ‘Teams’ structure may indicate process orientation. 
Processes identical to area of 
responsibility within each team? 
RIEGENS The company has done nothing to implement process orientation. N/A 
SDC DANDISC No.  Process communicated externally, but not used as an organizational unit internally. N/A 
 
A Typology of Process Interpretations 
Building from the above described interpretations a typology of processes emerges: 
1. Business Process (as understood by e.g. Hammer & Champy (1993)), 
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2. Manufacturing Process (e.g. the part of the fulfillment process solely relating to 
operations)6, 
3. SCM Process (processes combining human and non-human actors in processes 
spanning across functional silos, and perhaps even extending beyond the legal boundary 
of the company), and 
4. Department Process (like the SCM process, but embedded within a functional silo and 
with no or little coordination with other processes). 
Evaluating the identified processes and classifying according to this typology results in a 
more nuanced picture of the interpretation and implementation of processes at the case 
companies, see below. 
Table 8-4: Categorization of Processes 
Process Type(s) Company Process Orientation? Bus. Process Manufact. SCM Department 
Bang & Olufsen Yes 
Demand 
Planning, 
Business 
Process 
Development 
Production 
Planning Order Handling  
Brüel & Kjær No N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Coloplast Yes Demand Planning  
Order 
Fulfillment  
Dyrup No N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Fritz Hansen (Yes)  Order Fulfillment?   
LINAK (Yes)  Order Fulfillment?   
Novozymes Yes SC Planning  Fulfillment Customer Service 
Oticon (Yes)   
Inbound 
Transports, 
Logistics, 
Outbound 
Transports? 7 
 
RIEGENS No N/A N/A N/A N/A 
SDC DANDISC No N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 
First and foremost it must be recognized that a more stringent and detailed analysis of each 
process, e.g. through direct observation, would have revealed more insights into the internal 
logic of the processes8.  It might also have revealed that more processes exist, or that the 
mentioned processes exist only through the perception of the interviewees.  Where possible 
                                                 
6 Please note the difference between the ‘Manufacturing Process’ as defined in Chapter 6.2.3 and this 
construct.  The former is a measure imposed by the author as a result of an evaluation of the external 
conditions, whereas the latter is introduced through the process definitions put forward by the case 
companies. 
7 The three teams names listed are perceived as SCM processes as the responsibility of each team spans more 
than one traditional silo, or spans across the boundary of the company.  It is recognized, though, that this is 
a somewhat bold decision. 
8 Various tools for analyzing and describing processes exist, see e.g. Hines & Rich (1997). 
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the processes identified by one interviewee are controlled against at least one more 
interviewee, but still: more processes might exist. 
Nonetheless, evaluating the processes as mapped out in Table 8-4 above reveals the case 
companies differ from the companies participating in the pilot studies, as only one example of 
a ‘Silo’ process is identified (‘Customer Service’ at Novozymes).  Furthermore it becomes 
apparent that companies categorized as process oriented all have examples of processes from 
the ‘SCM’ category.  Not even the three companies (Fritz Hansen, LINAK, and Oticon) 
perceived as partially process oriented have silo processes, but have their processes 
categorized as either ‘Manufacturing’ (the LEAN companies Fritz Hansen and LINAK) or 
‘SCM’ (Oticon). 
Even if all companies undoubtedly perform planning and forecasting of various kinds only 
three companies (Bang & Olufsen, Coloplast, and Novozymes) mention this activity in 
relation to processes.  At Bang & Olufsen the planning takes two forms: Demand Planning 
and Production Planning.  The latter is perceived as a strictly operational activity, and the 
process is therefore placed in the ‘Manufacturing’ class.  Demand Planning at Bang & 
Olufsen is placed in the same class as ‘Demand Planning’ at Coloplast and ‘SC Planning’ at 
Novozymes: the ‘Business Process’ class.  As a concluding comment it should be mentioned 
that placing the planning activity/process in the management apex of the conceptual process 
framework (see e.g. Figure 2-9) was considered, thereby strengthening the explanations 
offered in this area.  But as described above it was decided to perceive the planning 
activity/process as part of the process framework itself. 
Process Communication 
Another aspect is the extent to which the processes have been communicated.  In Bang & 
Olufsen, for instance, the SCM Concept is explained in terms of process, replacing formal 
organization with (knowledge of) processes.  Within most of the case companies the 
processes are communicated internally enabling the creation of a process mentality – 
primarily within Purchasing and Logistics/SCM.  But two companies stand out: Oticon (due 
to their slightly confusing organizational structure) and SDC DANDISC who claim not 
having processes internally but communicate the manufacturing process on their website (see 
www.sdc-group.dk and Figure 7-30).  In the former case it is somewhat unclear how exactly 
communication within the company is organized; in the latter the interviewees clearly 
contradict the information published9.  In any case communicating the process design 
(including de-coupling points, interfaces, decision points etc.) enables suppliers and 
customers to better interact with the company reaping benefits of optimization. 
                                                 
9 Again the tight internal integration necessitated by the critically short lead times imposed by major 
customers lead to a somewhat counter-intuitive constellation of constructs.  The “nature” of this company is 
different from the other more traditional manufacturing companies. 
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8.1.3 Construct ‘Production Philosophy’ 
Adapting the processes to accommodate the customers is focal to SCM as is having the 
appropriate variety of products for the customers to choose from, a delivery system which 
ensures precision, and acceptable lead times.  The traditional solution was to stock-keep the 
entire product portfolio, but as customer requirements are getting more and more diversified 
stock keeping is no longer an option as it would tie up too much capital.  The production 
philosophy therefore should answer the question of how to produce, how to stock, and how to 
make sure lead times are acceptable to the customers.  Certain production philosophies are 
thereby perceived as “less SCM” than others.  Mass Production, for instance, is perceived as a 
strictly Push-type technology whereas e.g. Just-In-Time is perceived as “true” SCM, as it is a 
Pull-type production philosophy putting the customer in center. 
Production Philosophy versus Supply Chain 
As described in Chapter 8.1 several of the companies operate more than one supply chain.  
Intuitively one might perceive a production philosophy as describing the operation at a (one) 
entity thereby implying either: 1. a company’s supply chains are each associated or linked to 
distinct entities (plants or parts of plants), or 2. an entity can only have one production 
philosophy in place.  Both imply that the portion of a supply chain being managed by a 
company can not be mixed, but this is obviously incorrect, as this would invalidate e.g. 
production postponement10.  Therefore production philosophies and supply chains are both 
part of the design, even if supply chains might be a more illusive concept to define and 
describe11.  The case companies illustrate a number of combinations of supply chains and 
production philosophies: 
? SDC DANDISC describe the simplest combination of production philosophy and 
supply chains as only one supply chain and one production philosophy (Pull / Make-to-
order) is identified.  It should be noted, though, that SDC DANDISC tries to implement 
logistical postponement for the back-catalogue items, but so far with little success. 
? At Coloplast also only one supply chain could be identified – ranging from first tier 
suppliers to the sales companies.  But as the warehousing project proceeds it is the 
ambition of the company to implement make-to-order production for the largest 
wholesalers.  Coloplast will thereby introduce another philosophy, probably using the 
inventory as a leveling device for the production against wholesalers’ orders.  Currently 
no make-to-order production is taking place. 
? Fritz Hansen is quite similar to SDC DANDISC, but due to the two distribution 
solutions in place (domestic/export), two almost identical supply chains have been 
identified both using/supporting the LEAN Manufacturing production philosophy.  
                                                 
10 Implementing production postponement will decrease the overall level of inventory as Finished Goods 
Inventory will disappear (or be grossly diminished).  This is done by decoupling the production process into 
a Push and a Pull part, the former generating WIP inventory to balance lead time with inventory (and 
production) cost. 
11 Further complicating the issue, it must be recognized that production philosophy might be a criteria used 
when mapping and analyzing the supply chain(s) within a company. 
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Furthermore a supply chain for the production and delivery of expensive, wooden 
designer furniture is identified, based on crafts-based production.  Except for the (now 
internationally synchronized12) introduction of new products all production is performed 
against customer orders. 
? Also having implemented LEAN, albeit in a somewhat more complex manner, LINAK 
is slowly moving towards production against customer orders only.  In the past almost 
all OEM customers had their own products designed, produced, and keeping stock at the 
most convenient LINAK sales company.  This practice is slowly being altered as 
LINAK aims to enhance its LEAN Manufacturing principles by insisting on more 
modular products (thereby making production postponement a real option, not only at 
the most basic component level).  One of the current challenges to the LEAN principles 
is the size of orders, which make production resemble Mass Production. 
? The setup at RIEGENS is a bit more complex from a SCM perspective as two of three 
supply chains (standard cabinets and portfolio items) share production philosophy and 
the third supply chain is based on make-to-order (crafts-based) production of unique 
items. 
From the description above it should be evident the combination of supply chain and 
production philosophy is less than straight-forward.  Even in this small sample of companies 
few similarities are identified as a wide range of contextual variables result in differences in 
the motivation for the production philosophies in place.  Furthermore the above mentioned 
examples illustrate how the definition (or perception) of the supply chains and/or scope for 
SCM at the company has an impact on the analysis.  Including the suppliers in the analysis of 
e.g. LINAK and Fritz Hansen will demonstrate the extent of the LEAN principles by 
illustrating the de-coupling (by means of either long-term capacity commitments or inventory) 
between the companies in the supply chain. 
Looking for Push and Pull 
Analyzing the case companies for components of Push and Pull (or rather: looking for the de-
coupling) within the SCM scope in each company might reveal insights into the choice of 
production philosophies.  Or in other words: perhaps decoupling the production within the 
company is the “natural” or “popular” choice of the companies using SCM as opposed to the 
traditional manufacturing firms? 
The initial step in the analysis is to focus on the companies having either Push or Pull 
philosophies implemented as it does not require the inclusion of the entity supply chain in the 
analysis.  Only two companies fall in the ‘Push Only’ category, namely Coloplast13 and 
                                                 
12 As mentioned in the case study introduction of new products internationally is performed twice a year.  To 
support the marketing in the high number of outlets and showrooms across the world, bulk orders are placed 
to ensure availability in the early market. 
13  Classifying Coloplast as a ’Push Only’ may surprise some as Coloplast in Logistics circles in Denmark is 
renowned for e.g. their Closed Loop Distribution.  Dissecting this concept reveals a centralized inventory 
replenished through annual forecasts with periodic adjustments.  Only at sales company level does the 
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Dyrup.  The two companies seem quite similar (they have the same characteristics, see Table 
6-9), and both perceive themselves as performing SCM.  The evaluation presented in Table 
8-1 concurs, even if Dyrup is only partly formalized (organizational changes are presently 
under way) in their implementation of SCM.  Quite paradoxically both ‘Push Only’ 
companies are ‘SCM companies’. 
Identifying the ‘Pull Only’ category companies does not add clarity.  Again only two 
companies are identified: Fritz Hansen and SDC DANDISC.  The former is broadly 
recognized within the SCM domain as a frontrunner, the latter is an almost unknown producer 
in a niche market, itself denying working with SCM.  Of the four companies categorized 
according to Push / Pull components so far, only one (Fritz Hansen) seems to fit expectation. 
The six remaining companies have both Push and Pull components in their production 
philosophies.  Table 8-5 below contains a summary of the knowledge on production 
philosophies in the case companies. 
Table 8-5: Summary of ‘Production Philosophy’ 
Company Production Philosophy Push Pull 
Bang & Olufsen 
Mixed: The majority of products are produced against forecasts.  
These products may be postponed (production postponement) 
supporting a wide array of variants of each product.  
Expensive/special products are produced to order. 
Yes Yes 
Brüel & Kjær 
Mixed: Projects are performed in cooperation with the customers, 
whereas standard products are produced against forecast/inventory 
levels/firmed orders. 
Yes Yes 
Coloplast Batch production – against forecasts only.  Plans for production against orders for large customers/wholesalers are under way. Yes No 
Dyrup 
Almost solely batch production – against forecasts and inventory 
levels.  Dyrup on very rare occasions may produce a special product 
for a customer, if the customer is important enough for the company. 
Yes (No) 
Fritz Hansen LEAN for standard products (and crafts based production of the expensive wood products). No Yes 
LINAK 
Primarily production against firmed orders (LEAN).  Previously the 
company produced a broad portfolio of customer designed actuators.  
This practice is slowly being altered. 
Yes Yes 
Novozymes 
Bulk production against forecasts created at SCO.  Production of end-
products mostly against forecasts, but production against orders is an 
ambition. 
Yes Yes 
Oticon Production against forecasts and inventory levels. Yes Yes 
RIEGENS 
Mixed: standard (low cost) overhead cabinet are produced against 
firmed orders, projects are naturally made-to-order, whereas portfolio 
products are produced against forecast/inventory level. 
Yes Yes 
SDC DANDISC 
Pull – very short lead times.  Tries to market logistical postponement 
in the form of forward production and inventorying of customers 
products. 
(No) Yes 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
concept look like a Pull system as local inventory may be quite low (as it is being replenished from the 
central inventory). 
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Occasional Transactions versus Ongoing Business 
Drawing on one of the conclusions from Chapter 5 – that SCM is really only applicable in 
relation to recurrent (as opposed to occasional) transactions it seems evident the projects 
needs to be separated from the rest when evaluating Push and Pull activities14. 
Since the methodology applied when mapping the supply chains used frequency of 
transaction as a distinction (see Chapter Seven) “project” type supply chains are described 
separate from the “recurrent transactions” type supply chains for each company.  Exclusion of 
“project type” supply chains is thereby quite straight forward.  The subsequent repetition of 
the above documented evaluation of the supply chains result in a somewhat more detailed 
view of the production philosophies, see Table 8-6 below. 
Table 8-6: Production Philosophies for Recurrent Transactions 
Company Supply Chain(s) Excluded? Push Pull  
Internal 
Decoupling 
Bang & Olufsen No Yes Yes  Popular products only 
Brüel & Kjær Yes Yes No  No 
Coloplast No Yes No  No 
Dyrup No Yes No  No 
Fritz Hansen No No Yes  No 
LINAK No Yes Yes  Feeder Units/Component Mfg. versus Assembly 
Novozymes No Yes Yes  Splits Bulk Production and Mixing 
Oticon No Yes Yes  Brands and Color of the Shell 
RIEGENS Yes Yes No  No 
SDC DANDISC No (No) Yes  No 
 
Excluding the occasional transactions (the projects) from the analysis of Push / Pull results in 
two companies (Brüel & Kjær and RIEGENS) falling into the “Push Only” category.  For 
these two companies the Pull orientation only related to projects which in both cases represent 
a substantial part of the overall business.  Probably sharing capacity and equipment, and 
definitely sharing competences both companies have two sets of business models “built in”.  
Surprisingly, this configuration seems to be stable, even if intuitively the inherent logics 
(revenue generation, time allocation, scheduling etc.) conflict. 
A consequence of the new analysis is that the group of ‘Push Only’ companies now consists 
of two ‘SCM companies’ and two ‘non-SCM’.  In this sample the implementation of SCM 
apparently does not correlate with the Push / Pull dichotomy.  An analysis of the group of 
companies having both Push and Pull might shed some insights. 
                                                 
14 Projects are different from standard operations in many ways.  In relation to Push / Pull perhaps the most 
obvious difference is the scheduling paradigm in use: for projects scheduling is performed by calculating 
backwards from a deadline, whereas standard operations are scheduled to minimize lead time variations.  
For more on scheduling, see e.g. Slack, Chambers, & Johnston (2004). 
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Investigating Decoupling 
For the remaining four companies having both Pull and Push decoupling must be performed 
internally within the company15.  Looking closer at the four companies reveals the rationales 
for the internal decoupling vary greatly: 
? At Bang & Olufsen decoupling is performed as semi-finished products are produced to 
inventory, postponing e.g. choice of color.  For a few products (e.g. telephones) this 
customization is pushed all the way into the B1 stores, but Bang & Olufsen prefer the 
customization to be performed as part of a standard process under strict quality control.   
? The LEAN setup at LINAK has the decoupling built in as they use “supermarkets” with 
purchased as well as produced items at various component levels.  In contrast, Fritz 
Hansen purchases all items and thereby does not decouple in any way but simply has to 
manage their “supermarket” inventory. 
? At Novozymes the decoupling takes place in the interface between the bulk production 
(not using SCM) and the mixing and distribution operation (called SCO).  Novozymes 
thereby illustrate an interesting case where the choice of scope for the SCM 
organization apparently was influenced by the production philosophy? 
? Finally, at Oticon decoupling is performed to obtain economies of scale in the 
production of the electronics, postponing the branding of the finished product and the 
encapsulation in the shell (choice of color). 
Choice of decoupling point thereby illustrates diversity instead of commonality across the 
case companies, enhancing the argument that the implementation of SCM is very dependent 
on the context. 
8.1.4 Construct ‘IT Support’ 
The increased time pressure, shortened lead times along with added complexity in production 
methods makes the use of IT a necessity as described previously.  Evolving from stand-alone 
applications solving e.g. planning problems, performing network analysis, or enhancing 
inventory management software has been “process-enabled” as modern ERP systems cover all 
essential business activities. 
In this context it is therefore of interest to understand how software is being used to support 
the smooth and efficient flow of goods in order to meet the requirements of the end-consumer.  
Using IT to e.g. automate the ordering process or to ensure distribution details is forwarded 
the end-consumer in a timely and efficient manner may increases the end-consumers’ trust in 
the supply chain thereby possibly leading to more revenue and better profitability.  Also the 
use of IT might provide more features to the end-consumer, like Online Customization of the 
product or track-and-trace functionality allowing the customer (and shipper) to monitor the 
movement of goods from source to destination. 
                                                 
15 Determining whether or not decoupling takes place in the interface between the companies requires a more 
thorough analysis of customer and suppliers. 
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IT offerings 
Besides offering predictability and more functionality to the customer, IT also supports the 
operation itself.  All modern software packages (ERP systems) distinguish themselves from 
the traditional stand-alone applications by offering a higher degree of integration between 
modules, thereby e.g. allowing Operations to faster recognize changes in demand or Finance 
to continuously monitor costs in production.  Where “old-fashioned” applications are 
characterized by periodic cross-module batch updating (if at all) modern applications update 
all relevant modules online, and keep document trails of all transactions. 
Table 8-7: Summary of ‘IT Support’ 
Company IT Support ERP 
Bang & Olufsen 
The company implemented SAP some years ago – and stand-alone systems have 
been shut down ever since as more and more functionality is transferred to the 
SAP platform.  The B1 stores are supported by a web application called ROS 
(Retail Ordering System), whereas suppliers might be integrated by means of 
EDI.  A web-based application for the suppliers is being implemented to support 
the coming implementation of VMI. 
Yes 
Brüel & Kjær 
At Brüel & Kjær the IT support is done by various applications: Oracle for core 
operations and Siebel in decentralized implementations at the sales companies.  
Information on customers is transmitted from the Siebel applications to the 
central systems, and orders are transmitted as well.  Neither suppliers nor 
customers are supported by IT, but an implementation of EDI is under way. 
Yes 
Coloplast 
The core system is an ERP system called Enterprise OneWorld16.  Furthermore 
the company uses Lotus Notes for various applications. 
As a large portion of the required input is supplied by means of VMI, the 
suppliers have access to the inventory levels of their designated items through a 
web application. 
Yes 
Dyrup An old, outdated system which is in dire need of replacement.  On top of the core system a reporting application collects and reports on various KPI’s (all plants). No 
Fritz Hansen 
Internal operations are supported by a customized implementation of MOVEX, 
and a “home grown” application gives suppliers and customers access to relevant 
information. 
Yes 
LINAK The ERP system AXAPTA support production, planning, order management, finance etc. Yes 
Novozymes Bulk production as well as order management, planning, and distribution is 
supported by a SAP system.  The SAP system is modified to ease external IT 
integration, with both SAP and non-SAP systems. 
Customers may use the “Customer Centre” to track and trace their orders. 
Yes 
Oticon A few years ago an ERP system (MSGPRO) was implemented. 
EDI documents are exchanged with the majority of suppliers.  Furthermore a 
web application enables customers top place orders, which are subsequently 
transferred to the core system and converted by means of VIDELITY software. 
Yes 
RIEGENS 
Production and planning is supported by LIMES, an old system developed and 
maintained by a software house in Copenhagen.  The system does support the 
exchange of EDI documents.  The operation in Braintree (UK) uses a modified 
version of Baan, called the “MK System”.  The switch-over to the LIMES 
system is planned for 2006.  Administrative functions, product development and 
internal communications are done in a customized Lotus Notes application. 
No 
SDC DANDISC 
Production planning and control as well as master data maintenance and 
invoicing are performed in a small semi-integrated system.  The inventory 
management for the postponement solution is performed in an identical albeit 
separate installation.  The customer front-end is supported by a web-enabled 
application which interfaces with the core system. 
No 
 
                                                 
16 Enterprise OneWorld was first acquired by PeopleSoft which subsequently was acquired by Oracle. 
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And precisely this characteristic of modern ERP systems appeals to the SCM domain as this 
type of application helps bridge the inherent information gap existing (to a certain degree) in 
all complex systems.  Therefore it is of relevance to understand the use of IT in order to 
explain e.g. organizational safe guards, types of relationships etc.  Table 8-7 above 
summarizes the use of IT in the case companies. 
ERP Systems? 
As shown in the table above most companies (seven of ten) has at least one ERP system 
implemented.  Surprisingly there seem to be no dominant system among the seven companies 
as only two companies use the same system (Bang & Olufsen and Novozymes both use SAP). 
The companies not using ERP systems are primarily small companies (RIEGENS and SDC 
DANDISC) but other small companies do (Fritz Hansen uses MOVEX and Oticon uses 
MSGPRO).  At Dyrup Henrik D. Nielsen explains the absence of an ERP system by more 
pressing investments in the pipeline: 
“We have planned to upgrade our IT systems a number of times, but each time 
the investment has been postponed due to its size, and due to other pressing 
issues requiring financing … we are fully aware we need to address this 
issue…” 
If this is a general tendency explaining the absence of ERP systems in the two small 
companies might thereby be as straight forward as a combination of turnover/PBT and 
ownership structure, as RIEGENS and SDC DANDISC represent the least turnover/PBT and 
neither are owned by investment companies. 
ERP instead of Processes? 
It may be postulated the use of ERP systems have removed the need to implement process-
orientation in companies as the ERP system is built to support the integration of activities 
across functions.  As most users of ERP systems have experienced the effect of transparency 
is enormous.  Lead times and precision in performance becomes visible to other users of the 
system, and if included in reporting procedures becomes a highly possible target for 
monitoring.  Furthermore it becomes increasingly difficult to “pass the bucket” to other 
departments participating in the process, as all transactions have full document trail. 
It may therefore be hypothesized that the activities do not need to be supported by formal, 
cross-functional processes since each process is split into distinct activities with clear 
identification of roles and responsibilities, in most cases with identifiable deadlines/expected 
processing times. 
When implementing the earliest ERP systems the organization was required to adopt a 
predefined set of processes, but with the revised versions of the systems the extensive use of 
work flow technology17 has enabled companies to differentiate their processes and to mould 
them to their liking.  E.g. an order may trigger a work flow where step one is a check for order 
                                                 
17 Work flow technology is an event driven technology, where events trigger a chain of activities and decision 
points, coupled with communication tools and roles linked to individuals, as maintained in the application. 
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value.  In case the value exceeds a certain value the order is passed to a manager who has to 
accept the order before it is processed.  Alternatively if the order value is below the limit it is 
effectuated immediately.  Linking all this information with a business reporting system (most 
often built into the ERP system) enables reporting on e.g. processing time, number of stock-
outs, identification of the warehouse employee picking the goods, dispatch mode and time, 
and timing of invoicing runs. 
From all this information reports may be created pinpointing problem areas as they appear. 
For all these reasons, ERP systems make a difference – and companies using ERP systems 
may work from a different baseline than companies not having ERP systems. 
Testing the Hypothesis 
Testing the hypothesis is performed rather easily by combining previous results, see Table 8-8 
below.  Combining the findings on ERP implementation with the category ‘Process 
Orientation?’ as shown in Table 8-4 gives no support to the hypothesis of ERP systems acting 
as replacement for process-orientation.  In most cases (nine of ten) process orientation and 
ERP implementation goes hand in hand.  Only at Brüel & Kjær this is not the case, as they use 
Oracle and Siebel applications but have done little in terms of process orientation.  Analyzing 
at this level thereby does not support the hypothesis. 
Table 8-8: SCM, Process Orientation, and ERP18 
Process Type(s) 
Company SCM? Formal SCM 
Process 
Orientation? Bus Man SCM Silo 
ERP 
Bang & Olufsen Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Brüel & Kjær No No No N/A N/A N/A N/A Yes 
Coloplast Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Dyrup Yes (Yes) No N/A N/A N/A N/A No 
Fritz Hansen Yes Yes (Yes)  Yes?   Yes 
LINAK Yes No (Yes)  Yes?   Yes 
Novozymes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Oticon Yes No (Yes)   Yes?  Yes 
RIEGENS No No No N/A N/A N/A N/A No 
SDC DANDISC No No No N/A N/A N/A N/A No 
 
But taking a closer look at the process types identified at each case company reveals a 
possible correlation between working with SCM, process types, and the use of ERP systems.   
ERP as a Prerequisite for SCM? 
Analyzing the six companies having process orientation reveals all these companies have 
process types ‘Manufacturing’ and/or ‘SCM’19, and they have all implemented ERP systems.  
The correlation between SCM, process orientation, and the use of ERP systems might thereby 
be the following: ERP systems are required in order to manage the complexity of (tightly) 
                                                 
18 Columns ‘SCM?’ and ‘Formal SCM’ are from Table 8-1, columns ‘Process Orientation?’ and ‘Process 
Type’ are from Table 8-4.  Finally, the column ‘ERP’ is taken from Table 8-7. 
19 Using the process type in the analysis is important as ‘Business Process’ might be perceived as a strictly 
strategic entity and ‘Silo’ is simply a redressing of typical functionally isolated activities. 
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integrated processes in the inter-organizational system (SCM).  Whether this is the case or not 
can not be determined here, but certain evidence exists, Steen B. Jørgensen comments: 
“It does not make sense to talk about SCM without the use of IT systems.  The 
system [SAP] we have in place support our processes and make sure we 
coordinate activities across the internal supply chain.  …  This includes 
production, assembly, and distribution as well as planning and forecasting.” 
At LINAK Morten S. Raahede concurs: 
“We really depend on our IT system to make the LEAN Manufacturing work.  
…  It glues together the concept; it would make no sense to go back to the old 
[stand-alone] systems.” 
At Oticon the relation between the organization structure and the ERP system is somewhat 
less straightforward.  But the importance of the ERP system as a tool to achieve the strategic 
goals of the company is similar to the other two companies, Marianne B. Korsholm 
comments: 
“We rely heavily on our integrated system as it holds all information on 
suppliers, customer and products.  …  Without the [IT] system we would not be 
able to operate in the way we do today, it actually supports our teams quite 
well.” 
The use of IT internally within each company thereby seems quite important in relation to 
SCM, but it seems relevant to also analyze the use of IT in the interface between companies. 
IT in the Up- and Downstream Interfaces 
As described in Table 8-7 above most companies use IT to support the interface to customer 
and suppliers.  The functionality vary a lot, though, as some companies offer functionality to 
suppliers and customers both (e.g. Oticon), and others do not integrate outside the extended 
company (e.g. LINAK).  The type of functionality also varies, from the receiver driven (e.g. 
Track and Trace functionality) to the interacting (e.g. exchange of EDI documents or other 
types of integration of systems). 
Classes of Functionality 
Three classes of functionality are recognized in the empirical data: 
? Static – making information available on a “self-service” basis. 
? Push – making information available, and forwards it to the relevant party. 
? Interaction – functionality enabling interaction between parties.20 
In terms of integration the three categories are quite different.  The first category describes the 
manual interface where employees in the one party must manually look for the published 
information.  The second category enables a level of automation as information is created for 
a distinct receiver and forwarded automatically.  In the last category feedback is guaranteed as 
the systems are integrated. 
                                                 
20 The typology Static/Push/Interaction is a further development of a dichotomy presented in previous work 
on website functionality (Sørensen & Holst, 2003). 
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Table 8-9: IT Support for Interfaces 
Company IT Offering Up/Down Type 
A web-based application is being implemented to support the 
coming implementation of VMI. Up Static 
Suppliers’ systems are integrated with Bang & Olufsen’s 
systems, and forecasts and plans are shared. Up Dynamic Bang & Olufsen 
B1 stores use the web application Retail Ordering System 
(ROS) for placing and tracking customer orders. Down
* Dynamic 
EDI is being implemented with two of the suppliers. Up Dynamic 
Brüel & Kjær Siebel is used for CRM and Order Management in the sales 
companies.  Integrates with the core system (Oracle). Down
* Dynamic 
As a large portion of the required input is supplied by means of 
VMI, the suppliers have access to the inventory levels of their 
designated items through a web application. 
Up Static 
Whenever the inventory level drops below the agreed level an 
e-mail notification is sent to the designated supplier. Up Push 
Coloplast 
Sales companies are integrated into the core system, Enterprise 
OneWorld. Down
* Dynamic 
Dyrup 
An application collects sales and production data from all 
production units and sales companies and enables reporting and 
evaluation. 
Down* Static 
Suppliers have access to inventory levels and outstanding 
orders, as well as their performance evaluations through a 
web-enabled application. 
Up Static 
Fritz Hansen 
Track and Trace – through a web-enabled application. Down Static 
LINAK Integration with US Production and sales companies. Down* Dynamic 
Forecasts shared with Bulk Production through the SAP system. Up* Dynamic 
Plants abroad are integrated in the SAP environment.
Overall (aggregated) production planning is performed 
centrally. 
Down* Dynamic 
Customers may integrate their systems with Novozymes’ SAP 
system and have orders etc. updated “automatically”. Down Dynamic 
Novozymes 
The “Customer Centre” enables Track and Trace. Down Static 
EDI supporting VMI with the twelve largest suppliers (approx. 
80% of total volume). Up Dynamic Oticon 
A web application enables customers to place orders. Down Dynamic 
RIEGENS EDI with two suppliers. Up Dynamic 
SDC DANDISC Web-enabled application for managing inputs and orders from customers. Down Dynamic 
 
Analyzing the case companies according to this typology reveals that the Push category is 
quite rare (only identified at Coloplast).  The Static category is identified six times (at five 
different companies) whereas Dynamic is identified thirteen times (at eight companies).  This 
would imply a close integration with external parties if not for one thing: in six of the 
identified instances the external party belongs to the company (is owned fully or partly).  
Focusing on the focal company (typically the HQ) and thereby investigating the interface 
between HQ and subsidiaries instead of analyzing the entire “company network” and the 
interface to the outer network probably results in a distorted picture.  Excluding the “within 
ownership” interfaces and repeating the analysis quickly confirms this hypothesis of less 
integration with “true” external parties: one Push, five Static, and only seven Dynamic.  
Within ownership IT integration is tighter.  Findings on IT support of interfaces are listed in 
Table 8-9 above (“within ownership” interfaces are marked ‘*’). 
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Coupling of IT Systems 
The IT support of external parties is less sophisticated than might be expected, especially if 
the “within ownership” interfaces are excluded.  Analyzing the ten case companies to identify 
the coupled IT systems (enabling the seamless supply chain) results in Table 8-10.  As shown 
below most (six) of the cases are undetermined as information on the relevant interface is 
unavailable (for the reasons described above).  Among the remaining four companies only 
(Oticon) has coupled IT systems both up- and downstream.  The other three other operate an 
“IT-broken” supply chain. 
Table 8-10: Coupling of IT Systems 
Company Upstream Downstream Two-Directional IT Coupling 
Bang & Olufsen Coupled Coupled* Yes* 
Brüel & Kjær Coupled Coupled* Yes* 
Coloplast Decoupled (Push) Coupled* No 
Dyrup Decoupled Decoupled* No 
Fritz Hansen Decoupled Decoupled No 
LINAK Decoupled Coupled* No 
Novozymes Coupled* Coupled Yes* 
Oticon Coupled Coupled Yes 
RIEGENS Coupled Decoupled No 
SDC DANDISC Decoupled Coupled No 
 
8.1.5 Construct ‘External Integration’ 
Besides IT integration, companies in supply chains can be integrated in various ways e.g.  
process and social integration (e.g. Bagchi & Skjøtt-Larsen, 2002a; Bagchi et al., 2005).  
Especially the latter type of integration is often explained by length of relationship. 
Length of Relationship 
As referenced in Chapter 1 the length of relationship might in itself not represent an 
explanation as apparently most (all?) companies have long-term relationships with customers 
and suppliers.  But similarly to the description above of the use of ERP systems, long 
relationships might be a pre-requisite for close cooperation. 
Table 8-11 below describes how long-term relationships dominate the relationship map.  
Especially upstream this is the case - with only few exceptions: Novozymes and SDC 
DANDISC.  In both cases the companies purchase input of the lowest level of sophistication 
possible and therefore treat their trivial suppliers as players in a (perfect) market: 
“Almost all our inputs are very basic agricultural products which are bought 
on market-like terms.  There is no value in entering into partnerships with these 
suppliers as no advantages can be reaped.  …  At some stage the agricultural 
sector might decide to produce more specialized products but so far the supply 
of generic products is sufficient.” (Ken Friis, Novozymes) 
At SDC DANDISC the considerations are similar: 
“The few types of input we require are all supplied by a number of large 
suppliers – and in a generic quality.  We might choose to use a more 
specialized granulate, for instance, but then we would depend on that supplier.  
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…  So far, we have chosen to stay as independent as possible thereby enabling 
price competition – which is critically necessary due to the low contribution 
margin in our industry.” (Henrik Frandsen, SDC DANDISC) 
At Coloplast they have long-term relationships with most suppliers, but would like to have a 
more balanced approach: 
“A small group of our supplier have a misperception of their value-adding – 
they are really capacity suppliers but expect to be treated as competence 
suppliers.  …  We really should improve our supplier evaluation process – 
currently it may take as much as 1-1½ years to replace a supplier.  …  The way 
we manage each supplier should match the value–adding.” (Roland V. 
Pedersen, Coloplast) 
Besides these exceptions all companies use capacity suppliers for non-vital input. 
Table 8-11: Summary of ‘Relationship Length’ 
Company Upstream Downstream 
Bang & Olufsen21 Primarily long-term relationships. 
Local dealers are being replaced by B1 stores 
(franchisees), and Store-in-Store concepts. 
Master Dealers in Asia are relatively new, 
focus on contracts. 
Brüel & Kjær Primarily long-term relationships. 
Long-term for standard components.  Repeat 
sales to project partners.  Shared outlets with 
ENDEVCO are being dismantled. 
Coloplast Primarily long-term relationships.  Desire for more market orientation. 
Long-term relationships with institutional 
customers.  Others: mixed. 
Dyrup Primarily long-term relationships. Long-term relationships with industrial customers.  Others: mixed. 
Fritz Hansen Primarily long-term relationships. Long-term relationships with partners.  Few institutional customers (hotels etc.). 
LINAK Long-term relationships. Long-term relationships. 
Novozymes Market orientation for most inputs (agricultural products) 
Long-term relationships.  Novozymes aids in 
improving customers’ production. 
Oticon Long-term relationships. Access to market obtained through purchase of outlet chains.  Others: mixed. 
RIEGENS Long-term relationships. 
Long-term with dominant customers. 
Ongoing contact with key players in the 
project market. 
SDC DANDISC 
Long history but no close integration.  
Contracts are renegotiated every quarter. 
Relationship with equipment suppliers. 
The dominant customer was lost during the 
research project.  Others are mixed. 
 
Downstream Relationships 
On the downstream side, the length of relationship displays a higher degree of variation.  This 
may be due to the type of customer (B2B versus B2C), the ownership structure (independent 
customers versus co-owned distributors versus fully owned sales companies) or it may be due 
to the conditions under which the multiplicity of distributions channels operate. 
For a few of the companies the dominance of individual customers seems to have posed a 
problem, as illustrated in e.g. RIEGENS and SDC DANDISC.  In the case of RIEGENS the 
                                                 
21 The diversified businesses are not included in the analysis – as mentioned previously. 
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dominant customer is retained but the dominance is reduced whereas at SDC DANDISC the 
customer was lost (possibly resulting in accepting the proposed merger with DCM). 
Also at Bang & Olufsen the relationships downstream are altered as independent, local 
dealers are being replaced by franchisees and store-in-store concepts.  At Oticon attempts at 
penetrate local markets are made through the purchase of existing chains (hearing clinics). 
The current trend towards project sales also seem to have an influence on the downstream 
relationships, as “project facilitators” are becoming increasingly important for many 
companies.  At Brüel & Kjær and RIEGENS keeping in touch with this type of external 
partners is quite important. 
CPFR 
In order to determine the level of CPFR three dimensions are evaluated for each case 
company (see Table 6-2).  The first category ‘Information Sharing’ is derived from the 
information in Table 8-9 whereas the latter two are based on evaluations of the case material.  
The evaluation is split in up- and downstream as the level of CPFR might differ. 
As shown in Table 8-12 below the majority of companies have either periodic or continual 
information sharing both up- and downstream.  This should come as no surprise as Table 8-9 
documents the availability of static and dynamic functionality in the interfaces in both 
directions.  Evaluating the coordination is somewhat more challenging as coordination 
mechanisms are embedded in the business practices up- and downstream and not readily 
observable.  When evaluating each case company for coordination mechanisms the researcher 
looked for e.g. periodic meeting, evaluations, cross-placement of employees and joint 
activities such as collaborative planning or other types of ongoing contact at the operational 
level.  Interestingly it appears coordination is dependent on orientation as eight case 
companies do not coordinate with customers whereas all coordinate (at some level) with 
suppliers.  Only LINAK and Novozymes coordinate downstream.  Also the last of the three 
dimensions show diversity across the case companies.  For the majority (six) of the companies 
no alternative goals are identified but for the remaining four companies two alternative goals 
are identified: ‘Access to outsourced technology’ and ‘Product development’.  As 
documented in the case reports both Bang & Olufsen and Brüel & Kjær are highly dependent 
on their suppliers to sustain a competitive advantage in their market as a direct consequence 
of the “forced” outsourcing of their core competencies.  Both these companies have ended up 
in a “diseconomy of innovation” – the situation where a critically important technology is 
outsourced due to increasing cost of maintaining an adequate level of competence and rate of 
development.  Both companies therefore try to remain attractive customers to these critically 
important suppliers. 
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Table 8-12: Summary of ‘Collaboration’ 
Company  Information Sharing22 Coordination Alternative Goals CPFR Level 
Up Continual Continual Access to outsourced technology Advanced Bang & Olufsen 
Down Continual* None None None 
Up Continual Continual Access to outsourced technology Advanced Brüel & Kjær 
Down Periodic None Product development Basic (projects) 
Up (Continual) Periodic None Basic Coloplast 
Down Continual* None None None 
Up No Periodic None None Dyrup Down (Periodic) None None None 
Up (Continual) Continual None Basic Fritz Hansen Down No None None None 
Up No Periodic None None LINAK Down Continual* Periodic None Basic 
Up Periodic* (Periodic) None Basic23 Novozymes Down Continual Periodic Product development Basic 
Up Continual Continual Product development Advanced Oticon Down Continual No None None 
Up Continual Periodic None Basic RIEGENS Down Periodic None Product development Basic (projects) 
Up No Periodic None None SDC DANDISC 
Down Continual No None None 
 
Combining these three dimensions lead to the result presented in the table above: two 
companies does not collaborate at all, three companies have advanced CPFR with either up- 
or downstream partners and the rest cooperate at a moderate level either up- or downstream 
(or both).  Interestingly two of the companies (Brüel & Kjær and RIEGENS) develop 
products in collaboration with customers in a separate supply chain (customer projects) 
whereas Oticon cooperate with suppliers and Novozymes develop new products 
(enzymes/mixes) as part of the strategy to lock-in customers.  In a sense both Novozymes and 
Oticon encapsulates the product development within their “normal operation” whereas 
products developed with customers at Brüel & Kjær and RIEGENS must be “transferred” or 
redesigned to fit within the existing product portfolio. 
8.1.6 Construct ‘Inter-organizational Management’ 
The ideal of inter-organizational management extending beyond the individual company is 
central to the concept of SCM.  Therefore each interviewee was queried for whether or not 
their company takes part in inter-organizational management.  None of the interviewees 
initially responded positively to the question but in most cases the question triggered quite 
interesting discussions on what management is, and then on what management might look 
like across the supply chain.  Table 8-13 below contains a brief summary on inter-
organizational management for all case companies. 
                                                 
22 The mark (*) denotes “within ownership” as in Table 8-9. 
23 Coordination with suppliers of agricultural products is absent (perfect market?). 
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Table 8-13: Summary of ‘Inter-organizational Management’ 
Company Inter-org. Mgmt. ? Management Practice 
Bang & Olufsen No 
As described the logistics management is all performed from HQ, as 
distribution was changed some years back.  Changes developed at HQ, 
spread to sales companies. 
Brüel & Kjær No Fragmented practices across product categories.  Management does not extend the ownership boundary. 
Coloplast No SCM is being centralized under a stronger management.  Management of external parties does not take place. SCM “ends at” sales companies. 
Dyrup No Only recently has Dyrup taken the initiative to centralize the management of their plants.  No attempts on managing suppliers or customers exist. 
Fritz Hansen No 
At Fritz Hansen the identified Supply Partners are supported by means of 
education and assistance in managing their own supply chains.  But they are 
not managed as such. 
LINAK No 
Inventories are reduced and portfolio reduced as postponement is being 
implemented.  Management does not extend the network.  Centralization 
underway. External parties are not managed in any way. 
Novozymes No 
Novozymes aims at adding value to their large customers by helping them 
manage their inventory in an efficient way, and by assisting in altering the 
patterns of consumption. 
Oticon No 
Sales companies are managed, of course, and close cooperation with the ITE 
laboratories is a necessity.  Management does not extend to e.g. suppliers, 
albeit coordination is tight. 
RIEGENS No 
Within ownership.  Besides coordinating the operation in Braintree (UK) and 
Slovakia the company manages its external partners primarily through 
capacity planning.  As for other companies participating in project-like 
activities, the management of these activities is somewhat different from the 
“standard” operation. 
SDC DANDISC No 
Within ownership.  Management does not extend outside legal boundaries of 
the firm.  Within ownership capacity is being managed through shifting 
back-catalogue orders between production units. 
 
These finding are in line with Storey et al. (2006) reporting from a study encompassing six 
supply chains and a total of 72 companies: 
“Management of the supply chain was analogous to a relay race, with 
responsibility being passed from one company of actors to another…” (p. 763). 
Emerging Sub-constructs 
Most interviewees agreed inter-organizational management has to do with the orchestration of 
resources across supply chain – an issue to a certain extent covered already.  It seemed a few 
elements of management are missing, though, namely strategizing, intervention, and 
learning/knowledge sharing. 
In this context strategizing translates into joint or collaborative strategizing setting goals for 
the entire chain – and using “supply chain” as the focal entity for strategic analysis and 
implementation24.  But even if companies have not come this far strategizing collaboratively 
definitely demonstrates inter-organizational commitment.  As for intervention, granting the 
“right to intervene” to another legal entity (outside of ownership) denotes a very strong trust 
and belief in the other company – or a very strong dependency.  In both cases operational 
                                                 
24 In Tamas (2000) it is reported how strategies in most cases do not match the goals set for the companies’ 
supply chains. 
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issues are addressed with prior negotiation potentially leading to “network management” 
where the most competent entity has the right to intervene.  The last sub-construct is 
somewhat related to the former as it describes the routines in place to i.e. spread knowledge 
on good practices or of formal education between supply chain partners. 
Collaborative Strategizing 
Albeit collaborative strategizing as concept was instantly recognized all but one company 
immediately rejected it as current practice.  At Fritz Hansen uncertainty prevailed as to 
whether their current developments could be perceived as collaborative strategizing: 
“We rely heavily on our Supplier Partners but since we are driving the 
implementation of LEAN we are probably not performing collaborative 
strategizing.  …  The initiative was ours – and we had to persuade our suppliers 
to participate.” (Henrik Holm, Fritz Hansen) 
A few of the companies elaborated over the strategic nature of (joint) product development: 
“We’re probably not doing collaborative strategizing but we rely on our major 
suppliers when we develop products.”  (Klaus K. Knudsen, Bang & Olufsen) 
and 
“A very important part of our business is to develop specific solutions for our 
customers.  This is part of our strategy.  …  Our strategy is to collaborate, but 
the strategy is not developed collaboratively, and is separate from the goals 
and strategies of our customers.”  (Henrik Jeppesen, Brüel & Kjær). 
At other companies the interviewees elaborate over the difference between within ownership 
and outside ownership entities, e.g. Morten S. Raahede (LINAK): 
“When talking about collaborative strategizing we have it – between HQ and 
the sales companies.  …  But this is dramatically different from collaboration 
between truly independent companies.  …  We do not develop strategies with 
suppliers or customers – but we inform suppliers of our intentions in terms of 
required input.” 
Most companies agreed with especially the last bit of above quote – most communicate 
capacity forecasts in one form or the other. 
Intervention 
As for the second sub-construct the answers are even more homogeneous.  All reply 
negatively to the question of intervention25 – a few interviewees offer a different angle: 
“Intervention is needed when quality drops below agreed thresholds.  When 
this happens we reject the shipment and, if necessary, work with the supplier to 
fix the problem.”  (Marianne K. Borum, Oticon) 
Henrik Jeppesen (Brüel & Kjær) concurs: 
                                                 
25  Also this finding is in line with Storey et al. (2006): ”In consequence of the typically constrained scope of 
intervention the notion of ’seamless end-to-end pipeline management’ was far beyond actual practice – and 
indeed some distance even beyond aspirations.” (pp. 765-766). 
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“We rely on high quality in all inputs – therefore we need thorough quality 
inspection of all inputs.  …  In case of systematic errors we work with the 
supplier to solve the issue.” 
Intervention as understood in relation to management of an activity is thereby absent from the 
case companies, whereas a collaborative approach to problem solving between focal company 
and supplier might be quite common, especially on projects26.  At Brüel & Kjær, for instance, 
projects are routinely led by joint management - when developing e.g. test equipment for 
Volvo cars staff from Brüel & Kjær and Volvo jointly defines and executes the project.  At 
RIEGENS, working on a design project normally would mean close interaction with customer 
and entrepreneur – and project management might be placed at any of the three stakeholders. 
Learning / Knowledge Sharing 
In contrast to the first two sub-constructs, the last one splits the case companies into two 
groups: the companies who share knowledge or performs training programs for their supply 
chain partners, and the companies who do not.  The companies who share knowledge do so 
for more than one reason.  Companies like Bang & Olufsen and Brüel & Kjær do so in order 
to obtain access to outsourced technology whereas Oticon (and Brüel & Kjær) do so to 
develop better products (see Table 8-12)27.  Fritz Hansn has developed a complete training 
program on LEAN for their designated Supply Chain Partners in order to have the LEAN 
implementation succeed.  Novozymes share their knowledge on production and the use of 
enzymes to help their customers optimize their production.  The sharing of knowledge is 
thereby a multifaceted construct.  Table 8-14 above summarizes the three sub-constructs. 
Table 8-14: Summary of Sub-constructs for ‘Inter-org. Mgmt.’ 
Company Collaborative Strategizing Intervention 
Learning / 
Knowledge Sharing 
Bang & Olufsen No No Yes 
Brüel & Kjær No No Yes 
Coloplast No No No 
Dyrup No No No 
Fritz Hansen No No Yes 
LINAK No No No 
Novozymes No No Yes 
Oticon No No Yes 
RIEGENS No No No 
SDC DANDISC No No No 
 
8.1.7 Developing 2nd Level Constructs 
From these elaborations a number of sub-constructs have evolved. 
                                                 
26 As mentioned previously projects are perceived as distinctive different from supply chain.  Reference may 
be made to Stabell & Fjeldstad (1998): projects are “value shops” whereas continuously operated supply 
chain are “value chains”. 
27 RIEGENS resembles Brüel & Kjær in terms of customer projects except for the “innovation content” – in 
the case of RIEGENS the innovation is primarily design.  RIEGENS is thereby not considered a knowledge 
sharing company. 
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The construct ‘Supply Chain Organization’ was described by two sub-constructs: ‘Formal 
organization’ and ‘Match with Fulfillment Meta-process’.  The evaluation of the production 
philosophies in place resulted in a description according to Push versus Pull and the related 
construct of (control over) internal decoupling.  For this evaluation to make sense the “one-
off” supply chain were disregarded.  Describing the level of process implementation was 
performed by first identifying the types of processes in place (if any) and thereafter by 
evaluating the “range” within which these processes were communicated. 
The use of integrated systems (ERP) and the level of IT systems integration described the 
level of IT support of the process-oriented company.  External integration (besides IT 
integration) is described by ‘Length of Relationship’ and ‘Level of CPFR’.  Finally, 
management of the supply chain is described in terms of ‘Collaborative Strategizing’, 
‘Intervention’ in participating company’s operation, and ‘Learning/knowledge Sharing’ in the 
network.  The resulting construct hierarchy is shown in Table 8-15 below. 
Table 8-15: The ‘Supply Chain Management Practice’ Construct 
Level 0 
(Result) 
 Level 1 
(Construct) 
 Level 2 
(Sub-construct) 
Supply Chain 
Organization ? 
1. Formal Organization 
2. Match with Fulfillment Meta-process 
AND   
Production Philosophy ? 1. Push / Pull 2. Decoupling 
AND   
Process Orientation ? 1. Process Type(s) 2. Process Communication 
AND   
IT Support ? 1. Integrated System / ERP 2. Coupling of IT Systems 
AND   
External Integration ? 1. Length of Relationship 2. Level of CPFR 
AND   
Supply Chain 
Management 
Practice 
? 
Inter-organizational 
Management ? 
1. Collaborative Strategizing 
2. Intervention 
3. Learning / Knowledge Sharing 
 
In contrast to the first use of these construct hierarchies (see Appendix A) it became apparent 
the use of dichotomies in the evaluation were inadequate as a number of construct were 
typological in nature.  A five-point Likert scale is used instead, codified specifically for each 
construct.  Evaluation of dichotomies is done by using common values for yes (4) and no (2). 
The codified constructs and the meaning of the values are shown in Table 8-16 below. 
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Table 8-16: Coding of 2nd Level SCM Constructs 
  Coding for Value  
2nd Level SCM Construct 1 3 5 
Formal organization None Concept Formal org. entity 
Match with Meta-Process None Some coverage Full coverage 
Process Type(s) No processes No SCM processes Only SCM processes
Process Communication No communication Within organization Outside organization 
Coupling of IT systems No coupling Coupling 
Two-directional 
coupling across 
ownership 
Length of Relationship Only short Long in one direction Long in both directions 
Level of CPFR28 None Basic Advanced 
 
From this coding schema it is now possible to rate each second level SCM construct for each 
company in the study. 
8.1.8 Evaluating SCM Practices 
Applying above listed coding scheme to the constructs results in a collection of ratings as 
depicted in Table 8-17 below.  Sub-constructs are rolled up into the higher level construct by 
simple summations. 
Table 8-17: Ratings for SCM Constructs 
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External Conditions           
Size L L L L S L L S S S 
Input C C S S S S S C S S 
Process S C S S S S C C C C 
Mfg. Process S S S S S S C C S C 
SCM Award Y N Y N Y Y N Y N N 
Level 1 Constructs           
Level 2 Constructs           
SCM? Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y N N 
Supply Chain Organization 8 2 9 9 10 5 8 8 2 2 
1. Formal Organization 3 1 5 5 5 2 5 3 1 1 
2. Match with Fulfillment Meta-process 5 1 4 4 5 3 3 5 1 1 
Production Philosophy 8 4 4 4 6 6 8 8 4 6 
1. Push/Pull29 4 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 2 4 
2. Decoupling 4 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 2 2 
Process Orientation? Y N Y N (Y) (Y) Y (Y) N N 
Process Orientation 7 2 7 2 6 6 7 7 2 6 
1. Process Type(s) 4 1 4 1 3 3 4 4 1 1 
2. Process Communication 3 1 3 1 3 3 3 3? 1 5 
 
                                                 
28 Points = average of up- and down-stream. 
29 Recurrent transactions only! Scale: 2 = no pull, 4 = pull. 
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Table 8-17 (cont’d) 
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Level 1 Constructs           
Level 2 Constructs           
IT Support 8 8 6 3 5 6 8 9 5 5 
1. Integrated System / ERP 4 4 4 2 4 4 4 4 2 2 
2. Coupling of IT Systems 4 4 2 1 1 2 4 5 3 3 
External Integration 7 8 6 5 6 7 6 7 8 5 
1. Length of Relationship 4 4 4 4 4 5 3 4 5 4 
2. Level of CPFR 3 4 2 1 2 2 3 3 3 1 
Inter-organizational Management? N N N N N N N N N N 
Inter-organizational Management 8 8 6 6 8 6 8 8 6 6 
1. Collaborative Strategizing 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
2. Intervention 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
3. Learning/Knowledge Sharing 4 4 2 2 4 2 4 4 2 2 
 
As each of the 1st level constructs are perceived as independent and of equal importance the 
rate for each 1st level construct is translated into a score between zero and one by calculating 
the position between the minimum and maximum score.  The scores are depicted in Table 
8-18 below. 
Table 8-18: Scores for SCM Constructs (Level 1) 
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External Conditions           
Size L L L L S L L S S S 
Input C C S S S S S C S S 
Process S C S S S S C C C C 
Mfg. Process S S S S S S C C S C 
SCM Award Y N Y N Y Y N Y N N 
Level 1 Constructs           
Supply Chain Organization 0,75 0,00 0,88 0,88 1,00 0,38 0,75 0,75 0,00 0,00 
Production Philosophy 1,00 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 1,00 1,00 0,33 0,67 
Process Orientation 0,63 0,00 0,63 0,00 0,50 0,50 0,63 0,63 0,00 0,50 
IT Support 0,83 0,83 0,50 0,00 0,33 0,50 0,83 1,00 0,33 0,33 
External Integration 0,63 0,75 0,50 0,38 0,50 0,63 0,50 0,63 0,75 0,38 
Inter-organizational 
Management 0,33 0,33 0,00 0,00 0,33 0,00 0,33 0,33 0,00 0,00 
Total Score 0,70 0,37 0,47 0,27 0,50 0,39 0,67 0,72 0,24 0,31 
 
As shown in the table above the scores range between 24 and 72%.  The scores are split in 
two groups: the top consisting of Bang & Olufsen, Novozymes, and Oticon scoring approx. 
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70% and the rest of the group (rather evenly) distributed between 24 and 50%.  In Figure 8-1 
below the ‘SCM Total Score’ is mapped out against the first three (four) of the four (five) 
external conditions. 
Figure 8-1: SCM Total Score vs. External Conditions 
0% 50% 100%
Size
Large
Small
Input
Complex
Simple
Process
Complex
Simple
Mfg. Proc
Complex
Simple
SCM Total Score
 
 
As illustrated in the figure above no clear pattern emerges.  Splitting the companies at the 
50% mark does not result in a clear picture of the difference between the two groups as both 
values in each dichotomy is represented in each of the eight sub-groups.  Larger companies do 
not seem to be more sophisticated in terms of SCM than smaller ones, and process complexity 
does not seem to have an impact either. 
A few indications can be found, though: companies having ‘less SCM’ tend to take simple 
inputs and have simple manufacturing processes.  No other indications can be identified.  
Splitting the case companies to create to equally sized groups (indicated with the dotted line) 
does not result in clearer indications.30 
Most SCM in SCM Companies? 
As mentioned in Chapter 6 half the companies in the study had won an award for their SCM 
practice.  Mapping ‘SCM Total Score’ against ‘SCM Award’ results in Figure 8-2 below. 
                                                 
30 As demonstrated working with complex constructs necessitates a measure for explanatory power at each 
level.  In this context – an explanatory study with very intuitive constructs and a low number of cases – 
chasing this issue further is deemed futile.  For more on the analyses please see Chapter I.1 in Appendix I. 
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Figure 8-2: SCM Total Score vs. SCM Award 
0% 50% 100%
SCM
Award Yes
No
SCM Total Score
 
 
As can be seen above winning an SCM award seems to be predictive of the ‘SCM Total 
Score’ construct.  Only one company (Novozymes) seems to break the pattern as they score 
high on ‘Level of SCM’ but have not won an SCM award.  On the other hand, as far as the 
author knows, Novozymes have never entered these competitions31. 
Level 1 Constructs vs. External Conditions 
Repeating the simple descriptive statistical exercise as illustrated above on the level 1 SCM 
constructs results in very few additional insights: ‘IT Support’ seems to increase with 
complexity of ‘Process’ and ‘Production Philosophy’ (Pull and Internal Decoupling) increase 
with complexity of ‘Manufacturing Process’.  The former insight may be described by the 
need for increased IT support for complex processes; the latter is quite natural (or actual: 
predictable) as the complexity of manufacturing process is more or less defined by the 
emergent sub-constructs.  Quite interestingly ‘SCM Organization’ does not seem to be 
influenced by the company having won a SCM award or not. 
Conclusion 
Overall the external conditions put forward prior to the case selection seem to “predict” the 
identified SCM practices quite poorly.  The practices themselves differ quite a lot – as 
illustrated in the SCM diagrams and represented in the ratings and scores above. 
These findings thereby support the critics of SCM as they claim the SCM concept (and the 
entire empirical domain for that matter) is weakened by competing definitions.  An alternative 
explanation is naturally that the constructs put forward does not fully reflect the practices 
investigated – and that better constructs and revised external conditions will improve the 
explanatory power.  As the nature of the study performed is strictly exploratory findings are 
fully acceptable, though. 
8.2 Evaluating SCRM Practices by Constructs 
The exercise described in Chapter 8.1 is repeated for the SCRM practices. 
8.2.1 Construct ’Risk Management Organization’ 
Interviewing SCM and Purchasing professionals on SCRM practices within their respective 
domains revealed a low level of awareness of the risk management.  Most of the interviewees 
                                                 
31 This is confirmed by professor Tage Skjøtt-Larsen who has participated in the evaluation of all applications. 
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initially stated risk management had nothing to do with their domain and that these questions 
should be directed to the finance department or the CEO.  The only company which during 
the initial interviews claimed to be performing risk management within SCM and Purchasing 
was Bang & Olufsen: 
“It has taken a couple of years to implement the current supplier segmentation 
model.  …  The categories have worked quite well – especially the ‘level of 
investment’.  The other category ‘degree of specificity’ translates quite well into 
risk exposure and by looking into the model we get a picture of the risk 
landscape…  We now aim at quite stringently apply risk measures to the 
model…” (Peter S. Hune, Bang & Olufsen) 
In contrast three of the companies (Oticon, RIEGENS, & SDC DANDISC) claimed not 
performing any kind of risk management at all (besides regulatory and financial risk 
management) at all.  Especially the initial interview at Oticon was quite dramatic as Peter 
Finnerup claimed: 
“We have no risk management function, because we do not need one.  We have 
good processes instead.” 
This bold statement was later retracted: 
“Of course we have risk management, but it is a part of the roles and 
responsibilities across the company.  We have no formal organization for risk 
management.” 
Half the case companies report having neither positions nor organizational entities for risk 
management (except for financial risk management performed within the finance department).  
None of the companies report having positions within SCM or Purchasing or have positions 
elsewhere in the organization specifically for managing the risks relevant for SCM and/or 
Purchasing.  Interestingly, both Coloplast and Dyrup report having a person employed to 
implement Risk Management but so far interviewees do not see a strong relationship between 
this initiative and the supply chain risks.  At Brüel & Kjær it is reported that a department at 
holding company level performs internal audits.  At Novozymes the Issues Management 
Committee deals with risk management in the form of e.g. customer approval and market 
penetration strategies.  Table 8-19 below summarizes. 
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Table 8-19: Summary of ‘Risk Management Organization’32 
Company Risk Mgmt? Risk Management Organization 
Bang & Olufsen Yes 
Positions exist within the staff functions ’Legal’ and ’Corporate 
Finance’.  Within Operations no risk management organization or 
positions exist. 
Brüel & Kjær (Yes) 
No formal organization within Brüel & Kjær A/S, but at holding 
company level a department for internal auditing exists.  This 
department ensures procedures and policies are adhered to. 
Coloplast (Yes) 
No formal organization exists, but one person in Corporate Strategy 
(Peter Kofoed) is working with risk management, collecting information 
on identified risks from all parts of the company. 
Dyrup (Yes) 
Yes, one person (Anders B. Sørensen) is employed to implement risk 
management.  The initiative has changed character from project to staff 
function (albeit not yet a separate unit). 
Fritz Hansen (Yes) No formal organization for risk management exists. 
LINAK No No formal organization for risk management exists. 
Novozymes (Yes) 
Yes, one person in the Legal department works with insurance issues 
and product liability.  Furthermore Issues Management (under Corporate 
Communications) defines policies and procedures. 
Oticon No No formal organization for risk management exists. 
RIEGENS No No formal organization for risk management exists. 
SDC DANDISC No No formal organization for risk management exists. 
 
8.2.2 Construct ‘Risk Types and Management Effort’ 
Having described the organization around risk management it will be interesting to 
understand if this has an effect on the types of risks being managed.  A few risks seem to be 
quite standard: the use of single/sole suppliers and the risk of disruptions in the material flow 
(quantity, time and/or quality). 
Single/sole Suppliers 
As documented in the case studies most (seven) of the companies have to rely on sole and/or 
single suppliers.  For some of the companies (e.g. Bang & Olufsen and Brüel & Kjær) this 
was triggered by outsourcing following an economic downturn.  For others the reliance on 
single/sole suppliers is a result of the development within the supplier’s specific market.  
Irrespective of the explanation this dependency naturally represents a threat to the company – 
and none of the companies have any real possibility of insourcing the activities33.  One way of 
mitigating the dependency is by e.g. offering the supplier access to innovation or let the 
supplier “piggy-back” on a brand.  In both cases these mitigation mechanisms might be short-
lived and need continuous monitoring. 
A few companies mention “self-inflicted” risks: 
? At Bang & Olufsen the relative power of the Master Dealers is an issue.  Therefore 
contracts are designed to manage this risk. 
? At Coloplast poor documentation leads to “lock-in” of certain suppliers as an alternative 
is not available. 
                                                 
32  The ‘Risk Mgmt?’ column describes the self-perception by the interviewees, i.e. whether they believe their 
company performs (formal) risk management.  Financial risk management is excluded from the responses. 
33 The phenomenon is coined ”Diseconomies of Innovation” earlier in this manuscript. 
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? At Novozymes the constellation with NNSP constituted a risk factor – as documented.  
This issue was (partly) resolved by the detachment from Novo Nordisk. 
This leaves Coloplast as the only company with unresolved structural risks of which it could 
be in control.  Apparently this is not considered important enough to be addressed even if a 
cleanup and the implementation of new processes for documentation seem quite 
straightforward34. 
Disruption of the Material Flow 
The other frequently mentioned risk is the risk of disruptions in the material flow.  Within this 
category the variant most often cited is oriented towards the supply side but a number of 
companies mention risks oriented internally or downstream: 
? At Bang & Olufsen there are concerns about delivery precision towards the B1 stores as 
not to disappoint the end-customers.  Furthermore a concern about the credit limits for 
the B1 stores impacting the customer is raised. 
? At Dyrup the management incentive scheme actually stresses the production setup as it 
generates bullwhips – without the ‘help’ of the surroundings. 
? At Fritz Hansen they share Bang & Olufsen’s concerns about delivery prevision – and 
for the same reasons.  Furthermore they are concerned about the fragility of their setup – 
and intend to create a redundancy supply chain (including suppliers’ capacity) which 
can be activated quickly in case of e.g. fire or other types of damage to current facilities. 
? At Novozymes and SDC DANDISC there are concerns about the production process.  
In the former the concern is about control of the bulk production, whereas the latter 
company is concerned about contamination of the replicated material – and of security 
breaches. 
Only two risks are not addressed, both of them “self-inflicted”: the credit limits at the B1 
stores at Bang & Olufsen and the management scheme in place at Dyrup.  In the former case 
one might argue a credit limit always will have a potential detrimental effect on customer 
service, in the latter case there is no excuse - the company has chosen to organize in a way 
causing stress to the fulfillment system.  Therefore only Dyrup is punished in terms of rating. 
The major structure and process risks identified are presented in Table 8-20 below. 
                                                 
34 For this reason the company receives a rating of 3 in the ‘Structure Risk’ construct. 
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Table 8-20: Summary of ‘Risk Types and Management Effort’ 
Company Structure Risk Process Risk 
Bang & Olufsen 
- Master Dealers must not become too 
powerful in their region.  They are 
monitored closely. 
- The use of unique suppliers is inevitable 
but they must be monitored closely.  
Mitigated by giving access to 
innovations. 
- Delivery performance towards 
especially the B1 stores is a priority. 
- Suppliers are evaluated according to on-
time deliveries. 
- Credit limits at B1 stores might generate 
poor customer satisfaction. 
Brüel & Kjær35 
- Single and sole sourcing due to 
outsourcing and high speed of 
innovation.  Mitigated by giving access 
to innovations. 
- Suppliers’ delivery performance & 
quality. 
Coloplast 
- Single and sole sourcing due to 
patenting and customer preferences. 
- Poor product specifications leading to 
inertia and “lock-in” in the supply base. 
- Access to institutional customers. 
- Product quality. 
- Suppliers’ delivery performance & 
quality. 
Dyrup 
- Single and sole sourcing is inevitable 
due to specialization and “recipe lock-
in”. 
- Suppliers’ delivery performance. 
- Forecasts quality (large customers). 
- Management incentive scheme. 
Fritz Hansen 
- Single sourcing & use of JIT.  Tight 
integration and high complexity increase 
impact of exit. 
- Suppliers’ delivery performance & 
quality. 
- Resilience towards fire etc. 
- Own delivery performance and quality. 
LINAK - Replacing local with World-class suppliers. 
- Suppliers’ delivery performance & 
quality.  Actively used. 
Novozymes36 
- Single sourcing.  Dual sourcing is 
preferred but e.g. BASF is considered 
“safe”. 
- The brand is vulnerable – customers are 
therefore thoroughly evaluated before 
business relationship is established.  The 
technology must not be compromised. 
- Indirect purchasing through NNSP. 
- Variation in own production. 
- Quality breach in input. 
Oticon 
- Sole sourcing.  Dual sourcing is 
preferred but when it can not be avoided 
sole sourcing is countered by giving 
access to innovation. 
- Suppliers’ delivery performance & 
quality.  Actively used. 
RIEGENS 
- The two largest suppliers are used 
interchangeably to avoid dependency. 
- The three largest customers account for 
2/3 of turnover.  Managed through long-
term contracts and continuous contact. 
- Suppliers’ delivery performance & 
quality.  Rarely used. 
SDC DANDISC37 
- The dominant customer Technicolor was 
lost as their sourcing was shifted to 
Poland.  The one-year rolling contract 
was fulfilled by May. 
- Contamination of the duplicated 
material.  The manufacturing process is 
enforced. 
- Security is strictly enforced. 
 
                                                 
35 Albeit business risks are managed locally, reporting is performed in a structured process requiring the 
individual business units to report a status each quarter.  Management of risks is performed as an integral 
part of general management at each level and unit. 
36 The major risk for Novozymes, the environment’s fear of GMO, is a market risk (does not fit the 
dichotomy). 
37 The major risk for SDC DANDISC, the timing of investments in technology, is a market risk (does not fit 
the dichotomy). 
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Formal versus Informal Risk Management 
The investigation of risk management within the interviewed parts of the organizations 
revealed the formalization was a poor predictor for the practice.  Risk management is taking 
place in all companies and only in few companies have risks been identified which are not 
managed albeit they could be.  Of course the list of risks is endless – but focusing on the risk 
definitions in the Risk Matrix (see Figure 2-11) limits the list somewhat.  It seems it is “good 
manners” to ensure the process risks are managed, on the structure side there seems to be a 
tendency to accept placing the fate of the company in the hands of suppliers (and customers). 
Coordination 
One last aspect of the SCRM practice needs to be addressed, the issue of coordination.  As 
described above during the initial round of interviews almost all the companies denied 
performing risk management, but in the course of the interaction between researcher and 
research object a different understanding emerged.  From rejecting the idea of risk 
management the companies started to “find” practices which in some way or another managed 
(or mitigated, insured against etc) a certain risk.  It was therefore necessary to perform a 
“reality check” in these emerging practices. 
In order to do so the interviewees were asked if their risk management practices were 
coordinated – between SCM/Logistics and Purchasing.  If so, this would indicate a higher 
“level” of SCRM whereas the opposite would support the notion of the company as silo-based 
with separate logics, routines, and goals. 
After some deliberations only four companies claimed their practices were integrated, that 
efforts were coordinated and perception of critical risks were aligned across SCM/Logistics 
and Purchasing.  This naturally led to the mapping of critical risks and a comparison for each 
of the four companies. 
Analyzing using the Risk Matrix 
As shown in Appendix I the four companies are Bang & Olufsen, Coloplast, Novozymes, and 
SDC DANDISC38.  Mapping the risks by use of the Risk Matrix it quickly becomes obvious 
all companies might have coordinated their risk management even if they might not agree on 
the level of risk management applied. 
At Bang & Olufsen the cell ‘Downstream Process Risks’ contains risks from both 
SCM/Logistics and Purchasing, at Coloplast the cells ‘Upstream Process Risks’ and 
‘Upstream Structure Risks’ contain risks from both departments.  At Novozymes the cells 
‘Upstream Process Risks’, ‘Upstream Structure Risks’, and ‘Market Risks’ are of interest, at 
SDC DANDISC the cells ‘Internal Process Risk’, ‘Downstream Structure Risks’, and ‘Market 
Risks’ are relevant for further scrutiny. 
                                                 
38 For SDC DANDISC only some of the interviewees claim risk management was performed and even 
coordinated across the company.  For sake of completeness the company is included in the analysis. 
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Analyzing each identified cell for duplicate risk definitions across the two interview groups 
reveals little commonality: 
? Analyzing the three downstream process risks identified at Bang & Olufsen: ‘B1 Stores 
depend on speedy and precise delivery’ (P2), ‘Ramp-up generates uncertainty…’ (S3), 
and ‘Credit limits for sales offices negatively affects customer satisfaction...’ (S4) 
reveals the risks are completely different – no coordination can be identified. 
? The same is concluded for the upstream process risks at Coloplast: ‘Limited access to 
knowledge of suppliers’ (P2), ‘Quality Failure: Input’ (S1), ‘Suppliers product 
specifications are too poor’ (S5), and ‘Shortage of input’ (S6) whereas the upstream 
structure risks show a degree of commonality.  The Purchasing department describes the 
risk of loosing a critical supplier by risks ‘All eggs in one basket – reduction of supplier 
base’ (P1), ‘Single sourcing’ (P3), and ‘Lockin by suppliers’ (P4); SCM/Logistics use 
the risk ‘Loss of unique supplier’ (S3).  The two departments disagree on whether this is 
a monitored or a non-managed risks – but none claim the risk is managed. 
? At Novozymes the upstream process risks ‘Delivery precision…’ (P6) and ‘Quality 
breaches’ (S4) show no similarities but upstream structure risks ‘Single sourcing’ (P7) 
and ‘Supplier dependency’ (S1) are somewhat similar even if the former describes the 
practice of single sourcing and mitigation by integration (e.g. BASF) and the latter 
describes another strategy addressing the same problem: insisting on the use of 
standardized inputs.  Within the last set of risks identified (‘Market Risks’) the two risks 
‘GMO’ (P3) and ‘GMO’ (S3) are obviously identical. 
? At SDC DANDISC the internal process risks are not similar and the market risks only 
have similarities through the notion of the development of new technologies. 
It must therefore be concluded that the integration of risk management across SCM/Logistics 
and Purchasing is somewhat absent as only Novozymes seems to have a degree of 
coordination (the only risk they truly agree upon is the fear of their core technology becoming 
“unpopular” in their major markets). 
8.2.3 Construct ‘Risk Identification and Assessment’ 
The risk management sub-processes under scrutiny are risk identification and risk assessment, 
as described previously. 
Risk Identification 
Investigating the (formal) risk identification process reveals an almost complete absence in 
the case companies.  Only at two companies (Novozymes and RIEGENS) practices have been 
identified. 
At RIEGENS risk management was used in conjunction with e.g. the investment in Turkey: 
“I my opinion we did all the right things when we worked on the project in 
Turkey.  We had no chance of foreseeing the downturn in the Turkish 
construction segment.  …  We did not perform stringent risk management 
routines, but we talked about a lot of scenarios, and the outcome was far from 
the worst case scenario.  …  Of course it is a shame that the project 
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[production in Turkey] was stopped, but that’s the way it is.” (Claus Jensen, 
RIEGENS)39 
The absence of periodic risk identification is explained by the daily operations at RIEGENS 
being non-risky as there’s redundancy for most of the inputs, and the large customers all 
being stable, long-term business partners. 
At Novozymes apparently no formal procedures dictates how, when, or by whom risk scans 
should be performed but if identified risks must be forwarded the Issues Management 
Committee for evaluation.  A number of risks are defined already, e.g. the public debate on 
GMO, the use of the technology for criminal or unethical ends etc.  The Committee itself 
might perform risk identification as part of its responsibilities but unfortunately this could not 
be verified.  At the rest of the case companies this activity apparently is not formalized (or 
non-existent). 
Table 8-21: Summary of ‘Risk Identification and Assesment’ 
Company Risk Identification Risk Assessment 
Bang & Olufsen - None.  (Perhaps at Corporate?) 
- Performed periodically – on structure 
and process risks both (e.g. Days of 
Interruption). 
Brüel & Kjær - None/autonomous. 
- Autonomous.  Calculation of safety 
stock (based on time to find 
replacement). 
Coloplast - None. (Perhaps at Corporate?) 
- None.  Deviations in delivery 
performance and SCM costs are picked 
up by the KPI framework. 
Dyrup - None. (Perhaps at parent company?) - None. 
Fritz Hansen - None. - Evaluation of financial key figures for critical suppliers. 
LINAK - None. - None. 
Novozymes 
- No formal procedures – but identified 
risks forwarded Issues Management 
Committee. 
- Issues Management Committee may 
identify risks. 
- Issues Management develops 
guidelines for the entire company (e.g. 
the market / product matrix, CSR and 
customer evaluation) and has the 
authority to overrule local decision. 
Oticon - None. - None. 
RIEGENS - Scenarios developed before investing in Turkey and UK. - None (besides investment scenarios). 
SDC DANDISC - None.  (Perhaps at Board Level?) - The oil price is evaluated when renewing contracts for input. 
 
Risk Assessment 
Assessment of risks seems to follow quite a different pattern as the risk assessment process 
was identified at five of the ten case companies.  The practices span from the somewhat 
stringent methods to the more relaxed: 
? Bang & Olufsen has by far the most stringent method is in place – e.g. ‘Days of 
Interruption’ is used to describe vulnerability in the material flow.  Somewhat less 
ambitious Fritz Hansen rely on financial key figures when performing periodic meeting 
                                                 
39 More or less the same procedure was applied for the investments in UK and Eastern Europe. 
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with important suppliers.  Even simpler SDC DANDISC forecast the oil price for the 
next quarter when renewing contracts for input. 
? At Novozymes the risk assessment apparently is partly decoupled from the domain as 
the Issues Management Committee alone may determine if a new customer can be 
accepted.  Other risks are managed locally through the use of standard guidelines. 
? At Brüel & Kjær an autonomous practice of calculating the level of safety stock needed 
is performed aperiodically for some of the product groups. 
The rest of the companies have no (formal) risk assessment process. 
8.2.4 Construct ‘Supplier Risk Management’ 
The last top level constructs is described by two second level constructs: ‘Supplier 
Segmentation’ and ‘Supplier Audits’ – as described previously. 
Supplier Segmentation 
Quite surprisingly not all companies address the management of the suppliers by 
categorisation.  At Novozymes and SDC DANDISC the reason is straight forward: the supply 
base is so limited a categorisation is not needed.  This argument applies for neither Dyrup nor 
LINAK.  At Dyrup the centralisation of the production planning might lead to segmentation 
due to standardisation of recipes and subsequent consolidation of purchases; at LINAK the 
current efforts at monitoring the supplier might similarly lead to segmentation of the supply 
base.  The segmentation present in the remaining six companies spans a wide range from the 
very stringent and well defined segmentation model in place at Bang & Olufsen to the 
somewhat diffuse practice described at Brüel & Kjær.  An overview of the supplier 
segmentation in place is presented in Table 8-22 below. 
Table 8-22: Summary of ‘Supplier Segmentation’ 
Company Supplier Segmentation 
Bang & Olufsen Yes.  The model is being enhanced to address risks directly. 
Brüel & Kjær Yes.  Suppliers are segmented into Strategic, Tactical, and Other.  The model is updated too infrequently to add any real value. 
Coloplast The supply base is segmented into Innovative and Standard suppliers. 
Dyrup No formal segmentation model exists albeit the inputs are in very different market situations. 
Fritz Hansen Yes.  Supply Partners and Others. 
LINAK No formal segmentation model exists – but one might be underway.  Buffering is performed to ensure continued (LEAN) operation. 
Novozymes No formal segmentation model exists.  Few sole suppliers (e.g. BASF). 
Oticon Yes.  Critical, non-critical, and trivial suppliers.  Procedures graduate the level of interaction. 
RIEGENS 
Yes.  Two strategic suppliers are dealt with in a manner different from the rest.  The 
‘Lead Supplier’ concept might create another category.  Currently division is defined by 
size only – procedures are not documented. 
SDC DANDISC The supply base is not segmented as suppliers are few and all long-term business partners.
 
Surprisingly apparently most companies do not perceive segmentation of the supply base as a 
priority.  And at the ones who have segmentation in place the criteria used are unclear. 
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It seems odd so little emphasis has been placed on addressing the supply base in a stringent 
and methodical manner but this finding is not unique.  In Zsidisin et al. (2004) a study of 
purchasing practices in American firms is reported and subsequently it is concluded that tools 
are available but apparently tradition does not dictate the use of them. 
Supplier Auditing 
Also the practices on performing supplier audits differ across the companies. 
At Bang & Olufsen, Coloplast, Fritz Hansen and Oticon audits are performed routinely; at e.g. 
Brüel & Kjær supplier audits are performed as a reaction against quality problems only.  A 
few of the companies do not perform audits at all.  It seems maturity of the practices on 
supplier auditing more or less mirrors the practice on supplier segmentation.  The practices of 
supplier audits are summarized in Table 8-23 below. 
Table 8-23: Summary of ‘Supplier Audits’ 
Company Supplier Audits. 
Bang & Olufsen Audits performed – especially with new suppliers.  Suppliers’ plants audited periodically. 
Brüel & Kjær Only as reaction against continued quality problems with sole/single supplier.  Happens very seldom. 
Coloplast Audits performed – especially with new suppliers.  Suppliers’ plants audited periodically. 
Dyrup Audits are not performed. 
Fritz Hansen Supply Partners are audited periodically - entire operation as well as processes.  Education on LEAN is made available to all Supply Partners. 
LINAK New suppliers are thoroughly evaluated – but audits are not performed. 
Novozymes Audits are not performed – at least not in any systematic fashion. 
Oticon 
Before accepting a new (critical) supplier an audit is performed by production and 
financial staff ensuring stable and competent operation and long-term survival. 
Financial performance of suppliers is verified periodically. 
RIEGENS Audits are not performed – not even financial overviews. 
SDC DANDISC No.  Inputs are more or less standard, and are bought in bulk.  A thorough evaluation is performed when purchasing new production equipment. 
 
Supplier Management More Mature 
From this rather superficial investigation it seems the purchasing practices in general are more 
mature than the other areas investigated within risk management.  Risk management itself has 
little place within supplier management which seems strange but perhaps the work undertaken 
at Bang & Olufsen might generate a new “best practice” for other Danish manufacturing 
companies to aim for? 
8.2.5 Developing 2nd Level Constructs 
The construct ‘Risk Management Organization’ evolved into two sub-constructs: ‘Formal 
organization’ and ‘Risk Management Positions’ whereas the construct ‘Management of Risks’ 
(quite predictably) reference the two risk types in the Risk Matrix: Structure Risk and Process 
Risk.  Furthermore the level of coordination between the two functional areas SCM/Logistics 
and Purchasing is investigated.  The next construct covers the sub-processes risk identification 
and risk assessment thereby “going full circle” on the generic risk management model 
depicted in Figure 2-4 (except for risk monitoring).  The last construct, ‘Supplier Risk 
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Management’ gives more detail on the management of the upstream risks by describing the 
formal segmentation of the supply base and the practices on supplier audits. 
The resulting construct hierarchy is shown in Table 8-24 below. 
Table 8-24: The ‘Supply Chain Risk Management’ Construct 
Level 0 
(Result) 
 Level 1 
(Construct) 
 Level 2 
(Sub-construct) 
Risk Management 
Organization ? 
1. Formal Organization 
2. Risk Management Positions 
AND   
Risk Types and 
Management Efforts ? 
1. Structure Risks 
2. Process Risks 
3. Coordination of Risks 
AND   
Risk Identification 
and Assessment ? 
1. Risk Identification 
2. Risk Assessment 
AND   
Supply Chain 
Risk 
Management 
Practice 
? 
Supplier Risk 
Management ? 
1. Supplier Segmentation 
2. Supplier Auditing 
 
Similarly to the SCM constructs each second level construct is codified, see Table 8-25 
below. 
Table 8-25: Coding of 2nd Level SCRM Constructs 
  Coding for Value  
2nd Level SCRM Construct 1 3 5 
Formal Organization None Part of Staff Function Separate Entity 
Risk Management Positions None Business Risk Management 
Supply Chain Risk 
Management 
Structure Risk Not acknowledged Acknowledged Managed 
Process Risk Not acknowledged Acknowledged Managed 
Coordination of Risks None Partial Overlap Full Overlap 
Risk Identification None Outside Domain or Aperiodic 
Within Domain 
and Periodic 
Risk Assessment None Outside Domain or Aperiodic 
Within Domain 
and Periodic 
Supplier Segmentation None Unclear Criteria Clear Criteria 
Supplier Auditing None Occasional Periodic 
 
From this coding schema it is now possible to rate each second level SCRM construct for 
each company in the study. 
8.2.6 Evaluating SCRM Practices 
Repeating the exercise from Section 8.1.8 by applying the developed coding schema to the 
SCRM constructs results in the ratings depicted in Table 8-26 below.  As before sub-
constructs are rolled up into the higher level construct by simple summations. 
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Table 8-26: Ratings for SCRM Constructs 
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External Conditions           
Size L L L L S L L S S S 
Input C C S S S S S C S S 
Process S C S S S S C C C C 
Mfg. Process S S S S S S C C S C 
SCM Award Y N Y N Y Y N Y N N 
Level 1 Constructs           
Level 2 Constructs           
Risk Management? Y (Y) (Y) (Y) (Y) N (Y) N N N 
Risk Management Organization 6 6 6 6 2 2 6 2 2 2 
1. Formal Organization 3 3 3 3 1 1 3 1 1 1 
2. Risk Management Positions 3 3 3 3 1 1 3 1 1 1 
Risk Types and Management Efforts 11 9 9 9 11 9 13 11 10 9 
1. Structure Risks 5 3 3 4 5 3 5 5 5 3 
2. Process Risks 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 4 5 
3. Coordination of Risks 1 1 1 1 1 1 (3) 1 1 1 
Risk Identification and Assessment 6 4 2 2 6 2 6 2 4 6 
1. Risk Identification 1 1 1 1 1 1 (2) 1 3 1 
2. Risk Assessment 5 3 1 1 5 1 4 1 1 (5) 
Supplier Risk Management 10 6 8 2 10 4 3 10 4 2 
1. Supplier Segmentation 5 3 3 1 5 1 1 5 3 1 
2. Supplier Audits 5 3 5 1 5 3 2 5 1 1 
 
Also as before scores are calculated for 1st level constructs by determining the position 
between minimum and maximum rating for each constructs.  The scores are depicted in Table 
8-27 below. 
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Table 8-27: Scores for SCRM Constructs 
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External Conditions           
Size L L L L S L L S S S 
Input C C S S S S S C S S 
Process S C S S S S C C C C 
Mfg. Process S S S S S S C C S C 
SCM Award Y N Y N Y Y N Y N N 
Level 1 Constructs           
Risk Management 
Organization 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,00 0,00 0,50 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Risk Types and 
Management Efforts 0,67 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,67 0,50 0,83 0,67 0,58 0,50 
Risk Identification and 
Assessment 0,50 0,25 0,00 0,00 0,50 0,00 0,50 0,00 0,25 0,50 
Supplier Risk Management 1,00 0,50 0,75 0,00 1,00 0,25 0,13 1,00 0,25 0,00 
Total Score 0,67 0,44 0,44 0,25 0,54 0,19 0,49 0,42 0,27 0,25 
 
As shown in the table above the scores range between 19 and 67%.  The scores are split in 
three groups: Bang & Olufsen scoring the 67%, the middle group consisting of Brüel & Kjær, 
Coloplast, Fritz Hansen, Novozymes, and Oticon scoring between 42 and 54%, and the 
remainder scoring between 19 and 27%.  In Figure 8-3 below the ‘SCRM Total Score’ is 
mapped out against the first three (four) of the four (five) external conditions. 
Figure 8-3: SCRM Total Score vs. External Conditions 
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As for the analysis on the SCM practices no clear pattern emerges from combining the 
‘SCRM Total Score’ with the (first four) external conditions (see Figure 8-3 above).  Splitting 
the companies in two even-sized groups does not result in a clearer picture.  None of the 
external conditions seem to have an impact on the overall SCRM score. 
Level 1 Constructs vs. External Conditions 
Repeating the simple exercise as illustrated above on the level 1 SCRM constructs results in a 
single additional insights: ‘Risk Management Organization’ seems to increase with ‘Size’.  
For the immature practices of SCRM perhaps the “resources argument” put forward in 
Chapter 6 is correct.  If this is the case then the SCRM practices differ from the SCM ditto as 
the SCRM practices then to a higher degree rely on formalization. 
Conclusion 
Overall the SCRM practices seem to be quite immature as they are mostly implied/informal – 
and the practices are (with few exceptions) reactive instead of proactive.  There seem to be a 
very low level of coordination of structure and process risks – and procedures for risk 
identification and assessment seem to be almost absent.  In relation to supplier risk 
management a certain level of audits are performed; on the other hand the segmentation of 
suppliers is somewhat less rigorous than expected. 
8.3 SCM versus SCRM Practices 
Even if the practices do not reflect to hypothesized relationships with the external conditions 
there is still yet another relation which needs to be unravelled: namely the relationship 
implicitly stated Chapter 1 “More SCM -> More (Supply Chain) Risk Management” (see 
Figure 1-1).40 
Mapping the Scores 
Mapping out the total scores against each other results in Figure 8-4 below. 
                                                 
40 The implied relation to Perrow’s model is naturally that: the more SCM the less redundancy in the system, 
or perhaps even: the more SCM the larger the system. 
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Figure 8-4: SCM Total Score vs. SCRM Total Score 
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The dotted line in the figure above illustrates the “perfect balance” where the two scores are 
equal.  It is thereby easy to see that three companies score higher on SCRM than on SCM 
whereas the remaining seven score opposite.  It is also quite easily identified that a few 
companies seem to be quite low (comparative) on SCRM as the distance between the point 
and the dotted line is quite high. 
Superimposing a classification based on the distance from the dotted line onto the figure 
above enables a quick categorisation of the companies, see Figure 8-5 below. 
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Figure 8-5: SCM Total Score vs. SCRM Total Score (II) 
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Two companies (LINAK and Oticon) are categorized as having a ‘Risky Mismatch’ between 
the SCM and SCRM practices and another (Novozymes) is on the border between ‘Match’ 
and ‘Risky Mismatch’.  The remaining seven are categorized as ‘Match’. 
8.3.1 Appropriateness 
But even if a level of correlation is identified it does not necessarily mean the practices are 
considered appropriate. 
SCM Practices 
When querying the interviewees on the appropriateness of their SCM practice most 
companies describe their practice as continually evolving, e.g.: 
“We have worked focused with logistics and SCM for many years – and the 
concepts in use seems to evolve over time.” (Johnny Nielsen, Coloplast),  
 “We change all the time – we focus more on the global market today than 
previously.  The factory at Vassingrød would probably not have been built if the 
decision had to be taken today…  Both demand and sourcing is more global 
today…” (Henrik Holm, Fritz Hansen), 
and 
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“… it’s quite difficult to say if our SCM practice is appropriate or not – we are 
somewhere between entrepreneurial and professional …” (Henrik Jakobsen, 
RIEGENS)41. 
Coloplast and Fritz Hansen are thereby adapting to a changing environment whereas 
RIEGENS might be developing their SCM practice?  At both Brüel & Kjær and Coloplast the 
question of SCM appropriateness is difficult to answer as there’s no uniform concept: 
 “Our practices vary greatly across the organization.  Apparently no common 
practice exists – therefore local practices are heavily influenced by current or 
former department heads.  …  We are currently working on creating some sort 
of standardization…” (Henrik Jeppesen, Brüel & Kjær) 
and 
“We believe it’s time to standardize our SCM practices through centralization.  
Our current practice is thereby not appropriate – but the issue is being 
addressed.  …  The appropriate type or degree of SCM must be determined by 
the customers and the market in general – we believe SCM is part of the overall 
strategy…” (Henrik D. Nielsen, Coloplast). 
The only company who replied positively to the question of appropriateness of their SCM 
practice was Novozymes.  Thomas Videbæk explained: 
“We are probably a bit more academic than most companies – and we have a 
very structured approach to these issues [organizational and process design].  
We decided how we wanted to SC Organization to operate, performed thorough 
analyses, made a decision, and implemented.  We have made minor adjustments 
to the original design but nothing major…  We are about ready for the next 
phase – to include the bulk production in the SC Organization.” 
The classification of Novozymes as “very SCM” is thereby no coincidence as current practice 
was implemented as designed – in contrast to all other cases where current practice is a 
consequence of an evolutionary process… 
Supply Chain Risk Management Practice 
The SCRM practices are even more diverse.  In some companies it seems quite difficult to 
identify the SCRM practice: as mentioned previously Peter Finnerup (VP, Logistics, Oticon) 
quite dramatically rejected the existence of a SCRM practice and subsequently retracted the 
rejection.  The retraction was subsequently contradicted: 
“I really can’t say if our practice [on supply chain risk management] is 
appropriate – it’s built into the supplier management practice, I guess.  We 
evaluate the capabilities of each supplier and prioritize on that basis…” 
(Marianne K. Borum, Oticon) 
At other companies SCRM (except for compliance with regulations) is virtually non-existing: 
“We do not work with [supply chain] risk management as a separate discipline 
– it is not formalized.  But we work with e.g. internal processes to ensure health 
and safety – and we have contracts for capacity to help us out during demand 
peaks…” (Ernest Fuller, SDC DANDISC), 
                                                 
41 Perhaps due to being a recent hire Henrik Jakobsen does not reject working with SCM.  He thereby 
contradicts long-term employees at RIEGENS... 
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and 
“Our operation is so simple we do not need this type of [supply chain] risk 
management.  There are no real risks of this type…” (Jesper Boysen, SDC 
DANDISC). 
Besides buffering against demand peaks (due to the short deadlines imposed on the company) 
SDC DANDISC sees no reason to manage the risk of exits of critical supply chain partners42.  
Similarly at Dyrup SCRM does not play a large role: 
 “Our [supply chain] risk management practice is largely non-existent.  I 
believe we need to focus on [supply chain] risk management – perhaps develop 
scenarios.  Besides risk management relating to facilities I believe we need to 
address our customers with a risk focus as well – our current practice is the 
result of having smaller autonomous units.  …  The only reason we work on 
[supply chain] risk management today – besides regulatory risks – is the 
opportunity to decrease risk premiums…”  (Henrik D. Nielsen, Dyrup). 
In contrast to the practice at Dyrup scenario building is used actively at RIEGENS, albeit not 
on “normal operations”: 
“We’re running a very stable operations, therefore spending a lot of money on 
risk management of normal operations would be a waste.  Whenever we have a 
larger project [e.g. Turkey, Slovakia, UK] we spend quite some time in 
unraveling sources of uncertainty etc.” (Claus Jensen, RIEGENS)43 
Confronted with the failure of the Turkish project, Claus Jensen does not flinch: 
 “I my opinion we did all the right things when we worked on the project in 
Turkey.  We had no chance of foreseeing the downturn in the Turkish 
construction segment.  …  We did not perform stringent risk management 
routines, but we talked about a lot of scenarios, and the outcome was far from 
the worst case scenario.  …  Of course it is a shame that the project was 
stopped, but that’s the way it is.” 
The failure thereby did not lead to an improvement of their practice – as it was considered 
appropriate.  Quite surprisingly only a few companies confessed the development of a level of 
SCRM was triggered by adverse events: 
 “When the warehouse at Coloplast Denmark burned to the ground it took only 
four days before operations were back to normal.  It triggered the development 
of business continuity plans…  You have to balance the resources you spend on 
risk management – we probably spend most of ours on risks with critically high 
impact.  I believe our Business Risk Management implementation is quite 
appropriate – a lot of people have contributed…” (Johnny Nielsen, Coloplast) 
and 
“Following the long-drawn implementation of the new supplier [of buckets] it 
was decided to analyze the entire portfolio of suppliers – but it was never 
completed.  Quite quickly other problems required immediate attention thereby 
pushing the portfolio analysis in the background.” (Finn Aa. Andreassen, 
Dyrup) 
                                                 
42 Unfortunately the dominant customer chose not to extend the contract – as described in the case study. 
43 It should be noted the mentioned stability is achieved through the continued balancing of dependability – 
and a stringent use of contracts with the major customers. 
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Even quite straight forward problems are thereby not being addressed due to simple horizon 
conflicts? 
Integrated Practices 
In a few of the companies the potential of an integrated approach is voiced – at Brüel & Kjær 
the management of exit risks is to be designed into their product design procedures: 
 “Also in relation to sourcing new products we have a challenge ahead of us as 
we are not supposed to introduce new products relying on sole sourcing – but 
we still are not fully integrated into the product design process.” (Henrik 
Jeppesen, Brüel & Kjær) 
Dependency towards a single supplier is thereby avoided as is the impact of an exit.  At Fritz 
Hansen the failure (or exit) of a supplier might (due to the special characteristics of the market 
they operate in) threaten the long-term survival of the company.  They are therefore 
investigating the possibility of developing one or more “back-up supply chains” – ready to 
start operating at a very short notice. 
But it is Steen B. Jørgensen (Bang & Olufsen) who fully grasps the potential of the integrated 
approach.  Confronted with the idea of redesigning the supply chain for minimization of risks, 
Steen B. Jørgen after a few seconds of hesitation comments: 
“Redesigning our supply chain for minimization of risks operates at the tactical 
level, I guess.  Multiple opportunities for supply chain redesign exist, but the 
starting point must be to redesign the products, to eliminate unnecessary 
dependencies.  …  Taking this argument [the design] to the extreme customers 
as well as suppliers must be evaluated before being accepted as supply chain 
partners.  …  Product development and supply chain design must be performed 
in a continuous, concurrent process – to ensure ‘fit’….” 
and continues: 
“To redesign the supply chain processes products are the starting point.  
Therefore R&D must interact with Purchasing to identify appropriate sources 
for solutions.  Conversely, Purchasing should focus their attention on ensuring 
availability of the competencies needed by R&D.  These processes should be 
coordinated on a continuous basis to ensure product and supplier portfolios are 
‘in synch’.” 
Viewed in this perspective the stringent method in place at Bang & Olufsen suddenly seems 
even more important as it creates a basis for this next level of supply chain management: 
“Whenever this becomes necessary we are probably in a better situation than 
most [due to the supplier management methodology in place].  Within the next 
couple of years we probably have plenty of work to due in modifying our 
concepts according to the increased outsourcing.  This may alter the situation 
in ways we can not predict…” (Steen B. Jørgensen, Bang & Olufsen) 
Determining Appropriateness… 
… thereby apparently is not so straight forward.  Even the best companies can identify short 
comings and even the simplest practices are considered appropriate. 
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8.4 Conclusions 
The aim of this chapter was to answer the last research question – how the case companies 
perform SCM and SCRM. 
Practices and External Conditions 
The case studies and the analyses above fully document the idiosyncratic nature of the SCM 
practices and the immaturity of the SCRM practices.  Each SCM practice seems to differ from 
the others – perhaps due to the breadth and complexity of the practices investigated. 
The external conditions only to a very limited nature “predicted” the practices of each case 
study – but the assumed relationship between SCM and SCRM seems to exist for the 
companies investigated. 
Appropriateness 
The confusion arising from the attempt to describe a “shared” understanding of the 
appropriate match between SCM and SCRM practices documents the lack of 
institutionalization of SCRM and the lack of a “reference practice”.  Some of the companies 
with sophisticated SCM practices perceive their (relatively) advanced SCRM practices as 
inappropriate whereas companies with little or no SCM practices perceive their (near) absence 
of SCRM as appropriate.  The easy answer is naturally that non-SCM companies do not need 
SCRM. 
Revisiting the Scale on Risk Management 
Recalling the difference between the two domains in terms of conceptual understanding prior 
to developing the construct hierarchies (and associated scales) it may be speculated the scores 
on SCRM need to be calibrated.  Assuming the “theoretical best practice” implied by the 
constructs and scales within SCRM represents a score of 50% instead of the 100% used in the 
model the correlation between SCM and Risk Management does not change – but the 
classification of the companies does.  In Figure 8-6 below the new scores are used to map the 
two practices against each other. 
As shown a simple recalibration of the scores – which may make sense according to the 
assumption above – more than half the companies are now categorized as ‘Risky Mismatch’ 
and one (Oticon) is very close to the ‘Extreme Risky Mismatch’ class. 
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Figure 8-6: SCM Total Score vs. SCRM Total Score (III) 
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Whether the model above depicts a truer picture of reality than the previous version (Figure 
8-5) is difficult to answer – it may be appropriate to further triangulate the findings… 
8.5 Epilogue… 
Continuing the practices of triangulation introduced in Chapter 3 the conclusions above are 
challenged by investigating other data sources on SCM and SCRM.  In this instance Annual 
Accounts may include relevant information, as may the testaments of personnel from outside 
SCM and Purchasing.  In the following these triangulations are described and the chapter is 
concluded by a discussion of the combined findings. 
8.5.1 Triangulation I: External Reporting 
In order to perform the first triangulation the latest available Annual Accounts from the case 
companies are collected.  With reference to the discussions in Chapter Two the analysis will 
identify reporting on SCM and Corporate Governance and subsequently on Business and 
Financial Risk Management. 
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Construct ’External Reporting on SCM’ 
In three of the annual accounts indirect reference is made to the SCM term44.  At Bang & 
Olufsen the reference is made when emphasizing the importance of having close relationships 
with suppliers (not least in relation to the development of new products).  Also at Brüel & 
Kjær the practice of having close relationships with suppliers is praised whereas at 
Novozymes the close relationships are sought after on the downstream side. 
Only at Dyrup the annual accounts explicitly references the term ‘supply chain’: 
“A well-functioning and efficient supply chain is essential for Dyrup to 
continue in the right direction and to remain competitive.  The optimal 
transport structure, streamlined production processes and effective planning 
routines are all elements that have a major impact on costs and efficiency in the 
supply chain…” (Dyrup, 2005, p. 9) 
Interestingly the external reporting on SCM does not match the score on SCM (see Table 
8-18).  Dyrup, for instance, received the second lowest score on SCM (0,27) – and Oticon 
receiving the highest SCM score (0,72) does not refer to SCM at all.  Irrespective of the match 
between the external reporting and the SCM score obtained it is very interesting to observe 
how SCM is reaching a strategic importance justifying a place in the external reporting. 
Construct ‘External Reporting on Corporate Governance’ 
The case companies do slightly better on Corporate Governance as half the companies refer to 
the framework45.  Three of these five companies (Coloplast, Novozymes, and Oticon) 
furthermore make reference to Risk Management (in general terms) as an integral element of 
Corporate Governance.  Coloplast and Oticon have even published report on their homepages 
on Corporate Governance and/or Risk Management (Coloplast, 2005a; Coloplast, 2005b; and 
William Demant Holding, 2003). 
The reference made in the annual account for Bang & Olufsen quite narrowly focus on two 
issues: the use of multiple share types and incentives for members of the management and the 
boards.  At SDC DANDISC the reference is very brief: 
“SDC DanDisc follows the part of the recommendations from the Nørby report 
which is relevant for the company.” (SDC DanDisc, 2005, p. 15, translated). 
Construct ‘External Reporting on Business Risk Management’ 
In six of the ten annual accounts references to business risks and their management are 
identified46.  For Brüel & Kjær and Novozymes the most critical risk to be managed relates to 
their respective core technologies, whereas the other companies refer to e.g. customer specific 
inventory (LINAK), volatility of market (Dyrup), and dependency on key personnel (SDC 
DANDISC).  Only three companies (Coloplast, Dyrup, and Novozymes) hints how their risk 
management is performed. 
                                                 
44 More details in Chapter K.1 in Appendix K. 
45 More details in Chapter K.2 in Appendix K. 
46  References to ”the general trend” are disregarded as they will apply to all companies.  More details in 
Chapter K.3 in Appendix K. 
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Comparing the external reporting on Business Risk Management with the SCRM score (see 
Table 8-27) results in the same conclusion as for SCM: little or no correlation.  The two 
highest scores (Bang & Olufsen and Fritz Hansen) have no content on Business Risk 
Management in their external reporting whereas the three lowest scores (LINAK, SDC 
DANDISC, and Dyrup) all have content.  Average SCRM score for companies with no 
content is 0,475 whereas the average score for companies with content is 0,343. 
Construct ‘External Reporting on Financial Risk Management’ 
All annual accounts contain some level of description of the Financial Risk Management47.  
This is not surprising as the Accounts Act stipulates all relevant contingencies (hereunder 
risks) must be described. The ‘classical four’ financial risk categories are: Currency, Interest, 
Credit, and Liquidity Risks – as is evident in the investigated material. 
So… 
Comparing the findings across all four categories does not seem to reveal much besides the 
description of Corporate Governance in some instances contains a description of Business 
Risk Management.  Corporate Governance does not seem to trigger the introduction of SCM 
into the external reporting – which is not surprising as SCM and Corporate Governance do not 
see to connect in any way (see Chapter 2).  All four categories are combined in Table 8-28 
below. 
Table 8-28: Summary of ‘External Reporting’ 
Company SCM Corporate Governance 
Business Risk 
Management 
Financial Risk 
Management 
Bang & Olufsen (Yes) Yes No Yes 
Brüel & Kjær (Yes) No (Yes) Yes 
Coloplast No Yes Yes Yes 
Dyrup Yes No Yes Yes 
Fritz Hansen No No No Yes 
LINAK No No (Yes) Yes 
Novozymes (Yes) Yes Yes Yes 
Oticon No Yes (Yes) Yes 
RIEGENS No No No Yes 
SDC DANDISC No (Yes) (Yes) Yes 
 
Triangulating with the external reporting does thereby not seem to spread any more light on 
Supply Chain Risk Management.  Optimism is called for, though, as SCM has made its way 
to the external reporting – perhaps indicating a shift towards Supply Chain Strategizing? 
                                                 
47 More details in Chapter K.4 in Appendix K. 
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8.5.2 Triangulation II: Financial Department / Staff Perspective 
As mentioned previously the second triangulation is performed by means of interview with 
personnel from finance (or other relevant staff function).  The “staff function perspective” on 
risk management are described below48, followed by a discussion of the findings. 
Bang & Olufsen 
At Bang & Olufsen their supplier management model (see Figure 7-2) combines financial 
checks with compliance on operational issues and design of the supplier base.  Their practice 
thereby is rather advanced albeit it is unclear if risk management at corporate level addresses 
these issues.  According to Kim B. Hansen (Legal Council) there is little or no redundancy on 
risk management as: 
“Risk management is performed at various places, e.g. supplier risks at 
purchasing, operational risks at facilities management, and financial and legal 
risks at Finance and Legal, respectively.  At each place in the organization a 
unique risk category is addressed…” 
Palle Dalgaard (Legal Council) confirms49 the financial risk management does not take supply 
chains into consideration: 
“The information published in the Annual Accounts [p. 55] is accurate and 
precisely describes the scope of the financial risk management.” 
Supply chain risk management is thereby limited to the practice encapsulated in the supplier 
segmentation model. 
Brüel & Kjær 
In contrast to Bang & Olufsen the risk management practice at Brüel & kjær is designed by a 
parent company: 
“Currency and interest risks are not addressed as they are pooled at our parent 
company.  …  Our parent company specifies the guidelines for quarterly 
reporting which contains a wide range of elements…”  (Claus T. Madsen, 
Controller) 
Credit risks are managed at company level – but no risk management department or positions 
exist for financial or business risk management.  Risk management of inter-organizational 
issues is limited to a financial analysis of suppliers, an activity performed very rarely.  Risk 
management of the supply chain is not supported… 
Coloplast 
As described in the case study Coloplast has employed a person to work on Risk 
Management.  He explains his area of responsibility as follows: 
“I was employed to implement ERM throughout the organization.  I am 
responsible for all reporting and development.  …  The management of the 
specific risks is the responsibility of the respective manager – risks are to be 
                                                 
48  At Novozymes the relevant person was identified but attempts at getting an interview were futile. 
49  Several attempts at contacting Randi Toftlund (Director, Finance & Accounting) were unsuccessful. 
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managed where they occur.  …  Also, as I am employed at Corporate there’s 
quite a distance to e.g. Operations…” (Peter Kofoed, Risk Manager) 
The current setup does not give a lot of support to the managers as: 
“I do not offer a method as such – my job is to document the risks already 
identified and follow up on the periodic reporting.  I can not help the managers 
identify or assess risks within their respective areas...  ERM is restricted to 
giving top management periodic reporting on identified risks.” 
He further explains how financial risk management fits into the framework: 
“Corporate Finance works from the same method: they have a number of risks 
identified and they deliver periodic report to me.  Financial risks thereby are no 
different from any other types of risks…” 
According to Peter Kofoed ERM creates value at Coloplast: 
“ERM ensures identified risks are addressed: once a risk is identified the 
respective manager will have to follow up through the periodic reporting.  
Once identified a risks therefore will be managed until removed or 
minimized…” 
In Peter Kofoed’s opinion Coloplast probably has the second-best practice within ERM, only 
surpassed by Novo Nordisk. 
Dyrup 
Also at Dyrup a person is employed to do Risk Management – and again ERM is being 
implemented.  Anders Busk (Risk Manager) explains their current practice: 
“We have not worked with Business Risk Management but are currently 
implementing ERM.  We do not focus on financial risks as they are all scored 
pretty low.  …  We focus on operational and strategic risks – and on insurable 
risks…” 
He has worked with Risk Management at Dyrup for approx. two years and has within this 
timeframe performed a risk analysis of the entire company encompassing financial, strategic, 
and hazard risks.  The exercise has been strictly internal since: 
“Before venturing into the portfolio of customer and suppliers we want to have 
our own house in order.  We may at a later stage include these stakeholders but 
currently we are working on developing systems and processes supporting our 
internal risk management…  We also need a green light from the Board before 
taking risk management further…” 
In may therefore take some time before Dyrup addresses the supply chain risks… 
Fritz Hansen A/S 
According to Morten H. Larsen (Head of Accounting) the financial risks management practice 
at Fritz Hansen a/s is somewhat under-developed: 
“Fritz Hansen a/s is focused on operations and sales, and functions like cash 
management and risk management is not really developed yet.  They may be 
developed in the future if the need arise, but currently the financial risks are 
quite minimal.  …  But actually I have been asked to create a cash management 
function.” 
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He continues to describe a single instance when he helped Operations by assessing the 
financial data on a potential supplier.  He also offers an explanation of the minimal attention 
given to financial risk management: 
”Our owner is Skandinavisk Holding50, so there’s cash enough at our disposal.  
We therefore probably buy less insurance than other companies as our mother 
company can easily help us out in case of an accident or other types of adverse 
events.” 
Financial risk management at Fritz Hansen is thereby rather standard as policies and reporting 
standards are handed down from the parent company.  Supply chain risk management is 
absent except for the practices already described in the case study. 
LINAK A/S 
The practice in place at LINAK is also quite basic: 
“We have no dedicated personnel - financial risk management is an integral 
element in the controller job.  …  We have no advanced frameworks 
implemented, we do not even use the tools our bank tries to sell us.” (Carsten 
Borchert, Director) 
Management of the four classic categories is also pretty standard: the currency risk (primarily 
USD) is accepted, interest risk is managed by buying short bonds, credit risk is handled 
through insuring all debtors above a certain threshold, and liquidity risk is of no relevance. 
The only risk ranging outside the Finance department is the inventory: 
“We have an interest in the inventory level as it represents a very large sum.  …  
We have been working closely with Morten Raahede on the centralization of 
inventories.  We have to find a balance between adapting products for specific 
customers, reducing inventory, and keeping up delivery precision…” 
Carsten Borchert ends the interview by commenting on the positive impact of management 
ownership on Risk Management and Controlling in general. 
Oticon A/S 
At Oticon financial risk management does not have a distinct organizational entity, but takes 
place at various places in the organization: 
”The overall financial risk management is reported to Top Management who 
also dictate procedures and policies.  …  The typical risk categories credit, 
exchange rate, and interest rate risk management is performed by controllers, 
but other types of risk management take place as well.” (Svend Thomsen, 
Finance Manager). 
The implementation of risk management was initially driven by IT security issues and raising 
insurance costs as well as pressure from the company’s auditors, but now also internal 
pressures exist, Svend Thomsen: 
“We experience an increased interest in risk management from various part of 
the company.  There’s a growing understanding of the value of having dual 
perspectives of ‘troublesome’ issues: the operational perspective as well as the 
                                                 
50 For more information, please see www.st.dk. 
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perspective of the staff function.  …  Currently we are 5-6 people in total, 
across the company, who work (part time) on risk management, but this might 
change.” 
No position or role for the management of Logistics/Supply Chain Management risks exists, 
though, and no stringent methods have been implemented to evaluate this type of risks. 
RIEGENS A/S 
Financial risk management is performed solely by Finance Manager Thomas Hansen: 
”Even if we have had projects which have terminated unsatisfactory, the core 
business is actually quite stable.  …  The most important [financial] risk 
category is currency risk, but this is managed through loans, and through 
matching purchases with outstanding payments.  We have even used options.  
…  Credit risks are quite minimal as the vast majority of revenue come from 
long-term business partners – only on projects it may be necessary to ask for 
either a bank guarantee or a down payment.” 
The management of financial risks is thereby performed in the most traditional fashion – by a 
staff function defining policies and credit limits.  The company has no integrated frameworks 
or systems to report risk exposure, and Thomas Hansen insist there’s no need for it: 
“When we talked about acquiring the operation in Braintree we talked about 
requirements in terms of organizational structures, redundant position and 
such, but we decided to handle risk management from here.  The stability of the 
business limits the requirements on monitoring of e.g. market development, and 
the financial exposure is relatively limited.” 
Having procedures in place is important though when participating in projects, as lead times 
are getting shorter and shorter.  
SDC DANDISC A/S 
Following the merger between DCM and SDC DANDISC Torben Nordquist has taken over 
the position as CEO in the company renamed Dicentia.  He explains the current practice for 
financial risk management: 
”Our company does not differ from any other company our size: we have no 
separate staff function or department for risk management, but rely on the 
professionalism of the individuals in the finance department.  Our controllers 
handle the standard tasks within interest rate and currency risks.  …  The 
longer term or more strategic risks are dealt with at board and management 
level.”  (Torben Nordquist, CEO) 
He further describes how the company has insurance for loss of operation, and ponders 
whether this has to be re-evaluated when the merging of operations of the two companies has 
been completed.  He furthermore comments that no procedures for identification of risks are 
in place – risk management is triggered by events internally or externally. 
In Summary… 
Quite surprisingly several companies have integrated risk management frameworks 
implemented.  At both Coloplast and Dyrup apparently the reporting required by the ERM 
implementations is not perceived as Risk Management per se – but as management reporting? 
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Several of the companies (Brüel & Kjær, Dyrup, and Fritz Hansen) had their (financial) risk 
management practice dictated from the parent company, limiting the autonomy and setting 
standards for reporting (and thereby measurements). 
The companies also differed in terms of dispersion (or recognition) of the risk management 
activities.  At Bang & Olufsen risk management is performed at Legal, in Purchasing, and at 
Corporate Finance; at Coloplast apparently risk management is part of all managers job; and 
at Oticon their “spaghetti organization” contains 5-6 people working on risk management part 
time.  In the other companies risk management is part of the controllers’ jobs – and perhaps 
the job of the Head of Accounting.  Most likely this result is primarily driven by the 
perception of risk management in the minds of the interviewees…  Nonetheless practices of 
stringent, methodical risk identification, assessment, and management were not found outside 
the practices of financial risk management in the controlling functions. 
No practices of Supply Chain Risk Management were identified – and only to a very limited 
extent was cross-departmental risk management described.  It seems that Financial and 
Business Risk Management follows the split in Porters split between support and core? 
8.5.3 Conclusion 
The two triangulations resulted in different findings: the former identified SCM in the 
external reporting whereas the latter revealed the existence of ERM implementations in two of 
the case companies.  The latter finding explicated the difficulty in distinguishing between risk 
management and (strategic) management as no practices of Supply Chain Risk Management 
were identified. 
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Chapter 9 Contributions, Conclusions, Concerns… 
This chapter summarizes the contributions and conclusions and elaborates over concerns in 
relation to basic assumptions, methods, and the empirical foundation.  The chapter closes off 
with suggestions for future research. 
9.1 Contributions and Conclusions 
Contributions and conclusions are summarized below in chronological order. 
9.1.1 The Pilot Studies 
As described in Chapter 1 and Appendix A the assumption in Steven’s (1989) model - 
integration starts from within, leading to SCM – is rejected after performing two pilot studies.  
This leads to the first conclusion: 
Conclusion P-1: SCM does not evolve as predicted in Stevens’ model. 
During the pilot studies it is also clearly stated that Supply Chain Risk Management is 
relevant and even critically important to the domain, leading to the second conclusion: 
Conclusion P-2: Supply Chain Risk Management is important to the Logistics/ 
SCM domain. 
These conclusions in combination result in a redesign of the study. 
9.1.2 The Conceptualization 
Before doing so SCM and SCRM are conceptualized in Chapter 2.  It is described how risk 
management has evolved beyond the calculations of probability and impact of adverse events 
to a somewhat qualitative practice focusing on pure and speculative risks both.  Subsequently 
the SCM domain is described.  After venting three aversions (more on them later) two 
perspectives are derived, and a choice is made: 
Contribution C-1: SCM might be perceived as a fulfillment system (or a long-
linked technology)1. 
Following this choice the most relevant risks to manage are derived – matching the risks with 
the characteristics of the fulfillment system.  In line with existing literature the risks derived 
both relate to the operation of the system: the disruption in the flow and the sudden exit of a 
critical supply chain partner.  Furthermore distinction is made between the intentional and 
non-intentional disruption and exit. 
                                                 
1  See Thompson (1967) or Stabell & Fjeldstad (1998). 
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Contribution C-2: The Risk Matrix defines the risks relevant to the SCM context: 
process and structure. 
This leads to the claim that supply chain design must embrace risk management similarly to 
cost minimization, and that other objectives may be relevant.  Furthermore it is postulated that 
any one company may manage a multitude of supply chains. 
Contribution C-3: Designing Structure and Process within SCM must relate to 
cost and risk (and possibly other objectives as well) for each 
supply chain the company participates in. 
These contributions are naturally very subjective and even normative – and possibly impacts 
the conclusions made in the remainder of the manuscript.  But without these guiding 
clarifications the task of investigating the SCRM practice might be impossible.  The 
integration of SCM and SCRM by means of the Risk Matrix facilitates an understanding of 
the link between the short-term optimization of the fulfillment system and the long-term 
safeguarding of the company. 
9.1.3 The Literature Studies 
The next step is to answer the first two research questions: 
1. What are the major themes on Risk and Uncertainty within the SCM literature? 
2. How does state-of-the-art Supply Chain Design address the management of supply 
chain risks? 
In both cases the research question is answered by means of an extensive literature study.  
Analyzing thirty journals from the Logistics, Operations Management, and (General) 
Management domains answers to the two questions are sought using the literature study 
method described in Appendix C2. 
Literature Study on Risk, Vulnerability, and Uncertainty 
The literature study on Risk, Vulnerability, and Uncertainty identified 189 contributions of 
which nine referenced Vulnerability, 76 referenced Uncertainty, and the remaining 104 
referenced Risk.  Analyzing the contributions according to a number of categories clearly 
documents the variation across the 189 articles: 
? The analysis according to phase in the risk process (Identification, Assessment, 
Management) reveals that contributions on Uncertainty seldom addresses the 
Assessment and Management phases.  Conversely the contributions on Risk address all 
three phases. 
? Relatively few articles are oriented towards the network level (fourteen), most are 
internally oriented (84), whereas 62 are oriented upstream and 43 downstream.  Most of 
                                                 
2 The method described in Appendix C might be perceived as a contribution as well albeit it is somewhat 
disconnected from the subject at hand. 
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the articles oriented internally are OM articles dealing with incorporating uncertainty 
into various decision models. 
? Approx. 40% of the articles are oriented towards the strategic level.  Of the fourteen 
articles addressing the network ten are of a strategic nature. 
? A variety of research methods are identified: mathematical modeling (68), case studies 
(35), surveys (20), or simulation (12).  The remainder (54) is of conceptual nature. 
? Only a minor fraction (36) of the articles makes explicit reference to theory. 
Based on these findings a first conclusion is made: 
Conclusion L1-1: The literature on Risk, Uncertainty, and Vulnerability within 
the SCM domain is predominantly non-theoretical and only 
very few articles address the network level. 
Analyzing the identified article for commonalities reveals a number of themes.  The most 
relevant themes (in this context) are: 
1. Securing the Supply Chain, 
2. Supply Management, 
3. Supply Chain Design, and 
4. Risk Management in the Supply Chain. 
The first theme contains only recent contributions which are primarily focusing on extreme 
events like terrorism.  The second and third themes are broader, both in terms of focus and on 
the timeframe from which the articles are identified.  Risk and Uncertainty are two terms 
considered focal to securing inputs and in the design of supply chains. 
The last theme address directly the issue of this dissertation: the management of supply chain 
risks.  Unfortunately theory is almost absent in this collection of articles as only one article 
(Hallikas et al., 2004) makes explicit reference to theory.  In contrast both Supply 
Management and Supply Chain Design contains a number of theoretically founded articles. 
Analyzing the contributions belonging to these four themes for the strategy implied for 
managing the implied risks showed an overrepresentation for the strategies risk reduction and 
risk avoidance.  Few mentioned risk acceptance, insurance, and risk sharing – and only four 
articles (Hauser, 2003; Hallikas et al., 2004; Martha & Subbakrishna, 2002; Sinha, Whitman, 
& Malzahn, 2004) mention at least four of the five proposed strategies.  Of these four articles 
only the former two operate at the network level. 
From these findings another conclusion is made: 
Conclusion L1-2: The literature on Risk, Uncertainty, and Vulnerability within 
the SCM domain does not fully embrace Supply Chain Risk 
Management as contributions are scarce and fragmented. 
Performing the reverse analysis – trying to identify Logistics/SCM articles within the Risk 
Management domain – have very meager results as only six articles are identified, all dealing 
with transportation risks.  It is therefore concluded that: 
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Conclusion L1-3: The literature on Risk, Uncertainty, and Vulnerability within 
the SCM domain is not complemented by contributions from 
the Risk Management domain. 
Literature Study on Supply Chain Design 
In the second study the exercise is repeated this time identifying all contributions on Supply 
Chain Design.  This time the search is performed “automatically” using key word searches to 
increase efficiency.  Contributions are first evaluated for relevance and thereafter classified in 
a manner similar to the first study. 
The search results in a gross list containing 149 articles and adding the articles from the 
completeness check the list increased the total to 162.  Rejecting articles due to lack of 
relevance results in a net list containing only 40 articles.  Analyzing the contributions 
according to a number of categories again documents variation: 
? Only ten of the 40 articles aim at designing process and structure concurrently.  The 
remainder is quite evenly split between structure only and process only.  Showing less 
homogeneity the category ‘Orientation’ reveals 25 articles focus on internal design 
whereas seven focus on upstream and seven on downstream design problems.  More 
than half the articles (21) aim at the network level when designing structure (6), process 
(8), or both (7). 
? The vast majority of the relevant articles are either conceptual (14) or report case studies 
(15).  Eight use modeling and the last three use simulation. 
? The explicit use of theoretical frameworks is identified in only four articles – and only 
two theories are identified: TCE and Chaos Theory. 
Based on these findings a first conclusion on this literature study is made: 
Conclusion L2-1: The literature on Supply Chain Design addresses both 
‘systems components’ Structure and Process.  A fair share of 
the articles focuses on the network level – and a few of these 
address Process and Structure both.  The articles are 
predominantly conceptual or report case studies – and the 
explicit use of theory is almost absent. 
Following a grouping by subject area the articles are analyzed for design objective(s), and 
reference to risk and/or uncertainty.  It is concluded that: 
Conclusion L2-2: Less than half (sixteen) of the relevant contributions on 
Supply Chain Design address more than one design objective.  
The most popular objective is ‘Cost’ (fourteen), followed by 
‘Performance’ (thirteen), ‘Responsiveness (five), and ‘Lead 
Time’ (four).  Only two articles reference ‘Risk’ as a design 
objective – an additional two aim at reducing uncertainty. 
and 
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Conclusion L2-3: The role played by risk and uncertainty within Supply Chain 
Design is surprisingly low as only thirteen articles reference 
either term.  Three of these articles address demand 
uncertainty; very little commonality can be found between the 
remaining ten. 
Comparing the study with the theme ‘Supply Chain Design’ in the first literature study reveals 
a surprisingly low degree of overlap as only three articles are found in both studies3.  
Performing the above analyses on this sub-set reveals that all but one have more than one 
design objective, and that seven of the articles address risk or uncertainty directly and another 
two aim at reducing uncertainty in some way. 
Overall it is concluded that: 
Conclusion L2-4: The thirteen articles on Supply Chain Design (which also 
reference Risk or Uncertainty) cover both systems components 
(Structure and Process) as well as all relevant orientations 
(Up- and Downstream, Internal and Network level) despite the 
low number. 
The final check has two steps: first a simple comparison of the identified articles against the 
“classic articles” mentioned in Table 2-1 to verify if all relevant articles are identified; and 
subsequently an analysis of the articles mentioned in that table.  It is concluded that: 
Conclusion L2-5: The original claim made in Cooper, Lambert, and Pagh (1997) 
that ‘Risk and Reward Structure’ is challenged as 1. the 
overlap between the ‘classical’ articles listed under ‘Risk and 
Reward Structure’ and the list of articles on Supply Chain 
Design is very limited, and 2. the ‘classical’ articles do not 
seem to address Risk and/or Uncertainty to an acceptable 
extent but focus on the sharing of benefits. 
 
The next step is to investigate how the theories most often applied within the SCM domain 
address the management of the supply chain risks. 
9.1.4 The Review of the SCM Theories 
The review clearly documents how different the theories are in terms of addressing the SCM 
domain and the management of the supply chain risks. 
Addressing the SCM Domain 
All of the theories have shortcomings in addressing the SCM domain: 
                                                 
3 It may thereby be claimed that no literature study should be considered complete before performing a very 
broad completeness check.  Alternatively it may be postulated that every literature study should be subject 
to a verification by senior researchers ensuring “all relevant” contributions are represented.  Here it is 
simply concluded that the search strategy may have been too narrow – in spite of the large number of hits… 
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? TCE can only handle dyads (in contrast to more complex network constellations) and 
focuses on cost instead of value, 
? P/A theory has shortcomings when it comes to distribution of roles (principal and 
agent), time perspective, and the optimality criteria, 
? RBT has problems in addressing the notion of ‘supply chains’ (even if both resources 
and core competencies may stem from the combination of company and 
cooperators/environment) and a lack of objective measures, and 
? IA does not have any normative recommendations are to how supply chain should be 
designed, but merely insists networks evolve over time creating dependencies between 
companies as a result of successful exchanges and gradual adaptations. 
A number of contribution identified combine e.g. RBT and TCE when contributing on 
Outsourcing (McIvor, 2000), Strategic Sourcing/Vertical Integration (Walker, 1988), or 
Supplier Management (Bensaou & Anderson, 1999; Smeltzer & Siferd, 1998). 
In conclusion: 
Conclusion T-1: The perspectives offered by the four theories differ greatly – 
and neither of the theories in isolation handles the design of 
Structure and Process in a multi-entity context well. 
The study thereby echoes Croom, Romano, & Giannakis (2000d), Storey et al. (2006), and 
Burgess, Singh, & Koroglu (2006): the domain seems to be in dire need of coherent theory (or 
meta-theory)?  Suggestions to address the shortcomings are offered: 
Contribution T-1: Enhancements to the theoretical frameworks are suggested for 
improving their applicability for designing supply chains. 
Managing the Supply Chain Risks 
Also in terms of managing the supply chain risks (exit and disruption) the frameworks differ 
greatly: 
? In TCE the notions ‘Frequency of Disruption’ and ‘Fundamental Transformation’ are 
important in understanding the management of supply chain risks.  In case of 
unsatisfactory high frequency of disruptions a shift in governance mechanisms might 
mitigate the process risk.  The structure risk is managed through the balancing the 
(inter)dependencies – in case of an unintentional exit it will make a difference if the 
cause was e.g. bankruptcy or a hostile takeover. 
? In P/A theory the risk management mechanism available is choice of contract and 
design of penalty for breach of contract.  The structural risk is not really addressed as 
contracts are supposed to cover the entire period – applying the theory would result in 
all contracts being behavior-based. 
? Resource Based Theory does not address neither process nor structure risks directly.  
Indirectly RBT might appreciate the importance of ensuring stability in the operation as 
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the value of the competence might be negatively influenced in case disruptions are 
frequent.  On the structural level shared competencies might provide the incentive to 
ensure critical partners do not drop the relationship. 
? In the Interaction Approach the intentional disruptions and exits from the network are 
assumed non-existing.  Opportunistic external partners are supposed to be denied access 
as a measure to safeguard the entire network.  Once member of the network a poor 
performer is supported by the other members.  In case of an unintentional exit (e.g. 
bankruptcy or incident at a factory) only failures endangering the entire network are 
ignored.  Membership of a network is perceived as a quite resilient risk management 
measure. 
The frameworks are similar in the fashion only that no discrimination between up- and down-
stream partners seems to exist.  In conclusion: 
Conclusion T-2: None of the four theoretical frameworks support the 
management of all four supply chain risks, even if the 
suggested enhancements improve their applicability.  The 
distinction between intentional and unintentional incidents is 
not easily managed in the theories in general. 
9.1.5 The Empirical Investigations 
The third part of the dissertation investigates the SCM and SCRM practices. 
The SCM Practices 
The SCM practices investigated span a wide range as each practice seem to be “made to fit” 
the context of each company.  In terms of formalization most companies have an “informal” 
SCM organization.  SCM processes are not that well defined as most companies either have 
no processes or refer to functional areas as process names.  The use of integrated IT systems 
(ERP) is quite high but only few of the companies have integrated their applications with 
external parties.  Even if almost all companies report having long history with external parties 
collaborative planning exists at a very moderate level only.  Inter-organizational management 
(management across the supply chain) is absent less some level of learning/knowledge 
sharing.  It is concluded: 
Conclusion E-1: The SCM practices investigated span a wide range as each 
practice seem to be “made to fit” the context of each company.  
The SCM practices are perceived as continually evolving 
rather than following an overall plan. 
Case selection is guided by external conditions which are mapped out against total scores and 
the scores for each 1st level construct: 
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Conclusion E-2: The external conditions do not seem to “predict” the overall 
SCM practices well – except for ‘SCM Award’.  The 1st level 
constructs ‘IT Support’ and ‘Production Philosophy’ are 
described by complexity of ‘Process’ and ‘Manufacturing 
Process’, respectively. 
The SCRM Practices 
Overall the SCRM practices seem to be quite immature as they are mostly implied/informal – 
and the practices are (with few exceptions) reactive instead of proactive.  There seem to be a 
very low level of coordination of structure and process risks – and procedures for risk 
identification and assessment seem to be almost absent.  In relation to supplier risk 
management a certain level of audits are performed; on the other hand the segmentation of 
suppliers is somewhat less rigorous than expected. 
Conclusion E-3: The SCRM practices investigated seem to be quite immature.  
Practices are (with few exceptions) reactive instead of 
proactive. 
Also the SCRM practices are mapped against the external conditions: 
Conclusion E-4: The external conditions do not seem to “predict” the overall 
SCRM practices well.  The 1st level construct ‘Risk 
Management Organization’ is described by ‘Size’. 
SCM versus SCRM 
Following the investigation of the SCM and SCRM practices the relationship implied by 
Perrow (see Figure 1-1) between the two is investigated: 
Conclusion E-5: The relationship between SCM and SCRM practices implied 
by Perrow seems to be supported. 
Superimposing a categorization onto the model classifies the practices: 
Conclusion E-6: Most practices are classified as ‘Safe’ – only three (LINAK, 
Novozymes, and Oticon) are classified as ‘Risky’. 
Later questions as to the validity of the SCRM scale result in a reclassification of the 
practices: 
Conclusion E-7: When adjusting the SCRM scale most practices (six) are 
classified as ‘Risky’ with Oticon being close to ‘Extremely 
Risky’. 
This may be a more accurate classification albeit it naturally is very subjective. 
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Appropriateness of Practices 
Querying the interviewees for appropriateness of their practices revealed the companies were 
split in two groups: companies with low or none SCRM claiming appropriateness of their 
practice and companies with some SCRM and SCM practice in place.  Except for Novozymes 
the latter group of companies was quite hesitant to claim appropriateness as practices 
(especially SCM) were perceived as evolving with no determined “end-goal”.  This led to the 
conclusions: 
Contribution E-8: With the exception of Novozymes appropriateness is only 
claimed where a practice is absent (or nearly absent).  In all 
other instances practices are perceived as evolving – and since 
no “industry-standard” exists appropriateness is not claimed. 
At Novozymes appropriateness is claimed measuring planned implementation of SCM with 
the actual practice.  Their claim is thereby in this sense different from the rest of the case 
companies? 
Triangulations 
In line with the method applied consequently from the first pilot study onwards triangulations 
are performed on this part of the study as well.  Two triangulations are performed: first the 
annual accounts for the case companies are analyzed, and thereafter an alternative perspective 
on risk management is obtained. 
The first triangulation, the analysis of the annual accounts, do little in terms of validating the 
findings on the correlations between the SCM and Risk Management practices but documents 
the appearance of SCM in the external reporting.  As hypothesized in the analysis this may 
indicate a start to Supply Chain Strategizing? 
The second triangulation sheds a bit more light over the subject as several practices of ERM 
(Enterprise Risk Management) were identified.  The interviewed personnel either ignore the 
existence of this practice, consider it irrelevant in relation to the study, or perhaps the 
researcher inadvertently has discouraged the interviewees to share insights on this practice.  
Whatever the reason for omission these findings are quite intriguing as they demonstrate a 
higher level of risk awareness than documented in the main study.  On the other hand it raises 
questions on communication and on the most appropriate approach to ERM? 
A Final Sanity Check 
As a final sanity check the interview round with consultancies is repeated in order to get an 
understanding of the development of the market for consultancy on Business Risk 
Management4.  Since the original study consultancies have become more interested in sharing 
their experience (albeit not in detail).  In the first round three of ten consultancies gave an 
interview, in the second all ten participates.  In the timeframe between the two rounds of 
                                                 
4 For details, please see Appendix M. 
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inquiries either the practice of collaborating with research institutions has changed or the 
subject has attracted more (commercial) interest. 
Also in terms of actually working with Business Risk Management a radical shift has taken 
place as half the companies report working on some risk management framework5.  PwC is 
still the market leader (or so it seems) as they are responsible for the continued development 
of the COSO framework (as also reporting in Appendix B).  AT Kearney reports working on a 
framework for “Excellence in Risk Management”, COWI works on a “Risk and Opportunities 
Check”, and Ernst & Young reports working on a “Risk Universe” – a concept allegedly 
comparable to the COSO framework.  Only Marsh Consulting reports working on a 
framework combining SCM and Risk Management.  Unfortunately contact was never made 
with the responsible person at Marsh… 
Commercial demand for Business Risk Management has increased – and consultancies are 
spending considerable resources in developing frameworks to address the commercial 
demand… 
Contribution E-9: Commercial interest in Business Risk Management has risen 
over the last couple of years – and consultancies are 
addressing this demand through the development of various 
frameworks.  Only one consultancy focuses on developing a 
framework combining SCM and Risk Management. 
9.1.6 Policy Implications / Modification to Theory 
Adhering to the method depicted in Figure 6-1 the cross-case analysis is followed by 
modification to theory and/or policy implications. 
External Conditions 
As documented above the theory (as defined through the external conditions) only to a very 
limited extent has been able to “predict” the outcome of the cross-case analysis.  Only ‘SCM 
Award’ (quite foreseeable) seems to influence the SCM practice – none of the others seems 
to.  For the SCRM practices the external condition ‘Size’ seems to predict the level of 
formalization of the risk management organization. 
Constructs 
An alternative explanation is naturally that the constructs for SCM and SCRM are incorrect.  
Even taking the sampling method applied into consideration the lack of process orientation is 
striking – and so is the lack of inter-organizational management.  For SCRM the overall 
finding is that the practice is almost absent (but emerging?). 
                                                 
5 For a summary, please see Table M-2 in Appendix M. 
Chapter Nine – Contributions, Conclusions, Concerns… 
Page 359 
Modifications to Theory 
It is evident almost all the external conditions should be thoroughly revised as they relate so 
poorly to the cases investigated.  The relative low rate of implementation of process 
orientation and near absence of inter-organizational management constitutes justification for 
alternative theory.  It should be investigated if practices of SCM actually rely on cross-
department (inter-organizational) processes and if shared management is still desired.  The 
rest of the findings are too diverse to pose alternative theory, but it seems evident more insight 
into the practices of SCM and SCRM is needed.   
9.2 Concerns… 
Upon completing the study certain concerns have arisen. 
9.2.1 Concerns on Assumptions 
As documented in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 the study relies on a number of assumptions, and 
two of those have become issues of concern. 
More SCM -> More Risk 
One of the fundamental assumptions is “more SCM leads to more Risk” (or rather: higher 
impact of a failure).  As documented in Chapter 7 the SCM practices which are in place in 
some of the case companies differ greatly and therefore require a (high) number of constructs 
to be adequately described.  This constitutes an opportunity, upon establishing the validity and 
completeness of such a SCM construct hierarchy (see also Chen & Paulraj, 2004), to map out 
how each of these construct impact the risk situation of a company.  Understanding the risk 
impact of the various mechanisms will enable a more structured development of the SCM and 
SCRM practices. 
Aversion Two: Innovation versus Operations 
Aversion one and three did not seem to cause any problems during the study but aversion two 
became problematic during the analysis as innovation revealed itself as a risk mitigation 
mechanism.  The study contains examples of companies using innovation to attract the 
attention of the much larger suppliers of whom they are dependent. 
As documented in the Bang & Olufsen and Brüel & Kjær cases innovation is quite important 
in maintaining relationships with much larger suppliers.  The opposite situation is documented 
in e.g. the Coloplast case study where Coloplast is unable to influence BASF.  Another aspect 
of innovation in relation to SCM is the impact on customer relationships.  Innovating with 
customers gives ample opportunity to lock-in customers – and to use customers’ knowledge 
and experiences in adapting specific solution into the generic offerings.  It therefore becomes 
a bit problematic to persist innovation is separate from SCM. 
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9.2.2 Concerns on Literature Reviews 
Despite the considerable efforts gone into the literature reviews documented in Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 4 (and Appendices D, E, and F) the comparison of theme ‘Supply Chain Design’ 
from Chapter 3 and the net result of the study on ‘Supply Chain Design’ illustrats how 
illusory the concept of completeness is.  A concern is naturally that critically important 
contributions are not included – and the claim of “completeness” is invalid. 
9.2.3 Concerns on Empirical Research Design 
Also on the empirical research design a few concerns have arisen. 
Stuck in the Middle 
The most important concern in relation to the empirical research design is the diversity across 
practices compared to the number of case companies.  The case collection method ensures a 
certain breadth according to the chosen external conditions but analysing the empirical 
findings results in few and vague conclusions.  So on the one hand the case selection method 
ensures breadth, on the other hand it weakens the strength of the conclusions as diversity was 
broader than expected. 
In retrospect it seems more appropriate to either focus on few in-depth case studies or a higher 
number of less thorough case studies – but this finding is naturally influenced by the diversity 
of the practices investigated.  In case clear configurations had emerged from the analysis 
perhaps this concern would not have emerged. 
Interviews versus Participation 
Related to the previous concern is the investigation method.  Even if a substantial effort went 
into creating a trusting relationship between interviewer and interviewees it is obvious 
problems occurred during the interviews.  In some cases it was problematic to continue the 
discussion on supplier management after identifying the current practice on supplier 
segmentation6.  In most companies interviewees were quite generous with their time, though. 
Another problem was the inability to unravel the biases experienced: in one company three 
interviewees all had distinctly different recollections of the exit of a critical supplier.  
Researching “from a distance” as is the case with the interview method (Yin, 1994) left the 
researcher to subjectively qualify one explanation over others. 
Lastly the subject in itself emphasized the necessity of establishing a trusting relationship 
between interviewer and interviewees.  Expanding the population of interviewees in the 
second empirical triangulation might thereby have been an unwise decision. 
                                                 
6 The lack of stringency in segmenting the supplier base was quite surprising to the researcher (but in line 
with e.g. Zsidisin et al. (2004)).  This may have discouraged the Purchasing personnel in a few of the case 
companies from contributing further in the study. 
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Researching a Moving Target 
Also the duration of the study caused some problems as the SCM and/or SCRM practice in 
some of the case companies have developed during the data collection.  This concern is 
further emphasizes by the time delay between the final data collection and the publication of 
the research.  In at least three of the case companies the SCM practice has developed quite a 
bit since the last interview – and presumably the SCRM practice might have done the same… 
9.3 Future Research 
In line with above described concerns the author considers the following issues important for 
future research. 
Construct Hierarchies 
In order to improve the validity and quality of research into SCM practices a better conceptual 
understanding of the empirical domain is needed (e.g. Burgess, Singh, & Koroglu, 2006; 
Gripsrud, Jahre, & Persson, 2006).  Further research on the constructs and measurements of 
SCM will benefit the entire domain as it will enable a more operational definition of SCM.  
Allowing for the relative immaturity of the SCRM practice the construct hierarchy put 
forward should be developed further, e.g. by comparing with existing frameworks (e.g. 
COSO, Corporate Governance, IFRS etc.) and subsequently confronting the resulting 
hierarchy with empirical data.  As mentioned previously an analysis of the risk mechanisms 
relating to each SCM sub-construct will aid in developing a conceptual model of Supply 
Chain Risk Management – extending beyond the Supply Chain Risk Matrix put forward in 
this manuscript. 
The Relevance of Contracts 
One of the classical risk mitigation mechanisms, the contract, has not been included in this 
study as the first three companies contacted emphasized their disinterest in sharing this 
information.  In several of the case studies a certain level of information has been revealed, 
though, indicating in certain companies the portfolio of contracts may not cover the entire 
supplier base and scope of operation.  Even if some researchers consider contract irrelevant in 
long-term B-2-B relationships (as the formal contracts in reality are non-enforceable) it will 
prove critically relevant to understand which options in terms of formal contracts are 
applicable when managing the supply chain risks.  Especially in terms of establishing a 
balanced dependency the contracts may offer options not found elsewhere by introducing e.g. 
lump sum payments, formalize consignment inventory etc. 
Quantifying the Risks and Benefits 
Building on above it may improve the understanding of risks and benefits if these are 
quantified as in Norrman & Jansson (2004).  The use of Business Interruption Value (BIV) 
may prove a lasting concept within Supply Chain Design. 
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Diseconomies of Innovation 
As documented in Chapter 7 several of the companies have been forced to outsource 
strategically important activities – either due to financial problems or due to an increase in the 
cost of maintaining a lead within that specific technology (or discipline).  For both Brüel & 
Kjær and Bang & Olufsen this has placed the company in a situation where being at the 
cutting edge is crucial in remaining an attractive customer.  The increased speed and cost of 
innovation thereby increases the relevance of managing supply chain risks. 
As many Danish companies have the challenge of being dependent on suppliers many times 
bigger than themselves it is critically important to better understand the process of 
outsourcing cutting edge technology (or processes or products) – to avoid unnecessary 
dependencies and costly risk mitigation strategies… 
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Appendix A Pilot Studies 
The aim of this appendix is to document the two pilot studies performed in the beginning of 
the project.  The pilot studies are justified by the need to clarify the relevance of the project, 
and to adjust the research questions. 
A.1 Initial Research Focus 
The intent of the researcher is to perform a number of multi-level fit-analyses of the 
participating supply chains, and subsequently to analyze the consequences of using risk 
management on the design decisions (structure and type/degree of integration).  The 
questionnaire used in the panel group study does not go to the level of detail necessary in the 
case studies but will hopefully strengthen the research design by revealing weaknesses and 
mistakes to be amended before doing the case studies. 
The multi-level contingency model contains the following levels of inquiry: 
1. SCM “type” (participants, processes, techniques, etc.) 
2. Integration (internal, external, system/process/social) 
3. Risk management practices 
The first level describes the type of SCM in place, in terms of e.g. processes and participating 
functions.  The second level describes the integration with external partners based on a three-
variable construct (social, systemic, and process integration).  Each of these variables explain 
a component of the objective of the individual supply chain, e.g. a high degree of external 
process integration to obtain low inventory and high speed/flexibility and a high degree of 
external social integration to maximize mutual learning leading to faster development of new 
products.  The third level investigates the awareness of critical risks on network, strategic, and 
operational level, and their associated levels of impact and probability. 
A.2 Research Method 
Choosing a research method should be based on the characteristics of the phenomenon under 
scrutiny and the intended outcome of the study (e.g. Ghauri, Grønhaug, & Kristianslund, 
1995; Yin, 1994).  In this instance a contingency model was the intended outcome, which 
implies a large number of variables.  To speed up the collection of data in this initial stage, the 
trade-off between level of detail and amount and diversity of data collected normally observed 
when performing data collection from panel group discussions was deemed justified.  
Acknowledging the fact that the implemented SCM practices, the level and type of external 
and internal integration and not least the risk management practices in place are vital to 
companies, a questionnaire was designed to collect the information and ensure the highest 
level of privacy possible.  An obstacle to obtaining credible information is the absence of 
procedures for confirming the information, and the diversity of questions posed. 
Before designing the questionnaire, a model for the description of SCM practices must be 
developed.  In order to do so, some of the existing models are reviewed. 
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A.2.1 SCM Models 
The underlying premise of the first and partly the second level in the multi-level contingency 
model is based on Stevens (1989) frameworks on integration.  According to Stevens internal 
integration is a prerequisite for external integration, and only when external integration is in 
place is a company practising SCM.  The model contains four steps of progression, see Figure 
A-1 below. 
Figure A-1: Achieving an Integrated Supply Chain1 
Customers
Purchasing Materialcontrol Production Sales Distribution
Stage one: Baseline
Stage two: Functional Integration
Stage three: Internal Integration
Stage four: External Integration
Materials
Management
Manufacturing
Management Distribution
Materials
Management
Manufacturing
Management Distribution
Suppliers InternalSupply Chain
 
 
Complementary to this model Harland (1996) propose a four-level model describing the 
research within Supply Chain Management (see below).  The purpose of the model is to 
describe the levels of inquiry in existing research and to investigate the interconnectedness 
between them.  The model does not make claims on e.g. the integration of the entities or the 
progression from one type of SCM to the next, but on the objects of inquiry alone. 
                                                 
1  Source: Figure 5 in Stevens (1989), p. 7. 
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Figure A-2: Levels of research in supply chain management2 
Level 1 - Internal Chain
Level 2 - Dyadic relationship
Level 3 – External chain
Level 4 – Network
 
Harland thereby does not support the notion of progression from the simpler configuration to 
the more complex, but documents the tradition of classifying the structure under investigation. 
Where Stevens talk about internal integration (and Harland in this contribution does not), 
others use the term process orientation (e.g. Cooper, Lambert, & Pagh, 1997).  That process 
orientation is crucial is apparent in the same article, where it is claimed that 
“The integration of business processes across the supply chain is what we are 
calling supply chain management.” (p. 2) 
and 
“To implement SCM, some level of coordination across organisational 
boundaries is needed.  This includes integration of processes and functions 
within organizations and across the supply chain.” (p. 3). 
Albeit subscribing to the idea of progression this is not apparent in the three-component (1. 
business processes, 2. management components, and 3. supply chain structure) model put 
forward, but it is clearly stated after the definition of “process”3 that 
“Supply chain business processes can cross intra- and inter-organizational 
boundaries, independently of formal structure.” (p. 5). 
The emphasis on process orientation is further strengthened in a follow-up article (Lambert, 
Cooper, & Pagh, 1998) where the major contributions are the classifications of supply chain 
members into primary and supporting members, and business process links into managed, 
monitored, not-managed, and non-member process links. 
                                                 
2  Source: Figure 7 in Harland (1996), p. S72. 
3  “A process is thus a specific ordering of work activities across time and place, with a beginning, an end, and 
clearly identified inputs and outputs: a structure for action.” (Davenport, 1993, p. 5). 
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Assuming process orientation Mentzer et al. (2001) extend Stevens framework.  They propose 
a four-step model describing a progression from the single buyer-seller relationship over the 
multi-tier supply chain to the “complete” business environment including various supporting 
entities (see Figure A-3).  Besides offering a typology of external integration to support the 
Stevens model, they support the notion of progression from simpler setups towards the more 
complex. 
Figure A-3: Types of Channel Relationships4 
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Together these selected contributions describe a number of requirements for a typology of 
SCM, but a few are missing: 
? it is often emphasized that the key to SCM are long, trust-based relationships (e.g. 
Cooper, Lambert, & Pagh, 1997; Mentzer et al., 2001; Sahay, 2003), 
? the use of various IT-tools and techniques are necessary to exchange information in a 
smooth and timely manner (e.g. Mentzer et al., 2001; Bagchi, Skjøtt-Larsen, & 
Sørensen, 2003), and 
? the network level of management and coordination in the form of e.g. Collaborative 
Planning, Forecasting & Replenishment (CPFR) (Fliedner, 2003). 
                                                 
4  Source: Figure 1 in Mentzer et al. (2001), p. 5. 
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A.2.2 A Supply Chain Process Maturity Model 
In a contemporary contribution, Lockamy III & McCormack (2004) put forward a Supply 
Chain Process Maturity model.  Their framework has a certain commonality with the models 
described above, as they suggest progression from one level to the next, insist on using 
business process as an entity, and imply that the supply chain structure can be designed.  
Their model relies on the work by the Carnegie Mellon University on software development, 
and utilizes the BPO Maturity Model (a model categorizing companies by the degree of 
internal and external process integration), see Figure A-4. 
Figure A-4: The BPO maturity model5 
The breakthrough level.  Managers employ process management with strategic intent.  
Broad process jobs and structures are put in place outside of traditional functions.  
Cooperation between intra-company functions, vendors and customers takes the form of 
teams that share common process measures and goals.
Competition is based upon multi-firm networks.  Collaboration between legal entities is 
routine to the point where advanced process practices that allow transfer of responsibility 
without legal ownership are in place.  Trust and mutual dependency are the glue holding 
the extended network together.  A horizontal, customer-oriented, collaborative culture is 
firmly in place.
The company, its vendors and suppliers, take cooperation to the process level.  
Organizational structures and jobs are based on process, and traditional functions, as they 
relate to the supply chain, begin to disappear altogether.  Process measures and 
management systems are deeply embedded in the organization.  Advanced process 
management practices take shape.
Extended
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Basic processes are defined and documented.  Changes to these processes must now go 
through a formal procedure.  Jobs and organizational structures include a process aspect, 
but remain basically traditional.  Representatives from functions meet regularly to 
coordinate with each other concerning process activities, but only as representatives of 
their traditional functions.
Processes are unstructured and ill-defined.  Process measures are not in place and the jobs 
and organizational structures are based upon the traditional functions, not horizontal 
processes.  Individual heroics and “working around the system” are what makes things 
happen.Pr
oc
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The procedures for categorizing the companies into the five levels is not described in the 
article, but must rely on an extensive set of variables as the description of the BPO levels 
include references to jobs, organizational structure, process, collaboration, cooperation, 
organizational behavior etc.  Nonetheless, the model is operationalised using the SCOR6 
model using the concepts Plan, Source, Make, and Deliver.  Unfortunately, this 
operationalisation is not described in detail but only represented graphically, see Figure A-5 
below. 
                                                 
5  Source: Figure 3 in Lockamy III & McCormack (2004), p. 275. 
6  Supply Chain Operations Reference model.  For more information, please see www.supply-chain.org. 
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Figure A-5: The supply chain maturity model7 
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Not evident in the above figure is the level of cooperation between focal company and 
suppliers and customers.  As the reliability of the processes improve from level to level so 
does the cooperation.  At the top level, Extended, competition is between networks (as 
initially suggested by Christopher (1992)) and collaboration is routine and across legal 
boundaries. 
A.3 Suggesting a SCM Maturity Model 
However tempting it is to employ this model, it is deemed unrealistic due to the complexity 
and sophistication of the model.  Other SCM Maturity models exist, but most appear to have a 
specific focus: 
? In Towil, Childerhouse, & Disney (2002) a model aiming at describing the level of 
uncertainty reduction by means of supply chain integration is presented.  The model is 
based on the Stevens model, and even uses the same terminology. 
? Subscribing to the same notion of progression as Stevens and Mentzer et al. (but not 
referencing either) Fawcett & Magnan (2002) report from a study of supply chain 
integration.  Using a multi-method empiric approach they conclude that the rhetoric and 
reality of SCM is pretty far apart.  Unfortunately, their results on internal and external 
integration are reported separately, thereby making an analysis of the progression 
impossible.  The way they report their findings are thereby possibly a consequence of 
their perception of progression instead of the reported levels of integration. 
? Also subscribing to the Stevens model, Geary, Childerhouse, & Towill (2002) suggest a 
four construct model of uncertainty to describe Stage of Supply Chain Integration. 
                                                 
7  Source: Figure 4 in Lockamy III & McCormack (2004), p. 276. 
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Rejecting these models, either due to a narrow scope or lack of documentation,  and using the 
assumptions documented previously, the proposed model thereby contains the following level 
0 constructs: Internal, Upstream, Downstream, and Network.  Following the assumption of 
internal integration before external, and simple networks before complex, the following model 
emerges.  (Greyed-out box means the construct is not fulfilled). 
Figure A-6: SCM Maturity Model 
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Combining the four level 0 constructs results in a six-level maturity model, describing the 
“path of progression” from non-SCM to the true network company.  As companies possibly 
do not integrate up- and down-stream at the same time, levels 2a and 2b might be perceived as 
being parallel.  The difference between level 3 and 4 is that the network company has 
surrendered part of the management to the network, e.g. through CPFR. 
A.3.1 SCM Constructs 
Applying a method routinely used within e.g. Marketing Research each of the level 0 
constructs is de-composed into simpler level 1 constructs, which ultimately is broken down 
into separate questions (level 2 variables).  Both level 1 constructs and questions at level 2 
should correlate with the assumptions of SCM described above. 
The level 0 construct ‘Internal’ is made up of two mandatory and one optional sub-construct.  
The sub-construct ‘ERP’ (marked with grey in the figure below) is optional in the sense it is 
not required for the construct ‘Internal’ to be fulfilled, see Table A-1 below. 
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Table A-1: The ‘Internal’ Construct 
Level 0 
(Construct)  
Level 1 
(Sub-construct)  
Level 2 
(Variable) 
SCM Internally (Yes) ? 
SCM (Yes) 
AND 
SCM Internally (Yes) 
AND   
Process Orientation (Yes) ? 
Process Orientation (Yes) 
AND 
Process Names (Acceptable) 
AND/OR (Optional)   
Internal ? 
ERP (Yes) ? 
ERP (Yes) 
AND 
ERP Systems (Acceptable) 
 
The variables ‘Process Names’ and ‘ERP Systems’ differ from the rest in the sense the value 
of these variables are dependent on the subjective evaluation of the researcher.  ‘Process 
Names’ are deemed acceptable when the process names describe a collection of activities 
reaching outside and across the traditional functions.  A process name like ‘Invoicing’ will 
thereby not fulfill the criterion whereas the process name ‘Fulfillment’ will.  In a similar 
subjective manner the use of ERP systems is evaluated for each respondent. 
Table A-2: The ‘Upstream’ Construct 
Level 0 
(Construct)  
Level 1 
(Sub-construct)  
Level 2 
(Variable) 
SCM Upstream (Yes) ? 
SCM (Yes) 
AND 
SCM w/Suppliers (Yes) 
AND   
Social Integration (Yes) ? Frequency of Meetings (>= 4 / year) 
AND   
History (Yes) ? 
Long Relationships (Yes) 
AND 
Longest Relationship (>= 5 years) 
AND 
Avg. Relation Length (>= 5 years) 
AND/OR (Optional)   
Upstream (Yes) ? 
IT Integration (Yes) ? 
EDI w/Suppliers (Yes) 
AND 
EDI Doc Types (Acceptable) 
 
The level 0 constructs ‘Upstream’ and ‘Downstream’ are identical (except for the actors), and 
also contain elements for subjective evaluation.  The criteria for ‘Frequency of meetings’, 
‘Longest relationship’, and ‘Average relationship length’ are all very subjective and do not 
have a strict academic justification - their values are based on the subjective opinion of the 
researcher. 
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Table A-3: The ‘Downstream’ Construct 
Level 0 
(Construct)  
Level 1 
(Sub-construct)  
Level 2 
(Variable) 
SCM Downstream (Yes) ? 
SCM (Yes) 
AND 
SCM w/Customers (Yes) 
AND   
Social Integration (Yes) ? Frequency of Meetings (>= 4 / year) 
AND   
History (Yes) ? 
Long Relationships (Yes) 
AND 
Longest Relationship (>= 5 years) 
AND 
Avg. Relation Length (>= 5 years) 
AND/OR (Optional)   
Downstream (Yes) ? 
IT Integration (Yes) ? 
EDI w/Customers (Yes) 
AND 
EDI Doc Types (Acceptable) 
 
The last construct ‘Network’ is somewhat simpler as it has only one level 1 construct, 
consisting of only three level 2 questions, see Table A-4 below. 
Table A-4: The ‘Network’ Construct 
Level 0 
(Construct)  
Level 1 
(Sub-construct)  
Level 2 
(Variable) 
Network (Yes) ? CPFR (Yes) ? 
CPFR (Yes) 
AND 
CPFR w/Suppliers (Yes) 
AND 
CPFR w/Customers (Yes) 
 
From these de-composed constructs the maturity of the SCM practices are to be measured.  
The other element, Risk Management, needs to be measured as well. 
A.3.2 Risk Management Constructs 
Following the considerations on the sophistication of the model on SCM, the framework for 
describing the risk management practices is designed for a minimum of complexity as only a 
basic test of the measurement is required at this stage of the research project. 
The model will capture the critical risks as identified by the respondents, describing them by 
only three variables: ‘Level’, ‘Probability’ and ‘Impact’.  The variables ‘Impact’ and 
‘Probability’ are quite straightforward, whereas ‘Level’ requires an explanation. 
The variable can hold three values: ‘Network’, ‘Strategic’, and ‘Operational’.  The former 
refers to risks challenging the network or originates from the network in which the company 
is an integrated part.  The latter refers to the interruption of the normal operation in terms of 
disruptions of input, break-down of machinery etc.  The last value refers to the risks 
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challenging the current structure or the long-term plans of the company not covered in the 
‘Network’ class. 
To collect the information in the questionnaire three matrices are created, one for each value 
of the variable ‘Level’.  By “placing” a risk in one of the three matrices, the respondent 
thereby identifies the level.  Each matrix contains ‘Impact’ on the one axis and ‘Probability’ 
on the other, classified by the dichotomy High/Low. 
A.3.3 The Initial Questionnaire 
From these constructs and variables a questionnaire was designed, containing four segments: 
A. Company/Interviewee, B. Supply Chain Management, C. Supply Chain Integration, and D. 
Risk Management (see section A.8). 
The first section is to capture the name of the company and the name and position of the 
interviewee.  The second section is designed to capture information on processes and 
quantitative information on the participants in SCM cooperation.  The interviewee is asked to 
name processes implemented, if any.  Additionally, it is inquired for customers and suppliers 
separately, the total number in the portfolio, how many of these participate in SCM, and the 
duration of the longest and the average of relationship.  The third section tries to capture 
another aspect of SCM as it inquires about the internal systemic integration (ERP systems), 
the social integration, and external systemic integration (exchange of EDI-documents) with 
customers and suppliers.  The last section investigates the formalization of Risk Management, 
and asks the interviewee to name the most critical risks threatening the continued existence 
and development of his/her company.  The risks identified are thereafter to be classified 
according to level (network, strategic, operational), impact (high, low), and probability (high, 
low) as described in the previous section. 
A.4 The CLM8 Pilot Study 
The first pilot study was performed in cooperation with Council of Logistics Management at 
an ordinary quarterly meeting (March 11th, 2003), hosted by KPMG Consulting.  The themes 
for the meeting were “Supply Chain for Military and Business Operations – Failure is not an 
option” and “Similarities and Differences in Requirements for Planning and Quality”. 
Besides consultants and academics, twelve companies participated in the seminar – they all 
agreed to take part in the study.  Of the twelve companies two were software companies 
interested in supplying solutions within logistics and SCM (shown in bold and italics in the 
table below).  It quickly became apparent, that these two companies did not practice SCM 
themselves – it therefore did not make any sense for them to fill in the questionnaire.  The 
                                                 
8  Council of Logistics Management (CLM) is an American organization, originally founded in 1963 as 
National Council of Physical Distribution Management (NCPDM) by a group of educators, consultants, and 
managers who envisioned the integration of transportation, warehousing, and inventory as the future of the 
discipline.  CLM has been represented in Denmark since 1996, and has approx. 30 professionals as 
members.  For more information on CLM, please refer to www.clm1.org.  Since then the organization has 
changed name to Council of Supply Chain Management Professionals (CSCMP), see www.cscmp.org. 
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remaining ten companies were quite diverse as the group consisted of four wholesalers, two 
manufacturers, two retailers, and two logistics service providers. 
Table A-5: Participants in the CLM Pilot Study9 
ID Company Industry (NACE Classification) Rev. Emp. 
 Person 
PF1-01 Carl F A/S 5154 Wholesale of hardware, plumbing and heating 78 275 
 Lars Richter-Olesen 
PF1-02 Sanistaal A/S 5152 Wholesale of metals and metal ore 501 1.405 
 Per Thomsen 
PF1-03 LEGO SYSTEM A/S 3650 Manufacture of games and toys 574 3.202 
 Jørgen Hursted Nielsen 
PF1-04 LMG A/S 5154 Wholesale of hardware, plumbing and heating 136 108 
 Else Vibeke Lauridsen 
PF1-05 K. V. Tjellesen A/S 5146 Wholesale of pharmaceutical goods 438 N/A 
 Keld Grünfeld 
PF1-06 QVALE LOGISTIK DK A/S 5190 Other wholesale 19 63 
 Oli Jørgen Bergsrud 
PF1-07 SUPERFOS PACKAGING A/S 2522 Manufacture of plastic packing goods 47 348 
 Lars Kold 
PF1-08 Unwired Factory - - - 
 Morten Bentzen 
PF1-09 MERLIN A/S 5248 Other retail sale in specialised stores 173 468 
 John Hansen 
PF1-10 Alfa Laval Corporate AB 7415 Management activities of holding companies 500 1.891 
 Knud Midtgaard 
PF1-11 JDA Software - - - 
 Per Juul Ulrich 
PF1-12 Jysk A/S 5244 Retail sale: furniture, lighting eq. & household 287 992 
 Troels F. Larsen 
 
After a brief introduction to the study and the part of the presentation focusing on the internal 
practices a heated discussion started.  Problems on identifying the requirements for “proper” 
SCM were raised as was the opinion that the position in the chain should be included in the 
analysis.  One participant insisted that measuring SCM should include measures on the 
individual process, as the importance of different processes will vary from company to 
company, and classifying the company from an overall description of process orientation was 
too simplistic.  It was evident that the companies themselves had problems identifying the 
criteria by which their SCM practices should be measured.  After some discussion and a look 
on the second part of the questionnaire it was agreed that the questionnaire should be filled in, 
as it captured most of the critical information after all. 
After the second part of the presentation, an intense debate on the nature and importance of 
relationships with customers and suppliers took place.  Most participants agreed that long 
relationships were of value to their company, only a few objected advocating for short-term 
contracts and close evaluation. 
The use of IT integration was another issue lively discussed - some claimed it was a necessity 
for operating in the first place, others described their IT solutions as poor and limiting their 
interaction with customers and suppliers.  Discussions were stopped after an overrun of about 
                                                 
9  Data from the AMADEUS database, accessed 28-09-2004. Revenue in mio. USD. 
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½ hour, and it was concluded that the questions posed in the study must have “struck a 
nerve”.  The subsequent analysis of the questionnaires documented the discussions and 
disagreements. 
A.4.1 Results – Supply Chain Management 
The first surprising result was that not all companies indicated working with SCM.  Looking 
closer at the companies not working with SCM revealed that one (PG1-06) was a 
transportation company, one (PG1-07) was a manufacturer of packaging material, and one 
(PG1-09) was a retailer.  Apparently the concept of SCM had no appeal to the retailer (one 
might speculate if concepts like QR, ECR or the like have been implemented instead)?  Also 
surprising, the implementation of processes did not seem to correspond too closely with the 
implementation of SCM as companies not using SCM were reporting working process 
oriented and vice versa.  The names of the processes displayed a close resemblance to 
traditional department names, e.g. Sales, Purchasing etc.  Only two companies (PG1-04, PG1-
06) seem to have an appropriate process in place, but neither seem to have SCM co-operations 
(the former has implemented SCM but does not cooperate with anybody, the latter does not 
work with SCM). 
The use of ERP systems, on the other hand, appears to be pretty common.  Some of the 
companies have multiple (standard) ERP systems in place, others combine an ERP system 
with own systems, and still others use only own systems.  The multiplicity of systems is a bit 
surprising as the dominance of ERP systems like SAP, Baan, and Navision is treated as a fact 
within the discipline10.  Of the systems mentioned only SAP, Movex, and Navision are 
recognized as “real” ERP systems, giving the advantage of internal integration and process 
support.  The use of multiple ERP systems limits the flexibility of the implementation in 
restricting changes due to e.g. high complexity and high cost.  Companies using multiple ERP 
systems therefore often define the usage areas based on functional areas, organizational 
division, or other distinctly defined boundaries.  Other systems like BPCS are older, 
functionally/module oriented systems based on transactions processing instead of process 
support.  Systems designed and developed specifically to a company have the same 
characteristics in terms of process support and internal integration.  What appeared to be a 
good coverage of ERP systems is thereby diminished to a single company (PG1-12).  Table 
A-6 below summarizes the answers. 
                                                 
10  The author has worked for about 15 years within the IT industry, hereof from 1995 till 2002 as a SAP 
consultant.  Statements about the industry are based on this background knowledge. 
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Table A-6: SCM, Processes, and ERP Support 
ID SCM? Int.? Sup.? Cus.? Proc.? Which ERP? Which 
PF1-01 ? ? ? ? ? - (?) Astra (AS/400) 
PF1-02 ? ? ? ? ? Customer specific (?) Own 
PF1-03 ? ? ? ? ? (none) ? - 
PF1-04 (?) ? ? ? ? Fulfilment (?) Guide 
PF1-05 ? ? ? ? ? Purchasing, Order, Distribution (?) Navision: Finance 
        Own: Logistics 
PF1-06 ? - - - ? Fulfilment (?) ASW & E3 
PF1-07 ? - - - ? Sales, Demand, Order, Purch., Manuf. (?) Own 
PF1-09 ? - - - ? - ? - 
PF1-10 ? ? ? ? ? Demand, Order, Supply (?) BPCS, Movex, 
        Jeeves, Scala 
PF1-12 ? ? ? ? ? (none) ? SAP 
 
A.4.2 Results – Supply Chain Integration 
Analyzing the answers on the relationships with suppliers and customers reveal a higher 
degree of homogeneity as all participants confess having long lasting relationships with 
suppliers and all but one (PG1-09) with their customers as well.  The reported ratio between 
the total number of suppliers and the number of “close” suppliers is as expected, even if two 
companies (PG1-04, PG1-05) stand out.  These two have comparably small supplier 
portfolios, thereby enabling a close relationship to most or even all suppliers11.  As expected 
the analysis of the customer portfolio shows a higher degree of diversity.  Being a retailer 
(PG1-09, PG1-12) results in serving a large mass of anonymous customers, whereas e.g. 
wholesalers in highly regulated markets (PG1-05) or manufacturers of specialized good (PG1-
07) have smaller customer portfolios. 
Albeit all confess having long lasting relationships, the length of the relationships varies a lot.  
All but one (PG1-01) report relationships with suppliers in excess of ten years.  Conversely, 
the average length of relationship with a supplier is less accessible, as only half of the 
participants have answered.  Except for one company (PG1-01) the average length of 
relationship is very long, indicating a high degree of stability. 
The customer portfolios show more or less the same results, even if the information available 
is slightly less.  The retailers (PG1-09, PG1-12) have less detailed knowledge on their 
customers for obvious reasons, and few (PG1-01, PG1-03, PG1-05) have an estimate on the 
average length of relationship with customers.  The length of the longest relationship with 
customers is comparable with the information on the suppliers.  For more detail, see Table 
A-7 below. 
                                                 
11  It might be interesting to investigate if PG1-04 and PG1-05 have reduced the supplier portfolio recently or 
if the industry displays such high degree of stability as reported by at least PG1-05. 
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Table A-7: Number and Length of Relationships 
 -------------------Suppliers------------------- -------------------Customers------------------- 
 Long # Suppliers    Rel. Length Long # Customers    Rel. Length 
ID Rel.? Total Long Longest Avg. Rel.? Total Long Longest Avg. 
PF1-01 ? 6.00 20 2-3 1-2 ? 12.000 10 2-3 1-2 
PF1-02 ? 4.000 <10 >10 ? ? 18.000 Few >5 ? 
PF1-03 ? >1.000 10 40 20 ? ?   >10.00012 50 20 
PF1-04 ? 400 300 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
PF1-05 ? 150 150 20 10 ? 100 70 20 10 
PF1-06 ? 370 30 15 ? ? 2 á 25 ? 15 ? 
PF1-07 ? 50-100 10 >20 ? ? 1.200 50 >20 ? 
PF1-09 ? 120 15 50 10 ٱ ? - - - 
PF1-10 ? 3.000 >100 >15 ? ? >5.000 Many +15 ? 
PF1-12 ? ? >15 25 15 ? ? ? ? ? 
 
Even if long relationships apparently are the norm, collaborative planning is not.  Only three 
of the ten companies are cooperating with suppliers and customers on planning, and one of 
these (PG1-04) must rely heavily on e.g. IT-systems as they rarely have meetings with 
suppliers and customers.  The other two (PG1-03, PG1-12) meet frequently with suppliers and 
customers both.  Segmentation of the portfolio is more frequent on the customer side (eight of 
ten) compared to the supplier side (five of ten).  Comparing the frequency of meetings with 
suppliers with the frequency for customers does not reveal any apparent correlations.  If 
frequent meetings are defined as meeting at least quarterly only three to five companies have 
frequent meetings with suppliers and four to six have frequent meetings with customers.  The 
companies who differentiate do not seem to meet with customers and suppliers more 
frequently than the companies not differentiating.  Table A-8 below summarizes the results. 
 
Table A-8: External Relationships 
   ---Collab. Planning---   -------------------External Relations (Meetings)----------------- 
 ----------Suppliers---------- ----------Customers---------- 
ID CPFR? Sup.? Cus.? Diff.? How Often? Diff.? How Often? 
PF1-01 ? - - ? 1 / 6-8 per year ? 1-12 per year 
PF1-02 ? - - ? ? ? ? 
PF1-03 ? ? ? ? Monthly ? Monthly & Weekly 
PF1-04 ? ? ? ? 2 per year ? ? 
PF1-05 ? - - ? Rarely ? 1-2 per year 
PF1-06 ? - - ? Max 1 per year ? Monthly 
PF1-07 ? - - ? 0-5 per year ? 0-5 per year 
PF1-09 ? - - ? Avg: monthly ? Never 
PF1-10 ? - - ? ? ? 2 per year 
PF1-12 ? ? ? ? Weekly & monthly ? Monthly & Quarterly 
 
The use of EDI/XML exchanges is without doubt the most homogenous area uncovered by 
the questionnaire.  All but one (PG1-03) have EDI/XML exchanges and most companies 
exchange documents in both directions (up- and down-stream).  The documents most 
commonly exchanged are orders and invoices (6 companies), other types include delivery 
                                                 
12  Not sure if this was a mistake? 
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notices, order confirmations, payments and various purchasing information.  Besides 
customers and suppliers, one (PG1-07) exchange documents with the bank, another (PG1-10) 
with transporters.  See Table A-9 below for more detail. 
Table A-9: Exchange of Electronic Documents 
ID EDI? Sup.? Cus.? Other Document Types 
PF1-01 ? ? ?  Purchase orders, Incoming invoices, Purchase data 
PF1-02 ? ? ?  Orders, Invoices, various notices 
PF1-03 ? - - - - 
PF1-04 ? ? ?  Purchase orders, Invoices 
PF1-05 ? ? ?  Orders, Order confirmations, Delivery notices 
PF1-06 ? ? ?  Orders, Delivery notices 
PF1-07 ? ? ? Banks Orders, Invoices, Payments 
PF1-09 ? ? ?  Orders, Invoices 
PF1-10 ? ? ? Transporters Orders, Invoices 
PF1-12 ? (?) ?  Delivery notices, Invoices 
 
Having described the results from the questionnaire the build-up of constructs will unveil the 
fit between assumed and realized interdependencies of variables, and the progression in SCM 
practices. 
A.4.3 Identifying SCM Maturity 
Analyzing the results is a process of updating the multi-level model, one level at a time from 
the bottom up.  The construct definitions in use here is extremely restrictive as few (in most 
cases: one) combinations of a large number of variables is required to fulfill a construct.  A 
vast amount of information will be lost unless the values of each level 2 variable and the 
entire hierarchy of constructs are made available.  For the sake of clarity all steps in the 
analysis is reported. 
Each level 2 variable is updated, following an evaluation if necessary.  This enables the 
update of the level 1 constructs by using the criteria as described in section A.3 above and an 
evaluation of the “fit” between the level 2 questions and their “parent” level 1 constructs is 
made possible.  After updating the level 1 constructs the level 0 constructs can be updated 
similarly.  Table A-10 below gives an overview of all level 1 constructs, Table A-11 shows 
the level 0 constructs and the resulting maturity level. 
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Table A-10: Level 1 Constructs 
 ------Internal------     ----------Suppliers--------     --------Customers-------- ---Network--- 
 Social IT Social IT  
ID SCM?Proc? ERP? SCM?Integ?Hist?Integ? SCM?Integ?Hist?Integ? CPFR? 
PF1-01 ? ? ? ? (?) ? ? ?  (?) ? ? ? 
PF1-02 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
PF1-03 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
PF1-04 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
PF1-05 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
PF1-06 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
PF1-07 ? ? ? ? (?) ? ? ? (?) ? ? ? 
PF1-09 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
PF1-10 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
PF1-12 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Table A-11: Level 0 Constructs and Maturity Level13 
     Maturity Consistent 
ID Internal? Upstream? Downstream? Network? Level w/ Model ? 
PF1-01 ?  ? + ? + ? No SCM ? (except IT) 
PF1-02 ?  ? + ? + ? No SCM ? (except IT) 
PF1-03 ?  ?  ?  ? No SCM ? 
PF1-04 ?  ? + ? + ? No SCM ? 
PF1-05 ?  ? + ? + ? No SCM ? (except IT) 
PF1-06 ?  ?  ?  ? No SCM ? 
PF1-07 ?  ? + ? + ? No SCM ? (except IT) 
PF1-09 ?  ? + ? + ? No SCM ? (except IT) 
PF1-10 ?  ? + ? + ? No SCM ? (except IT) 
PF1-12 ? + ?  ?  ? No SCM ? 
 
From Table A-11 above it is evident that the construct definitions are too restrictive as all 
companies are at the lowest maturity level.  The top level constructions are only consistent 
with the model when none of the level 0 constructs are set, all others (PG1-03, PG1-04, PG1-
12) are inconsistent as they do not have the ‘Internal’ construct set.  The use of IT internally 
and externally seems to directly contradict the assumption that IT supports the organizational 
arrangements.  Perhaps the logic of efficiency through the use of IT is de-coupled from the 
logics of SCM?  The assumption that process orientation is a prerequisite for internal 
integration/SCM does not correspond well to the observed practices.  Relaxing this 
requirement will change the Maturity Level quite a lot as three companies (PG1-01, PG1-10, 
PG1-12) will become ‘Internal’ and one (PG1-03) will become ‘Network’ and be consistent 
with the model, see Table A-12 below. 
                                                 
13  A ’+’ indicates the optional criteria are fulfilled.  E.g. in ’Internal’ it indicates the support of processes 
through the presence of an ERP system. 
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Table A-12: Level 0 Constructs and Maturity Level (Relaxing Req’s on Internal) 
     Maturity Consistent 
ID Internal? Upstream? Downstream? Network? Level w/ Model ? 
PF1-01 ?  ? + ? + ? Internal ? (except IT) 
PF1-02 ?  ? + ? + ? No SCM ? (except IT) 
PF1-03 ?  ?  ?  ? Network ? 
PF1-04 ?  ? + ? + ? No SCM ? 
PF1-05 ?  ? + ? + ? No SCM ? (except IT) 
PF1-06 ?  ?  ?  ? No SCM ? 
PF1-07 ?  ? + ? + ? No SCM ? (except IT) 
PF1-09 ?  ? + ? + ? No SCM ? (except IT) 
PF1-10 ?  ? + ? + ? Internal ? (except IT) 
PF1-12 ? + ?  ?  ? Internal ? 
 
In the analysis of the formalization of Risk Management and the risks identified both sets of 
classifications will be used. 
A.4.4 Practices on Risk Management 
The questions posed on Risk Management can be divided in two groups: questions on the 
identifiable organization around Risk Management, and the personal perception of critical 
risks.  The former aims at unraveling the current level of formalization whereas the latter will 
describe the awareness in the organization.  The former might be perceived as a top-down 
construct whereas the latter is a bottom-up.  The critical risks reported are to be classified as 
described earlier, by placing the risk in one of twelve cells (three matrices with two by two 
cells each). 
Albeit all participants at the beginning of the presentation said that Risk Management was of 
critical importance to the modern enterprise, almost half of them report their company does 
not work actively with it.  In three of the four companies the responsibility is placed at the top 
management.  In one instance (PF1-09) it seems that the Risk Management reported is more 
correctly described as Project Risk Management.  For the other three meetings are rare, if any 
at all.  The formalization of Risk Management thereby seem to best almost absent, which was 
confirmed during the discussions.  Of the participating companies only one had a Risk 
Manager (PF1-03), and that position was primarily concerned with the procurement of 
insurance. 
Analyzing the (personal) perceptions of the critical risks documents a similar absence of 
attention.  Most of the risks reported are generic risks such as IT14 (PF1-02 #3, PF1-04 #1, 
PF1-05 #3, PF1-06 #2), supply stability (PF1-02 #2, PF1-10 #1), ability to deliver (PF1-03 
#1, PF1-04 #2, PF1-07 #3, PF1-09 #1), competency/HR (PF1-01 #2-3, PF1-06 #3), and 
anonymous external events (PF1-02 #1, PF1-06 #4, PF1-07 #1, PF1-12 #3).  The 
idiosyncratic risks are limited to the risk of loosing a transporter (PF1-01 #4), the threat 
                                                 
14  The high frequency of IT-related risks is interesting, not least in terms of investigating the level of 
implementation of Business Continuity.  Albeit some authors claim Business Continuity is much more than 
IT-security, the vast majority of articles on the subject is on IT security and recovery (e.g. Savage, 2002; 
Turner, 2003). 
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imposed by an unbalanced customer portfolio (PF1-06 #1), and fire at own (PF1-12 #2) and 
the suppliers’ facilities (PF1-12 #1). 
The classification of the risks seem to have failed as only four (4!) of the 28 risks mentioned 
have been correctly classified.  About one third of the invalid answers can be explained by 
insufficient instructions as the questionnaires contain x’s instead of the number referencing 
the critical risks.  The same number of risks lacked an answer, documenting the difficulty or 
lack of access to probabilities, impact and strategy.  Overall this section of the questionnaire 
documented the lack of communication of relevant risks faced by the companies. 
Table A-13: Risk Management15 
 Risk Freq. of ----Risk Matrices---- 
ID Mgmt? Responsible Meetings? Risks Level Prob. Impact 
PF1-01 ? - - 1. Resources/bottle necks  No answer 
    2. Competencies/knowledge  No answer 
    3. People/staff S H H 
    4. Transporter disappears  Invalid 
PF1-02 ? - - 1. Changes in the market S H H 
    2. Stability of supply N L H 
    3. IT O L H 
PF1-03 ? Top Management At least yearly 1. Ability to deliver  Invalid 
PF1-04 (?) Management ? 1. IT systems  No answer 
    2. Ability to deliver  No answer 
PF1-05 (?) VP Logistics Frequent 1. Fire O ? ? 
    2. Water O ? ? 
    3. IT O ? ? 
PF1-06 ? - - 1. One large customer  Invalid 
    2. IT development  Invalid 
    3. HR development  Invalid 
    4. Globalisation  Invalid 
    5. Security/theft/break-in  Invalid 
PF1-07 ? - - 1. Trend/structure adjustments  No answer 
    2. Demand/capacity adjustments  No answer 
    3. Delivery lead times  No answer 
    4. Competing technology/products  No answer 
PF1-09 ? VP Production In project 1. Delivery problems  Invalid 
    2. ???  Invalid 
    3. ???  Invalid 
PF1-10 ? Department heads ? 1. Supply problems  Invalid 
    2. Customer/supplier take-over  Invalid 
PF1-12 ? CEO - 1. Fire at suppliers site  Invalid 
    2. Fire at warehouse,  Invalid 
    3. War – loss of the Far East  Invalid 
 
A.4.5 Combining SCM Maturity and Risk Practices 
Combining the SCM Maturity (with or without the relaxed requirements) with the Risk 
Practices does not result in clarification.  The most advanced practitioners of SCM (PF1-01, 
PF1-03, PF1-10, PF1-12) seem to work actively with risk management and have some degree 
of formalization as three of the four work with risk management.  Conversely, the other 
practitioners of Risk Management (PF1-04, PF1-05, PF1-09) seem to report more or less 
                                                 
15  Risk Matrices: Level – O = Operational, S = Strategic, N = Network; Prob. & Impact – L = Low, H = High. 
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identical practices.  From this analysis, it is not possible to detect a difference between the 
two groups.  The perceptions of the critical risks seem to display the same lack of systematic 
implementation as neither group displays distinct proof of experience with the domain. 
A.4.6 Conclusion from the CLM Pilot Study 
Conclusions from the first study are quite clear as many of the issues discussed are directly 
observable in the questionnaires.  Many of the participants commented that it was difficult to 
fit their SCM practices with the questions on SCM in the questionnaire.  A few commented 
that the internal implementation of SCM is unrealistic due to a number of factors – a 
phenomenon directly observable in the questionnaire.  Additionally, the description of 
processes should be enhanced as the aggregated view taken in the questionnaire results in a 
loss of a vast amount of detail.  A description of participants per process might enhance the 
description. 
Several commented the difficulties of comparing across industries and position in the supply 
chain.  Perhaps analyzing the companies based on similarity in size, process, and position will 
reveal important findings otherwise lost. 
 And even if the subject (risk management) was known to the participants on beforehand, 
none seemed to have detailed knowledge of the type and level of implementation.  Analyzing 
the responses on the risk matrices revealed a need to better explain the differentiation between 
operational, strategic and network level risks. 
As a consequence of the results obtained it was decided to perform yet another pilot study.  
To isolate the problem of identifying SCM practices the companies invited were from a short 
list of companies working actively with SCM, and with whom the research environment had 
previous experience. 
Before performing the second pilot study the questionnaire and the constructs were modified 
according to the experience obtained through the first study. 
A.5 Modifying the Research Instrument 
The experience from the first study results in the modification of the maturity model and the 
inherent constructs both. 
A.5.1 The Modified SCM Maturity Model 
One of the key learning points from the first study was the fact that the internal organization is 
de-coupled from the external integration.  The internal characteristics are thereby reported 
separate from the external.  The first level in the model is unchanged (at this level of detail), 
but all subsequent levels contain the separate classifications on internal and external both. 
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Figure A-7: The Revised SCM Maturity Model 
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Besides the changes to the maturity model, the constructs themselves need adjusting. 
A.5.2 Constructs 
The ‘Internal’ construct has been changed quite a bit to reflect the criticisms described above.  
The top level is unchanged though, still insisting on SCM and process orientation and listing 
ERP as an optional construct.  Enhancing the process descriptions by including a description 
of the participants in each process has enabled the simplification of the construct ‘SCM 
Internally’ to consist of the variable ‘SCM’ only.  The ‘Process Orientation’ has become a bit 
more complex as it now consist of four variables including a measure for cross-functionality 
and the identification of the person or function responsible for the process.  The ‘Upstream’ 
and ‘Downstream’ constructs have changed as the level 1 construct ‘History’ has been 
removed from both.  All three level 0 constructs are shown below. 
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Table A-14: The Modified ‘Internal’ Construct 
Level 0 
(Construct)  
Level 1 
(Sub-construct)  
Level 2 
(Variable) 
SCM Internally (Yes) ? SCM (Yes) 
AND   
Process Orientation (Yes) ? 
Process Orientation (Yes) 
AND 
Process Names (Acceptable) 
AND 
Cross-functional (Yes) 
AND 
Responsible Defined (Yes) 
AND/OR (Optional)   
Internal ? 
ERP (Yes) ? 
ERP (Yes) 
AND 
ERP Systems (Acceptable) 
Table A-15: The Modified ‘Upstream’ Construct 
Level 0 
(Construct)  
Level 1 
(Sub-construct)  
Level 2 
(Variable) 
SCM Upstream (Yes) ? 
SCM (Yes) 
AND 
Processes (Acceptable) 
AND 
Suppliers in Proc’s (Yes) 
AND   
Social Integration (Yes) ? Frequency of Meetings (>= 4 / year) 
AND/OR (Optional)   
Upstream (Yes) ? 
IT Integration (Yes) ? 
EDI w/Suppliers (Yes) 
AND 
EDI Doc Types (Acceptable) 
Table A-16: The Modified ‘Downstream’ Construct 
Level 0 
(Construct)  
Level 1 
(Sub-construct)  
Level 2 
(Variable) 
SCM Downstream (Yes) ? 
SCM (Yes) 
AND 
Processes (Acceptable) 
AND 
Customers in Proc’s (Yes) 
AND   
Social Integration (Yes) ? Frequency of Meetings (>= 4 / year) 
AND/OR (Optional)   
Downstream (Yes) ? 
IT Integration (Yes) ? 
EDI w/Customers (Yes) 
AND 
EDI Doc Types (Acceptable) 
 
The ‘Network Characteristics’ has been changed to include a measure for adaptation, see 
Table A-17 below. 
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Table A-17: The Modified ‘Network’ Construct 
Level 0 
(Construct)  
Level 1 
(Sub-construct)  
Level 2 
(Variable) 
CPFR (Yes) ? 
CPFR (Yes) 
AND 
CPFR w/Suppliers (Yes) 
AND 
CPFR w/Customers (Yes) 
OR   
Network (Yes) ? 
Adaptation (Yes) ? 
Adaptation (Yes) 
AND 
Area/process (Acceptable) 
 
The questionnaire has been revised according to these changes (see section A.9).  The Risk 
Management construct has not been amended, but the instructions and the presentation was 
altered to improve clarity on how to fill in this information. 
A.6 The CBS Pilot Study 
The second pilot study was conducted in conjunction with a seminar on SCM held at CBS on 
May 8th, 2003.  Approx. 50 persons from 40 companies were invited all of whom the SCM 
research group had previous experience.  As for the first pilot study the seminar contained 
three sessions, the session on Supply Chain Risk Management was again scheduled for 1½ 
hours.  The presentation given was a revised version of the first one, incorporating the 
modifications described above.  The fit between presentation and questionnaire was identical 
to the first seminar. 
A.6.1 Population 
Albeit more than twenty persons from the industry had signed up for the seminar, only ten 
companies were represented during the study.  Of the ten companies three were deemed not 
suited for the study, leaving the following seven companies in the population, see Table A-18 
below. 
As in the first study, the presentation was performed in sessions, each session covering a part 
of the questionnaire.  After each presentation a discussion led up to the participants filling in 
the corresponding part of the questionnaire. 
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Table A-18: Participants in the CBS Pilot Study16 
ID Company Industry (NACE Classification) Rev. Emp. 
 Person 
PF2-01 Gillette Group Danmark A/S 5145 Wholesale of perfume and cosmetics 171 154 
 Helle Breinholt 
PF2-02 Post Danmark A/S 6411 National post activities 1.780 21.847 
 Kurt Madsen 
PF2-03 Arla Foods A.m.b.a. 1551 Operation of dairies and cheese making 6.378 17.791 
 Line Grosen 
PF2-04 L’Oreal Denmark A/S 5145 Wholesale of perfume and cosmetics 116 228 
 Lone Larsen 
PF2-05 Carlsberg Danmark A/S 1596 Manufacture of beer 687 2.892 
 Per Barkholt 
PF2-06 Glunz & Jensen A/S 3340 Manufacture of optical instr. & photog. eq. 109 405 
 Bo Siersbæk 
PF2-07 LEGO SYSTEM A/S 3650 Manufacture of games and toys 574 3.202 
 Jan Stentoft Arlbjørn 
 
A.6.2 Results 
Surprisingly, two of the companies (PF2-02, PF2-05) participating in the study reported not 
working with SCM.  The implementation of a process oriented organization again proved less 
frequent than the use of SCM as only two reported doing so, and two having partially 
implemented processes.  Interestingly, even one company (PF2-06) reporting not working 
process oriented give names of five processes which are in place. 
Interestingly, two companies (PF2-02, PF2-03) report processes that span more than the 
typical dyadic relationship.  As the processes include up- and down-stream participants, they 
give the impression of a pretty advanced SCM practise.  And even more interestingly, one of 
the two companies (PF2-03) report that the responsibility of the processes is unknown.  
Whether this is due to a lack of knowledge of the individual participating in the study or if the 
management of the processes is really on the network level, remains unknown17. 
                                                 
16  Data from the AMADEUS database, accessed 28-09-2004. Revenue in mio. USD. 
17  The nature of the company (the national postal service) might explain the response as the company to a 
certain degree can be perceived as a resource owner, setting its processes and resources at the disposal of its 
customers.  This remains an interesting hypothesis that might be explored further at a later stage. 
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Table A-19: SCM Processes 
 Cross-  
ID SCM? Proc.? Which Sup-2 Sup-1 Cus-1 Cus-2 funct.? Resp.? 
PF2-01 ? (?) Monthly internal forecasting ? ? ? ? ? ? 
   Monthly supply ? ? ? ? ? ? 
   Customer claims / returns ? ? ? ? ? ? 
PF2-02 ? ? Parcel sorting ? ? ? ? ? ? 
   Sales ? ? ? ? - ? 
   Transport ? ? ? ? ? ? 
   Distribution ? ? ? ? ? ? 
PF2-03 ? ? Fulfilment ? ? ? ? ? ? 
   Product development / control ? ? ? ? ? ? 
   Production planning ? ? ? ? ? ? 
PF2-04 (?) (?) Forecasting ? ? ? ? ? ? 
   Planning ? ? ? ? ? ? 
   Follow-up on service-level ? ? ? ? ? ? 
   Communicating master-data ? ? ? ? ? ? 
PF2-05 ? - - - - - - - - 
PF2-06 ? - Forecasting - - - - - - 
   Planning - - - - - - 
   Procurement - - - - - - 
   Sales - - - - - - 
   Development - - - - - - 
PF2-07 ? ? - - - - - - - 
 
The use of IT shows a much less diversified picture.  All participants use ERP systems and all 
but one use EDI.  Document types vary a bit, invoices and purchase orders are not 
surprisingly the most common. 
Table A-20: IT Usage 
ID ERP? Which EDI? Sup.? Cus.? Document Types 
PF2-01 ? - ? ? ? Invoices, Orders, Inventory data 
PF2-02 ? Cust. & prod. systems ? ? ? Delivery notices, KPI’s 
PF2-03 ? SAP R/2 & SAS (R3+APO) ? ? ? Orders, Claims 
PF2-04 ? SAP ? ? ? Purchase plans, Invoices, Order, Confirm. 
PF2-05 ? SAP incl. CRM, APS etc. ? - - - 
PF2-06 ? ? ? ? ? Forecast, Purchase orders, Invoices 
PF2-07 ? SAP (customized) ? ? ? - 
 
Where systemic integration thereby is high, the social integration seems to be surprisingly 
low.  About half the companies differentiate their social integration with suppliers and 
customers, but the frequency of meetings vary a lot.  None of the participants report working 
with collaborative planning (CPFR), but most report having adapted processes to fit external 
partners.  The pattern thereby is a bit surprising, as the adaptation would suggest a continued 
contact between partners in the supply chain. 
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Table A-21: Collaboration with External Parties 
        External Relations (Meetings) -----------------------------Collaboration----------------------------- 
 --Suppliers-- --Customers-- --------CPFR--------    -----------------Adaptation---------------- 
ID Diff.? Freq.? Diff.? Freq.? CPFR?Sup.?Cus.? Adap.? Which Area/Process? 
PF2-01 ? 12-24 - - ? - - ? - 
PF2-02 ? 12 ? - ? - - ? Parcel sorting 
PF2-03 ? >12 ? 12/? ? - - ? E.g. purchasing (min order qty) 
PF2-04 ? 2 ? 2 ? - - ? Follow-up on service level 
PF2-05 ? Ad hoc ? - ? - - ? Forecasting 
PF2-06 ? 4/1 ? ? ? - - - - 
PF2-07 ? ? ? ? ? - - ? Distribution 
 
The next step is to determine the SCM Maturity according to the modified model. 
A.6.3 Identifying SCM Maturity 
Analogous to the method applied previously, the constructs are updated from the bottom up.  
As in the first study, the results show a lack of consistency between data and the model, as 
two of the companies claim to work with SCM but are not process oriented.  Looking at the 
integration up- and down-stream it is obvious that the systemic integration does not correlate 
with the other types of integration.  And it is furthermore evident that social integration and 
SCM does correlate either. 
One way of interpreting the types of integration in place is that the supply chains have already 
been aligned, but this is contradicted by the level of process orientation.  A more likely 
interpretation is that cooperation is still at a quite low level, albeit the systems seem to be 
integrated to some degree.  The implementation of IT solutions is perceived less “dangerous” 
than the integration of processes (or even the implementation of processes in the individual 
organization).  If this is correct, Stevens’ assumption is incorrect, and SCM is to be found in 
the interface between companies instead of across the activities performed in the participating 
companies.  Table A-22 below summarizes the results. 
Table A-22: Level 1 Constructs18 
 -------Internal------- ------Suppliers------ -----Customers----- -----Network----- 
 Social IT Social IT 
ID SCM?Proc.?ERP? SCM?Integ.? Integ.? SCM?Integ.? Integ.? CPFR? Adapt.? 
PF2-01 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
PF2-02 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
PF2-03 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? (?) ? ? ? 
PF2-04 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
PF2-05 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
PF2-06 ? ? ? ? (?) ? ? ? ? ? ? 
PF2-07 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
 
Even if the constructs have been modified, still a lot of information is being discarded, albeit a 
bit less than previously.  Of the five companies claiming to work with SCM, only three 
                                                 
18  Strictly speaking the column ’SCM?’ should not be reported here, as it references a variable, not a 
construct. 
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qualify for the ‘Internal’ construct as two of them do not work process oriented.  In 
comparison, no companies from the first study qualified for the construct. 
On the upstream side only two companies qualify for the construct, de-qualifying three 
companies with either SCM or social integration, but not both.  Interestingly both 
combinations exist.  On the downstream side only one company pass the test. 
Finally, on the network construct a staggering five companies qualify for the construct as all 
except two companies report having adapted processes to fit external partners.  The table 
below summarizes the top level constructs and the resulting maturity levels. 
Table A-23: Level 0 Constructs and Maturity Level 
 ---Maturity Level--- Consistent 
ID Internal Upstream Downstream Network Internal External w/ Model ? 
PF2-01 ?  ? + ? + ? Internal Upstream ? (except IT) 
PF2-02 ?  ?  ? + ? No No ? 
PF2-03 ? + ? + ?  ? Internal Network ? 
PF2-04 ? + ? + ? + ? Internal No ? 
PF2-05 ? + ?  ?  ? No No ? 
PF2-06 ?  ? + ?  ? No No ? 
PF2-07 ? + ?  ? + ? No No ? 
 
In Table A-23 above it is evident that the progression suggested in the maturity model is 
absent as four out of seven does not fit the model.  Three companies (PF2-02, PF2-04, PF2-
05) have network characteristics (due to the claim adaptation of processes) but does not have 
the requested up- or down-stream characteristics.  The use of the adaptation requirement in 
the network construct thereby seems to blur the picture instead of providing clarity and 
insight.  Ignoring the network construct and subsequently re-evaluating the consistency with 
the model results in a perfect fit between the constructs and the model, see Table A-24 below. 
Table A-24: Level 0 Constructs and Maturity Level (Relaxing Req’s on Network) 
 ---Maturity Level--- Consistent 
ID Internal Upstream Downstream Network Internal External w/ Model ? 
PF2-01 ?  ? + ? + % Internal Upstream ? (except IT) 
PF2-02 ?  ?  ? + % No No ? 
PF2-03 ? + ? + ?  % Internal Up & Down ? 
PF2-04 ? + ? + ? + % Internal No ? 
PF2-05 ? + ?  ?  % No No ? 
PF2-06 ?  ? + ?  % No No ? 
PF2-07 ? + ?  ? + % No No ? 
 
On the other hand it is evident that the de-coupling of the internal and external constructs is 
unnecessary, at least with this population.  It seems quite difficult to adjust the model to fit the 
empirical data. 
A.6.4 Practices on Risk Management 
As in the first study, all participants claimed that Risk Management is of critical importance 
for the modern enterprise, only two companies (PF2-02, PF2-06) report having a formal 
routines and/or structure in place.  In the case of the former a position exists but meetings on 
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Risk Management is infrequent, whereas the latter list a number of departments as responsible 
but claim meetings are frequent and regular.  All other companies report not working with 
Risk Management.  The discrepancy between the rhetoric and the reality of the practices on 
Risk Management (at least the formal part) is extreme. 
The personal perception of the risks faced by the companies is much better documented in the 
second study than in the first as the classification of the risks have improved dramatically.  
Only six answers are invalid and four have no classification leaving fourteen risks with full 
information. 
Of the fourteen risks only two are operational (PF2-02 #1, PF2-03 #1) and three are at the 
network level (PF2-01 #2, PF2-03 #3, PF2-05 #1).  Interestingly, all three at the network level 
reference supply failure in some form, questioning whether this category provides clarity or 
confusion to the classification of the risks.  The discussion on the Risk Management section 
of the questionnaire (and presentation) supports this suspicion.  The term network might have 
been an unwise choice as it apparently has many translations, and might have been translated 
into “supply network” in this context.  The term “supply chain” might have been a wiser 
choice. 
Even more interestingly, the risks identified by the respondent are predominantly low 
probability, high impact risks at the strategic (or network) level.  Only three risks are reported 
as high probability, and only one is reported as low impact.  The disproportion in the replies is 
a well-known phenomena within Risk Management and might in this context be explained by 
the desire to justify the lack of management of the risk (the low probability) and their 
identification of the risk (its importance in terms of impact).  The analysis and description of 
these mechanisms are clearly outside the scope of this study. 
The risks reported seem to lack commonality except at the most overall level, as only one 
theme, supply management, can be identified among the risks with full information.  
Including the risks with incomplete information one more theme appear, forecast accuracy.  
The table below summarizes the results on Risk Management. 
Risk Management in the Supply Chain 
Page 28 
Table A-25: Risk Management 
 Risk Freq. of ----Risk Matrices---- 
ID Mgmt? Responsible Meetings? Risks Level Prob. Impact 
PF2-01 ? - - 1. Forecast accuracy S M M 
    2. Supplier failure N L H 
    3. Product dev./Branding S L H 
    4. Customer buying power  No answer 
PF2-02 ? Risk Manager Ad hoc 1. Sorting operation fails O L H 
    2. Choosing wrong partner S L H 
    3. Sale of shares S L H 
PF2-03 ? - - 1. Unclear responsibility distr. O H H 
    2. Quality S L H 
    3. Dependency on suppliers N L L 
    4. Monopoly legislation S H H 
PF2-04 ? - - 1. IT systems  Invalid answer 
    2. Forecast accuracy  Invalid answer 
    3. Factory: fire etc.  Invalid answer 
    4. Transport strike  Invalid answer 
    5. Losing customer trust  Invalid answer 
PF2-05 ? - - 1. Supply of input N L H 
    2. Spare parts for production  No answer 
    3. Quality S L H 
    4. Revenue S L H 
    5. Forecasts  No answer 
PF2-06 ? Purchasing, Monthly 1. Supply failure (Far East)  Invalid answer 
  Development,      All other are kept confidential 
  Logistics 
PF2-07 ? - - 1. Low sales on dev. products S H H 
    2. Demand management  No answer 
 
A.6.5 Combining SCM Maturity and Risk Practices 
Combining the SCM Maturity with the Risk Practices does not give the expected results as 
the correlation seems to be negative instead of positive.  The companies having formalized 
Risk Management (PF2-02, PF2-06) do not have any SCM practices, and the companies with 
varying degree of SCM practices (PF2-01, PF2-03, PF2-04) do not have formalized Risk 
Management.  For the second time, the expectation of having more Risk Management when 
the SCM practices are more advanced has not been fulfilled. 
Whether this results from the inability to measure the SCM practice or if the Risk 
Management practices must be measures on the implicit routines and practices instead of the 
formalized structures and personal perceptions of risks is still not certain. 
A.7 Overall Conclusions 
From the two pilot studies a number of conclusions can be drawn. 
First and foremost, the relevance of Risk Management in relation to SCM was perceived of 
critical importance by all participants in the two studies.  During the discussions and after 
analyzing the responses it has become evident that some sort of implicit risk management is 
taking place but the structure and level of formalization is very low. 
So, the overall area of concern proved relevant, but when combining with SCM it became a 
bit more ambiguous.  It was difficult to describe the “type” of SCM as it became clear, the 
Appendix A – Pilot Studies 
Page 29 
companies implementations of SCM was exaggerated.  This finding is in line with the 
findings of Fawcett & Magnan (2002) who investigated the level of Supply Chain Integration 
by means of survey instruments and case studies.  In their study they subscribed to a modified 
version of Stevens (1989) model (see Figure A-8 below), found that the level of integration is 
somewhat less advanced than expected, and claimed that most companies are working on 
creating seamless processes internally. 
Figure A-8: Different Views of Supply Chain Integration19 
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Where Fawcett & Magnan comply with Stevens’ assumption and the idea of progression, the 
pilot studies suggest that internal integration is far more complicated than external integration.  
Integrating with external partners might prove beneficial (and popular) for both parties, 
sometimes even resulting in better results for better parties.  But implementation of the 
process-oriented company is a much more difficult task, creating uncertainty about carrier 
paths, responsibilities, chain and command etc.  When implementing process oriented 
companies, it is vital that the roles and responsibilities are discussed and agreed upon on 
beforehand, as the crossing of chains of command is detrimental to performance and stability.  
One reason for this difference in perception might be the cultural difference between 
Denmark and the USA, an issue raised by e.g. Mentzer et al. (2001): 
”Do the antecedents and nature of SCM … change under and across different 
national cultures?” (p. 20). 
As mentioned previously, perhaps SCM (in Denmark) is to be found in the interfaces between 
companies in sets of dyadic relationships instead of in continually aligned processes spanning 
multiple tiers. 
                                                 
19  Source: Figure 2 in Fawcett & Magnan (2002), p. 354. 
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A.7.1 Consequences for the Research Design 
It seems clear that designing the study to create a contingency model for SCM and Risk 
Management has been invalidated by these studies.  When little knowledge is available or 
basic assumptions are discarded a more exploratory design is needed.  Therefore, instead of 
performing a survey type study, the design is changed to a multiple case study. 
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A.8 The Initial Questionnaire 
SUPPLY CHAIN INTEGRATION & RISK MANAGEMENT 
ID:   ___
Agenda 
Section A: Company Profile 
Section B: Supply Chain Management 
Section C: Supply Chain Integration 
Section D: Risk Management 
SECTION A: COMPANY PROFILE 
A1. Which company do you work for?  
 
A2. Your name?  
A3. Your position?  
A4. Your e-mail address?  
A5. Transscript for approval? Yes ? No ? 
Comments: 
Lars B. Sorensen Page 1 of 5
Dept. of Operations Management 
Copenhagen Business School  
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SUPPLY CHAIN INTEGRATION & RISK MANAGEMENT 
SECTION B: SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT 
B1. Have you implemented SCM? Yes ? No ? (jump to B3) 
Internally (eg between departments)  ? 
With suppliers ? 
With customers ? 
B2. With whom do you perform SCM? 
(Please tick all relevant) 
Other: 
B3. Do you work process oriented? Yes ? No ? (jump to B5) 
B4. Which processes? 
 
 
 
 
 
B5. Long-term relationships with suppliers? Yes ? No ? (jump to B9) 
B6. How long is the longest relationship (approx.)?  
B7. With how many suppliers do you have long-term 
relationships? 
 
B8. What is the average length of relationship with 
these (B7)? 
 
B9. Total number of suppliers (approx.)?  
B10. Long-term relationships with customers? Yes ? No ? (jump to B14) 
B11. How long is the longest relationship (approx.)?  
B12. With how many customers do you have long-term 
relationships? 
 
B13. What is the average length of relationship with 
these (B12)? 
 
B14. Total number of customers (approx.)?  
B15. Where in the chain are you positioned?  
Comments to Supply Chain Management: 
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SUPPLY CHAIN INTEGRATION & RISK MANAGEMENT 
SECTION C: SUPPLY CHAIN INTEGRATION 
C1. Do you use ERP system(s)? Yes ? No ? (jump to C3) 
C2. Which system(s)? 
 
 
 
 
C3. Do you exchange EDI/XML documents with 
suppliers and/or customers? 
Yes ? No ? (jump to C6) 
With suppliers ? 
With customers ?
C4. With whom do you exchange electronic 
documents? 
(Please tick all relevant) Other: 
C5. Which document types? 
 
 
 
 
C6. Have you implemented CPFR (collaborative 
planning, forecasting & replenishment)? 
Yes ? No ? (jump to C8) 
C7. Who is participating in CPFR? 
(Relative position in the chain) 
 
 
 
 
C8. How often do you have meetings with each 
supplier?  Do you have a differentiated approach? 
 
 
 
 
C9. How often do you have meetings with each 
customer?  Do you have a differentiated 
approach? 
 
 
 
 
Comments to Supply Chain Integration: 
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SUPPLY CHAIN INTEGRATION & RISK MANAGEMENT 
SECTION D: RISK MANAGEMENT 
D1. Do you actively work with Risk Management ? Yes ? No ? (jump to D4) 
D2. Who is overall responsible? 
 
 
 
 
D3. How often do you have meetings on Risk 
Management ? 
 
D4. Which are the most critical risks in relation to the 
continued survival and development of your 
company? 
1.                                                                  . 
2.                                                                  . 
3.                                                                  . 
4.                                                                  . 
5.                                                                   . 
 
Please place the above listed risks in the matrices below. 
Network level risks 
L
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rg
e
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t 
S
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Low High 
Probability 
Strategic risks 
L
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e
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t 
S
m
a
ll 
  
Low High 
Probability 
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SUPPLY CHAIN INTEGRATION & RISK MANAGEMENT 
SECTION D: RISK MANAGEMENT (CONT’D) 
Operational risks 
L
a
rg
e
   
Im
p
a
c
t 
S
m
a
ll 
  
Low High 
Probability 
Comments to Risk Management: 
Thank you for participating !!! 
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A.9 The Modified Questionnaire 
SUPPLY CHAIN INTEGRATION & RISK MANAGEMENT 
ID:  ___
Agenda 
Section A: Company Profile 
Section B: Supply Chain Management 
Section C: Supply Chain Integration 
Section D: Risk Management 
SECTION A: COMPANY PROFILE 
A1. Which company do you work for? 
 
 
 
 
A2. Your name?  
A3. Your position?  
A4. Your e-mail address?  
A5. Transscript for approval? Yes ? No ? 
Comments: 
Lars B. Sorensen Page 1 of 6 
Dept. of Operations Management 
Copenhagen Business School  
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SUPPLY CHAIN INTEGRATION & RISK MANAGEMENT 
SECTION B: SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT 
B1.  Where in the chain is your company positioned?
- What is it’s role (eg manufacturer)? 
- How many tiers upstream? 
- How many tiers downstream? 
 
B2. Have you implemented SCM ? Yes ? No ? (jump to section C) 
B3a. Do you work process oriented internally? Yes ? No ? (jump to B4) 
B3b. Which processes have you implemented? 
(Refer to these when filling out questions 
below). 
 
 
 
 
B4a.  Proces (eg order 
fulfillment)?  
B4b. External 
participants? 
(Please tick) 
 Indirect Direct Focal Direct Indirect 
 suppliers suppliers company customers customers 
 ? ? ? ? ? 
B4c.  Internal participants 
(eg purchasing)?   
B4d.  Who is formally 
responsible?   
B4e. Comments?  
B5a.  Proces (eg order 
fulfillment)?  
B5b. External 
participants? 
(Please tick) 
 Indirect Direct Focal Direct Indirect 
 suppliers suppliers company customers customers 
 ? ? ? ? ? 
B5c.  Internal participants 
(eg purchasing)?   
B5d.  Who is formally 
responsible?   
B5e. Comments?  
B6a.  Proces (eg order 
fulfillment)?  
B6b. External 
participants? 
(Please tick) 
 Indirect Direct Focal Direct Indirect 
 suppliers suppliers company customers customers 
 ? ? ? ? ? 
B6c.  Internal participants 
(eg purchasing)?   
B6d.  Who is formally 
responsible?   
B6e.  Comments?  
Lars B. Sorensen Page 2 of 6
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SUPPLY CHAIN INTEGRATION & RISK MANAGEMENT 
SECTION B: SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT (CONT’D) 
B7a.  Proces (eg order 
fulfillment)?  
B7b. External 
participants? 
(Please tick) 
 Indirect Direct Focal Direct Indirect 
 suppliers suppliers company customers customers 
 ? ? ? ? ? 
B7c.  Internal participants 
(eg purchasing)?   
B7d.  Who is formally 
responsible?   
B7e. Comments?  
B8a.  Proces (eg order 
fulfillment)?  
B8b. External 
participants? 
(Please tick) 
 Indirect Direct Focal Direct Indirect 
 suppliers suppliers company customers customers 
 ? ? ? ? ? 
B8c.  Internal participants 
(eg purchasing)?   
B8d.  Who is formally 
responsible?   
B8e. Comments?  
B9a.  Proces (eg order 
fulfillment)?  
B9b. External 
participants? 
(Please tick) 
 Indirect Direct Focal Direct Indirect 
 suppliers suppliers company customers customers 
 ? ? ? ? ? 
B9c. Internal participants 
(eg purchasing)?   
B9d. Who is formally 
responsible?   
B9e. Comments?  
Comments to Supply Chain Management: 
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SUPPLY CHAIN INTEGRATION & RISK MANAGEMENT 
SECTION C: SUPPLY CHAIN INTEGRATION 
C1a. Do you use ERP system(s)? Yes ? No ? (jump to C2) 
C1b. Which system(s)? 
 
 
 
 
C2a. Do you exchange EDI/XML documents with 
suppliers and/or customers? 
Yes ? No ? (jump to C3) 
With suppliers ? 
With customers ?
C2b. With whom do you exchange electronic 
documents? 
(Please tick all relevant) Other: 
C2c. Which document types? 
 
 
 
 
C3a. Have you implemented CPFR (collaborative 
planning, forecasting & replenishment)? 
Yes ? No ? (jump to C4) 
C3b. Who is participating in CPFR? 
(Relative position in the chain) 
 
 
 
 
C4a. Have you change routines/procedures in 
cooperation with or on request by external 
parties? 
Yes ? No ? (jump to C5) 
C4b. Which processes/functional areas? 
 
 
 
 
C5. How often do you have meetings with each 
supplier?  Do you have a differentiated 
approach? 
 
 
 
 
C6. How often do you have meetings with each 
customer?  Do you have a differentiated 
approach? 
 
 
 
 
Comments to Supply Chain Integration: 
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SUPPLY CHAIN INTEGRATION & RISK MANAGEMENT 
SECTION D: RISK MANAGEMENT 
D1. Do you actively work with Risk Management? Ja ? Nej ? (jump to D4) 
D2. Who is overall responsible? 
 
 
 
 
D3. How often do you have meetings on Risk 
Management? 
 
D4. Which are the most critical risks in relation to 
the continued survival and development of your 
company? 
1. _________________________________ 
2. _________________________________ 
3. _________________________________ 
4. _________________________________ 
5. _________________________________ 
 
Please place the above listed risks in the matrices below. 
Network level risks 
L
a
rg
e
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p
a
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t 
S
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a
ll 
  
Low High 
Probability 
Strategic risks 
L
a
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e
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a
c
t 
S
m
a
ll 
  
Low High 
Probability 
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SUPPLY CHAIN INTEGRATION & RISK MANAGEMENT 
SECTION D: RISK MANAGEMENT (CONT’D) 
Operational risks 
L
a
rg
e
   
Im
p
a
c
t 
S
m
a
ll 
  
Low High 
Probability 
D5. Which of these risks (if any) can be 
mitigated/reduced by changing practises of SCM 
and integration? 
 
D6. What should be altered? 
 
 
 
 
Comments to Risk Management: 
Thank you for participating !!! 
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Appendix B Consultancy Practice I 
This appendix contains detailed information on consultancy firms’ practices on Supply Chain 
Risk Management (or other integrated risk management frameworks) as of late 2003.  The 
intent is to perform an empirical triangulation over the practices of integrated risk 
management. 
B.1 Consultancies, Contacts, and Interviewees 
The intent of the interviews is to get an idea of the level of interest for and competence within 
Risk Management in Supply Chains.  The list of consultancy firms contacted is based on 
previous knowledge by the researcher, and is not intended to cover all aspects of consultancy 
in Denmark (most major players are included, though).  The table below contains the names 
of consultancy firms, contact persons, and interviewee(s) as well as the result of the request 
for an interview in the initial data collection. 
Table B-1: Companies, Contacts, and Interviewees 
Consultancy Contact Contacted on Result 
 Interviewee(s) Interviewed on 
Accenture Thorbjørn Nielsen 2003-11-07 & 2003-12-04 No reply 
AT Kearney Tine Sørensen 2003-12-08 Not working on SCM20 
Deloitte & Touche Henning Winter 2003-11-10 & 2003-12-04 No reply 
Ernst & Young Otto Winterskov 2003-11-10 & 2003-12-04 No reply 
IBM Consulting Henrik Knak 2003-11-07  
 Henrik Knak & 2003-11-26 (personal) OK! 
 Peter Matthiessen   
KPMG Christian H. Pedersen 2003-11-10 No competence 
KPMG Consulting Stig Due 2003-11-07 Declined the invitation 
Marsh Consulting21 Bjørn Rothaus 2003-11-10  
 Bjørn Rothaus & 2003-11-21 (personal) OK! 
 Christian Boserup   
McKinsey Katrine Lange 2003-11-07 & 2003-12-04 Sent book on SCM 
PwC Leif Christensen 2003-11-11  
 Leif Christensen 2003-11-11 (personal) OK! 
 
B.2 Results 
As can be seen in the table above, most of the companies showed no interest in the subject.  
Only three consultancies agreed to an interview, each of which is described below. 
B.2.1 IBM Consulting 
The interview at IBM Consulting revealed that Supply Chain Risk Management is not a part 
of their services portfolio.  Risk management is a focal component in performing 
                                                 
20  Subsequent contact with AT Kearney revealed that this response was incorrect.  AT Kearney has worked 
with SCM for a number of years and perceives the area as one of the most critically important, see 
Appendix L. 
21  Marsh Consulting is somewhat different from the rest as they are specialized in insurance brokerage and 
consultancy on risk management whereas the rest are general consultancies. 
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(implementation) projects and is supported by an impressive framework containing definition 
of stages, evaluations, grading, and reporting requirements as well as procedures and routines 
for the management of exceptions during implementation. 
As for the content relating to SCM, Peter Matthiessen shared his experiences from his career 
in logistics and SCM, and described how outsourcing and e.g. the implementation of risk 
pooling and inventory monitoring has been implemented in major Danish companies (no 
names disclosed). 
Conceptually the risk management component is present in the models used by IBM, for 
instance in the Supply Chain Insight Framework (SCIF) model which is used to map out 
characteristics of the company and its products, and thereby to identify internal and external 
strengths and weaknesses.  The model is used for evaluating strategic changes in companies 
and therefore has to enable a discussion of risks and potentials.  But, at the end of the 
interview it was concluded that no framework for Supply Chain Risk Management exist 
within IBM Consulting. 
B.2.2 Marsh Consulting 
At Marsh Consulting they claimed to be working on a framework for Supply Chain Risk 
Management.  This work was led by senior consultant Rikke Aarøe Carlsen who 
unfortunately was unavailable at that time22. 
Since Rikke Aarøe Carlsen was not attendant no methods/techniques for Supply Chain Risk 
Management were presented during the interview, but the efforts within Business Continuity 
Management (BCM) were described along some general models for risk management.  The 
models presented reflect viewing the risk management requirements from a functional (or 
departmental) perspective, see Figure B-1 below.  This is not surprising since Marsh’s 
ambitions to perform more than “simple” risk evaluation and insurance brokerage is not 
fulfilled at this time. 
The desire to work on the right hand side of the figure below, instead of the left hand side (as 
today) is supported by research performed by Marsh, which documents that 94% of all losses 
stem from risks located at the right hand side.  Aiming at improving processes and strategies 
are much more beneficial than simply insuring against losses which may be mitigated at 
minimal cost. 
                                                 
22  The claim is supported by articles identified subsequent to the interview.  See e.g. Hauser (2003) or Martha 
& Subbakrishna (2002). 
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Figure B-1: The Four Risk Quartiles23 
Financial
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Strategic
Risks
Hazard
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The method most often used to identify relevant risks in large organizations is questionnaire 
survey.  After identifying employees from all levels and functions (departments) 
questionnaires are sent out and subsequently analyzed for the identification of central risk 
issues.  From this reduced list the further analysis in terms of quantification and perhaps 
prioritizing can continue.  Aggregating this list may result in a “risk overview” containing a 
measure for risk and revenue impact both, see Figure B-2 below. 
Figure B-2: Risk vs. Revenue24 
∆Risk
∆Revenue
A B
CD
 
 
The example used by Bjørn Rothaus and Christian Boserup was that of a multi-division 
corporation, but the classification might be product line, distribution channel etc. instead.  The 
                                                 
23  Source: www.marsh.dk (translated from Danish). 
24  Source: Marsh Consulting. 
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strength of this type of analysis is thereby its generic nature.  It does not, though, address the 
complexity of supply chains.  The aggregation of risk and revenue impacts is another 
weakness but the model surely will highlight “unhealthy” combinations of increased risk and 
decreased revenue. 
B.2.3 PricewaterhouseCoopers 
Interviewing Leif Christensen, partner at PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), spread some light 
on the practice of modern risk management.  Having worked with risk management for some 
years, Leif Christensen describes how the discipline of (business) risk management within 
PwC Consulting has matured over the years.  Sarcastically he describes the former framework 
Risk Intelligence (RI), as defined as the square root of the product of Risk Management (RM) 
and Business Intelligence (BI), that is 
2 * BIRMRI = . 
Evolving from this rather technically oriented data warehousing construct, the concept in use 
today is Enterprise Risk Management (ERM), containing the four primary areas: Finance, IT, 
HR and Facilities, see Figure B-3 below. 
Figure B-3: Enterprise Risk Management25 
Suppliers CustomersERM
Facilities HR
Finance IT
Enterprise Risk Management
 
 
The risk management concept has thereby evolved from a “technical” linkage between 
Business Warehousing and traditional Business Risk Management into a more holistic 
concept, albeit still internally oriented26.  The term ERM is taken from the work performed by 
PwC commissioned by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway 
Commission (COSO). 
                                                 
25  Source: Leif Christensen (PwC). 
26  Different categories but conceptually identical to the ‘four quartiles model’ of Marsh Consulting. 
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The COSO Framework 
Without doubt the most renowned framework within the area27, the (yet not published) report 
defines ERM as follows: 
“Enterprise risk management is a process, effected by an entity’s board of 
directors, management and other personnel, applied in strategy setting and 
across the enterprise, designed to identify potential events that may affect the 
entity, and manage risks to be within its risk appetite, to provide reasonable 
assurance regarding the achievement of entity objectives” 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2004, p. 3).28 
The framework aims at improving risk management practices, and more specifically to: 
? Align risk appetite and strategy 
? Link growth, risk and return 
? Enhance risk response decisions 
? Minimize operational surprises and losses 
? Identify and manage cross-enterprise risks 
? Provide integrated responses to multiple risks 
? Seize opportunities 
? Rationalize capital 
Albeit the list is impressive, the report basically advocates integration of risk management 
practices and emphasizes stringent procedures for risk identification, assessment, and 
management (so: basically the same steps as before). 
The real contribution of the framework is that risks are to be described and analyzed in a 
“portfolio view”, linking the management of risks to the objectives of the enterprise.  Risk 
management is about more than minimizing the costs of disruptions as the efforts are driven 
by strategic objectives.  Figure B-4 below illustrates the well-known process including the 
objectives setting and continual monitoring. 
Unfortunately, more detailed information on how to perform each of steps in the overall risk 
management process is not given, leaving the reader/user of the report in the same tight spot 
as always: how to ensure that the list of risks is complete, the assessment is valid, and risk 
responses appropriate? 
Leif Christensen report that all work performed on projects so far is oriented towards the four 
boxes (the “departmental” categorizations of risk) in Figure B-3 above.  Paradoxically no 
experience with risk identification and assessment in relation to e.g. outsourcing exist even if 
this may very well be the area within which the most urgent need exist.  No proven 
frameworks for this type of boundary spanning risk management exist within PwC, all known 
examples of risk management consulting are characterized by “having a nice chat over 
dinner” type of investigations.  Only from an overall perspective does the “ORCA” 
(Objectives, Risk, Controls, & Alignment) make any sense, but this framework is so generic it 
                                                 
27  This claim is supported by all other interviewees.  
28  Quote taken from an early draft version of the report, supplied by Leif Christensen (PwC).  The final 
version was released in September 2004.  See www.coso.org. 
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does not add any value besides structuring the activities.  The risk identification and 
assessment thereby in its basic nature is extremely subjective as it does not contain any 
tools/techniques to make a precise measure of neither probability nor impact. 
Figure B-4: Components in the COSO Model29 
Internal Environment
Risk Management Philosophy – Risk Culture – Board of Directors –
Integrity and Ethical Values – Commitment to Competence – Management’s Philosophy and
Operating Style – Risk Appetitte – Organizational Structure – Assignment of Authority and
Responsibility – Human Ressource Policies and Practises
Objective Setting
Strategic Objectives – Related Objectives – Selected Objectives – Risk Appetite –
Risk Tolerance
Event Identification
Events – Factors Influencing Strategy and Objectives – Methodologies and Techniques –
Event Interdependencies – Event Categories – Risks and Opportunities
Risk Assessment
Inherent and Residual Risk – Likelihood and Impact – Methodologies and Techniques –
Correlation
Risk Response
Identify Risk Responses – Evaluate Possible Risk Responses – Select Responses –
Portfolio View
Control Activities
Integration with Risk Responses – Types of Control Activities – General Controls –
Application Controls – Entity Specific
Information and Communication
Information – Strategic and Integrated Systems – Communication
Monitoring
Separate Evaluation – Ongoing Evaluations
 
 
Another weakness of the model is the obvious ignorance of external partners: neither 
suppliers nor customers are integrated in the risk identification and assessment, and 
implementation of risk response.  Interestingly, material supplied by Leif Christensen 
describes how supply chain risks relate to the COSO model.  Referencing the SCOR30 
framework, supply chain risks are process risks located at the lowest level in the corporate 
hierarchy, detailing out the findings from the enterprise and business unit levels. 
                                                 
29  Source: Exhibit 2 in PricewaterhouseCoopers(2004) (early draft version), p. 17 (colors removed to improve 
readability). 
30  Supply Chain Operations Reference model.  For more, see www.supply-chain.org. 
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Corporate Governance 
The final criticism concerning the known practices of Risk Management is the absence of any 
real contributions in the Nørby report (Nørby Johansen et al., 2001) on Corporate 
Governance31.  In the report it is repeatedly stated that risk management is critically 
important: 
“Effective risk management is a precondition for the board of directors to 
perform the tasks within its area of responsibility.  It is therefore of essential 
importance that the board of directors ensure that appropriate systems for the 
management of risks are available and fulfill the requirements of the firm at all 
times.  … 
The purpose of risk management is amongst other thing to: 
• develop and retain an understanding in the organization of the 
strategic and operative goals and an ability to identify critical success 
factors, 
• analyze the opportunities for and threats to the realization of 
abovementioned goals, and 
• analyze core activities taking place in the company in order to 
identify relevant risks.” (p. 62, translated) 
No where in the report are more specific guidelines to be found - a waste of a good 
opportunity, according to Leif Christensen32. 
B.3 Conclusion 
Findings are summarized in Table B-2 below. 
Table B-2: Integrated Risk Management Frameworks 
Consultancy Risk Management Framework Implemented? 
Accenture   
AT Kearney   
Deloitte & Touche   
Ernst & Young   
IBM Consulting None N/A 
KPMG (Auditors)   
KPMG Consulting   
Marsh Consulting Business Continuity Management Yes 
 Supply Chain Risk Management (under dev.) No 
McKinsey   
PwC Consulting ERM / COSO Yes 
 
From these scarce and diverse findings it must be concluded that no frameworks for Supply 
Chain Risk Management exist at this time.  The integrated risk management framework 
presented by Leif Christensen (PwC) is a step in the right direction but still pretty far removed 
                                                 
31 See www.corporategovernance.dk. 
32  This sentiment is supported in Hildebrandt (2002), p. 2. 
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the “ideal” of a Supply Chain Risk Management as customers and suppliers are not included.  
The framework under development at Marsh Consulting sounds promising, but time alone 
will tell. 
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Appendix C Performing Literature Studies 
Having planned to perform at least two extensive literature studies, a thorough and 
comprehensive method for the task at hand was required.  Many textbooks on research 
methods reviewed33 emphasize the importance of doing a “critical literature review” in the 
beginning of the research project (e.g. Bell, 1993), albeit warnings on the potential limiting 
effects are found as well (e.g. Bickman & Rog, 1998).  Ghauri et al. (1995) are 
uncharacteristically diverse when stating the purposes of the (critical) literature study are to: 
“(a) frame the problem under scrutiny; 
  (b) identify relevant concepts, methods/techniques and facts; and 
  (c) position the study.” (p. 23). 
Most other text books claim only the first purpose.  In Welman & Kruger (2001) and Bell 
(1993) entire chapters are devoted to “the critical literature review”, whereas e.g. Cooper & 
Schindler (2003), Ghauri et al. (1995), and Bickman & Rog (1998) have only a few pages on 
the subject.  Some authors offer a well-defined process description (e.g. Welman & Kruger, 
2001), while others are less detailed (e.g. Cooper & Schindler, 2003). 
What these more or less conflicting views on literature studies have in common is the 
perception that choosing the right strategy for the literature study is of critical importance as it 
has a definite impact on the research project, the constructs developed, the methods applied, 
and the conclusions arrived at. 
Therefore, this appendix attempts to develop and describe a typology of strategies to choose 
from when performing literature studies. 
C.1 Building a Generic Model 
The first step in doing a literature study is to identify the purpose of the study.  Is the study a 
means to getting an overview over a new domain, is it to introduce the research problem in a 
project application for a Ph.D. position, or is it an attempt to contribute to the academic 
society through the publication of an overview article? 
Depending on the purpose of the study several strategies are available, each having distinct 
characteristics.  Before selecting a strategy, the generic model for designing and performing a 
literature study is presented below. 
C.1.1 Designing the Study 
When designing a literature study the following five questions must be answered: 
? What is the domain (types of and sources for literature)? 
? What are the selection criteria (key words, subjects, authors)? 
? What are the relevance criteria (academic level, “fit” with research question)? 
                                                 
33 Reviewing literature to write a note on reviewing literature!  The method applied: (1) domain = personal 
library plus section 303.4 at the CBS library, (2) selection = availability on September 24th, 2004, (3) 
relevance = the text “literature review” or “literature study” in the index, (4) validity = assumed, (5) 
completed = immediate - no iterations! 
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? What are the validity criteria (methods applied, type of study etc.)? 
? How is “completeness” determined? 
The first two questions define the input to the literature study – enabling the impressive, all-
encompassing overview of the subject in question, or the “introverted” short-listing of the 
critical few major contribution to a specific problem.  The next two questions must be 
answered for each contribution as the literature study progresses.  Irrelevant contributions are 
dropped from the study as well as the contributions deemed insufficiently valid.  The resulting 
set of contributions is thereafter analyzed for completeness – will the set of contributions 
identified meet the expectations of the researcher? 
In the following each of the five steps are described in more detail. 
Step D1 – Define Source 
The ultimate literature study will naturally answer the first question by way of: “All!”.  As 
most researchers are quite busy individuals, there is a tendency to limit the sources of 
literature a bit.  The sources may be limited to the local library and the five most commonly 
used journals within the research area.  Defining the population too narrowly will have 
consequences on the results of the study, whereas defining the population too widely might 
have consequences on the resources required to perform the study.  It is not uncommon to 
iterate back to questions one and/or two after realizing the consequences of these “easy” 
choices. 
Step D2 – Define Selection Criteria 
The selection criteria might be as simple as “all bibliographical material on Wolfgang 
Amadeus Mozart” or more complex as “studies on bacteriology and epidemics in North 
Africa before 1970, or in South America after 1980, but only the studies using clinical data”.  
The former might result in defining the population of sources as a section of the local library 
and a few electronically available journals, whereas the latter might initially define the source 
as scores of medical journals, reports, proceedings from conferences, and a massive body of 
literature in university libraries across the world. 
Step D3 – Define Relevance Criteria 
The relevance criteria has the dual responsibility of on the one hand permitting material to 
progress to the next step in the evaluation phase, and on the other to limit the resources 
needed for evaluation.  In case of the study on Mozart, the researcher might choose to discard 
a children’s book on the composer, as the research is targeted at an academic audience. 
Step D4 – Define Validity Criteria 
The last of the questions which must be answered for the individual contribution is the 
question of validity.  Is the contribution of a type and to a quality that justifies inclusion in the 
literature study?  Are the tools and techniques applied correctly, and is the research design in 
the contribution convincing?  Precisely defining the criteria for validity is often very difficult 
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as (relevant) contributions often span wider in terms of type, methods applied etc. than 
expected initially. 
Step D5 – Define Criteria for “Completeness” 
The resulting set of contributions is evaluated for completeness, which can be based on 
various techniques.  The simplest test is by counting the number of contributions in the 
resulting set, and comparing to (explicit) expectations or similar studies.  Another technique is 
to check whether “famous” contributions are amongst the resulting set.  Within a discipline 
there might exist a number of central contributions which can not be left out.  In case the 
“famous” contributions are not included, they might be referenced in the analysis of the 
results or the literature study can be repeated until the “famous” contributions are present in 
the resulting set.  Finally, a cross-search test can be performed (described in detail later). 
C.1.2 Performing the Study 
Having defined sources and criteria the literature study can be performed. 
Step P1 – Obtain Access to Source 
Before the advent of IT-systems and databases in libraries, getting access to materials 
required considerable effort.  Today getting an overview of material available is a matter of 
using a couple of search engines, and subsequently either reserving or downloading the 
material (if possible). 
Step P2 – List Materials Using Selection Criteria 
Again, making use of the search engines enables the fast creation of overview listings.  In 
case the source is electronically available and key word searching is permittable, the creation 
of lists is almost instantaneous.  Otherwise “manual evaluation” is required – here the search 
engines normally will be able to deliver listings over material (books, journal volumes etc.).  
Completing this step finalizes the (initial) definition of the input material for the study. 
Steps P3 – Evaluate Relevance & P4 – Evaluate Validity 
Each entry in the list generated in step P2 will need to be evaluated in two steps: first for 
relevance and thereafter for validity.  In both cases the criteria are defined and the evaluation 
should be straightforward albeit probably time-consuming. 
Step P5 – Perform Check for “Completeness” 
Depending on the requirements of the study the completeness of the review can be tested.  
Performing either a count of the contributions in the resulting set or check if the famous 
articles are present is quite simple.  The cross-search technique requires a bit more 
explanation.  This method applies to studies on material accessible through search engines, 
e.g. journal articles.  Instead of searching by journal for each database a search can be 
performed using appropriate search terms (e.g. subject area and/or keywords).  If more 
databases are to be used, the results are pooled, and redundancies and matches with the 
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resulting set are removed leaving what might be called the “control set”.  Each contribution 
from this set is evaluated according to definitions in steps three and four, resulting in a set of 
valid contributions not identified in the original literature study.  Three results might come out 
of such a cross-search test: 
1. A low number of identified journals.  This would imply that the literature review has 
been sufficiently complete, and must be accepted. 
2. A large set of articles from other journals (sources).  This result would indicate the 
choice of journals (sources) has been incomplete.  The study might be repeated. 
3. A large set of articles from journals (sources) in the population.  This would imply that 
the relevance and validity criteria have been used inconsistently.  The study will have 
to be performed again on the same sources. 
 
Figure C-1 below illustrates the process of defining and performing a literature study. 
Figure C-1: A Generic Model for Literature Studies 
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The model presented so far is very stringent and forward progressing.  This is naturally not 
the only strategy available. 
C.1.3 A Typology of Strategies 
Depending on the type of research project, and the researcher’s experience with and 
knowledge of the area of research, different strategies might be applied.  In case the 
researcher has previously done work within an area, a quick review of the latest issues of the 
relevant journals might suffice, whereas the researcher entering a new domain might need a 
more thorough analysis of the literature.  Furthermore, the purpose of the study will have an 
impact on the resources available for a literature study.  To accommodate the various 
requirements of researchers, a number of strategies can be identified. 
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The Domain-based Strategy 
The domain-based strategy takes its starting point in a (hopefully) precise definition of what is 
under scrutiny.  This most closely resembles the process described above.  Often this type of 
research will be performed by researchers entering a new domain – or if the purpose of the 
research is to produce an overview article classifying the literature for other researchers’ 
convenience.  The definition of domain might consist of a list of (academic) journals, of an 
index range in the library, a keyword for e-database searches, news databases etc. most often 
combined with a criterion on the date of publication.  Most often (if not always) the date 
criterion will be a result of a trial-and-error process, based on the relevance and the number of 
contributions identified.  Disadvantages of this strategy are that it is quite time-consuming and 
requires a considerable degree of discipline in analyzing and categorizing the contributions.  
Advantages are that the review is complete and that categories match the purpose of the 
research to be performed subsequently.  Except in instances where references are made to 
internet pages which tend to be updated often and archived only in rare cases, the study can be 
repeated at a later time. 
The Trusted-review Strategy 
The trusted-review strategy relies, as indicated by the name, on a review of the subject area 
published by a trusted source, e.g. a highly ranked journal.  Working within an established 
area of research one will often be able to find review articles, describing and classifying the 
contributions identified.  In case the trusted review is quite new and the classifications fit the 
purpose of the research, it will simply be a matter of updating the existing body of knowledge.  
Alternatively it might be necessarily to include more journals, to re-do the analysis to 
accommodate other categories etc.  Even if all the categories conflict with the intended 
framework, the literature study from a trusted source represents a time-saver in terms of 
having identified the contributions. 
The Snow-balling Strategy 
The last strategy to be mentioned here is the snow-balling strategy.  It provides the least 
structured result, thereby delivering the least valid result of the strategies described here.  The 
process of performing a study of this type starts with the identification of at least one article of 
relevance, and then reading the sources referenced.  One of several things might occur from 
this “backtracking”: either the contours of the subject matter is getting clearer in terms of 
keywords, authors active within the field, or perhaps the subject is dropped.  In case the 
subject is not dropped the further search might be performed by keyword search in e-
databases, in the journals identified, by searching for the authors etc.  Using internet-enabled 
tools forward searching is possible as well, perhaps searching in citation databases, personal 
homepages for newer contributions, or other methods not described in detail here. 
 
Combining the five steps with the three strategies might look like Table C-1 below. 
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Table C-1: Strategies Step-by-Step 
Study type 
Step 
Domain-based Trusted-source Snow-balling 
1. Source Domain in question. Trusted source, e.g. review article. 
Not precisely defined, starts 
from e.g. overview article 
or “famous” article on the 
subject. 
2. Selection Dependent on study. All references in trusted source. Not precisely defined. 
3. Relevance “Fit” with purpose of study. “Fit” with purpose of study. “Fit” with purpose of study.
4. Validity The subjective evaluation of the researcher Assumed. 
The subjective evaluation 
of the researcher 
5. Completeness Relevant, probably using the cross-search test. Might be relevant. Not relevant. 
 
C.2 Combining the Strategies 
In reality, it might not be possible to perform a “trusted-source” study without the elements of 
the “snow-balling” strategy.  The trusted source might be outdated, or might have an 
orientation that does not completely cover the domain.  Following the stringent procedure 
outlined in the “domain-based” strategy might be unrealistically time-consuming if applied 
across all source types, therefore the “domain-based” strategy might be applied for selected 
journals and the “snow-balling” strategy for all other sources (books etc.). 
Applying a mixed-strategy approach thereby confuses the requirement for the overall 
literature study, and disqualifies the credibility of the study if not addressed.  One way of 
dealing with the complexity is to report each sub-study separately, and combining the studies 
in a following discussion.  Alternatively, the overall study might be perceived as a study of 
the “snow-balling” type. 
C.3 A Final Word of Caution… 
As mentioned earlier, the choice of strategy will have dependencies to the epistemological 
“stance” in the overall research initiative.  E.g. choosing the domain-based strategy will imply 
the possibility to make firm statements about the object studied, fulfilling an aspiration to 
report the results as a “complete” study.  As for all types of studies the overall criteria is the 
criteria of coherence, choosing the appropriate strategy and defining the desired objectives of 
the study before performing it. 
Furthermore, methods for performing the content analysis and determine relevance and 
validity has not been addressed here.  As this does have a direct impact on the outcomes of the 
study the researcher will have to explain the interplay between criteria and method. 
If these two issues are dealt with, it is the perception of this researcher that the method 
described enables a discussion of the appropriateness of literature studies performed, and 
thereby supports the stringent (albeit tiresome) work of creating a sound foundation for 
research. 
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Appendix D Risk, Vulnerability, and Uncertainty 
This appendix contains the detailed information on the literature study on Risk, Vulnerability, 
and Uncertainty.  Table D-1 below gives the parameters for the study. 
Table D-1: Parameters for Literature Study 
Step Description 
1. Population The list of SCM and logistics journals presented in Chapter 1. 
2. Selection method Browse/read each volume of each journal. 
                & criteria Must relate to risk, uncertainty, or vulnerability. 
3. Relevance Editorials, book reviews, and interviews etc. are ignored. 
4. Validity Should be ensured by the definition of the population. 
5. Completeness check Search the five e-databases (across all journals) for articles having the phrase  
“logistics” or “supply chain” AND the phrase “risk”, “vulnerability”, or 
“uncertainty” in Abstract. 
 
Besides listing the identified articles, each article is described in terms of a number of 
categories, namely Term, Phase, Orientation, Level, Research Method, and Explicit Theory.  
Some of the contributions might not “fit” into one or more of the categories.  In such case this 
will be identified with the symbol “-” in all possible values in the category. 
The category ‘Term’ identifies which of the terms Risk (R), Vulnerability (V), or Uncertainty 
(U) is used in the article. 
The next category, ‘Phase’, refers to the three generic phases in the risk management process: 
Risk Identification (I), Risk Assessment (A), and Risk Management (M). 
The ‘Orientation’ category documents the players in scope in the article, and thereby links the 
study with the holistic view of SCM.  The values in the category are: Upstream (U), Internal 
(I), Downstream (D), and Network (N). 
The strategic level is documented in ‘Level’, taking the values: Strategic (S) and Operational 
(O). 
The last two categories, ‘Research Method’ and ‘Explicit Theory’, should be self-explaining. 
The articles are furthermore grouped into themes for later reference. 
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D.1 Volumes Investigated 
The table below lists the journals and volumes investigated. 
Table D-2: Volumes Investigated 
Area 
 Journal (Abbr.) Period Investigated 
SCM/Logistics 
 EJPSM 1994 [vol 1, no 1] – 2002 [vol 8, no 4] 
 IJL-RA 1999 [vol 2, no 1] – 2004 [vol 7, no 2] 
 IJLM 1998 [vol 9, no 1] – 2003 [vol 14, no 2] 
 IJPDLM 1989 [vol 19, no 1] – 2004 [vol 34, no 5] 
 IJPMM 1971 [vol 7, no 4] – 1998 [vol 34, no 4] 
 JBL 1978 [vol 1, no 1] – 2003 [vol 24, no 2] 
 JPSM 2003 [vol 9, no 1] – 2004 [vol 10, no 2] 
 JSCM 1990 [vol 26, no 4] – 2004 [vol 40, no 2] 
 SCM-IJ 1996 [vol 1, no 1] – 2004 [vol 9, no 2] 
 SCMR 2000 [vol 4, no 1] – 2004 [vol 8, no 4] 
Operations Management 
 I 1971 [vol 1, no 1] – 2004 [vol 34, no 2] 
 IMS 1990 [vol 1, no 1] – 2003 [vol 14, no 8] 
 IJPE 1991 [vol 22, no 1] – 2004 [vol 90, no 2] 
 IJOPM 1980 [vol 1, no 1] – 2004 [vol 24, no 7] 
 JMTM 2004 [vol 15, no 1] – 2004 [vol 15, no 4] 
 JOM 1980 [vol 1, no 1] – 2004 [vol 22, no 4] 
 PIM 1983 [vol 24, no 1] – 2002 [vol 43, no 3/4] 
 POM 1999 [vol 8, no 1] – 2003 [vol 12, no 4] 
 PPC 1990 [vol 1, no 1] – 2004 [vol 15, no 3] 
Management 
 CMR 1980 [vol 22, no 1] – 2004 [vol 46, no 3] 
 DS 1985 [vol 16, no 1] – 2004 [vol 35, no 2] 
 EMJ 1982 [vol 1, no 1] – 2004 [vol 22, no 3] 
 HBR 1990 [vol 68, no 1] –  2004 [vol 82, no 7/8] 
 IMM 1985 [vol 14, no 1] – 2004 [vol 33, no 5] 
 JOcB 1980 [vol 1, no 1] – 1987 [vol 8, no 4] 
 JOrB 1988 [vol 9, no 1] –  2004 [vol 25, no 5] 
 SJM 1988 [vol 4, no 1] –  2003 [vol 19, no 4] 
 SMR 1970 [vol 12, no 1] – 2004 [vol 45, no 3] 
 
D.2 SCM/Logistics Journals 
Table D-3: Classification of Articles Published in SCM/Logistics Journals 
Journal Term   Phase   Orientation  Level Research Explicit 
 No Author(s) R V U I A M U I D N S O Method Theory 
EJPSM 
 1. Ottesen & Gronhaug, 2002   U   M U    S  Case study None 
IJLM 
 2. Ho & Carter, 1994   U - - -  I    O None None 
 3. Sheffi, 2001   U   M U  D  S  None Utility 
IJL-RA 
 4. Svensson, 2001  V    M U  D   O Survey Mkt. Chan. 
 5. Svensson, 2002c  V   A  U  D   O Survey Mkt. Chan. 
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Table D-3 (cont’d) 
Journal Term   Phase   Orientation  Level Research Explicit 
 No Author(s) R V U I A M U I D N S O Method Theory 
IJPDLM 
 6. Boronico & Bland, 1996   U - - -  I    O Math. mod. None 
 7. Cavinato, 2004 R   - - -    N S  None None 
 8. Christopher & Lee, 2004 R     M    N S  None None 
 9. Koutsoukis et al., 2000   U - - - U I D   O Math. mod. None 
 10. Norrman & Jansson, 2004 R   I A M U I   S  Case study None 
 11. Spekman & Davis, 2004 R   I      N S  None None 
 12. Svensson, 2000  V   A  U  D   O Case study Mkt. Chan. 
 13. Svensson, 2002a  V   A  U  D   O Survey Mkt. Chan. 
 14. Svensson, 2002b  V   A  U  D   O Survey Mkt. Chan. 
 15. Talluri, Cetin, & Gardner, 2004   U - - -  I    O Math. mod. None 
 16. van der Horst & Beulens, 2002   U I   U     O None None 
 17. Wilding, 1998a   U I   U  D   O None Chaos 
 18. Zsidisin et al., 2004 R    A  U     O Case study Agency 
IJPMM 
 19. Carter, Vickery, & D'Itri, 1993 R     M U     O Simulation None 
 20. Pilling & Zhang, 1992 R   I   U    S  Case study None 
 21. Smeltzer & Siferd, 1998 R   - - - U     O Case study TCE, RBT 
 22. Templin & Noffsinger, 1994 R    A  U     O Survey None 
 23. Tullous & Munson, 1991   U - - - U     O Survey None 
JBL 
 24. Copacino & Lapide, 1984   U - - - U  D   O Math. mod. None 
 25. Lau, 1989   U - - -  I    O Math. mod None 
 26. Menachof, 1996 R     M - - - -  O Simulation None 
 27. Meshkat & Ballou, 1996   U - - -  I    O Math. mod. None 
 28. Schwarz & Weng, 2000   U - - - U  D   O Math. mod. None 
 29. Speh & Wagenheim, 1978   U - - -   D   O Math. mod. None 
 30. Vidal & Goetschalkx, 2000   U - - -    N  O Math. mod. None 
 31. Wood, 1985 R    A  - - - -  O Math. mod. None 
 32. Zinszer, 1983 R    A   I    O Math. mod. None 
JPSM 
 33. Harland, Brenchley, & Walker, 2003 R    A M U  D  S  Case study None 
 34. Zsidisin, 2003a R   - - - U    - - Case study None 
JSCM 
 35. Zsidisin, 2003b R   I A  U     O Case study None 
 36. Zsidisin & Ellram, 2003 R     M U    S  Survey Agency 
SCM-IJ 
 37. Finch, 2004 R    A  U  D  S  Case study None 
 38. Lonsdale, 1999 R    A M U    S  Case study RBT 
 39. Sinha, Whitman, & Malzahn, 2004 R     M U    S  None SCOR* 
 40. Svensson, 2002d  V  - - - U  D  S  Survey Mkt. Chan. 
 41. Zsidisin, Panelli, & Upton, 2000 R    A M U    S  Survey None 
SCMR 
 42. Geary, Childerhouse, & Towill, 2002 
     U   M U I D  S  Case study None 
 43. Hauser, 2003 R   I A M    N S  Case study None 
 44. Lee & Wolfe, 2003 R     M U  D  S  None TQM* 
 45. Martha & Subbakrishna, 2002   U   M U    S  None None 
 46. Rice & Caniato, 2003 R     M U I D  S  None None 
 47. Simchi-Levi, Snyder, & Watson, 2002 
     U   M U    S  None None 
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Table D-4: Themes Identified in SCM/Logistics Journals 
Theme Article No 
Improving Operations under Uncertainty 1-2, 6, 9, 15, 24-25, 27-29, 32 
Pricing 24, 26, 31 
Risk Management in the Supply Chain 7-8, 10-11, 37, 43 
Securing the Supply Chain 3, 44-47 
Supply Chain Design 16, 30, 38-39, 42-43, 46 
Supply Management 1, 6, 10, 18, 21-23, 33-36, 38-39, 41 
Vulnerability in Physical Flows 4-5, 12-14, 40 
- none - 17, 19-20 
 
D.3 Operations Management Journals 
Table D-5: Classification of Articles Published in Operations Management Journals 
Journal Term   Phase   Orientation  Level Research Explicit 
 No Author(s) R V U I A M U I D N S O Method Theory 
I 
 48. Boodman, 1987 R     M U I D  S  None None 
 49. Brown, 1981   U - - - - - - - - - None Decision 
 50. Davidson & Cooper, 1980 R    A   I    O Case study None 
 51. Hoffman, 1982 R    A   I    O Math. mod. None 
 52. Merrick et al., 2002 R   I A  - - - -  O Simulation None 
 53. Paté-Cornell & Fischbeck, 1994 R    A   I    O Math. mod. None 
 54. Swoveland, 1987 R    A   I    O Case study None 
 55. Walker, 1988 R     M U    S  Case study RBT, TCE 
IJOPM 
 56. Adams & Walbank, 1983 R   - - -  I    O Survey None 
 57. Baker, 1986   U - - -  I    O Math. mod. None 
 58. Callarman & Hamrin, 1984   U - - -  I D   O Math. mod. None 
 59. Cousins, Lamming, & Bowen, 2004 R   - - - U    S  None None 
 60. Newman, Hanna, & Maffei, 1993   U - - -  I   S  None None 
 61. Wright, 1980 R     M U    S  None None 
IJPE 
 62. Agrell, Lindroth, & Norrman, 2004 R    A M    N S  Math. mod. Agency 
 63. Albino & Garavelli, 1995  V   A  U  D   O Math. mod. None 
 64. Bartezzaghi & Verganti, 1995b   U - - -   D   O Math. mod. None 
 65. Bartezzaghi, Verganti, & Zotteri, 1999 
     U - - -  I    O Math. mod. None 
 66. Blanchini, Rinaldi, & Ukovich, 1996   U - - -    N  O Math. mod. None 
 67. Dolgui & Ould-Louly, 2002   U - - -  I    O Math. mod. None 
 68. Gong & Sun, 1995   U - - -  I    O Math. mod. None 
 69. Gupta, Gerchak, & Buzacott, 1992   U - - -  I    O Math. mod. None 
 70. Güllü, Ônol, & Erkip, 1999   U - - - U     O Math. mod. None 
 71. Hallikas, Virolainen, & Tuominen, 2002 
   R    A  U  D  S  Case study None 
 72. Hallikas et al., 2004 R   I A M    N S  Case study TCE 
 73. Jang & Liu, 1993   U - - -  I D   O Math. mod. None 
 74. Jeunet & Jonard, 2000   U - - - U     O Math. mod. None 
 75. Johansen, 1999   U - - -   D   O Math. mod. None 
 76. Kelle & Miller, 2001 R   - - - U     O Math. mod. None 
 77. Korpela et al., 2002 R    A    D  S  Math. mod. None 
 78. Lau, Lau, & Willett, 2000   U - - -   D   O Math. mod. None 
 79. Lefley, 1997 R   - - -  I   - - None None 
 80. Link & Marxt, 2004 R   I A M - - - - S  None None 
 81. Matsuura, Tsubone, & Kataoka, 1995 
     U - - -  I    O Math. mod. None 
 82. Mohebbi, 2004   U - - - U     O Math. mod. None 
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Table D-5 (cont’d) 
Journal Term   Phase   Orientation  Level Research Explicit 
 No Author(s) R V U I A M U I D N S O Method Theory 
 83. Muntslag, 1994 R    A   I    O Math. mod. None 
 84. Murthy & Ma, 1991   U - - -  I    O None None 
 85. Petrovic, 2001   U - - -    N  O Simulation None 
 86. Petrovic & Petrovic, 2001   U - - -  I    O Math. mod. None 
 87. Tang & Grubbström, 2002   U - - -  I    O Math. mod. None 
 88. van der Vaart, de Vries, & Wijngaard, 1996 
     U - - - U     O Case study None 
 89. van Dorp & Duffey, 1999 R   - - -  I    O Simulation None 
 90. Vörös, 1999 R   - - -  I    O Math. mod. None 
 91. Weng, 1999   U - - -   D   O Math. mod. None 
 92. Zaidman, 1994  V  - - -   D   O Math. mod. None 
 93. Zimmer, 2002   U - - - U     O Math. mod. None 
 94. Zäpfel, 1996   U - - -  I    O Math. mod. None 
IMS 
  - None -               
JMTM 
  - None -               
JOM 
 95. Callen & Sarath, 1995 R   - - -  I    O Math. mod. None 
 96. Denzler, Boe, & Duplaga, 1987   U - - -  I    O Simulation None 
 97. Etienne, 1987   U - - - U I    O Math. mod. None 
 98. Hill & Vollmann, 1986   U - - - U     O Math. mod. None 
 99. Kadipasaoglu & Sridharan, 1995   U - - - U I    O Simulation None 
 100. Lewis, 2003 R   - - -  I    O None None 
 101. Pagell & Krause, 1999   U - - -  I    O None None 
 102. Schmitt, 1984   U - - -  I    O Math. mod. None 
 103. Treleven & Schweikhart, 1988 R    A  U    S  None None 
 104. Zhao & Lee, 1993   U - - -  I    O Simulation None 
PIM 
 105. Allen & Schuster, 2000 R     M  I    O Math. mod. None 
 106. Chapman, 1992 R   - - -  I    O None None 
 107. Finch & Luebbe, 1991 R   - - - - - - - - - Math. mod. None 
 108. Pagell et al., 2000   U - - -  I   S  Case study None 
POM 
 109. Kanyamibwa & Ord, 2000   U - - - - - - -  O Math. mod. None 
PPC 
 110. Akomode, Lees, & Irgens, 1999 R    A   I    O Math. mod. None 
 111. Bartezzaghi & Verganti, 1995a   U - - -  I    O Math. mod. None 
 112. Caputo, 1996   U - - -  I    O None None 
 113. Filho, 1999   U - - -  I    O Math. mod. None 
 114. Guide Jr & Srivastava, 2000   U - - -  I    O None None 
 115. Hegstad, 1990 R   - - -  I    O Case study None 
 116. Jörnsten & Leisten, 1994   U - - -  I    O Math. mod. None 
 117. Koh & Saad, 2003   U I    I    O Survey/sim. None 
 118. McGaughey & Gunasekaran, 1999 R   I   U I   S  None None 
 119. Sundararaj et al., 2000 R     M  I    O Case study None 
 120. Zotteri, 2000   U - - -  I    O Simulation None 
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Table D-6: Themes Identified in Operations Management Journals 
Theme Article No 
Improving Operations under Uncertainty 51, 57, 60, 63, 65-66, 68-70, 73-76, 78, 81-82, 85-86, 88-91, 93, 99, 
 104-106, 108, 112-113, 116, 119-120 
MRP/IT and Uncertainty 58, 64, 67, 84, 87, 94, 96-97, 102, 111, 114, 117 
Pricing / Investment 79, 83, 95 
Risk Management in the Supply Chain 71-72, 80 
Supply Chain Design 60, 62, 69, 77, 103 
Supply Management 55, 59, 61, 71-72, 98, 103 
- none - 48-50, 52-54, 56, 92, 100-101, 107, 109-110, 115, 118 
 
D.4 Management Journals 
Table D-7: Classification of Articles Published in Management Journals 
Journal Term   Phase   Orientation  Level Research Explicit 
 No Author(s) R V U I A M U I D N S O Method Theory 
CMR 
 121. Grabowski & Roberts, 1997 R     M    N S  Case study None 
 122. Johnson, 2001 R     M U  D  S  Case study None 
 123. Lee, 2002   U   M U  D  S  None None 
DS 
 124. Arcelus, Pakkala, & Srinivasan, 2002 
   R     M U     O Math. mod. None 
 125. Ballestero, 2002   U - - - - - - -  O Math. mod. Decision 
 126. Ballou & Pazer, 1987   U - - -  I    O None None 
 127. Chopra, Reinhardt, & Dada, 2004   U - - - - - - -  O Math. mod. None 
 128. Christy & Kanet, 1988   U - - -  I    O Simulation None 
 129. Dillinger, Stein, & Mizzi, 1992 R   - - - - - - -  O None Decision 
 130. Ghosh & Ray, 1992 R   - - - - - - -  O Math. mod. Decision 
 131. Ghosh & Ray, 1997 R   - - - - - - -  O Math. mod. Decision 
 132. Ghosh, 1994 R   - - - - - - -  O Math. mod. Decision 
 133. Graves & Ringuest, 1991 R   - - - U I    O None None 
 134. Havlena & DeSarbo, 1991 R   - - - - - - -  O Survey None 
 135. Krueger & Dickson, 1994 R   - - - - - - -  O Survey Utility 
 136. Lee, 1997 R   - - - - - - -  O Case study Prospect 
 137. Lin & Krajewski, 1992   U - - -  I    O Math. mod. None 
 138. Marshall & Narasimhan, 1989 R   - - - - - - -  O Math. mod. Decision 
 139. Noori & Keller, 1986   U - - -  I    O None None 
 140. Sridharan & Berry, 1990   U - - -  I    O Simulation None 
 141. Wallace, Keil, & Rai, 2004 R   I A   I    O Survey Socio-sys. 
 142. Wedel & DeSarbo, 1993 R   - - - - - - -  O Simulation Decision 
EMJ 
 143. Braithwaite, 1989 R     M  I   S  None None 
 144. Collis, 1992   U   M  I   S  None Strat. mgt. 
 145. Drottz-Sjöberg, 1991 R   - - - - - - - - - Survey None 
 146. Gelber, 1986 R    A M  I    O None None 
 147. McHugh & Wilson, 1987 R     M  I   S  None None 
 148. Niebling & Shubik, 1982 R    A  - - - - S  None None 
 149. Noy & Ellis, 2003 R     M  I   S  Survey Strat. mgt. 
 150. Stambaugh, 1996 R    A   I   S  None None 
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Table D-7 (cont’d) 
Journal Term   Phase   Orientation  Level Research Explicit 
 No Author(s) R V U I A M U I D N S O Method Theory 
HBR 
 151. Bernstein, 1996 R   - - - - - - - - - None None 
 152. Fisher et al., 1994   U - - - - - - - - - Case study None 
 153. Froot, Scharfstein, & Stein, 1994 R     M  I    O Case study None 
 154. Groysberg, Nanda, & Nohria, 2004 R   - - - - - - - - - None None 
 155. Hecht & Morici, 1993 R   - - - - - - - - - None None 
 156. Sells, 1994 R   - - - - - - - - - Case study None 
 157. Simons, 1999 R   I A   I   S  None None 
 158. Watkins & Bazerman, 2003  V    M - - - - S  None None 
IMM 
 159. Bunn & Liu, 1996 R   I     D   O Survey None 
 160. Henthorne, LaTour, & Williams, 1993 R   I A   I    O Survey None 
 161. Hunter et al., 2004 R   - - - U I    O None None 
 162. Meldrum & Millman, 1991 R   I     D  S  Case study None 
 163. Polk, Plank, & Reid, 1996 R    A    D   O Survey None 
 164. Schill, 1985 R     M U  D  S  Math. mod. None 
 165. Westbrook, 1996 R   - - -   D   O None None 
JOcB 
 166. Clegg & Fitter, 1981   U - - -  I    O Case study Organiz. 
JOrB 
  - None -               
SJM 
  - None -               
SMR 
 167. Allaire & Firsirotsu, 1989 R     M  I   S  None None 
 168. Bowman, 1980 R   - - -  I   S  Case study Finance 
 169. Bowman, 1982 R   - - -  I   S  Case study Finance 
 170. Clemons, 1995 R   - - -  I   S  None None 
 171. Cozzolino, 1979 R    A  - - - -  O Math. mod. None 
 172. Davis, 1993   U   M    N S  Case study None 
 173. Ghemawat, 1993 R   - - -  I   S  None None 
 174. Hertz & Thomas, 1983 R    A   I   S  Math. mod. None 
 175. Marsh & Swanson, 1984 R    A   I   S  None Finance 
 176. Quelch, Neslin, & Olson, 1987 R        D  S  None None 
 
Table D-8: Themes Identified in Management Journals 
Theme Article No 
Decision Making 125, 129-132, 134-136, 138, 142, 171 
Improving Operations under Uncertainty 127-128, 133, 139 
MRP/IT and Uncertainty 137, 140 
New Product Introduction 162-163, 174 
Pricing / Investment 124, 146, 150, 153, 164, 168-169, 173, 175 
Risk and Strategy 143-144, 147-149, 167 
Risk Management in the Supply Chain 121-122, 172 
Supply Chain Design 122-123, 172 
Supply Management 159-161, 165 
- none - 126, 141, 145, 151-152, 154-158, 166, 170, 176 
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D.5 Completeness Check (Cross-database Search) 
Table D-9: Classification of Articles Published in Other Journals 
 Term   Phase   Orientation  Level Research Explicit 
 No Author(s) R V U I A M U I D N S O Method Theory 
 177. Agrawal & Seshadri, 2000 R     M U     O Math. mod. None 
 178. Bensaou & Anderson, 1999 R   - - - U    S  Case study TCE, RBT 
 179. Bowersox, Stank, & Daugherty, 1999 R     M   D   O None None 
 180. Escudero et al., 1999   U - - -  I D   O Math. mod. None 
 181. Grabowski & Roberts, 1999 R     M    N S  None None 
 182. Kouvelis & Milner, 2002   U - - - U  D  S  Math. mod. None 
 183. Nooteboom, Berger, & Noorderhaven, 1997 
   R    A  U  D  S  Survey TCE 
 184. Ritchie & Brindley, 2000 R     M U  D  S  None None 
 185. Sabri & Beamon, 2000   U - - -    N S  Math. mod. None 
 186. Sharratt & Choong, 2002 R    A     N  O None None 
 187. Tsay, 1999   U - - -   D   O Math. Mod. None 
 188. van der Horst et al., 1998   U - - -  I D   O Case study None 
 189. van Mieghem, 1999   U - - - U     O Math. mod. None 
 
D.6 Themes on Risk, Uncertainty, and Vulnerability 
Table D-10: Themes Identified Across Journal Categories 
Theme Article No 
Decision Making 125, 129-132, 134-136, 138, 142, 171, 182, 187 
Improving Operations under Uncertainty 1, 6, 9, 15, 24-25, 27-29, 32, 51, 57, 60, 63, 65-66, 68-70, 73-76, 78, 
 81-82, 85-86, 88-91, 93, 99, 104-106, 108, 112-113, 116, 119-120, 
 127-128, 133, 139, 177, 180, 185, 188 
MRP/IT and Uncertainty 2, 58, 64, 67, 84, 87, 94, 96-97, 102, 111, 114, 117, 137, 140 
New Product Introduction 162-163, 174, 179 
Pricing/Financial Instruments 24, 26, 31, 79, 83, 95, 124, 146, 150, 153, 164, 168-169, 173, 175, 189 
Risk and Strategy 143-144, 147-149, 167, 178 
Risk Management in the Supply Chain 7-8, 10-11, 37, 43, 71-72, 80, 121-122, 172 
Securing the Supply Chain 3, 44-47 
Supply Chain Design 16, 30, 38-39, 42-43, 46, 60, 62, 69, 77, 103, 122-123, 172, 181-182, 
 184-185 
Supply Management 1, 6, 10, 18, 21-23, 33-36, 38-39, 41, 55, 59, 61, 71-72, 98, 103, 
 159-161, 165 
Vulnerability in Physical Flows 4-5, 12-14, 40 
- none - 17, 19-20, 48-50, 52-54, 56, 92, 100-101, 107, 109-110, 115, 118, 
 126, 141, 145, 151-152, 154-158, 166, 170, 176, 183, 186 
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Appendix E SCM/Logistics in the Risk Domain 
This appendix contains the detailed information on the literature study on SCM and Logistics 
within the Risk domain.  The table below gives the parameters for the study. 
Table E-1: Parameters for Literature Study 
Step Description 
1. Population The list of risk management journals presented in Chapter 1. 
2. Selection method Browse/read each volume of each journal. 
                & criteria Must relate to logistics and/or SCM. 
3. Relevance Editorials, book reviews and interviews are ignored. 
4. Validity Should be ensured by the definition of the population. 
5. Completeness check E-search for articles having “Supply Chain Management” or “Logistics” in Abstract. 
 The search is performed in the listed journals only.  
 
Besides listing the identified articles, each article is described in terms of a number of 
categories, namely Orientation, Level, Research Method, and Explicit Theory. 
The Orientation category documents the players in scope in the article, and thereby links the 
study with the holistic view of SCM.  The values in the category are: Upstream (U), Internal 
(I), Downstream (D), and Network (N) (also in this category more than one value is possible).   
The strategic level is documented in ‘Level’, taking the values: Strategic (S) and Operational 
(O). 
The last two categories, Research Method and Explicit Theory, should be self-explaining. 
E.1 Volumes Investigated 
The table below lists the journals and volumes investigated. 
Table E-2: Volumes Investigated 
Area 
 Journal (Abbr.) Period Investigated 
Risk 
 JR 1998 [vol 1, no 1] – 2004 [vol 6, no 4] 
 JRI 1990 [vol 57, no 1] – 2004 [vol 71, no 3] 
 JRR 1998 [vol 1, no 1] – 2004 [vol 7, no 2] 
 JRU 1992 [vol 5, no 1] – 2004 [vol 29, no 2] 
 RA-IJ 1981 [vol 1, no 1] – 2004 [vol 24, no 4] 
 RM 1979 [vol 26, no 8] – 2004 [vol 51, no 8] 
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E.2 Risk Journals 
Table E-3: Classification of Articles Published in Risk Journals 
Journal    Orientation     Level Research Explicit 
 No Author(s) U I D N S O Method Theory 
JR 
  - None -        
JRI 
  - None -        
JRR 
  - None -        
JRU 
  - None -        
RA-IJ 
 1. Erkut & Verter, 1995 U  D   O Modelling None 
 2. Hubert & Pages, 1989 U  D   O Case study None 
 3. Meslin, 1981  U  D   O Case study None 
 4. Saccomanno & Haastrup, 2002 U  D   O Modelling None 
RM 
 5. Clark & McGinn, 1997 U  D   O None None 
 6. Darling, 1996 U  D   O None None 
 
Table E-4: Themes Identified in Risk Journals 
Theme Article No 
Transportation 1-6 
 
E.3 Completeness Check (Within Journal Search) 
Table E-5: Classification of Articles Published in Other Journals 
    Orientation     Level Research Explicit 
 No Author(s) U I D N S O Method Theory 
 - None-         
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Appendix F Supply Chain Design 
This appendix contains the detailed information on the literature study on Supply Chain 
Design.  The table below gives the parameters for the study. 
Table F-1: Parameters for Literature Study 
Step Description 
1. Population Volumes of the journals presented in Chapter 1 available electronically. 
2. Selection method Search for articles for each journal in the population via web-browser. 
                & criteria Identify all articles with “Supply” and “Chain” and “Design” in Abstract. 
3. Relevance All identified articles are included.  Each article is subsequently evaluated based 
 on it’s contribution to design of processes and structure. 
4. Validity Should be ensured by the definition of the population. 
5. Completeness check Search the five e-databases (across all journals) for articles having “Supply” and 
 “Chain” and “Design” in Keyword34. 
 
Besides listing the identified articles, each article is described in terms of a number of 
categories, namely ‘Relevance’, ‘Design Object’, ‘Orientation’, ‘Research Method’, and 
‘Explicit Theory’. 
The ‘Relevance’ category describes whether the article deals with Supply Chain Design.  
Articles on methodology, editorials, book reviews, and articles on sub-disciplines (e.g. reverse 
logistics, or decision making) are classified ‘Not relevant’ in this study. 
The category ’Design Object’ makes reference to Systems Theory as the design object might 
be Structure (S) and/or Process (P). 
The ‘Orientation’ category documents the players in scope in the article, and thereby links the 
study with the holistic view of SCM.  The values in the category are: Upstream (U), Internal 
(I), Downstream (D), and Network (N) (also in this category more than one value is possible).   
The last two categories, ‘Research Method’ and ‘Explicit Theory’, should be self-explaining. 
 
Table F-2 on the next page contains the list of journals and volumes investigated.  The 
following tables contain the identified articles.  Subsequently, the articles are classified 
according to ‘Subject Area’ and ‘Design Objective(s)’. 
                                                 
34  In databases not supporting keyword searching (ABI-INFORM and JSTOR), abstracts are searched for the 
text string ‘Supply Chain Design’ instead. 
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F.1 Volumes Investigated 
The table below lists the journals and volumes investigated. 
Table F-2: Volumes Investigated 
Area Journal (Abbreviation) Period Investigated  
SCM/Logistics 
 EJPSM 1996 [vol 2, no 1] – 2002 [vol 8, no 4] 
 IJLM 1998 [vol 9, no 1] – 2004 [vol 15, no 2] 
 IJL-RA 1999 [vol 2, no 1] – 2004 [vol 7, no 1] 
 IJPDLM 1992 [vol 22, no 1] – 2005 [vol 35, no 2] 
 IJPMM 1990 [vol 26, no 4] – 1998 [vol 34, no 4] 
 JBL 1978 [vol 1, no 1] – 2005 [vol 26, no 1] 
 JPSM 2003 [vol 9, no 1] – 2004 [vol 10, no 4-5] 
 JSCM 1990 [vol 26, no 4] – 2004 [vol 41, no 1] 
 SCM-IJ 1996 [vol 1, no 1] – 2005 [vol 10, no 1] 
 SCMR 2000 [vol 4, no 1] – 2005 [vol 9, no 2] 
Operations Management 
 I 1971 [vol 1, no 1] – 2004 [vol 34, no 2] 
 IJOPM 1980 [vol 1, no 1] – 2005 [vol 25, no 4] 
 IJPE 1991 [vol 22, no 1] – 2004 [vol 96, no 2] 
 IMS 1992 [vol 3, no 1] – 2003 [vol 14, no 6] 
 JMTM 2004 [vol 15, no 1] – 2005 [vol 16, no 3] 
 JOM 1980 [vol 1, no 1] – 2005 [vol 23, no 3/4] 
 PIM 1983 [vol 24, no 1] – 2002 [vol 43, no 3/4] 
 POM 1997 [vol 6, no 2] – 2004 [vol 13, no 3] 
 PPC 1990 [vol 1, no 1] – 2004 [vol 15, no 3] 
Management 
 CMR 1958 [vol 1, no 1] – 2005 [vol 47, no 2] 
 DS 1988 [vol 19, no 1] – 2005 [vol 36, no 1] 
 EMJ 1988 [vol 6, no 1] – 2004 [vol 22, no 6] 
 HBR 1922 [vol 1, no 1] –  2005 [vol 83, no 4] 
 IMM 1971 [vol 1, no 1] – 2005 [vol 34, no 2] 
 JOcB 1980 [vol 1, no 1] – 1987 [vol 8, no 4] 
 JOrB 1988 [vol 9, no 1] –  1998 [vol 18, no 7] 
 SJM 1988 [vol 4, no 1-2] –  2004 [vol 20, no 4] 
 SMR 1970 [vol 12, no 1] – 2004 [vol 46, no 1 (supp.)] 
 
F.2 SCM/Logistics Journals 
Table F-3: Classification of Articles Published in SCM/Logistics Journals 
Journal Rele-  Design    Orientation Research Explicit 
 No Author(s) vance S P U I D N Method Theory 
EJPSM 
  - None -          
IJLM 
 1. Anderson & Katz, 1998 ? S  U    None None 
 2. Christopher & Towill, 2002 ? S     N Case study None 
 3. Claycomb, Droge, & Germain, 1999 ?         
 4. Hewitt, 1994 ?  P  I  N Case study None 
 5. Payne & Peters, 2004 ? S     N Case study None 
 6. van der Horst, van Dijk, & Beulens, 2001 ?  P    N Case study None 
 7. van Hoek & Weken, 1998 ? S P U I   Case study None 
 8. Wilding, 1998b ? S P  I  N None Chaos 
 9. Wouters, Sharman, & Wortmann, 1999 ?  P    N Case study None 
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Table F-3 (cont’d) 
Journal Rele-  Design    Orientation Research Explicit 
 No Author(s) vance S P U I D N Method Theory 
IJL-RA 
 10. Forza, Romano, & Vinelli, 2000 ?         
 11. Larson & Gammelgaard, 2001 ?         
 12. McGovern, Hicks, & Earl, 1999 ?         
 13. Towill & Christopher, 2002 ?         
 14. van der Horst & Beulens, 1999 ?         
 15. Zografos & Giannouli, 2001 ?         
IJPDLM 
 16. Anumba, Siemieniuch, & Sinclair, 2000 ?         
 17. Auramo, Kauremaa, & Tanskanen, 2005 ?         
 18. Christiaanse & Kumar, 2000 ? S P    N None TCE 
 19. Christopher & Towill, 2001 ? S P    N None None 
 20. Dumond, 1996 ?         
 21. Elliman & Orange, 2000 ?         
 22. Farris II, Wittmann, & Hasty, 2005 ?         
 23. Giddings, Bailey, & Moore, 2001 ?         
 24. Graham & Hardaker, 2000 ?         
 25. Jayaram, Vickery, & Droge, 2000 ?         
 26. Klevås, 2005 ?         
 27. Lau & Lee, 2000 ?         
 28. Lehtonen, Småros, & Holmström, 2005 ?         
 29. Mason et al., 2002 ? S     N None None 
 30. Mollenkopf & Dapiran, 2005 ?         
 31. Mourits & Evers, 1995 ?         
 32. Nynke Faber, de Koster, & van de Velde, 2002         
   ?         
 33. Sarkis & Sundarraj, 2000 ?         
 34. Shore & Venkatachalam, 2003 ?         
 35. Simatupang & Sridharan, 2005 ?         
 36. Towill, Naim, & Wikner, 1992 ?         
IJPMM 
 37. Carter & Hendrick, 1997 ?         
 38. Walton, Handfield, & Melnyk, 1998 ?         
JBL 
 39. Schwarz & Weng, 2000 ?         
 40. van Hoek, Commandeur, & Vos, 1998 ?  P  I D  Case study None 
 41. Vidal & Goetschalkx, 2000 ?         
JPSM 
  - None -          
JSCM 
 42. Carter & Ellram, 2003 ?         
 43. Hallenbeck Jr., Hautaluoma, & Bates, 1999 ?         
 44. Talluri & Ragatz, 2004 ?         
 45. Trent, 2004 ?         
 46. Vonderembse & Tracey, 1999 ?         
SCM-IJ 
 47. Brunnermeier & Martin, 2002 ?         
 48. Chandra & Kumar, 2000 ?  P  I   Case study None 
 49. Childerhouse et al., 2003 ?         
 50. Hammel, Kuettner, & Phelps, 2002 ? S     N Case study None 
 51. Hamprecht et al., 2005 ?         
 52. Hoole, 2005 ?         
 53. Huan, Sheoran, & Wang, 2004 ?         
 54. James, Grosvenor, & Prickett, 2004 ?         
 55. Kwon & Suh, 2005 ?         
 56. Li et al., 2005 ?         
 57. Love, Irani, & Edwards, 2004 ?         
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Table F-3 (cont’d) 
Journal Rele-  Design    Orientation Research Explicit 
 No Author(s) vance S P U I D N Method Theory 
 58. McIvor, 2000 ? S  U I   None TCE, RBT 
 59. McIvor, 2003 ? S  U I   Case study TCE 
 60. Nollet & Beaulieu, 2005 ?         
 61. Preiss & Murray, 2005 ?         
 62. Samaranayake, 2005 ?         
 63. Sinha, Whitman, & Malzahn, 2004 ?         
 64. Towill, 1996 ?  P  I  N Modeling None 
 65. Tracey & Tan, 2001 ?         
 66. Wilson & Clarke, 1998 ?         
 67. Zeng, 2003 ? S  U I   Case study None 
SCMR 
 68. Arntzen & Shumway, 2002 ?         
 69. Ayers, 2003 ?         
 70. Boyson & Corsi, 2001 ?  P U I D  None None 
 71. Cargille & Bliss, 2001 ?         
 72. Dershin, 2000 ?  P  I   None None 
 73. Herman, 2002 ?         
 74. Kopczak, 2001 ?  P   D  None None 
 75. Martha & Subbakrishna, 2002 ? S P U I D  None None 
 76. Shankar, 2001 ?         
 77. Walker, 2000 ?         
 
F.3 Operations Management Journals 
Table F-4: Classification of Articles Published in Operations Management Journals 
Journal Rele-  Design    Orientation Research Explicit 
 No Author(s) vance S P U I D N Method Theory 
I 
 78. Fleischmann, Van Nunen, & Grave, 2004 ?         
 79. Lee, Billington, & Carter, 1993 ?         
 80. Sodhi, 2001 ?         
IJOPM 
 81. Baines et al., 2005 ?         
 82. Barker, 1994 ?         
 83. Boardman & Clegg, 2001 ?  P  I  N None None 
 84. Buxey, 2005 ?         
 85. Croom, 2005 ?         
 86. Fowler, 1998 ?  P  I   Modeling None 
 87. Fynes, Voss, & de Burca, 2005 ?         
 88. Gimenez & Ventura, 2005 ?         
 89. Voordijk, 2000 ?         
 90. Zirpoli & Caputo, 2002 ?         
IJPE 
 91. Herer, Tzur, & Yücesan, 2002 ?         
 92. Korpela, Lehmusvaara, & Tuominen, 2001a ? S P  I  N Modeling None 
 93. Korpela, Lehmusvaara, & Tuominen, 2001b ? S   I D  Modeling None 
 94. Korpela et al., 2002 ? S P  I   Modeling None 
 95. Olhager & Selldin, 2004 ?         
 96. Persson & Olhager, 2002 ? S     N Modeling None 
 97. Wang, Huang, & Dismukes, 2004 ?         
IMS 
 98. Macbeth & Ferguson, 1991 ?         
 99. Walsh et al., 2003 ?          
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 Table F-4 (cont’d) 
Journal Rele-  Design    Orientation Research Explicit 
 No Author(s) vance S P U I D N Method Theory 
JMTM 
 100. Aslanertik, 2005 ?         
 101. Han & Damrongwongsiri, 2005 ?         
 102. Manzini et al., 2005 ?         
 103. Routroy & Kodali, 2005 ?         
JOM 
 104. Blackhurst, Wu, & O'Grady, 2005 ? S P  I  N Modeling None 
 105. Fine, Golany, & Naseraldin, 2005 ? S P  I  N Modeling None 
 106. Forza, Salvador, & Rungtusanatham, 2005 ?         
 107. Petersen, Handfield, & Ragatz, 2005 ?         
 108. Rungtusanatham & Forza, 2005 ?         
PIM 
 109. Hammel & Kopczak, 1993 ?  P  I   Case study None 
 110. Vokurka, 1998 ?         
POM 
 111. Anderson Jr, Fine, & Parker, 2000 ?         
 112. Boyler & Olson, 2002 ?         
 113. Fine, 2000 ? S P  I  N None None 
 114. Fleischmann et al., 2001 ?         
 115. Gan, Sethi, & Yan, 2004 ?         
 116. Kreipl & Pinedo, 2004 ?         
 117. Parker & Anderson Jr, 2002 ?         
 118. Ramdas, 2003 ?         
 119. Tatsiopoulos et al., 2001 ?         
PPC 
 120. Bhattacharya, Coleman, & Brace, 1995 ?         
 121. Korhonen, Huttunen, & Eloranta, 1998 ?         
 122. Lee & Sasser, 1995 ?         
 123. Olhager, 2002 ?         
 124. Onwubolu et al., 1999 ?         
 125. Sadeh et al., 2001 ?         
 126. Taylor & Whicker, 2002 ?         
 127. Towill, 1997 ?  P  I   None None 
 128. Towill & Del Vecchio, 1994 ?         
 129. Trienekens & Beulens, 2001 ?         
 
F.4 Management Journals 
Table F-5: Classification of Articles Published in Management Journals 
Journal Rele-  Design    Orientation Research Explicit 
 No Author(s) vance S P U I D N Method Theory 
CMR 
 130. Blackburn et al., 2004 ?         
 131. Krikke, le Blanc, & van de Velde, 2004 ?         
DS 
 132. Bapna et al., 2002 ?         
 133. Curkovic, Vickery, & Droge, 2000 ?         
 134. Damodaran & Wilhelm, 2004 ?         
 135. Jayaram, 1998 ?         
 136. Mabert & Venkataramanan, 1998 ?         
 137. Robinson Jr & Satterfield, 1998 ? S    D  Simulation None 
 138. Swaminathan, Smith, & Sadeh, 1998 ? S     N Simulation None 
 139. van der Zee & van der Horst, 2005 ?         
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 Table F-5 (cont’d) 
Journal Rele-  Design    Orientation Research Explicit 
 No Author(s) vance S P U I D N Method Theory 
EMJ 
  - None -          
HBR 
 140. Burt, 1989 ?         
 141. Guide Jr & Van Wassenhove, 2002 ?         
 142. Ferdows, Lewis, & Machuca, 2004 ?  P    N Case study None 
 143. Stock, Speh, & Shear, 2002 ?         
IMM 
 144. Lancioni, 2000 ?         
 145. Reutterer & Kotzab, 2000 ?         
JOcB 
  - None -          
JOrB 
  - None -         
SJM 
  - None -         
SMR 
 146. Kopczak & Johnson, 2003 ?         
 147. Lee & Billington, 1992 ?         
 148. Lee, Padmanabhan, & Whang, 1997 ?  P  I  N Case study None 
 149. Sodhi, 2003 ?         
 
F.5 Completeness Check (Cross-database Search) 
Table F-6: Classification of Articles Published in Other Journals 
Database Rele-  Design    Orientation Research Explicit 
 No Author(s) vance S P U I D N Method Theory 
ABI/INFORM 
 150. Anderson Jr, Fine, & Parker, 200035          
 151. Boardman & Clegg, 2001          
 152. Chiang, Chhajed, & Hess, 2003 ?         
 153. Daskin, 2004 ?         
 154. de Vericourt, Karaesmen, & Dallery, 2002 ?         
 155. Fine, 2000          
 156. Hammel, Kuettner, & Phelps, 2002          
 157. Harrison, 2001 ?         
 158. Johnson, 1998 ?  P  I  N None None 
 159. Kotzab, Skjoldager, & Vinum, 2003 ?         
 160. Kumar, 2004 ?         
 161. Shore & Venkatachalam, 2003          
 162. Sinha, Whitman, & Malzahn, 2004          
 163. Swaminathan, Smith, & Sadeh, 1998          
 164. van der Horst, van Dijk, & Beulens, 2001          
Business Source Premier 
  - None -          
                                                 
35  All articles grayed out in this section are duplicates as they have been identified in the previous search in 
the journals. 
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Table F-7: Classification of Articles Published in Other Journals 
Database Rele-  Design    Orientation Research Explicit 
 No Author(s) vance S P U I D N Method Theory 
EMERALD 
 165. Abdinnour-Helm, 1999 ? S    D  Simulation None 
 166. Anumba, Siemieniuch, & Sinclair, 2000          
 167. Brunnermeier & Martin, 2002          
 168. Giddings, Bailey, & Moore, 2001          
 169. Roberts, 2001 ?         
 170. Simatupang, Sandroto, & Lubis, 2004 ?         
JSTOR 
  - None -          
ScienceDirect 
 171. Fine, Golany, & Naseraldin, 2005          
 172. Fixson, 2005 ?         
 173. Goetschalckx, Vidal, & Dogan, 2002 ?         
 174. Persson & Olhager, 2002          
 175. Reiner & Trcka, 2004 ?  P  I   Case study None 
 176. Rungtusanatham & Forza, 2005          
 
F.6 Subject Area 
Table F-8: Articles Classified According to Subject Area 
 No Author(s) Subject Area Grouped 
 1. Anderson & Katz, 1998 Supply management Supply Management 
 2. Christopher & Towill, 2002 Leanness/Agility Agility 
 4. Hewitt, 1994 SC re-design Supply Chain Design 
 5. Payne & Peters, 2004 Matching product and chain 3D-CE 
 6. van der Horst, van Dijk, & Beulens, 2001 Decoupling  
 7. van Hoek & Weken, 1998 Modular production  
 8. Wilding, 1998b Chaos theory  
 9. Wouters, Sharman, & Wortmann, 1999 Inventory mgmt.  
 18. Christiaanse & Kumar, 2000 ICT and SC redesign Supply Chain Design 
 19. Christopher & Towill, 2001 Agility Agility 
 29. Mason et al., 2002 Outsourcing (electronics mfg.) Outsourcing 
 40. van Hoek, Commandeur, & Vos, 1998 Postponement  
 48. Chandra & Kumar, 2000 Accurate (quick) response Quick Response 
 50. Hammel, Kuettner, & Phelps, 2002 SC re-design Supply Chain Design 
 58. McIvor, 2000 Outsourcing Outsourcing 
 59. McIvor, 2003 Outsourcing Outsourcing 
 64. Towill, 1996 Time compression  
 67. Zeng, 2003 Global sourcing Supply Management 
 70. Boyson & Corsi, 2001 Real-time supply chain  
 72. Dershin, 2000 Business process re-eng. Supply Chain Design 
 74. Kopczak, 2001 Last mile strategy Distribution 
 75. Martha & Subbakrishna, 2002 Risk management in SCD  
 83. Boardman & Clegg, 2001 3D-CE for Prod. Dev. 3D-CE 
 86. Fowler, 1998 Modeling in Mgmt of Ops  
 92. Korpela, Lehmusvaara, & Tuominen, 2001a Supply Chain Development Supply Chain Design 
 93. Korpela, Lehmusvaara, & Tuominen, 2001b SC Design for Cust. Service Supply Chain Design 
 94. Korpela et al., 2002 Allocation of prod. capacity Supply Chain Design 
 96. Persson & Olhager, 2002 Simulation of supply chain  
 104. Blackhurst, Wu, & O'Grady, 2005 Design decisions 3D-CE 
 105. Fine, Golany, & Naseraldin, 2005 3D-CE 3D-CE 
 109. Hammel & Kopczak, 1993 Distrib. Res. Planning (DRP) Distribution 
 113. Fine, 2000 3D-CE 3D-CE 
 127. Towill, 1997 Material flow  
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Table F-8 (cont’d) 
 No Author(s) Subject Area Grouped 
 137. Robinson Jr & Satterfield, 1998 Design of distrib. systems Distribution 
 138. Swaminathan, Smith, & Sadeh, 1998 SC design Supply Chain Design 
 142. Ferdows, Lewis, & Machuca, 2004 Quick response Quick Response 
 148. Lee, Padmanabhan, & Whang, 1997 Bullwhip/Forrester Bullwhip 
 158. Johnson, 1998 Bullwhip/Forrester Bullwhip 
 165. Abdinnour-Helm, 1999 Distribution Distribution 
 175. Reiner & Trcka, 2004 SC design Supply Chain Design 
 
F.7 Design Objective(s) 
Table F-9: Articles Classified According to Design Objective(s) 
 Cost Perfor- Respon- Lead Residual 
 No (Profit) mance siveness Time Risk Design Objective(s) 
 1. (?) ? ? ? ? Sustainable growth 
 2. ? ? ? ? ?  
 4. ? ? ? ? ?  
 5. ? ? ? ? ?  
 6. ? ? ? ? ? Demand uncertainty 
 7. ? ? ? ? ?  
 8. ? ? ? ? ? Remove uncertainty 
 9. ? ? ? ? ? Differentiation 
 18. ? ? ? ? ? Flexibility 
 19. ? ? ? ? ?  
 29. ? ? ? ? ? Agility 
 40. ? ? ? ? ?  
 48. ? ? ? ? ? Synchronization of chain 
 50. ? ? ? ? ? Exploitation of opportun. 
 58. ? ? ? ? ? Strategic Decision Making 
 59. ? ? ? ? ? Identify drivers/processes 
 64. ? ? ? ? ?  
 67. ? ? ? ? ?  
 70. ? ? ? ? ?  
 72. ? ? ? ? ? SC integration 
 74. ? ? ? ? ? Differentiation 
 75. ? ? ? ? ?  
 83. ? ? ? (?) ?  
 86. ? ? ? ? ? Competitive Advantage 
 92. ? ? ? ? ?  
 93. ? ? ? ? ? Customer service 
 94. ? ? ? ? ? Customer service 
 96. ? ? ? ? ? Quality 
 104. ? ? ? ? ? “Fit” 
 105. ? ? ? ? ? “Fit” 
 109. ? ? ? ? ?  
 113. ? ? ? ? ? “Fit” 
 127. ? ? ? ? ?  
 137. (?) ? ? ? ?  
 138. ? ? ? ? ?  
 142. ? ? ? ? ?  
 148. ? ? ? ? ?  
 158. ? ? ? ? ?  
 165. ? ? ? ? ?  
 175. ? ? ? ? ? Robustness… 
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Appendix G Interview Guides 
This appendix contains the interview guides used during the empirical investigations. 
At each company SCM and Purchasing personnel is interviewed in two rounds.  The purpose 
of the first round of interviews is to establish a relationship between the interviewer and the 
interviewees, and to obtain basic information about the company, the products and 
technologies, and about their SCM and SCRM practices.  The second round poses more 
“tough” questions as current practices are challenged.  Table G-1 below illustrates how the 
interview guides are applied during the two rounds of interviewing. 
Table G-1: Application of Interview Guides 
Round Interview Guide SCM Interviewee Purchasing Interviewee 
I: SCM & SCRM Practices Yes Yes 
II: Supply Risk Management  (Yes) 1 
III: Appropriateness of Current Practices   
I: SCM & SCRM Practices (Yes) (Yes) 
II: Supply Risk Management  Yes 2 
III: Appropriateness of Current Practices Yes Yes 
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G.1 Interview Guide I: SCM & SCRM Practices 
Interview Guide: Risk Management in the Supply Chain 
SCM & SCRM Practices 
The purpose of this interview guide is to help structure the interview and ensure the 
planned information is collected.  As the interview most likely will uncover non-planned but 
relevant issues, time must be allocated during the interview to pose questions/talk about 
issues not covered in the guide. 
The interview guide is structured as follows: 
Section A: Introduction 
Section B: Company Profile 
Section C: Supply Chain Management Practice 
Section D: Supply Chain Risk Management Practice 
Section E: Critical Risks & Incidents 
Section A: Introduction 
This part of the guide introduces the study and the researcher to the interviewee – and 
verifies the identity of company and interviewee. 
- Introduce the study.  Explain the study is intending to describe and understand the 
phenomena SCM and SCRM in a number of contexts. 
- Introduce yourself (the researcher) and the Supply Chain Management group within 
Copenhagen Business School.  In case the contact is made through a common 
acquaintance make sure to mention him/her.  Try to establish a trusting relation as 
early as possible. 
- Check if it is acceptable to record the interview.  Make sure not to force the 
interviewee as it might limit the answers. 
A1 Verify the identity of the case company. 
A2 Verify the name, position, and area of responsibility of the interviewee(s). 
Make sure the interviewee(s) feel(s) as confident as possible in answering the questions. 
Company 
• Name 
• Address 
• Telephone 
[ Verify identity of case company. ] 
Interviewee(s): 
• Name(s) 
• Position(s) 
• Time & Place 
[ Verify identity of interviewee(s). ] 
Lars B. Sorensen Page 1 of 5 
Dept. of Operations Management 
Copenhagen Business School 
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Interview Guide: Risk Management in the Supply Chain
SCM & SCRM Practices 
Section B: Company Profile 
Information on the company is collected prior to the interview, e.g. the company’s history, 
financial information, and other types of background information.  The collected 
information should enable an initial classification according to the external conditions. 
B1 Verify/obtain information on the company’s history, including mergers and 
acquisitions. 
B2 Obtain information on turnover and number of employees from the database 
AMADEUS.  Verify this information.  Get information on organizational structure. 
B3 Verify/obtain information on product portfolio, and manufacturing technology. 
B4 Verify/obtain information on the customer portfolio, markets etc. 
B5 Verify/obtain information on the supplier portfolio, segmentation etc. 
B6 Verify/obtain information on the competition: players, products, technology… 
B7 Other information… 
Company History: 
• Company Start 
• Milestones 
[ Verify collected material.  Obtain new/alternative material. ]
Current: 
• Turnover 
• Employees 
• Organizational 
Structure and Network 
[ Verify collected material.  Obtain new/alternative material. ]
Portfolio & Operations 
• Products 
• Technology 
[ Verify collected material.  Obtain new/alternative material. ]
Customers 
• Portfolio 
• Markets 
[ Verify collected material.  Obtain new/alternative material. ]
Suppliers 
• Portfolio 
• Segmentation 
[ Verify collected material.  Obtain new/alternative material. ]
Competition 
• Players 
• Products 
• Technology 
[ Verify collected material.  Obtain new/alternative material. ]
Other: [ Anything ? ] 
Lars B. Sorensen Page 2 of 5 
Dept. of Operations Management 
Copenhagen Business School 
 
 
Risk Management in the Supply Chain 
Page 78 
Interview Guide: Risk Management in the Supply Chain 
SCM & SCRM Practices 
Section C: Supply Chain Management Practice 
This part of the guide collects information on the SCM practice. 
C1 Obtain information on the structure of the supply chains, including internal and 
external participants, markets, and products. 
C2 Obtain information on internal operations, including inventory management, 
postponement, distribution/hubs, and mass customization. 
C3 Obtain information on IT integration, internally as well as externally. 
C4 Obtain information on any kind of cooperative planning, coordination of schedules, 
campaigns etc. 
C5 Obtain information on any kind of processes implemented and their content/type. 
C6 Other information… 
SCM: 
• Internal participants 
• External participants 
• Markets/products 
[ Obtain information. ] 
Operations (Internal): 
• Inventory Management 
• Postponement 
• Distribution/Hubs 
• Mass Customization 
[ Obtain information. ] 
IT Integration: 
• Type 
• Participants 
[  Obtain information. ] 
Process Orientation: 
• Processes 
• Process Types 
[ Obtain information. ] 
Cooperative Planning: 
• Type 
• Participants 
• Schedule 
[ Obtain information. ] 
Other: [ Anything ? ] 
Lars B. Sorensen Page 3 of 5 
Dept. of Operations Management 
Copenhagen Business School 
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Interview Guide: Risk Management in the Supply Chain
SCM & SCRM Practices 
Section D: Supply Chain Risk Management Practice 
This part of the guide collects information on the SCM practice. 
D1 Obtain information on formal organization and position within Risk Management. 
D2 Obtain information on informal/decentralized/embedded risk management, including 
scope and participants. 
D3 Obtain information on risk acknowledged and how each risk is managed (if at all). 
D4 Obtain information on identification and assessment of risks. 
D5 Other information… 
Organizationt: 
• Department 
• Positions 
[ Obtain information. ] 
Informal/Decentralized 
Risk Management: 
• Scope 
• Participants 
[ Obtain information. ] 
Risks Acknowledged: 
• Managed 
• Not managed 
[ Obtain information. ] 
Risk Identification and 
Assessment: 
• Scheduling 
• Procedures 
[ Obtain information. ] 
Other: [ Anything ? ] 
Lars B. Sorensen Page 4 of 5 
Dept. of Operations Management 
Copenhagen Business School  
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Interview Guide: Risk Management in the Supply Chain 
SCM & SCRM Practices 
Section E: Incidents & Critical Risks 
This part of the guide collects information on illustrative incidents and critical risks (not 
necessarily related). 
E1 Obtain information on illustrative incidents, describing situation where an incident 
(almost) seriously impacted the company.  Make sure cause/effect is described as 
well as the response. 
E2 Obtain knowledge on the most critical risks as perceived by the interviewee. 
Comparing this information from the two interviewees will describe the integration of 
the informal/decentralized/embedded risk management across the enterprise. 
E3 Other information… 
Incident: 
• Cause/Effect 
• Participants 
• Response 
[ Obtain information. ] 
Critical Risks: 
• Source 
• Cause/effect 
• Appropriate response 
[ Obtain information. ] 
Other: [ Anything ? ] 
Lars B. Sorensen Page 5 of 5 
Dept. of Operations Management 
Copenhagen Business School  
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G.2 Interview Guide II: Supply Risk Management 
Interview Guide: Risk Management in the Supply Chain
Supply Risk Management 
The purpose of this interview guide is to help structure the interview and ensure the 
planned information is collected.  As the interview most likely will uncover non-planned but 
relevant issues, time must be allocated during the interview to pose questions/talk about 
issues not covered in the guide. 
The interview guide is structured as follows: 
Section A: Introduction 
Section B: Supply Base Size and Segmentation 
Section C: Supplier Selection 
Section D: Supplier Evaluation & Management 
Section A: Introduction 
This part of the guide introduces the study and the researcher to the interviewee – and 
verifies the identity of company and interviewee. 
- Introduce the study.  Explain the study is intending to describe and understand the 
phenomena SCM and SCRM in a number of contexts. 
- Introduce yourself (the researcher) and the Supply Chain Management group within 
Copenhagen Business School.  In case the contact is made through a common
acquaintance make sure to mention him/her.  Try to establish a trusting relation as 
early as possible. 
- Check if it is acceptable to record the interview.  Make sure not to force the 
interviewee as it might limit the answers. 
A1 Verify the identity of the case company. 
A2 Verify the name, position, and area of responsibility of the interviewee(s). 
Make sure the interviewee(s) feel(s) as confident as possible in answering the questions. 
Company 
• Name 
• Address 
• Telephone 
[ Verify identity of case company. ] 
Interviewee(s): 
• Name(s) 
• Position(s) 
• Time & Place 
[ Verify identity of interviewee(s). ] 
Lars B. Sorensen Page 1 of 4 
Dept. of Operations Management 
Copenhagen Business School 
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Interview Guide: Risk Management in the Supply Chain 
Supply Risk Management 
Section B: Supply Base Size and Segmentation 
This part of the guide collects information on the company’s supply base hereunder size 
and segmentation. 
B1 How many suppliers does the company have? What is the yearly purchase value 
(only direct input to production)? 
B2 Has the company outsourced activities recently?  (Or perhaps insourced)?  Does the 
company have plans to outsource in the near future?  If so, why? 
B3 Investigate if the supply base is segmented (formally).  Check which criteria 
determine the various categories, and to which stringency the model is used. 
Investigate if each category has distinct procedures and routines in place. 
Investigate if uniqueness is dealt with in the model, and if uniqueness is desired or 
accepted. 
B4 Other information… 
Supply Base: 
• Size 
• Value of purchase 
[ Obtain information. ] 
Outsourcing: 
• Recent outsourcing 
• Planned ditto 
[ Obtain information. ] 
Segmentation Model? 
• Criteria 
• Routines 
• Uniqueness? 
[ Obtain information. ] 
Other: [ Anything ? ] 
Lars B. Sorensen Page 2 of 4 
Dept. of Operations Management 
Copenhagen Business School 
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Interview Guide: Risk Management in the Supply Chain
Supply Risk Management 
Section C: Supplier Selection 
This part of the guide collects information on supplier selection. 
C1 What is the company’s supply strategy?  Is the use of systems suppliers preferred? 
How much redundancy is desired? 
C2 On which criteria are suppliers selected?  Are exit criteria defined?  Are these rules 
followed? 
C3 Are criteria for exclusion defined?  Are there any examples of exclusion of suppliers?
C4 Other information… 
Supply Strategy 
• Level of redundancy 
(single/sole sourcing) 
• Use of systems 
suppliers etc. 
[ Obtain information. ] 
Supplier Selection: 
• Criteria? 
• Procedure? 
• Exit defined? 
[ Obtain information. ] 
Supplier Exclusion: 
• Criteria 
• Risk? 
• Examples 
[ Obtain information. ] 
Other: [ Anything ? ] 
Lars B. Sorensen Page 3 of 4 
Dept. of Operations Management 
Copenhagen Business School 
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Interview Guide: Risk Management in the Supply Chain 
Supply Risk Management 
Section D: Supplier Evaluation & Management 
This part of the guide collects information on the evaluation and management of the 
supplier base. 
D1 Obtain information on how often suppliers are evaluated.  Is it integrated into the 
segmentation model (if one such exists)? 
D2 Obtain information on which types of information is collected. 
Which KPI’s are collected continuously, which are obtained periodically? 
Is the risk profile of the supplier evaluated periodically? 
D3 Is the supplier audited? 
D4 If there is a dependency, how is it balanced?  How is the intended exit managed, and 
what about the un-intended? 
D5 Other information… 
Evaluation Schedule: 
• Timing 
• Type (meeting etc.) 
• Financial Data 
[ Obtain information. ] 
Evaluation Content: 
• Process 
• Structure 
• KPI’s 
[ Obtain information. ] 
Supplier Audits: 
• What & How? 
• How often? 
[ Obtain information. ] 
Balancing Dependence 
• Intended exit 
• Un-intended exit 
[ Obtain information. ] 
Other: [ Anything ? ] 
Lars B. Sorensen Page 4 of 4 
Dept. of Operations Management 
Copenhagen Business School 
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G.3 Interview Guide III: Appropriateness of Current Practices 
Interview Guide: Risk Management in the Supply Chain
Appropriateness of Current Practices 
The purpose of this interview guide is to help structure the interview and ensure the 
planned information is collected.  As the interview most likely will uncover non-planned but 
relevant issues, time must be allocated during the interview to pose questions/talk about 
issues not covered in the guide. 
The interview guide is structured as follows: 
Section A: Introduction 
Section B: Appropriateness of Current Practices 
Section A: Introduction 
This part of the guide introduces the study and the researcher to the interviewee – and 
verifies the identity of company and interviewee. 
- Introduce the study.  Explain the study is intending to describe and understand the 
phenomena SCM and SCRM in a number of contexts. 
- Introduce yourself (the researcher) and the Supply Chain Management group within 
Copenhagen Business School.  In case the contact is made through a common 
acquaintance make sure to mention him/her.  Try to establish a trusting relation as 
early as possible. 
- Check if it is acceptable to record the interview.  Make sure not to force the 
interviewee as it might limit the answers. 
A1 Verify the identity of the case company. 
A2 Verify the name, position, and area of responsibility of the interviewee(s). 
Make sure the interviewee(s) feel(s) as confident as possible in answering the questions. 
Company 
• Name 
• Address 
• Telephone 
[ Verify identity of case company. ] 
Interviewee(s): 
• Name(s) 
• Position(s) 
• Time & Place 
[ Verify identity of interviewee(s). ] 
Lars B. Sorensen Page 1 of 2 
Dept. of Operations Management 
Copenhagen Business School 
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Interview Guide: Risk Management in the Supply Chain 
Appropriateness of Current Practices 
Section B: Appropriateness of Current Practices 
This part of the guide collects information on the appropriateness of current SCM and 
SCRM practices. 
B1 Is the current practice on SCM appropriate? 
Why / why not? 
Would you like to change the practice? 
B2 Is the current practice on SCRM appropriate? 
Why / why not?  
Would you like to change the practice? 
B3 Other information… 
Practice on SCM: 
• Appropriate? 
• Why / why not? 
• Change? 
[ Obtain information. ] 
Practice on SCRM: 
• Appropriate? 
• Why / why not? 
• Change? 
[ Obtain information. ] 
Other: [ Anything ? ] 
Lars B. Sorensen Page 2 of 2 
Dept. of Operations Management 
Copenhagen Business School 
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Appendix H Interviewees & Interviews 
In this appendix the interviewees and the main interviews performed are documented. 
H.1 Interviewees 
In the table below all interviewees in the case studies are listed by company. 
Table H-1: Interviewees in the Case Studies 
Company Interviewee Position 
Bang & Olufsen Kim B. Hansen Legal Council 
 Klaus K. Knudsen Director, Purchasing 
 Peter S. Hune Senior Manager, Purchasing 
 Steen B. Jørgensen Director, Logistics 
Brüel & Kjær Erik Ziegler Production Manager 
 Henrik Jeppesen Global Purchasing Manager 
 Ole Bjørn Strategic Purchasing Director 
Coloplast Johnny Nielsen VP, Supply Chain Management 
 Roland V. Pedersen Purchasing Manager 
Dyrup Finn Aagaard Logistics Manager 
 Henrik D. Nielsen Supply Chain Director 
 Nis Petersen Purchasing Manager 
Fritz Hansen Bo Rasmussen Factory Manager 
 Henrik Holm Logistics Manager 
 Jacob Pedersen Supply Chain Coordinator 
 Marianne Thompson Supply Chain Planner 
 Rikke Schmidt Supply Chain Planner 
 Rudi Kjeldsen Supply Chain Planner 
 Thomas Touborg Supply Chain Director 
LINAK Morten Raahede Logistics Manager 
 Paul Frees Purchasing Director 
Novozymes Ken Friis Purchasing Director 
 Thomas Videbæk VP, Supply Chain Operations 
Oticon Kim S. Hald Research Fellow 
 Marianne K. Borum Purchasing Manager 
 Per Sørensen Purchasing Manager 
 Peter Finnerup VP, Logistics 
RIEGENS Claus Jensen VP (Sales) 
 Henrik Jakobsen Purchasing Director 
 Henrik J. Hansen IT Manager 
SDC Group Erik Clarke Logistics Planner 
 Ernest Fuller Production Manager 
 Henrik Frandsen Purchasing Manager 
 Jesper Boysen CEO 
 Ole Holm36 Purchasing Assistant 
 Søren Mikkelsen Production Manager 
 
                                                 
36 Henrik Frandsen left the company. 
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H.2 Interviews 
The table below lists the most important interviews performed during the case studies. 
Table H-2: Interviews Performed 
Company Date/time Type Recorded? Interviewee(s) 
Bang & Olufsen 2004-05-05 10:00 Pers. No Klaus K. Knudsen, Peter S. Hune 
 2004-05-05 11:30 Pers. Yes Steen B. Jørgensen 
 2005-06-22 08:15 Phone Yes Steen B. Jørgensen 
 2005-08-17 09:00 Phone Yes Kim B. Hansen 
 2005-08-22 11:15 Phone Yes Peter S. Hune 
Brüel & Kjær 2002-08-13 13:00 Pers. No Erik Ziegler 
 2003-11-21 12:00 Pers. No Ole Bjørn 
 2005-06-27 10:00 Pers. No Henrik Jeppesen 
 2005-07-29 15:30 Phone Yes Henrik Jeppesen 
 2005-11-25 15:30 Phone Yes Henrik Jeppesen 
Coloplast 2004-02-04 10:00 Pers. Yes Johnny Nielsen 
 2004-05-12 13:00 Pers. Yes Roland V. Pedersen 
 2005-06-08 14:30 Phone No Roland V. Pedersen 
 2005-12-12 09:30 Pers. Yes Johnny Nielsen 
Dyrup 2003-11-18 10:00 Pers. No Finn Aagaard 
 2004-06-02 09:00 Pers. Yes Henrik D. Nielsen 
 2004-06-14 10:00 Pers. Yes Nis Petersen 
 2005-08-25 09:00 Pers. Yes Henrik D. Nielsen 
Fritz Hansen 2004-11-26 15:30 Pers. No Henrik Holm 
 2004-12-10 12:00 Pers. No Thomas Touborg, Henrik Holm 
 2004-12-10 13:00 Pers. Yes Henrik Holm, Rudi Kjeldsen, Rikke 
Schmidt, Marianne Thompson, Jacob 
Pedersen, Bo Rasmussen 
 2005-08-04 08:30 Pers. Yes Thomas Touborg, Henrik Holm 
LINAK 2004-12-01 12:00 Pers. No Morten Raahede 
 2005-08-17 10:00 Phone Yes Morten Raahede 
 2006-01-25 10:00 Phone Yes Paul Frees 
Novozymes 2003-12-05 10:00 Pers. Yes Thomas Videbæk 
 2004-04-29 09:00 Pers. Yes Thomas Videbæk 
 2004-05-06 15:00 Pers. Yes Ken Friis 
 2005-12-19 16:30 Pers. Yes Thomas Videbæk 
Oticon 2004-05-10 14:00 Pers. Yes Peter Finnerup, Marianne K. Borum, Per 
Sørensen 
 2005-07-24 16:30 Pers. No Kim S. Hald 
 2005-07-29 13:00 Phone Yes Marianne K. Borum 
RIEGENS 2004-05-17 14:00 Pers. Yes Henrik Jakobsen 
 2004-06-22 09:00 Pers. Yes Claus Jensen 
 2005-07-07 15:00 Phone Yes Claus Jensen 
 2005-07-29 09:00 Phone Yes Henrik Jakobsen 
 2005-11-24 15:00 Phone No Henrik J. Hansen 
 SDC Group 2004-04-01 10:00 Pers. No Søren Mikkelsen, Erik Clarke 
 2004-04-20 10:00 Pers. Yes Henrik Frandsen 
 2004-05-14 10:00 Pers. Yes Jesper Boysen 
 2005-07-06 15:00 Phone No Ole Holm 
 2005-08-02 15:30 Phone Yes Ernest Fuller 
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Appendix I Coordination of Critical Risks? 
As a few of the companies have hinted that their Risk Management practice, albeit not 
formalized, is at least coordinated across departmental boundaries, it is of interest to 
investigate to which degree this is the case.  In case the risk management is in fact 
coordinated, one might assume the list of critical risks (or sources of risk) has been 
coordinated.  Therefore the four companies having hinted at least some coordination have 
been subjected to a further analysis – an analysis of their most critical risks.  For all four 
companies, the coordination of risks between the Logistics/SCM and Purchasing has been 
tested by posing the following question: 
Which risks are the most critical – in terms of endangering the survival of 
your company? 
 
In the following the result of these inquiries is described – one sub-chapter per company.  The 
first table in each section gives a brief description of the risk along classifications and risk 
management measures in place.  The second table categorizes the risks according to the 
classifications. 
I.1 Bang & Olufsen 
At Bang & Olufsen six critical risks were identified, see Table I-1 below. 
Table I-1: Critical Risks Identified – Bang & Olufsen 
No Risk Class Type Risk Management Current Practice 
P1 
The use of systems 
suppliers leads to 
increased risk. 
U S 
Risk management of critical suppliers by use of 
contracts and mitigation through long relationships. 
Risk assessment by analyzing impact (matrix with 
delays/downtimes, and economic consequence). 
Possibility: technology forum? 
Threat: non-intended departure! 
(?)
P2 
The 670 B1 stores depend 
on speedy and precise 
delivery – they have no 
local inventory. 
D P 
Retail Ordering System: stringency in the ordering 
process, use of IT-system for configuration/ 
customization. Delivery precision is very high (use 
of buffer inventory for finished goods) 
?
S1 
Master Dealer in e.g. 
China can not be too 
successful. 
D S 
Limitations (e.g. period and volumes) in contract.  
Monitoring & thorough evaluation and selection of 
Master Dealers. 
(?)
S2 Subsidiaries can have their own objectives. D S Monitoring?  Power/Influence? (?)
S3 
Ramp-up generates 
uncertainty due to lack of 
systems controls. 
D P 
Enhancement of analysis on the introduction of 
products.  Perhaps special indicators on orders for 
ramp-up? 
%
S4 
Credit limits for sales 
offices may have negative 
impacts on end-customer 
satisfaction 
D P Credit limits must be monitored continuously… %
 
From this list it is obvious the risk portfolio is not shared across departments.  The two 
department representatives share no risks at all.  Combining the identified risks in a matrix 
results in Table I-2 below. 
Risk Management in the Supply Chain 
Page 90 
Table I-2: Critical Risks Categorized – Bang & Olufsen 
 Risk Class 
Risk Type Upstream Internal Downstream Market/Env. 
Managed   P2  
Monitored     Process 
None   S3, S4  
Managed     
Monitored P1  S1, S2  Structure 
None     
 
I.2 Coloplast 
At Coloplast no less than twelve risks were identified. 
Table I-3: Critical Risks Identified – Coloplast 
No Risk Class Type Risk Management Current Practice 
P1 All eggs in one basket – reduction of supplier base U S 
Closer/more thorough evaluation of suppliers. 
Risk management of fewer suppliers.  
Stringent evaluation: financial check, fire safety 
audits at suppliers plant etc. 
(?)
P2 Limited access to knowledge from suppliers U P 
Innovation is critically important. 
Close relationships and innovation with suppliers. %
P3 Single sourcing U S 
In the case of BASF no possibility for risk 
management.  BASF’s decision perceived as 
irrational/based on policy. 
%
P4 Coloplast being “locked in” by suppliers U S 
Inertia / stickyness due to customer preferences 
and variation in suppliers’ portfolios. %
P5 Uncertainty in relation to sourcing from Asia. U S Social and process integration? %
P6 Increased complexity E N/A ??? %
S1 Quality Failure: Input U P Supplier Plant Assessment – being done ?
S2 Quality Failure: Internal I P Quality procedures and measures in place ?
S3 Loss of unique supplier U S Very few unique suppliers – all very solid companies.  Continuous contact. ?
S4 Product specifications are too poor / not outdated. I P 
Continuous updating of product specifications?  
Difficult to enforce – not attractive work… %
S5 
Suppliers’ product 
specifications are too poor 
/ not updated 
U P Part of supplier management? %
S6 Shortage of input U P Warning systems in place for inventory management (order points, minimum inventory) ?
 
Two of the risks identified by Purchasing at Coloplast address the issue of single sourcing, 
each from their own perspective.  In the first instance (P1) single sourcing is an undesired 
result from supplier base reduction – a self inflicted risk which must be managed.  The second 
instance (P3) is the case of BASF, where the required input is protected by patents.  Here the 
risk is not self inflicted but caused by the protection of innovation being stronger than the 
need for competition (within the patent period). 
Also the SCM department is aware of this risk - “Loss of critical supplier” (S3), but besides 
this risk no commonality between the two departments in terms of identified risks exists.  
Apparently no coordination is taking place. 
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Table I-4: Critical Risks Categorized – Coloplast 
 Risk Class 
Risk Type Upstream Internal Downstream Market/Env. 
Managed S1, S6 S2   
Monitored     Process 
None P2, S5    
Managed S3    
Monitored P1    Structure 
None P3, P4, P5 S4  P6 
 
I.3 Novozymes 
Also at Novozymes at high number of critical risks were identified. 
Table I-5: Critical Risks Identified – Novozymes 
No Risk Class Type Risk Management Current Practice 
P1 
Indirect purchasing 
through NN Service 
Partner. 
I S Indirect purchase was supposed to be only “trivial” purchases.  This was not so… %
P2 Indirect purchasing - cost/quality & disruptions. I S Constant monitoring, but fault stricken… (?)
P3 GMO. E N/A 
Cooperation with NGO’s across the world. 
Markets chosen according to the perception of 
GMO 
?
P4 Increased refinement in the agricultural sector. M N/A Market may or may no be influenced? %
P5 Lack of understanding of the market. U S E-sourcing not used, except for commodities. ?
P6 Delivery precision… U P Use of raw materials inventory / bulk purchasing ?
P7 Single sourcing U S Risk assessment and integration with relevant suppliers ?
P8 Lead supplier U S 
Suppliers are not dropped when appropriate as it 
is time-consuming to assess and certify 
replacements 
%
P9 
Shortage of supply 
(incorrect perception of 
input) 
E N/A Diversification %
S1 Supplier dependency U S 
It is the deliberate strategy to use standardized 
input, not due to risks but to cost (and protection 
of process knowledge and enablement of 
innovation internally). 
The market dictates complexity to be placed 
within the firm. 
?
S2 Production disruption I P 
Methods and techniques are enhanced 
continuously.  Variation in output - batches are 
occasionally scrapped. 
?
S3 GMO E N/A 
No activities within Food & Feed in Europe, not 
influential enough to correct “misperceptions” 
the political debate. 
?
S4 Quality breaches U P Monitoring and quality control (but not in second tier) ?
 
Also at Novozymes the issue of single sourcing is recognized as a critical risk.  This 
perception is shared between Purchasing and SCM – in a few variations (as was the case for 
Coloplast).  The vulnerability towards the public opinion of GMO’s is also well perceived at 
both departments – and both reference the current strategy of not supplying Food & Feed in 
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the European market.  The strategic importance of managing the risk of stirring public opinion 
is apparently communicated throughout the company. 
No shorter-term risks are shared across the two departments – risk portfolios do not seem to 
be shared. 
Table I-6: Critical Risks Categorized – Novozymes 
 Risk Class 
Risk Type Upstream Internal Downstream Market/Env. 
Managed P6, S4 S2   
Monitored     Process 
None     
Managed P5, P6, P7, S1   P3, S3 
Monitored  P1   Structure 
None P8 P2  P4, P9 
 
I.4 SDC DANDISC 
At SDC DANDISC nine risks were identified. 
Table I-7: Critical Risks Identified – SDC DANDISC 
No Risk Class Type Risk Management Current Practice 
P1 The VHS market is dying E N/A Consumption of resources closely monitored, planning for exit ?
P2 Heterogeneous customer base D S Technicolor is a dominant customer (30%) (?)
P3 Security breach – property rights I P 
Entry and exit checks, intensive procedures for 
mail security, fence surrounding the factory, 
guards… 
?
P4 Quality breach U P Monitoring and quality control… ?
S1 Decreasing prices E N/A 
Constant monitoring of suppliers performance 
and process.  Own competence in distribution in 
the Nordic countries. 
?
S2 Delivery precision I P Continuous improvement of processes. (?)
S3 Shift in technology E N/A “Reading the curves” (?)
S4 Heterogeneous customer base D S 
Adaptation / new services 
Strategy to diversify (?)
 
Apparently the critical risks for SDC DANDISC are “shift in technology” and “dominant 
customer”.  Both departments have identified both risks which may indicate a level of sharing 
of risk portfolios. 
Interestingly, the size of the dominant customer did not seem to trouble the interviewees – and 
this is especially interesting since during the research project the customer actually chose to 
move their purchase to Poland. 
The other risk, the shift in technology, is recognized throughout the company as the most 
important parameter for long-term survival.  Many examples of companies in the business 
who did not pay enough attention to these shifts document the importance of managing this 
risk. 
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Table I-8: Critical Risks Categorized – SDC DANDISC 
 Risk Class 
Risk Type Upstream Internal Downstream Market/Env. 
Managed P4 P3   
Monitored  S2   Process 
None     
Managed    P1, S1 
Monitored   P2, S4 S3 Structure 
None     
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Appendix J Triangulation I – External Reporting 
In this appendix the detailed information obtained by the triangulation in the external 
reporting is described.  The information is described by the following constructs: ‘External 
reporting on SCM’, ‘External reporting on Corporate Governance’, ‘External reporting on 
Business Risk Management’, and ‘External reporting on Financial Risk Management’. 
J.1 Construct ’External Reporting on SCM’ 
Table J-1: Summary of ‘External Reporting on SCM’ 
Company External Reporting on SCM Y/N 
Bang & Olufsen 
The entity ‘supply chain’ is not referenced but the importance of suppliers is 
described in the “Knowledge Resources” section: “Bang & Olufsen has extended 
cooperation with some of the worlds best suppliers within a number of areas, where 
Bang & Olufsen does not itself possess the knowledge and competence.  These 
partners not only supply components to Bang & Olufsen’s production, they also 
supply knowledge and competence to the development of the products.” (Bang & 
Olufsen, 2005, p. 53, translated) 
(Yes)
Brüel & Kjær 
No reference to ‘supply chains’ is made in the annual accounts, but to the practice 
of having close relationships with suppliers: “On the supply side the company tries 
to safeguard the technological lead by working closely with the larger suppliers.” 
(Brüel & Kjær Sound & Vibration Measurement, 2005, p. 4, translated) 
(Yes)
Coloplast 
No reference to ‘supply chains’ is made in the annual accounts, but ‘Logistics and 
IT’ is briefly mentioned, hereunder the ERP implementation and the forthcoming 
European Distribution Centre in Hamburg.  (Coloplast, 2004) 
No 
Dyrup 
Under the heading “The supply chain” the importance of SCM is emphasized: “A 
well-functioning and efficient supply chain is essential for Dyrup to continue in the 
right direction and to remain competitive.  The optimum transport structure, 
streamlined production processes and effective planning routines are all elements 
that have a major impact on costs and efficiency in the supply chain.  …  The 
logistics processes are being restructured and strengthened across the Group.  The 
changes are intended to raise productivity and create a more satisfactory working 
environment.” (Dyrup, 2005, p. 9) 
Yes 
Fritz Hansen No reference to ‘supply chains’ or any related concept is made in the annual accounts.  (Fritz Hansen, 2004) No 
LINAK No reference to ‘supply chains’ or any related concept is made in the annual accounts. (LINAK, 2004) No 
Novozymes 
No reference to ‘supply chains’ is made in the annual accounts, but the practice of 
having close relationships with customers is described.  Furthermore the company 
routinely initiates cross-departmental groups to facilitate knowledge sharing. 
(Novozymes, 2005, p. 19 and 20, respectively) 
(Yes)
Oticon 
No reference is made to supply chain, but to ‘value chain’: “The companies in the 
William Demant Holding group work closely together in the early stages of the 
value chain, e.g. purchasing and production.  In the part of the value chain facing 
the customers, e.g. product development, marketing and sales, each company has 
its own organization and identity.” (William Demant Holding, 2005, p. 3) 
No 
RIEGENS No reference to ‘supply chains’ or any related concept is made in the annual accounts.  (RIEGENS, 2005) No 
SDC DANDISC No reference to ‘supply chains’ is made in the annual accounts, but to ‘value chain’ (which is explained in terms of service offerings).  (SDC DanDisc, 2005) No 
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J.2 Construct ‘External Reporting on Corporate Governance’ 
Table J-2: Summary of ‘External Reporting on Corporate Governance’ 
Company External Reporting – Corporate Governance Y/N 
Bang & Olufsen 
Reference to corporate governance is made, and two issues are dealt with: the use 
of multiple share types (A and B shares) and incentives for members of 
management and the boards.  No references to risk management is made, but 
“…concerning the other concrete recommendations in the reports, management 
continuously use these when evaluating the corporate governance, in such a manner 
as to best manage the interests of the company and other stakeholders.” (Bang & 
Olufsen, 2005, p. 48, translated) 
Yes 
Brüel & Kjær No reference is made to corporate governance.  (Brüel & Kjær Sound & Vibration Measurement, 2005) No 
Coloplast 
With the aim of attracting more investors, increase the insight of shareholders and 
employees, to enhance managements ability to see strengths and weaknesses, and to 
increase other stakeholders confidence in Coloplast, corporate governance is 
defined as “… corporate governance refers to the business principles underlying the 
organization, relations with stakeholders and the processes for determining and 
implementing basic business concepts, strategy, business objectives and controls.  
Coloplast’s Board of directors and Group Management regularly review the 
company’s business processes against these principles.” (Coloplast, 2004, p. 21).  
In a supplement published on the corporate website the company adds risk 
management as an issue dealt with under corporate governance (see Table J-3). 
Yes 
Dyrup No reference is made to corporate governance.  (Dyrup, 2005) No 
Fritz Hansen No reference is made to corporate governance.  (Fritz Hansen, 2004) No 
LINAK No reference is made to corporate governance.  (LINAK, 2004) No 
Novozymes 
Corporate governance at Novozymes is an integral element of the management 
routines and encompasses multiple issues, hereunder risk management.  The 
company has worked with corporate governance for several years, and uses it to 
improve practices by e.g. evaluating the cooperation between management and the 
Board.  (Novozymes, 2005) 
Yes 
Oticon 
Corporate governance at Oticon is an integral element of management, at least at 
holding company level: “It is the perception of the Board that corporate governance 
within the William Demant group fully complies with the guidelines presented in 
the Nørby report.” (William Demant Holding, 2005, translated).  In  William 
Demant Holding (2003) a number of issues are identified, hereunder: 1. 
shareholders role, 2. principles for communication, 3. duties, composition and 
remuneration of the board of directors, and 4. risk management.  The section on the 
latter issue is very brief. 
Yes 
RIEGENS No reference is made to corporate governance.  (RIEGENS, 2005) No 
SDC DANDISC 
Corporate governance is briefly mentioned: “SDC DanDisc follows the part of the 
recommendations from the Nørby report which is relevant for the company.” (SDC 
DanDisc, 2005, p. 15, translated).   The only issue touched upon is minority share 
holders. 
(Yes)
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J.3 Construct ‘External Reporting on Business Risk Management’ 
Table J-3: Summary of ‘External Reporting on Business Risk Management’ 
Company External Reporting – Business Risk Management Y/N 
Bang & Olufsen No reference to the management of business risks was found.  (Bang & Olufsen, 2005) No 
Brüel & Kjær The only business risk mentioned is the risk of loosing the technological lead.  (Brüel & Kjær Sound & Vibration Measurement, 2005) (Yes) 
Coloplast 
“Coloplast has established a formal process for the identification, management, 
and reporting of business and financial risks.  Risk management aims to maintain 
stability in the generation of profit and to protect Coloplast’s reputation.“ 
(Coloplast, 2004).  Significant risks are ‘Market conditions’, ‘Competition’, and 
‘Innovation’.  In a supplement on corporate governance (Coloplast, 2005a), the 
process is described: “Coloplast’s risk management is implemented through an 
annual process based on input from all parts of the organization…”  In a 
supplement on business risk management (Coloplast, 2005b) each of the 
categories mentioned are described in more detail. 
Yes 
Dyrup 
Risk management is important to Dyrup: “Effective risk management at all levels 
of the organization contribute to protecting Dyrup’s values and the achievement of 
planned results.” (Dyrup, 2005, p. 13, translated).  The volatility of the market is 
explicated, and the price formations’ dependence on the oil price is described.  
Furthermore the dependence on suppliers is mentioned: “Some of the raw 
materials used by Dyrup are only available from a handful of suppliers.  Wherever 
possible, Dyrup seeks to obtain guarantees with respect to agreed supply capacity 
and stable prices.” (p. 13) 
Yes 
Fritz Hansen 
Only one business risk is mentioned: “… the general economic trend, since the 
sales of furniture is strongly dependent on the economic situation of our 
customers, who are primarily in the corporate and institutional markets in Western 
Europe, Japan, and USA.” (Fritz Hansen, 2004, p. 5, translated) 
No 
LINAK 
The only business risks mentioned is inventory of obsolete customer-specific 
products.  The liability is limited as customers are obliged to purchase this 
inventory.  (LINAK, 2004) 
(Yes) 
Novozymes 
The main risk identified relates to the core technology: “Novozymes’ business is 
the industrial application of contained gene technology.  The general accept of the 
application of industrial gene technologies are therefore critically relevant.  
Novozymes promotes openness towards stakeholders and work dedicated on 
informing about the advantages of contained application of gene technology” 
(Novozymes, 2005, part I, p. 14, translated).  The other major business risk 
mentioned is the customer portfolio, which is dominated by relatively few, large 
customers.  To mitigate the risk: “… we cooperate closely with these customers, 
on e.g. shared production planning and by integrating IT systems.” (part II, p. 7, 
translated) 
Yes 
Oticon 
In the annual accounts no reference is made to the management of business risks  
(William Demant Holding, 2005).  In the report on Corporate Governance 
(William Demant Holding, 2003) it is briefly described that the risk management 
policies include quality assurance systems.   
No 
RIEGENS 
The main risk mentioned is the “general trend in the market” which is somewhat 
vague.  Furthermore, under the heading “Other risks” the following clause is 
found: “The company has no essential risks concerning any customer, since 
cooperation with the larger customers typically is based on longer term 
commitments.” (RIEGENS, 2005, p. 5, translated). 
No 
SDC DANDISC 
Besides the “classic four” financial risk categories, the list of risks in the annual 
accounts include: price risks, market risks, dependence on key employees, 
security risks, and environmental risks.  Security and market risks are the most 
important of the business risks (SDC DanDisc, 2005, p. 13). 
(Yes) 
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J.4 Construct ‘External Reporting on Financial Risk Management’ 
Table J-4: Summary of ‘External Reporting on Financial Risk Management’ 
Company External Reporting – Financial Risk Management Y/N
Bang & Olufsen 
The “classic four”: currency, interest rate, credit, and liquidity risks are all 
described, the former being the only relevant risks category for Bang & Olufsen.  
(Bang & Olufsen, 2005) 
Yes 
Brüel & Kjær 
Currency, interest rate, and credit risks are mentioned.  Due to a conservative credit 
policy, the company evaluates all its potential creditors, and rarely sustains any 
losses.  Conversely, currency risks are accepted.  (Brüel & Kjær Sound & Vibration 
Measurement, 2005) 
Yes 
Coloplast 
Besides being part of the framework for ‘Managing business risks’ (coloplast 
managing), overall responsibility for setting policies lies with the parent company’s 
Corporate Finance department. (Coloplast, 2004, p. 9). 
Yes 
Dyrup 
Currency, interest rate, and credit risks are mentioned, but all are quite limited.  
Insurance is used to ensure stability: “Besides statutory insurances, the Group has 
taken out business interruption and product liability insurance.” (Dyrup, 2005, p. 13) 
Yes 
Fritz Hansen 
Currency, interest rate, and credit risks are described in the annual report, currency 
risk being the only risk category relevant for management: “It is the policy of the 
company to cover 80% of the expected currency risk by the start each calendar year, 
if the currency represents a value of at least 200 mio DKK.  Currency risks in EURO 
are not covered.” (Fritz Hansen, 2004, p. 6, translated) 
Yes 
LINAK Only currency risk is mentioned.  It is managed through balancing purchase and sales in each foreign currency.  (LINAK, 2004) Yes 
Novozymes 
The “classic four”: currency, interest rate, credit, and liquidity.  The company has 
conservative policies on interest rate and currency risks - credit and liquidity risks 
are more or less irrelevant.  (Novozymes, 2005) 
Yes 
Oticon The description of the management of financial risks is very brief, and includes only credit and currency risks.  (William Demant Holding, 2005) Yes 
RIEGENS Only currency risk is referenced.  Since most transactions are carried out in EURO and GBP, the risk is perceived as quite minimal.  (RIEGENS, 2005) Yes 
SDC DANDISC 
The “classic four” are on a list of the relevant risk types.  Of the four types the credit 
risk is the most important as: “… there is a certain concentration of credit risks on 
few larger customers.” (SDC DanDisc, 2005, p. 13, translated) 
Yes 
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Appendix K Triangulation II - Finance/Staff Perspective 
In this appendix the interviewees and interviews performed with the Finance/Controlling 
departments in the case companies during the second triangulation are documented.  The 
interviews performed thereby constitute a sub-study which is subsequently compared/ 
analyzed against the SCM and Purchasing practices documented in the case studies. 
K.1 Interviewees 
In the table below all interviewees participating in the sub-study are listed by company. 
Table K-1: Interviewees in the Case Studies 
Company Interviewee Position 
Bang & Olufsen Kim B. Hansen Legal Council 
 Palle Dalgård Legal Council 
Brüel & Kjær Claus T. Madsen Controller 
Coloplast Peter Kofoed Risk Manager 
Dyrup Anders B. Sørensen Risk Manager 
Fritz Hansen Morten H. Larsen Head of Accounting 
LINAK Claus Borchert Finance Director 
Novozymes [ Contact person identified but no interview performed ] 
Oticon Svend Thomsen Finance Manager 
RIEGENS Thomas Hansen Finance Manager 
SDC Group Torben Nordquist37 CEO 
 
K.2 Interviews 
The table below lists the interviews performed during the sub-study. 
Table K-2: Interviews Performed 
Company Date/time Type Recorded? Interviewee(s) 
Bang & Olufsen 2005-08-17 09:00 Phone Yes Kim B. Hansen 
 2005-08-22 11:15 Phone No Palle Dalgård 
Brüel & Kjær 2005-12-12 16:30 Phone Yes Claus T. Madsen 
Coloplast 2005-12-21 09:00 Phone Yes Peter Kofoed 
Dyrup 2005-12-12 15:30 Phone Yes Anders B. Sørensen 
Fritz Hansen 2005-12-05 15:00 Phone Yes Morten H. Larsen 
LINAK 2006-01-26 10:00 Phone Yes Carsten Borchert 
Novozymes [ Contact person identified but no interview performed ] 
Oticon 2005-12-16 11:30 Phone No Svend Thomsen 
RIEGENS 2005-11-28 11:00 Phone Yes Thomas Hansen 
SDC Group 2005-11-24 15:30 Phone No Torben Nordquist 
 
                                                 
37 Following the merger of DCM and SDC, Jesper Boysen left the new company, Dicentia.  Torben Nordquist 
took over as CEO. 
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K.3 Interview Guide IV: Risk Management Practice 
Interview Guide: Risk Management in the Supply Chain 
Triangulation II: Finance/Controlling 
The purpose of this interview guide is to help structure the interview and ensure the 
planned information is collected.  As the interview most likely will uncover non-planned but 
relevant issues, time must be allocated during the interview to pose questions/talk about 
issues not covered in the guide. 
The interview guide is structured as follows: 
Section A: Introduction 
Section B: Risk Management Practice 
Section A: Introduction 
This part of the guide introduces the study and the researcher to the interviewees. 
A1 Introduce yourself (the researcher) and the Supply Chain Management group within 
Copenhagen Business School.  In case the contact is made through a common 
acquaintance make sure to mention him/her.  Try to establish a trusting relation as 
early as possible. 
A2 Verify the name, position, and area of responsibility of the interviewee(s). 
A3 Check if it is acceptable to record the interview.  Make sure not to force the 
interviewee as it might limit the answers. 
A4 Introduce the study.  Explain how the two interviews planned at each company is not 
intended to check/control the interviewee but to unravel as much information as 
possible.  Also explain that the study is not intending to rank companies, but simply to 
explain the phenomena SCM and Risk Management in a number of contexts. 
Make sure the interviewee feels as confident as possible in answering questions on SCM 
and Risk Management. 
Company 
• Name 
• Address 
• Telephone 
e.g. B&O A/S 
       Peter Bangs Vej 15 
       7600 Struer 
       +45 9684 1027 
Interviewee(s): 
• Name(s) 
• Position(s) 
• Time & Place 
e.g. Klaus Knudsen, (Director, Purchasing), 
         Building 9, May 5th, 2004, 10:00 AM 
       Sten Bilde Jørgensen, (Director, Logistics), 
         Factory 3, May 5th, 2004, 11:15 AM 
Lars B. Sorensen Page 1 of 2 
Dept. of Operations Management 
Copenhagen Business School 
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Interview Guide: Risk Management in the Supply Chain
Triangulation II: Finance/Controlling 
Section B: Risk Management Practice 
This part of the guide collects information on the SCM practice. 
D1 Obtain information on formal organization and position within Risk Management. 
D2 Obtain information on informal/decentralized/embedded risk management, including 
the identification of routines and participants. 
D3 Other information… 
Formal Risk Management: 
• Department 
• Positions 
• Shared Procedures 
[ Obtain information. ] 
Informal/Decentralized Risk 
Management: 
• Routines 
• Participants 
[ Obtain information. ] 
Other: [ Anything ? ] 
Lars B. Sorensen Page 2 of 2 
Dept. of Operations Management 
Copenhagen Business School 
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Appendix L Consultancy Practice II 
This appendix contains detailed information on the second investigation of consultancy firms’ 
practices on Supply Chain Risk Management (or other integrated risk management 
frameworks).  This study was performed mid-2005 approx 1½ years after the initial 
investigation. 
L.1 Consultancies, Contacts, and Interviewees 
As in the first investigation the intent of the study is top understand the level of interest for 
and competency within Risk Management in Supply Chains.  The method has not changed, 
but a few companies were added to the list, see Table L-1 below. 
Table L-1: Companies, Contacts, and Interviewees 
Consultancy Contact Contacted on Result 
 Interviewee Interviewed on 
Accenture Carsten Sachmann 2005-05-03  
 Carsten Sachmann 2005-06-13 (telephone) OK! 
AT Kearney Jesper Schade 2005-05-03  
 Jesper Schade 2005-05-03 (telephone) OK! 
COWI Stig P. Christensen 2005-05-03  
 Jens Schierbeck 2005-06-17 (telephone) OK! 
Deloitte & Touche Henning Winter 2005-05-03  
 Henning Winter 2005-05-03 (telephone) OK! 
Ernst & Young Henrik Holmark 2005-04-20  
 Henrik Holmark 2005-04-20 (telephone) OK! 
IBM Consulting Henrik Knak 2005-05-03  
 Henrik Knak 2005-05-03 (telephone) OK! 
KPMG Advisory Henrik Bang 2005-04-20  
 Henrik Nygård 2005-06-13 (telephone) OK! 
Marsh Consulting Bjørn Rothaus 2005-06-13 Left Marsh for PwC 
 Rikke Aarøe Carlsen 2005-06-13 (telephone) OK! 
McKinsey Jill Febry / Martin Møller 2005-05-03 / 2005-06-14  
 Johannes Lüneborg 2005-06-17 (telephone) OK! 
PwC Leif Christensen 2005-06-17  
 Henrik Axelsen 2005-06-22 (telephone) OK! 
 
L.2 Results 
For some reason the companies were much more forthcoming when approached for a 
telephone interview.  No deliberate changes in the way of approaching the consultancy firms 
were made.  The results are described below. 
L.2.1 Accenture 
Albeit both SCM and Risk Management are both very important discipline areas for 
Accenture, according to Carsten Sachmann no services combining the two exist at present 
time.  Besides the “traditional” risk management services (IT Risk Management, Financial 
Risk Management etc.) managing the project risks are a focal responsibility for all project 
managers.  Besides an elaboration on the differences in internal risk management practices 
between projects types (advisory versus implementation), no conclusions on the advent of a 
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customer market for Supply Chain Risk Management could be made as no demand for this 
type of service has been identified.  In case such a market eventually would emerge, the 
competence would most probably be located in the cross-Nordic organization to enable cross-
fertilization. 
L.2.2 AT Kearney 
At AT Kearney, a considerable effort has been made to create a framework to 
measure/understand the customers’ practices within Risk Management.  The framework 
contains a large number of variables across seven categories, see Figure L-1 below. 
Figure L-1: Stages of Excellence in Risk Management38 
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Describing different levels of competence within the listed categories, the framework can be 
used to grade the customer and to identify areas for improvement.  The framework does not in 
itself constitute a model for the implementation of Supply Chain Risk Management, but 
especially the category “Supply chain” might inspire consultants and managers from the 
                                                 
38  Source: Figure 2 in Monahan, Laudicina, & Attis (2003), p. 10. 
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customer organization to evaluate practices on both the process and structural level39.  
Interestingly only in stage 4 the area of responsibility extends the legal boundaries of the firm. 
As for Accenture risk management is a focal component in many SCM and Procurement 
projects as well as in the internal management of projects, but as far as Jesper Schade knows 
no separate projects on Supply Chain Risk Management have been implemented by AT 
Kearney. 
L.2.3 COWI 
At COWI, a department for Integrated Risk Management Services has been created recently.  
Jens Schierbeck describes how COWI, in order to enable a better and more comprehensive 
risk management services portfolio, has decided to invest in the creation of this new business 
area, pulling together competencies for process and change management and supported by the 
experts from the various technical areas.  The ambition for the business area is to change the 
risk management focus of COWI itself and their customer from being focused solely on 
technically oriented risks to the strategic risks and opportunities. 
This is to be achieved by the use of their “Risk and Opportunity Check” framework, a generic 
framework that takes its starting point in the company and its context.  The framework is 
generic in the sense that it does not contain a detailed description of all the risk categories, but 
provide a process for the identification and assessment of risks and opportunities. 
Jens Schierbeck also describes how “selling” the concept internally has been quite a challenge 
as the new concept is non-quantitative focusing on the broad, overall strategic issues in 
contrast to the existing quantitatively (engineering-oriented) competencies.  The process is 
quite generic as it: 
1. defines the boundaries and the objects for analysis, 
2. determines goals/objectives, 
3. identifies risks/opportunities, and 
4. deploys the appropriate (technical) competencies. 
The hope for the concept both internally as well as for the customers is that the upside of 
risks, the opportunities, is recognized as well, and that the management of risks has to be 
integrated in the strategizing efforts. 
So far the concept has been tested externally on a number of old, loyal customers, who all 
have responded positively.  The services are ready to be marketed after the summer holidays. 
L.2.4 Deloitte & Touche 
Deloitte & Touche does not have any experience with risk management in a supply chain 
management context.  Obviously, they practice risk management on their own activities 
(project risk management), and do include risk management evaluation on e.g. scenarios for 
                                                 
39  In other words to evaluate according to the Risk Matrix as defined in Chapter One. 
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outsourcing, but do not offer advisory services within or experience demand for supply chain 
risk management. 
L.2.5 Ernst & Young 
At Ernst & Young some experience with implementation of integrated risk management 
frameworks exist, as ERM-type frameworks have been implemented earlier.  Currently Ernst 
& Young are working on developing a framework, “Risk Universe”, which basically is 
comparable to the COSO framework described previously.  According to Henrik Holmark the 
area of Supply Chain Risk Management is perceived as an interesting (not least 
commercially) area, but so far the experience gained has primarily been obtained through 
projects on outsourcing to e.g. China. 
L.2.6 IBM Consulting 
According to Henrik Knak IBM does not work specifically on Risk Management in Supply 
Chains.  Risk management is perceived as an integral element in all project management and 
in any proposals for corporate re-structuring and process re-engineering. 
L.2.7 KPMG Advisory 
At KPMG Advisory Henrik Nygård argues that no demand for Supply Chain Risk 
Management has been identified.  As for the other consultancies risk management is a critical 
competence when managing projects, but the demand they encounter is for more “traditional” 
SCM services like outsourcing, implementation of LEAN Manufacturing, ERP (SAP) 
upgrades etc. 
L.2.8 Marsh Consulting 
A brief interview with before mentioned Rikke Aarøe Carlsen reveals that the framework for 
Supply Chain Risk Management has not developed into a mature, generic framework, and 
have definitely not been implemented (in Denmark at least).  The company is still eager to 
migrate into strategic consulting but remain primarily occupied with insurance brokerage and 
simpler risk evaluation projects for their broad customer portfolio. 
According to Rikke Aarøe Carlsen, the customer base is simply not yet ready for this level of 
sophistication in their risk management practices. 
L.2.9 McKinsey 
The interview with Johannes Lüneborg at McKinsey documents that the subject is of 
relevance but that no framework for this type of risk management exists at McKinsey.  
Having extensive experience with e.g. outsourcing projects the risks of dependency is a 
natural component in discussing scenarios for strategic change.  But since these issues always 
will be heavily influenced by the company and its context, frameworks will inherently be of a 
generic nature.  According to Johannes Lüneborg, the development of a formal methodology 
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for Supply Chain Risk Management is therefore quite unlikely.  And to his knowledge no 
projects on the subject exists within McKinsey in the region. 
L.2.10 PricewaterhouseCoopers 
PwC has developed a global framework for (enterprise) risk management, integrating 
governance, risk and compliance. Briefly it covers 3 project phases - 
diagnostic/design/implementation, as PwC views the development of ERM within firms as a 
change initiative, where benefits must be realized in the process. Risks are assessed, evaluated 
and prioritized on a portfolio basis across a company's value chain or parts thereof, including 
the supply chain. Management effectiveness is assessed against the critical risks, using any 
common risk management framework and a customized risk management framework is 
designed and implemented on the basis of this diagnostic. The COSO framework described 
previously described (see Appendix B) is still being used at PwC in particular with non-
financial services firms.  It acts as the generic framework for the integration of the 
traditionally functionally separated risk management functions/responsibilities.  As already 
described the framework is not really SCM oriented as it includes neither suppliers nor 
customers.  Still, it aims at integrating risk management practices and emphasizes the strategic 
dimension. 
The final version of the COSO report was released in October 2004, and following that PwC 
performed a study (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2005) of risk management practices in Danish 
companies across industries.  Quite surprisingly, 27% of the companies participating in the 
study responded having implemented full scale Enterprise Risk Management (ERM).  Lest 
this last category (category E, please see Figure L-2 below) the rest of the responses to this 
question were as expected with quite few companies having an integrated risk management 
methodology in place.  The study also revealed that approx. half the companies expect to 
strengthen their risk management in the coming years, and also approx. half the companies 
rate risk management as very important. 
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Figure L-2: Implementation of Risk Management40 
A Risk management does not receive any attention among theemployees, and risks are managed in a reactive manner.
A 11% B 31% C 25% D 7% E 27%
B
Risk management policies are defined in few departments (e.g. the
finance department).  In the rest of the organization risk
management is left to the discretion/common sense of individuals.
C Every department has attention towards and understands localrisks, and manages them decentrally.
D
A shared Risk Management framework and a portfolio of methods
for all departments and projects exist.  Policies for risk management 
are developed decentrally and reported centrally.
E
Strategy and objectives for Risk Management is outlined by the
board of directors, and top management is responsible for the
development of policies for the management of all relevant risks.  
Enterprise Risk Management is implemented and is used as a 
common frame of reference.
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Full implementations of ERM are still absent but partial projects are becoming more and more 
frequent.  Henrik Axelsen report demand for risk management implementations is increasing, 
primarily for financial risk management projects, where companies want to integrate previous 
'silo' functions, such as insurance and treasury or risk adjusted performance and evaluation 
models as well as certain compliance type projects41. 
As projects are often expected to result in a list of risks and quantified measures, PwC 
internationally are working on collecting and manipulating (categorizing and aggregating) 
data for a portfolio of benchmarks for risk management in the COSO framework.  The risk 
identification is still more art than science as the list of potential risk sources in principle is 
endless, but the structured approach recommended by COSO (Top-down, Bottom-up, 
External expertise, & Benchmarks) ensure a certain level of certainty. 
                                                 
40  Source: Figure 2 in PricewaterhouseCoopers (2005), p. 3 (author’s translation). 
41  Risk management projects at PwC originate as either governance (”can we achieve our goals?”), risk ("can 
we optimize/improve our current approach to risk management using alternative approaches"), or 
compliance (”do we do what we intend/say?” or "do the right things right?”) type projects.  Often RFQ’s for 
compliance projects evolve into governance type projects including strategizing and implementation, and 
vice-versa. 
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Summing up, PwC expect an increased interest in ERM, and are further developing their 
competencies to meet demand. 
L.3 Conclusion 
Comparing with the previous study performed in late 2003, consultancies have been much 
more forthcoming in terms of giving interviews and sharing knowledge.  Table L-2 below 
summarizes the findings. 
Table L-2: Integrated Risk Management Frameworks 
Consultancy Risk Management Framework Implemented?  
Accenture None N/A  
AT Kearney Framework on Excellence in Risk Management N/A  
COWI Risk and Opportunities Check (Yes)  
Deloitte & Touche None N/A  
Ernst & Young ERM-type frameworks Yes  
 “Risk Universe” Yes  
IBM Consulting None N/A  
KPMG Advisory None N/A  
Marsh Consulting Supply Chain Risk Management (under dev.) No  
McKinsey None N/A  
PwC ERM / COSO Yes  
 
The majority of consultancies do not work with risk management, except internally when 
answering bids and working on implementation projects for customers.  Neither of the 
“strategy consultancies” (AT Kearney & McKinsey) has local competencies but may request 
the transfer personnel from e.g. the US.  The same goes for KPMG and IBM, and presumably 
for Accenture as well. 
Albeit three of the consultancies have implemented integrated risk management frameworks 
of various kinds42, none of them are oriented towards SCM.  Risk management is thereby not 
integrated into SCM, even if the consultants working on SCM all state that risk management 
is of critical importance when implementing various SCM concepts.  All agree that reduction 
of the supplier base and the trend of outsourcing require stringent risk analysis when 
evaluating scenarios, and it is evident that the leaner supply chain will require a closer 
monitoring and availability of alternative resources. 
But so far, no consultancies have developed concepts comparable to the framework put 
forward in this dissertation. 
                                                 
42  Possibly more of the consultancies have implemented integrated risk management.  Especially the larger 
consultancies probably have the competencies in their (international) network. 
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